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# FILED

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT TACOMA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

NO. 9213

vs.

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STATE OF WASHINGTON, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OF AUTHORITIES
BY WASHINGTON STATE SPORTSMENS COUNCIL, AMICUS CURIAE,
IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT
WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF
GAME'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

### PERTINENT TREATY LANGUAGE

The various treaties before this Court, and the pertinent language which this Court must interpret, of which the Treaty of Medicine Creek, 10 Stat. 1132, is typical, narrows down to a relatively few words:

"The right of taking fish at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations is further secured to said Indians in common with all citizens of the Territory, . . ."
[emphasis added]

In another context, the Treaty With the Yakima, 12 Stat.
951, provided that the Indians had the

"right to go about the public highways in common with [emphasis added] citizens of the Territory."

In both the Treaty of Medicine Creek involving fishing and the Treaty With the Yakima involving going about the public

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highways, Indians were ceding and giving up certain lands but had reserved to them the right to continue to go upon such lands, in the one instance for purposes of fishing, and in the other, for purposes of movement or transportation, but in neither instance were such rights exclusive.

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An example of an exclusive right is found in the Treaty With the Walla Walla, 12 Stat. 945, which provides:

"That the exclusive [emphasis added] right of taking fish in the streams running through and bordering said reservation is hereby secured to said Indians, and at all other usual and accustomed stations in common with [emphasis added] citizens of the United States. . "

This particular treaty is very significant in that it clearly shows the contrast in intent. On the reservation Indians have exclusive fishing rights, whereas off-reservation their right to fish as equals with U.S. citizens is protected. The off-reservation language in the Walla Walla Treaty is nearly identical to that used in the several treaties before this court. It is quite simply a right in common with others and it is difficult to imagine a clearer expression of intent, devoid of any ambiguity.

In State v. Moses, 79 Wn.2d 104, 113, 483 P.2d 832 (1971) the Washington State Supreme Court stated that

"Fish, while in a state of freedom, are the property of the sovereign power in whose waters they may be. In the United States, it is the state and not the United States which is the sovereign power in whose waters the fish are, and the state owns the fish in its sovereign capacity as the representative of and for the benefit of all people in common."

[emphasis added]

Can there be any doubt as to the meaning of this? Is there any ambiguity to the "in common" phrase?

Referring again to the Treaty With the Yakima, supra, namely the "right to go about the public highways in common

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with citizens of the territory," would plaintiffs contend that members of the Yakima tribe have a greater right than other citizens to use the public highways of this state? Does the treaty say this? Obviously not, and it is an absurd proposition. Yet it logically follows by analogy from plaintiffs' fundamental position in this case, namely, that certain Indians have a right that is special, greater or superior than anyone else to net salmon and steelhead trout in the streams and rivers of this state. The Indian lawyers and some courts are quick to point out the reference to "usual and accustomed places and stations," but at that point, they simply stop. Ahead lies the "in common with" language. They fail or refuse to recognize the inevitable coupling of the right, that is, that such right is to be exercised in common with other citizens. Courts have tended to duck this issue, and their indecisiveness has encouraged certain Indians to take the law into their own hands and the treadmill of conflict and confusion over Indian fishing rights continues.

## A FEW DEFINITIONS

"In common. Shared in respect to title, use, or enjoyment, without apportionment or division into individual parts; held by several for the equal advantage, use or enjoyment of all." Black's Law Dictionary, p. 893, Fourth Edition (1951).

"In Common. Commonly; esp., equally with another or with others; affecting or affected equally." Webster's New International Dictionary, p. 540, Second Edition (1948).

"In Common. In joint possession or use; shared equally." The Random House Dictionary of the English Language, p. 297 (1966).

There is nothing to suggest that "in common" had any different meaning at the time the treaties were signed. A

MEMORANDUM OF AUTHORITIES - 3 SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98154 23/ "tenants in common") has been a part of Anglo-American law and the English language for centuries.

# AN ANOMALY

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Although an accepted rule in the interpretation of Indian treaties is that ambiguities are resolved in favor of the Indians, this rule is qualified by another rule, that Indian treaties are to be construed according to their tenor and their terms are not to be varied by judicial construction in order to avoid alleged injustices. This principle was clearly stated in Confederated Bands of Ute Indians v. U.S., 330 U.S. 169, 91 L.Ed. 823 (1947), by Justice Black in the following language:

It is said, however, that the Indians understood in 1880 that they owned the Executive Order lands which lay north of the White River Valley; that they understood their "present Ute Reservation" to include them; that they understood that Congress undertook by the 1880 Act to sell the lands for their benefit; and that Congress was aware of this understanding . . . But even if the Indians had believed that they had a compensable interest in the Executive Order lands, this fact would not necessarily have given it to them . . . Nor can this alleged understanding be imputed to Congress in the face of plain language . . . While it has long been the rule that a treaty with Indians is to be construed so as to carry out the Government's obligations in accordance with the fair understanding of the Indians, we cannot, under the guise of interpretation, . . . rewrite congressional acts so as to make them mean something they obviously were not intended to mean. Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431, 432, 87 L.Ed. 877, 882, 883, 63 S.Ct. 672. We cannot, under any acceptable rule of interpretation, hold. that the Indians owned the lands merely because they thought so. (Pages 829-830)

Notwithstanding the fact that the treaties are clear and unambiguous, and that "in common with" has a well understood meaning, Indian lawyers have from time to time been able to convince some courts that Indians have an exalted status, superior to other people, as far as fishing off-reservation is concerned. By repeating over and over that Indians have greater

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rights than other citizens, and by weaving imaginative and deceptively subtle argumentation, they have been able to confuse and encourage certain courts to accept specious and fallacious arguments that fly in the face of sound reasoning and common sense. In endeavoring to show concern for one of the country's long neglected minority groups, certain courts have either ignored or perverted the simple language of the treaty. As stated by Justice Hale of the Washington State Supreme Court, dissenting in Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, 80 Wn.2d. 561, P.2d (1972):

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"There is, I perceive, a curious aura of romantic whimsy suffusing the law of Indian treaties. Indian treaty cases seem never quite fully to depart that peculiar genre of elemental melodrama compounded more of fantasy than fact, more of folk lore than truth --- all subject to the inevitable distortion of time and history --- in order to. reach a devoutly wished judicial consummation. Although this may make for good reading, it probably produces bad law. Inexorably inhering in these decisions on Indian treaties, I think, is the judicial conscience which aspires somehow to right what the courts think to be historical wrongs --- even if the treaty is somehow twisted out of shape to achieve it." (page 577)

### GUIDELINE FOR THIS COURT

The most recent pronouncement on Indian fishing rights by the U. S. Supreme Court is found in <u>Department of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, Inc., et al.</u>, 391 U.S. 392, 20 L.Ed.2d 689 (1968) in which Justice Douglas, in a unanimous decision, stated the following directive:

"Whether the prohibition of the use of set nets in these fresh waters was a 'reasonable and necessary' (70 Wn.2d at 261, 422 P.2d, at 764) conservation measure was left for determination by the trial court when the Supreme Court, deeming the injunction in No. 247 too broad, remanded the case for further

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findings. When the case was argued here, much was said about the pros and the cons of that issue. Since the state court has given us no authoritative answer to the question, we leave it unanswered and only add that any ultimate findings on the conservation issue must also cover the issue of equal protection implicit in the phrase in common with. [emphasis added] (Pages 695-696)

v. Puyallup Tribe, Inc., 80 Wn.2d 561, P.2d (1972), is the first judicial analysis that we have seen of the relationship between the "in common with" phrase and equal protection guarantees, even though the U. S. Supreme Court, over thirty years ago, in Tulee v. State of Washington, 315 U.S. 68, 86 L.Ed. 1115 (1942) which upheld the "right" of Indians to fish without a license, speaking through Justice Black, stated that:

"... the treaty leaves the state with power to impose on Indians, equally with others, [emphasis added] such restrictions of a purely regulatory nature concerning the time and manner [emphasis added] of fishing outside the reservation as are necessary for the conservation of fish... (page 1119)

### EQUAL PROTECTION

"No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

14th Amendment to the United States Constitution.

"No law shall be passed granting to any citizen, class of citizens, or corporation other than municipal, privileges or immunities which upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens, or corporations." Washington State Constitution, Article I, Section 12.

The statutes adopted by the State Legislature of the State of Washington, and the regulations adopted by its Department of Game, establish conservation measures for determining the time

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and manner of the taking of steelhead trout in non-discriminatory terms and these laws are uniformily enforced by the Department of Game in a non-discriminatory manner.

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On the other hand, certain regulations adopted by the Director of Fisheries and the Washington State Fisheries Department during the past couple of years establish special commercial netting seasons in the rivers and other bodies of water of this State exclusively for the benefit and privilege of members of certain Indian tribes. These regulations are in violation of statutes enacted by the Washington State Legislature prohibiting the use of set or fixed nets to catch salmon and steelhead trout and are clearly discriminatory against the other citizens of this state and violate the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment to the U. S. Constitution as well as the Washington State Constitution.

## SUMMARY

The average citizen has known all along that "in common with" means that people are to be treated equally and without discrimination for or against any individual or group of individuals. In contrast, certain courts have been ethereal in dealing with the question of Indian fishing rights. This has resulted in inconsistent positions by agencies within the same state. Further, individual Indians have set nets whenever and wherever they please, contending that they have the right to set their own seasons. This in turn has led to willful breach of the peace, including the use of firearms and Molotov cocktails on the Puyallup River last year. In addition, the public is subjected to a seemingly never ending series of lawsuits from which no one benefits discernably.

As amicus curiae, we urge the Court to use this opportunity

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to inject some long overdue common sense into the area of Indian fishing rights. This court should act decisively upon the Department of Game's motion for summary judgment and not only grant the motion but also declare that the regulations adopted by the Director of the Washington State Department of Fisheries granting special netting seasons for certain Indians, exclusive of all other citizens, are not required by the treaty language, and not only violate statutes enacted by the Washington State Legislature, but discriminate against all other citizens, Indians and non-Indians alike, and thereby abridge the privileges of other citizens and deny to such citizens the equal protection of the laws and are therefore invalid and unconstitutional. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, of Davis, Wright, Todd, Riese & Attorneys for Washington State Sportsmen Council, Amicus Curiae 

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