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CAMBODIAN NATIONALITY LAW AND THE REPATRIATION OF CONVICTED ALIENS UNDER THE ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION REFORM AND IMMIGRANT RESPONSIBILITY ACT

Jana M. Seng

Abstract: Currently the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") is indefinitely detaining thousands of aliens who have already completed their criminal sentences. The 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA") allows the INS to detain these convicted aliens while initiating a removal proceeding for deportation to their native country. Absent from the IIRIRA is a provision addressing whether the INS may indefinitely detain convicted aliens who cannot be deported because the United States has no repatriation agreement with the alien's native country. Justification for the indefinite detention rests on the assumption that the United States will secure a repatriation agreement in the near future. However, an analysis of Cambodia's methods for determining citizenship and the lack of uniformity in international "proof of nationality" law demonstrates that a repatriation agreement is not likely to occur. For this reason, the U.S. Supreme Court should preclude the INS' practice of indefinite detention and require an immediate release of indefinite detainees after they have served their sentence where the native country has no repatriation agreement with the United States and has not shown a willingness to accept the detainees' return.

I. INTRODUCTION

In 1996, Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA"), putting into effect strict deportation provisions against aliens who have been convicted of crimes that range from aggravated felonies to misdemeanors. The IIRIRA instructs the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") to initiate removal proceedings against convicted aliens and to deport them to their country of

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nationality after they have completed their sentences in the United States.\textsuperscript{3} The Attorney General has ninety days after the removal order becomes administratively final to remove the alien.\textsuperscript{4} However, some convicted aliens cannot be removed within the ninety-day statutory period and have remained in INS detention indefinitely because their countries of nationality lack a repatriation agreement with the United States and refuse to accept their return.\textsuperscript{5} The countries where most of the indefinite detainees are from and where the United States currently has no repatriation agreement with are Cambodia, Cuba, Laos, or Vietnam.\textsuperscript{6}

The IIRIRA's deportation provision has grave consequences for many aliens. For example, the INS may initiate deportation proceedings against convicted aliens without regard to the alien's legal resident status\textsuperscript{7} or long-term residence in the United States.\textsuperscript{8} As a result, many aliens have been forced to return to countries to which they have few or no ties.\textsuperscript{9} Frequently, the deportation of these aliens results in the forced separation of families\textsuperscript{10} and may undermine the financial stability of the family unit.\textsuperscript{11}

\textsuperscript{3} \textit{Id.} § 1231(a).

\textsuperscript{4} 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A)-(B) provides for the detention, release, and removal of aliens ordered removed:

\textit{[W]hen an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall remove the alien from the United states within a period of 90 days . . . [and the] removal period begins on the latest of the following: (i) The date the order of removal becomes administratively final; (ii) If the removal order is judicially reviewed and if a court orders a stay of the removal of the alien, the date of the court’s final order; (iii) If the alien is detained or confined (except under an immigration process), the date the alien is released from detention or confinement.}

\textsuperscript{5} 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A)-(B).

\textsuperscript{6} See Varied Routes Led Immigrants to INS Custody, SEATTLE P-I, June 17, 1999, at B1 [hereinafter Varied Routes] (giving reasons that include lack of proper documentation of citizenship, fraud in obtaining documents, and successive government's refusal to acknowledge the prior government's form of identification).


\textsuperscript{8} See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20) ("The term 'lawfully admitted for permanent residence' means the status of having been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United States as an immigrant in accordance with the immigration laws, such status not having changed.").

\textsuperscript{9} 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a).

\textsuperscript{10} See Varied Routes, supra note 5.


\textsuperscript{11} Olsen, supra note 10.
In addition, the IIRIRA deportation provision is exhausting administrative resources. Aliens waiting for their deportation occupy jails and detention centers; currently those who cannot be deported will remain there for an indefinite period. Estimates of the number of indefinite detainees held throughout the United States as of February 2001 have ranged from 3,000 to 4,500. Furthermore, deportation proceedings have recently increased. In 1999, the INS deported 62,359 immigrants for criminal offenses, an increase of seventy-two percent from 1996, the year of IIRIRA’s enactment. Consequently, indefinite detainees have flooded the INS offices and courts with habeas corpus petitions challenging their detention.

Using Cambodia as a model, this Comment argues that the INS should release convicted aliens who have completed their sentences and are being detained indefinitely because the United States does not have a repatriation agreement with the detainee’s country of nationality. Part II examines the indefinite detention loophole of the IIRIRA and highlights the case of Kim Ho Ma, a Cambodian national who successfully sought judicial release from indefinite detention. Part III briefly describes how IIRIRA fits in with international standards for repatriation. Part IV provides a history of the political instability and the rise of nationalism in Cambodia as a background for understanding why repatriation of Cambodian criminal aliens will be difficult. Part V outlines Cambodia’s nationality and citizenship laws. Part VI argues that Cambodia’s xenophobia and exclusive nationality policies will hinder negotiation of a repatriation agreement with the United States. Part VII recommends that the INS release indefinite detainees who have completed their sentences and cannot be repatriated to their country of nationality.

II. THE IIRIRA INDEFINITE DETENTION LOOPIOHE

The IIRIRA is silent on the length of time the INS may hold a convicted alien and the INS therefore maintains that it has the authority to

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13 Id.
14 See Florangela Davila, Immigrants’ Case Going to High Court, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 21, 2001, at B1; Monica Whitaker, Laoitan in Legal Limbo Tougher Legislation Often Makes Trouble With the Law an Even Bigger, TENNESSEAN, Oct. 23, 2000, at 1A.
15 Since the enactment of IIRIRA, the number of habeas petitions filed by detainees seeking release from detention have increased significantly, causing an administrative backlog. See Hearing, supra note 12.
detain such aliens for an unlimited amount of time.¹⁶ This has resulted in the indefinite detention of aliens who have completed their sentences.¹⁷ Contrary to the INS position, the Ninth Circuit held in Ma v. Reno that indefinite detention is unlawful and ordered the release of indefinite detainees held in INS custody.¹⁸ Even so, the INS continues to hold convicted aliens that cannot be repatriated¹⁹ while the U.S. Supreme Court reviews the issue.²⁰

A. The IIRIRA Allows the INS to Detain Aliens Indefinitely

The IIRIRA specifically authorizes the U.S. Attorney General on behalf of the INS to detain²¹ and remove an alien from the United States who has been found guilty of the crimes enumerated in 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2).²² The deportation consequence of criminal convictions applies to both illegal aliens and to lawful permanent residents.²³ After a removal order becomes administratively final, the Attorney General “shall” remove the alien from the United States “within a period of 90 days” (referred to as the “removal period”).²⁴ Furthermore, an alien may be detained beyond the removal period where the alien is deemed “a risk to the community or unlikely to comply with the order of removal[.]”²⁵ Thus, aliens may be detained beyond the ninety days after their final administrative removal order while waiting for their deportation.²⁶

However, absent in the statute is how long the Attorney General may detain an alien when the deportation order cannot be effectuated.²⁷ The INS

¹⁶ Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 69 U.S.L.W. 3257 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2000) (No. 00-38); see also Varied Routes, supra note 5.
¹⁷ See infra Part II.A.
¹⁸ Ma, 208 F.3d at 821; see also discussion infra Part II.B.
¹⁹ See Hedges, supra note 10; Hanrahan, supra note 10; Lewis, supra note 10.
²⁰ See Davila, supra note 14.
²² Id. § 1227(a)(2).
²³ For example, an aggravated felony conviction invokes the same strict exclusionary and deportability standards that apply to all aliens, regardless of their status. See Bruce Robert Marley, Exiling the New Felons: The Consequences of the Retroactive Application of Aggravated Felony Convictions to Lawful Permanent Residents, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 855, 873 (1998).
²⁵ Id. § 1231(a)(6).
²⁶ The use of indefinite detention to deter repeat offenses is a questionable objective, particularly when an alien has only committed a minor offense or when a detainee has exemplified rehabilitative behavior. See Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815, 819 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 69 U.S.L.W. 3257 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2000) (No. 00-38) (disapproving of the Attorney General’s characterization of Ma as a “danger to the community”).
²⁷ Id. at 821.
argues that its authority to “detain [aliens] beyond the removal period” means that it can detain convicted aliens indefinitely.\(^\text{28}\) Thus, it is foreseeable that a convicted alien who has committed a misdemeanor that renders him deportable can remain in INS custody for life, unless the United States is able to negotiate a repatriation agreement with the receiving country.\(^\text{29}\) Justifications advanced by the INS for indefinite detention rest on the assumption that a repatriation agreement can be secured in the near future because international law dictates that a country must readmit its nationals.\(^\text{30}\)

Recently the United States established a delegation to negotiate a repatriation agreement with Cambodia, realizing that the increased number of convicted Cambodian aliens would result in an undesirable population of indefinite detainees.\(^\text{31}\) Nevertheless, Cambodian officials oppose a repatriation agreement. Cambodia maintains that the detainees either do not have requisite documents, or that the documents are insufficient to prove nationality.\(^\text{32}\) In addition, many detainees have been in the United States most of their lives, leading Cambodian officials to believe that the detainees should serve their punishment in the United States and thereafter be reintegrated into American society.\(^\text{33}\) Moreover, Cambodia does not have the resources to rehabilitate the detainees.\(^\text{34}\) Thus, the possibility that the detainees will commit crimes in Cambodia is great since many of the detainees are believed to lack the family support, language, and relevant employment skills to become productive citizens in Cambodia.\(^\text{35}\)

\(^{28}\) Id.

\(^{29}\) See infra Part VI.

\(^{30}\) For arguments in favor of long-term detention, see Varied Routes, supra note 5. See also infra Part III.

\(^{31}\) Telephone Interview with Jean Christensen, District Director for Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S. Embassy in Bangkok (May 10, 2000).

\(^{32}\) Telephone Interview with Nou Hak, Political Consular, Cambodian Embassy in Washington, D.C. (May 10, 2000) [hereinafter Nou Hak].

\(^{33}\) Lise Olsen, ‘Men Without Countries’ Create a Class of Unremovables, SEATTLE P-I, Apr. 6, 1999, at A1. A similar reason was provided by a Vietnamese police chief regarding the acceptance of convicted aliens ordered deported from the United States: “When they left my country they were small children, they went to the camps and then they went to your inner cities and became hardened criminals. We don’t want them.” Id. Vietnam, like Cambodia, does not have a repatriation treaty with the United States and similarly has not offered repatriation to the indefinite detainees ordered deported to its country. Id.

\(^{34}\) Nou Hak, supra note 32.

\(^{35}\) Id.
B. Ma v. Reno

Until Ma, most courts upheld the power of the INS to indefinitely detain criminal aliens.\(^3^6\) In Ma, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the habeas corpus petition of a Cambodian native who had completed his prison sentence but was being held indefinitely by the INS after Cambodia refused repatriation.\(^3^7\) Ma's personal background is similar to that of other convicted Cambodian nationals who are currently in detention or have been in detention and cannot be repatriated.\(^3^8\) Most often they are males in their late teens to early twenties when convicted; they have sought asylum in the United States at an early age and have become legal permanent residents; most have not returned to Cambodia since fleeing the country; and most are not fluent in their home language.\(^3^9\)

When he was two, Ma fled Cambodia with his family in fear of persecution by the communist Khmer Rouge.\(^4^0\) They sought asylum in Thailand's refugee camps, living there for four years before lawfully entering the United States in 1985.\(^4^1\) Soon after, Ma became a legal permanent resident. He lives in Seattle, Washington and has not returned to Cambodia since his escape at age two.\(^4^2\)

When Ma was seventeen, he was convicted of manslaughter for his involvement in a gang-related shooting.\(^4^3\) Due to good behavior and because this was Ma's only criminal conviction, he served only two years in prison.\(^4^4\) However, after Ma completed his sentence, the INS found him to be a "danger to the community"\(^4^5\) and detained him for deportation to

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\(^3^6\) See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279, 279 (5th Cir. 1999) cert. granted, 69 U.S.L.W. 3257 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2000) (No. 99-7791) (holding that long-term detention of removable aliens who have been ordered deported does not violate substantive due process); Ho v. Greene, 204 F.3d 1045, 1057 (10th Cir. 2000) (concluding that because § 1231(a)(6) was silent as to any time duration, "Congress intended to and expressly did authorize the Attorney General to indefinitely detain certain removable aliens").

\(^3^7\) Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815, 818 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 69 U.S.L.W. 3257 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2000) (No. 00-38).

\(^3^8\) Interview with Jay Stansell, Federal Public Defender, in Seattle, Wash. (May 2, 2000) [hereinafter Jay Stansell].

\(^3^9\) Id.

\(^4^0\) Interview with Kim Ho Ma in Seattle, Wash. (June 8, 2000) [hereinafter Kim Ho Ma].

\(^4^1\) Id.

\(^4^2\) Id.

\(^4^3\) Id.

\(^4^4\) Id.

\(^4^5\) 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) authorizes the Attorney General to detain an alien beyond the removal period if the Attorney General determines that the alien is a "risk to the community or unlikely to comply with the order of removal."
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Cambodia. Manslaughter is a deportable crime under the IIRIRA. Ma’s order of removal became final on October 26, 1998, but the INS could not remove him within the ninety-day removal period because the United States does not have a repatriation agreement with Cambodia. Ma’s family and friends were also unsuccessful in persuading the Cambodian government to accept Ma into the country. By the time he filed his habeas corpus petition, Ma had been in INS custody for nearly two years after completing his sentence.

Ma’s petition was one of five cases consolidated to consider the IIRIRA indefinite detention issue in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Like Ma, many other indefinite detainees are from Southeast Asian countries that do not have repatriation agreements with the United States. In Ma, the Ninth Circuit interpreted the IIRIRA deportation provision as granting the INS authority to detain aliens only for a reasonable amount of time beyond the statutory removal period.

In light of the Ma decision, the INS released indefinite detainees being held in the Ninth Circuit. However, Ma conflicts with decisions from the Fifth and Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. Thus, the INS continues to indefinitely detain criminal aliens within those jurisdictions. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to hear Reno v. Ma and resolve the conflict.

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46 The determination that Ma was a “risk to the community” was made by an INS deputy director despite the fact that Ma’s manslaughter conviction was his only criminal conviction and an INS report that documents the strong likelihood of rehabilitation for Ma if released. Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815, 819 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 69 U.S.L.W. 3257 (U.S. Oct. 10, 2000) (No. 00-38).
48 Ma, 208 F.3d at 819.
49 Kim Ho Ma, supra note 40.
50 Ma, 208 F.3d at 818.
52 See Ma, 208 F.3d at 819. At the time that Ma filed petition for habeas corpus, over 100 detainees filed habeas corpus petitions seeking release from INS detention. The district court designated five lead cases that presented issues common to all petitioners and directed the parties to brief and argue those issues before five district court judges. The five district court judges issued a joint order establishing a legal framework to apply to each individual case. Judge Robert S. Lasnik issued the opinion in Ma v. Reno. Id. at 815.
53 Other Southeast Asian countries that have refused to readmit criminal aliens from the United States are Laos and Vietnam. See Varied Routes, supra note 5.
54 Ma, 208 F.3d at 818.
55 See Carri Geer, Immigrants Finally Find Freedom, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., July 10, 2000, at 1B.
57 See Ho v. Greene, 204 F.3d 1045, 1057 (10th Cir. 2000).
III. IIRIRA AND INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR REPATRIATION

Under international law, every state has a duty to admit its nationals.59 However, each state promulgates its own nationality laws and has discretion to determine what evidence is sufficient proof of nationality. A consequence of the lack of uniform nationality laws is that certain individuals can become "stateless." Thus, to the extent that the IIRIRA relies on the uniformity of nationality laws to effectuate its deportation provision, its indefinite detention loophole is exacerbated.

A. The Duty of Sovereign States to Grant Admission to Their Nationals

The principle that every state has a duty to admit its own nationals is widely accepted as a customary international rule of law.60 International law regulates the movement of persons across state borders, and thus imposes certain duties, such as the duty to admit nationals, on the states so that such movement occurs effectively. However, it is unclear to whom the duty to admit nationals is owed. One argument is that the duty is owed between states and that the duty is a corollary of the right of states to expel non-nationals from its territory.61 This right to expulsion is subject to limitations. For example, its exercise is confined only to aliens, only in the event of the lawful exercise of states’ rights, and only in those cases in which a foreign state is prepared to permit the expelled person to settle in its territory.62 Furthermore, the extent to which a state is free to expel aliens who have effectively acquired nationality by virtue of long-term residence is a matter for debate.63

The duty of admission has also been viewed as a duty owed to the national seeking reentry.64 In this context, the duty is corollary to the individual’s right to return to “one’s own country” as recognized in article 13(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“Universal

59 See infra Part III.A.
60 RICHARD PLENDER, INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW 133 (2d ed. rev. 1988).
61 Id. at 133-34.
62 Id.
63 GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS BETWEEN STATES 201, 255-61 (1978). Proponents of the doctrine of “legitimate expectations” of the alien who is admitted for any substantial period of time, especially one who is admitted for permanent residence, advance the argument that such aliens have interests which warrant more protection than those who have just arrived. This follows the belief that such “alien who is deported suffers a punishment distinctive by reason of his alienage, and the longer he has been resident in the host country, the greater will be the hardship.” Id. at 261.
64 PLENDER, supra note 60, at 134-37.
Declaration\(\)\textsuperscript{65\(\)\): \textquotefalse{everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.\(\)\textsuperscript{66\(\)\) Although the Universal Declaration is not a legally enforceable instrument,\textsuperscript{66\(\)\) the international community's repeated reliance on it as a normative instrument has given rise to a universally binding customary law.\textsuperscript{67\(\)\) Furthermore, modern human rights treaties, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (\textquotedblleft ICCPR\textquotedblright)\textsuperscript{68\(\)\) and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (\textquotedblleft Convention on Discrimination\textquotedblright)\textsuperscript{69\(\)\) have developed to give more detailed legal effect to the Universal Declaration.\textsuperscript{70\(\)\) Cambodia is a signatory to both instruments.\textsuperscript{71\(\)\) The international community narrowly construes \textquoteleft one's own country\textquotefalse{ to mean a country in which nationals or citizens live or have lived.\textsuperscript{72\(\)\) This right to return is enforceable not merely by the individual but by interstate action, such as by court order or by legislation.\textsuperscript{73\(\)\)

In summary, international laws such as the ICCPR and the Convention on Discrimination delineate the duty to admit nationals. Cambodia, as a signatory to both conventions and a member of the international community, therefore has a duty to admit its nationals.

B. Non-Uniform Nationality Laws Exacerbate the IIRIRA Indefinite Detention Loophole by Creating \textquoteleft\textquoteleft Stateless\textquotefalse{ Individuals

Each state decides for itself what constitutes nationality and how nationality can be proven. As a result, some individuals may not be able to demonstrate nationality in any country, thereby becoming \textquoteleft\textquoteleft stateless.\textquotefalse{ This

\textsuperscript{66\(\)\) The Universal Declaration is not a treaty and thus has no force of law. Its purpose is to provide goals and principles that each country should aspire to achieve. THOMAS BUERGENTAL, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL 29 (1988).
\textsuperscript{67\(\)\) \textit{Id.} at 31-33.
\textsuperscript{68\(\)\) Article 12(4) provides that \textquoteleft\textquoteleft no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.\textquotefalse{ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 12(4), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
\textsuperscript{69\(\)\) Article 5(d)(ii) provides that States Parties would undertake to guarantee everyone \textquoteleft\textquoteleft the right to leave any country, including one's own, and to return to one's country.\textquotefalse{ International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, \textit{opened for signature} Mar. 7, 1966, art. 5(d)(ii), 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 220 [hereinafter Convention on Discrimination].
\textsuperscript{70\(\)\) PLENDER, supra note 60, at 134-35.
\textsuperscript{72\(\)\) HURST HANNUM, THE RIGHT TO LEAVE AND RETURN IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 56-60 (1987).
\textsuperscript{73\(\)\) PLENDER, supra note 60, at 134.
exacerbates the IIRIRA indefinite detention loophole, which rests on the premise that every alien is eventually deportable.

I. International Standards for Nationality Laws

To effectuate the deportation provision of the IIRIRA, the receiving state must (1) recognize the nationality of the individual seeking admission to its territory and (2) recognize its duty to admit those nationals. Thus, the United States' power to expel aliens under the IIRIRA is correlative to and is dependent on the receiving state's willingness to grant admission to nationals.

A state's recognition of its nationals and its duty to admit nationals is a matter associated with the sovereignty of the state and is thus left within national jurisdiction.74 Article 1 of the 1930 Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws ("Convention on Conflicts") provides that "[i]t is for each State to determine under its own law who are its nationals" and article 2 further provides that "any questions as to whether a person possesses the nationality of a particular State shall be determined in accordance with the law of that State."75 Thus, international law leaves to each sovereign state the inherent right to promulgate laws and regulations as it sees fit. However, limitations to these rights are recognized in cases where their exercise would be inconsistent with international conventions, international custom, and principles of law generally recognized with regard to nationality.76

The most pertinent international instruments relating to the law of nationality are the conventions relating to statelessness and discrimination. The Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons ("Convention on Statelessness") provides that an individual may not be deprived of his nationality so as to render him stateless.77 A stateless person is one "who is not considered a national by any state under the operation of its law."78 Although Cambodia is not a signatory to the Convention on Statelessness, its obligation under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights dictates a similar goal as the Convention on Statelessness. Article 15 of the Universal Declaration states that "]everyone has a right to a nationality," and "]nol

74 P. WEIS, NATIONALITY AND STATELESSNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 65 (2d ed. rev. 1979).
75 Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, Apr. 12, 1930, art. 1, 2 179 L.N.T.S. 89, 99 [hereinafter Convention on Conflicts].
76 Id. art. 1.
78 Id. art. 1.
one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality[.]” The Convention on Statelessness has been interpreted to prevent the same undesirable situation of statelessness. The Convention on Discrimination is also relevant to nationality laws. Specifically, article 5 emphasizes the need to avoid discrimination in the treatment of state nationals who wish to cross its borders. Cambodia ratified the Convention on Discrimination in 1994.

2. **International Standards for Proof of Nationality**

International law recognizes that proof of nationality is within the domestic jurisdiction of each sovereign state. For example, article 2 of the Convention on Conflicts establishes that “[a]ny question as to whether a person possesses the nationality of a particular state shall be determined in accordance with the law of that State.” Typically, an individual who claims that his nationality entitles him to enter a state commonly bears the burden of proving his national status.

What is considered acceptable evidence varies according to the jurisdiction. A number of states follow a combination of *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis* methods in determining nationality. Evidence of birth in the territory is sufficient in *jus soli* states. By comparison, proof of descent from parents that are nationals is necessary in *jus sanguinis* states, which adhere to the principle that a child’s nationality follows that of the parents. Proof of nationality in *jus sanguinis* states is more difficult. It involves not only evidence of descent from the parent who is a national, but also evidence of the parent’s nationality.

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79 Universal Declaration, supra note 65, art. 15.
81 Convention on Discrimination, supra note 69, at 216.
82 Id. art. 5.
83 Marks, supra note 71, at 94 n.152.
84 WEIS, supra note 74, at 204.
86 Id. art. 2.
87 PLENDER, supra note 60, at 149.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 217.
Typically, official documents such as a passport or consular certificate suffice as evidence of nationality. Where valid documents are not available, another method of determining nationality is the “effective link” doctrine developed in the Nottebohm case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala). In Nottebohm, the International Court of Justice held that that a person is a national of a country if he or she has a specific, effective link to the country, such that there is a genuine connection between a state and the person. The Court defined nationality as “a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties.” Habitual residence is recognized as an important factor in the determination of an individual’s effective link to a country. The effective link doctrine can be useful particularly where nationality cannot be established by documentary evidence, as is common with refugees who have fled their countries in fear of war or violence.

In the absence of documentary evidence of nationality, international tribunals occasionally allow secondary evidence of nationality or evidence from which nationality may be inferred, such as voting in elections, holding public office, or offering witness testimony as corroborative evidence of nationality. The Convention on Conflicts was an early attempt to resolve conflicts of nationality laws and defined nationality in terms of habitual residence or other close connection. Article 5 of the Convention on Conflicts provides that “a third State shall, of the nationalities which any such person possesses, recognize exclusively in its territory either the nationality of the country in which he is habitually and principally resident, or the nationality of the country with which in the circumstances he appears to be in fact most closely connected.”

In summary, although sovereign states have a duty to readmit their nationals, each state has wide discretion in determining who is a national.

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92 Id. at 222-36; see also RUTH DONNER, THE REGULATION OF NATIONALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 68 (1983).
93 The Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), 1955 I.C.J. 4, 23 (Apr. 6). See also VON GLAHN, supra note 88, at 207.
95 Id. at 23.
96 DONNER, supra note 92, at 61.
98 WEIS, supra note 74, at 216.
99 Convention on Conflicts, supra note 75, art. 5, 179 L.N.T.S. at 101; see WEIS, supra note 74, at 163.
100 Id.
This discretion has led to conflicts amongst the states. Furthermore this conflict aggravates the IIRIRA indefinite detention problem by creating “stateless” individuals.

IV. POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND THE RISE OF NATIONALISM: A FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING CAMBODIA’S NATIONALITY LAWS

Cambodia’s history is crucial to an understanding of the country’s political instability, exclusionist laws, and social circumstances that hinder its duty to admit nationals and preclude an immediate repatriation agreement with the United States. Cambodia’s political instability and xenophobia arise from a history of foreign invasion and serving as a vassal state for foreign interests.\(^{101}\) Having achieved independence in the twentieth century, the government has cultivated policies that are based on nationalism and are arbitrary in practice.\(^{102}\)

A. Brief History of the Political Instability in Cambodia

Cambodia’s struggle for sovereignty dates back to the thirteenth century and involves repeated foreign invasions, occupations, and coups by Thai and Vietnamese regimes.\(^{103}\) The two regimes repeatedly fought on Cambodian soil for control over Cambodian territory.\(^{104}\) With France’s intervention in 1862, Cambodia secured protection from further encroachment upon its land but retained only partial independence.\(^{105}\) It was not until almost 100 years later that the Cambodian government was given administrative control of most state functions and the Cambodian military gained autonomy within certain provinces.\(^{106}\) The French continued to control foreign policy, the judicial system, finances, customs, and military operations outside of the autonomous provinces.\(^{107}\) In 1953, Cambodia finally won its independence from France and enjoyed a period of peace and


\(^{102}\) See infra Part V.

\(^{103}\) Marlowe Hood and David A. Ablin, The Path to Cambodia’s Present, in THE CAMBODIAN AGONY xix (David A. Ablin & Marlowe Hood eds., 1987).


\(^{107}\) Id.
stability until the mid-1960s. During that time, the North Vietnamese forces established bases in Cambodia's provinces operating against South Vietnam.

Cambodia's infrastructure was further undermined when the United States began a series of bombings, between 1969 and 1973, against the North Vietnamese bases established in Cambodia in an effort to prevent a communist takeover of South Vietnam. In 1970, General Lon Nol succeeded in taking control of Cambodia's government. Despite Cambodia's attempt to remain neutral, Cambodia was forced to serve as a battlefield for the United States and the South Vietnamese on the one side, and the North Vietnamese on the other. In January 1973, the parties signed an agreement ending the war and U.S. troops withdrew from Cambodia.

Shortly thereafter, civil unrest broke out in Cambodia. On April 17, 1975, the communist Khmer Rouge, led by Pol Pot, defeated the Lon Nol forces. The Khmer Rouge set out to restructure Cambodian society, including rejection of all foreign influences. The Khmer Rouge abolished formal education, eradicated money, and ultimately destroyed the Cambodian economy by heavily relying on a communal agrarian economy. Cities, towns, and hospitals were forcibly evacuated, and family life was virtually abolished. In addition, the Khmer Rouge initiated a mass persecution campaign against ethnic minorities, intellectuals, urban elites, and members of the former regime. During its reign (1975-1979), the Khmer Rouge killed approximately two million Cambodians.

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109 SUTTER, supra note 105, at 11.
111 Id. at 202-10.
112 SUTTER, supra note 105, at 12.
113 Id. at 10.
116 See CHANDLER (1991), supra note 101, ch. VIII; BECKER, supra note 101, ch. VII.
118 See generally GENOCIDE AND DEMOCRACY IN CAMBODIA: THE KHMER ROUGE, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY (Ben Kiernan ed., 1993); see also CHANDLER (1991), supra note 101, ch. VIII; BECKER, supra note 101, ch. VII.
In 1979, Vietnam invaded Cambodia in an alleged effort to cease the slaughtering of ethnic Vietnamese in Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge’s aggressive incursions into Vietnam. Vietnam defeated the Khmer Rouge and controlled Cambodia until 1989 when international pressure and political and economic strains forced Vietnam to withdraw its troops. Cambodians were finally allowed to rebuild their country as a sovereign state.

B. Political Instability and Cambodian Nationalism

The foreign incursions, bombings, and revolution destabilized, if not destroyed, Cambodia’s economic, political, and social structures. With the withdrawal of Vietnam in 1989, Cambodia became a sovereign state and began the process of rebuilding the country’s economic and political infrastructure from scratch. However, by that time, over half a million people had fled Cambodia and sought refuge in neighboring countries. Meanwhile, Vietnamese immigrants continued to migrate to Cambodia. The continued residence of Vietnamese immigrants and the memories of past invasions gave rise to an anti-Vietnamese sentiment that has pervaded all levels of Cambodian society. For example, Cambodians commonly use the term “youn” to refer to the Vietnamese; roughly translated, “youn” means “foreign barbarian.” It is also common in Cambodian politics to treat the Vietnamese as scapegoats for the demise of the country. In fact, political parties have gone so far as to suggest the establishment of a massive deportation program in their campaign platforms. Thus, what began as cultural animosity towards Vietnamese and other foreigners has developed into ethnic background-based nationalism.

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120 Seekins, supra note 106, at 6.
123 ZIECK, supra note 119, at 138.
124 Seekins, supra note 106, at 3. Vietnamese began settling in the Mekong Delta, a Cambodian territory from the 1620s to the mid-1880s, leading to Vietnam’s annexation of that area. Id.
126 Id. at 402.
127 Berman, supra note 122, at 839.
128 Id. at 840.
The population of Cambodia has been fairly homogeneous, with ethnic Khmers accounting for the vast majority of the population. The term "Khmer" refers to ethnic Cambodians whose ancestors are also ethnic Cambodians. In 1962, Khmers comprised eighty percent of the population; in 1981, Khmers comprised ninety percent or more of the population. The Khmer Rouge genocide and the civil war in the 1970s forced many Cambodian citizens to flee their country without documentation of their ties to the country. Over half a million people fled Cambodia and sought refuge in neighboring countries in 1979 to early 1980 and some eventually resettled in third countries, such as the United States, France, Australia, and Canada. As a result of limited documentation, the Cambodian government has difficulty verifying the national status of refugees, particularly those who successfully sought asylum in third countries. In addition, nationality and immigration laws often preclude refugees from returning to Cambodia.

C. Development of Democracy

Cambodia was isolated from the rest of the world during the reign of the Khmer Rouge and after the Vietnamese invasion. In an effort to bring Cambodia back into the international community, representatives of nineteen countries participated in the Paris Peace Conference on Cambodia and signed a set of accords ("Paris Accords") in 1991. The agreements signed in Paris on October 23, 1991, include a set of four documents: (1) Final Act of the Paris Conference; (2) Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, with Annexes; (3) the Agreement Concerning the Sovereignty, Independence, Territorial Integrity and Inviolability, Neutrality and National Unity of Cambodia; and (4) the Declaration on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia.

[130] Headley, Jr., supra note 129, at 83.
[131] Id.
[132] Id.
[133] Headley, Jr., supra note 129, at 86.
[135] See infra Part V.
[138] The agreements signed in Paris on October 23, 1991, include a set of four documents: (1) Final Act of the Paris Conference; (2) Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, with Annexes; (3) the Agreement Concerning the Sovereignty, Independence, Territorial Integrity and Inviolability, Neutrality and National Unity of Cambodia; and (4) the Declaration on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia. Id.
aimed to "restore and maintain peace in Cambodia"\textsuperscript{139} and vowed that Cambodia would never return to "the policies and practices of the past."\textsuperscript{140} The Paris Accords sought to end Cambodia's internal conflict by providing for international supervision and recognition of the country's sovereignty and independence.\textsuperscript{141} The Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict ("Settlement Agreement") is the principal accord of the Paris Accords and contains annexes discussing arrangements of the transitional period, military aspects of the settlement, elections, repatriation of refugees and displaced persons, and constitutional principles.\textsuperscript{142}

Following the signing of the Paris Accords, Cambodia adopted a new constitution and established a new government.\textsuperscript{143} The Settlement Agreement set forth a framework for establishing the new constitution and provided several human rights guarantees.\textsuperscript{144} The Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia,\textsuperscript{145} which took effect in 1993, established a democratic government and enumerated the rights and obligations of its citizens.\textsuperscript{146} The Paris Accords also created the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia ("UNTAC") to supervise elections and provide stability during the country's transition to democracy.\textsuperscript{147} UN peacekeepers occupied Cambodia from 1991 and 1993, during Cambodia's transitional phase towards democracy to ensure peace and a fair and free election.\textsuperscript{148}

Following the 1993 election, Cambodia achieved a short period of peace and political stability under the nationally elected coalition government,\textsuperscript{149} dominated by the National United Front for an Independent,  

\textsuperscript{139} Id. at 183.
\textsuperscript{140} The Paris Accords recognize that "Cambodia’s tragic recent history requires special measures to assure protection of human rights, and the non-return to the policies and practices of the past[.]" Id.
\textsuperscript{142} Settlement Agreement, supra note 138.
\textsuperscript{143} Marks, supra note 71, at 56.
\textsuperscript{144} Settlement Agreement, supra note 138.
\textsuperscript{146} Id. ch. III.
\textsuperscript{147} Paris Accords, supra note 137, at 186, 189.
\textsuperscript{148} The UNTAC was considered the largest peacekeeping operation ever mounted by the United Nations; "UNTAC deployed 15,900 peacekeeping troops, 3600 civilian police, and approximately 3000 administrators and election officials. The UN personnel was supported by tens of thousands of Cambodians, recruited mainly to help organize the elections." PIerre P. Lizee, Peace, Power and Resistance in Cambodia: Global Governance and the Failure of International Conflict Resolution 10 (2000).
\textsuperscript{149} The coalition of four elected parties included the FUNCINPEC party, the CPP, the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party ("BLDP"), and the MOLINAKA party. In a 120-member national assembly, FUNCINPEC received fifty-eight seats and the CPP received fifty-one seats. Marks, supra note 71, at 58.
Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia ("FUNCINPEC") party and the Cambodian People's Party ("CPP"). Prince Norodom Ranariddh of the FUNCINPEC party led as First Prime Minister and Hun Sen of the CPP held the position of Second Prime Minister. However, this sharing of power quickly ended in July 1997 when Hun Sen and the CPP staged a coup to overthrow the government and declared themselves the governing party. The coup resulted in the death of innocent people, unlawful mass arrests, torture, and intimidation of political parties. As for its long-term impact, the coup has not only reversed many of the positive steps taken toward democracy and economic development, but has plunged the country into instability and chaos.

In short, Cambodia has an extremely turbulent political history and its democratic system remains fragile. It is against this background of instability and nationalist policies that a repatriation agreement between the United States and Cambodia is being negotiated.

V. OVERVIEW OF CAMBODIA'S NATIONALITY LAWS

The Constitution, the Nationality Law, and the Sub-decree on Khmer Nationality Identity Cards ("Identity Card Law") are the most relevant sources of law that deal with Cambodian nationality. The Constitution enumerates the rights and obligations of Khmer citizens. The Nationality Law explains, among other things, who is a Khmer citizen. The Identity Card Law provides guidance about what kind of evidence is sufficient to demonstrate citizenship.
A. The Constitution Limits Cambodia’s Duty to Admit Nationals

Although the Settlement Agreement provides for the right of displaced Cambodians to return home, Cambodia’s Constitution limits the duty to readmit “Khmer citizens” only. The Settlement Agreement provides that “[a]ll persons in Cambodia and all Cambodian refugees and displaced persons shall enjoy the rights and freedoms embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other relevant international human rights instruments.” The Universal Declaration provides for the right to return to one’s own country. Nevertheless, the Constitution is silent on the rights of undocumented Cambodians, particularly ethnic minorities, to travel in or return to Cambodia. Specifically, article 33 provides that “Khmer citizens shall not be deprived of their nationality,” and article 40 states that “Khmer citizens shall have the right to travel and settle abroad and return to the country.” Thus, although the Cambodian government does have a duty to admit nationals to its territory, the scope of the constitutional duty is limited to “Khmer citizens.”

There are two problems with the “Khmer citizen” approach found in the Cambodian Constitution. First, this approach grants no rights to the undocumented non-citizens residents of Cambodia. Such an exclusion of non-citizens violates the ICCPR, which states that “everyone lawfully within the territory” has a right to “liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence.” The second problem is that the Cambodian Constitution does not define “Khmer citizen.” Thus, the Cambodian legislature was given discretion to define who is a citizen. In 1994, Cambodia adopted an Immigration Law that detailed the procedures and requirements non-citizens must meet to qualify for citizenship. However, the Immigration Law still provided no guidance about who is a Khmer citizen.

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157 See Settlement Agreement, supra note 138, art. 20, pt. V; see also Universal Declaration, supra note 65, art. 13(2).
158 See Cambodia Const., supra note 145, arts. 33, 40.
159 Settlement Agreement, supra note 138, art. 15, pt. III. Pertinent human rights convention include the ICCPR, supra note 68, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and the Convention on Discrimination, supra note 69. See also Ratner, supra note 141, at 25-26.
160 Universal Declaration, supra note 65, art. 13(2).
161 CAMBODIA CONST., supra note 145, art. 33.
162 Id. art. 40.
163 See ICCPR, supra note 68, art. 12(4).
164 Marks, supra note 71, at 126.
165 Berman, supra note 122, at 821-22.
166 Nationality Law, supra note 156, pmbl.
citizen.  

In 1996, Cambodia enacted a Nationality Law \(^{169}\) in an attempt to resolve the issue of who is a Khmer citizen.  

B. Cambodia’s Nationality Law

The drafters of the Nationality Law sought to evade criticism that government officials wished to rid the country of residents who were not of Khmer descent.  

Thus, the Nationality Law adopted a combination of the *jus sanguinis* and *jus soli* principles for determining how a person acquires Khmer nationality. Article 4(1) provides the *jus sanguinis* principle, granting citizenship to a child “regardless of the place of birth” if the child was born from a parent who has Khmer nationality or citizenship. \(^{172}\) Article 4(2) imparts the *jus soli* principle, granting citizenship to a person “born in the Kingdom of Cambodia[,]” including any child who is “born and living legally in the Kingdom of Cambodia.”  

C. Proof of Nationality Under the National Identity Card Law

Cambodia’s Nationality Law provides that the Identity Card Law governs proof of nationality.  

The Identity Card Law provides that identity cards can be granted only to Khmer citizens.  

Article 4 provides that government officials shall consider the following factors when deciding whether to issue an identity card: (1) birth certificates; (2) judgments of the court stating that such persons were born from fathers or mothers who have Khmer nationality; (3) royal decrees proclaiming the recognition of the request for Khmer nationality by the concerned persons; (4) royal decrees proclaiming the recognition of the application for Khmer nationality by the concerned persons; (5) documents or evidence proving that the concerned persons were born in Cambodia to fathers or mothers who were born in Cambodia; (6) documents or evidence proving that the concerned persons

\(^{168}\) Berman, *supra* note 122, at 817.

\(^{169}\) Nationality Law, *supra* note 156.


\(^{171}\) Berman, *supra* note 122, at 821. Human rights activists speculated that Cambodia’s legislature was reluctant to define nationality because it did not want Vietnamese residents to seek citizenship. Some also speculated that the Cambodian legislature was prepared to deport all of its ethnic Vietnamese residents back to Vietnam following the enactment of the nationality law. *Id.* at 822.

\(^{172}\) Nationality Law, *supra* note 156, art. 4(1).

\(^{173}\) *Id.* art. 4(2).

\(^{174}\) *Id.* art. 5.

\(^{175}\) Identity Card Law, *supra* note 154, art. 3.
used to have Khmer nationality, or documents or evidence proving that the concerned persons were born to fathers or mothers who had Khmer nationality; and (7) any documents which could prove that such person is a Khmer citizen. The Ministry of Interior examines the evidence of nationality, makes a determination, and receives approval from the Royal Government. Khmer national identity cards are valid for ten years from the issue date and must be renewed thereafter.

VI. MANY CAMBODIAN REFUGEES CANNOT DEMONstrate APPROPRIATE PROOF OF NATIONALITY BECAUSE OF CIVIL UNREST, CHANGING LAWS, AND CORRUPTION

For the most part, Cambodia's nationality-related human rights problems are not attributable to a failure to recognize such human rights in its laws, such as the Constitution or the Nationality Law. In accordance with international human rights norms, Cambodia's Constitution and the Settlement Agreement impose a duty, although it is limited, to admit nationals. Likewise, the Nationality Law provides a relatively broad definition of who is a Khmer citizen. Instead, the crucial problem lies with both the Cambodian government's frequent disregard for the authority of the Constitution, and the power of corrupt officials. For example, the Identity Card Law establishes overly stringent procedures for demonstrating evidence of nationality. This is particularly troubling for Cambodian refugees who fled the country without documentation and have resettled in other countries. Many of these refugees cannot provide adequate proof of nationality by documentation or establish an "effective link" to Cambodia.

A. Difficulties Establishing Proof of Nationality by Documentation

There are several reasons why Cambodian refugees cannot establish nationality by documentation. The official documentation of some refugees was destroyed or lost during the years of civil unrest. Some have documentation that the government considers insufficient or old, because the

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176 Id. art. 4.
177 Id. art. 5.
178 Id. art. 2.
179 Marks, supra note 71, at 55.
180 Id.
181 See infra Part VI.A.1.
laws for citizenship verification have changed over time. Others have obtained their documentation fraudulently from corrupt officials.

1. Lack of Documentation Because of Civil Unrest

Cambodia’s history of civil unrest has forced a massive departure of its citizens into neighboring countries and abroad, and as a result, many Cambodian refugees do not have official birth certificates or any other identification to establish their citizenship. Over half a million of Cambodia’s residents fled during the decades of turmoil, and in most of those cases, citizenship records were lost or destroyed. The 1975 revolution inspired a massive refugee departure. The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1979 led to another major exodus of refugees.

For those Cambodians who returned to Cambodia relatively quickly, the documentation problem was not as serious. By their continued residency, they were eventually able to obtain some documentation, such as government-issued family books used as a form of citizenship identification or government identification cards. However, nationality has been more difficult to prove for those Cambodians who did not return. As most refugees who escaped persecution had little or no contact with Cambodia for years, their options for obtaining nationality documentation became limited. In short, political instability has caused hundreds of thousands to flee Cambodia with no means of obtaining documentation.

2. Inadequate Documentation Because of New Laws

Because the current government may not recognize Cambodian identification cards issued from previous regimes, even those Cambodians who do possess identification can face citizenship documentation

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182 See infra Part VI.A.2.
183 See infra Part VI.A.3.
184 ZIECK, supra note 119, at 131-38.
185 Berman, supra note 122, at 870.
186 ZIECK, supra note 119, at 138.
187 Amnesty Int’l, supra note 97, at 37.
188 ZIECK, supra note 119, at 133.
189 Id. at 138.
190 Marks, supra note 71, at 78.
191 See Amnesty Int’l, supra note 97, at 37.
problems. The current Cambodian government is generally unwilling to recognize old identification cards, fearing that the cards were sold to aliens or illegally issued by corrupt officials. Thus, some of those who fled Cambodia with identification may not be recognized as nationals upon their return.

Furthermore, nationality verification systems continue to change. Following the Peace Accords, the United Nations established the UNTAC in Cambodia to create a neutral political environment to hold free and fair elections. UNTAC supervised the first national election in Cambodia in 1993 assisting with registration of eligible voters. This system identified citizens by providing identification cards to Cambodian citizens under the State of Cambodia. UNTAC acknowledged the citizenship of any resident who was born in Cambodia or who had lived in Cambodia for a minimum of five years. However, following the departure of UNTAC, the new regime instituted a new identification system in 1999, replacing the registration papers issued and recognized by UNTAC and previous governments. These frequent policy changes impose an undue burden on undocumented citizens to verify their nationality. In addition, such changes allow government officials excessive discretion in determining who is a qualified citizen entitled to the rights protected under the Constitution.

3. Corruption and Fraudulent Documentation

Concerns over illegal immigrants fraudulently obtaining nationality identification have led officials to question the legitimacy of identification cards, especially when the person who possesses the card is an "undesirable," i.e., an ethnic minority. Without question, corruption flourishes in Cambodia, in large part because the military, the police, and other civil servants are not well paid. Although Cambodian citizenship

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193 Id.
194 Chea, supra note 192.
196 Ratner, supra note 141, at 14, 21, 25.
197 Id. at 13-19.
198 Id. at 235.
199 Id.
200 Chea, supra note 192.
201 See, e.g., Ros, supra note 170. A Cambodian politician expressed the fear that is prevalent in Cambodia, "[t]here are many illegal immigrants from Vietnam and Thailand and they hold fake identification papers which are given to them by corrupt Cambodian officials." Id.
202 See General Accounting Office, Cambodia—Limited Progress on Free Elections, Human Rights, and Mine Clearing, Briefing Report to the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Committee on
requirements are rigid, problems on applications are often over-looked when the applicant offers money or gifts to the reviewing official(s). In addition, the laws are often unclear and applied at the discretion of government officials who lack basic training and skills to properly execute the laws.

For example, corrupt officials and weak border control have allowed Cambodia to become a common transit point for illegal aliens and a safe haven for those seeking to evade the law. Many pay thousands of dollars to purchase false documents in order to reach destinations via Cambodia. Between January and March 2000, Cambodia deported 700 illegal Chinese immigrants. When Cambodian police found these illegal aliens, they were awaiting documentation to enter such countries as Australia, the United States, and France. The government blames the influx of illegal immigrants on police corruption. Others blame this immigration problem on a lack of training and supervision of immigration officials. As a result of these problems with illegal immigrants, the Cambodian government has adopted exclusionist immigration and nationality laws.

In summary, political instability, changing laws, and corruption aggravate the nationality documentation problem in Cambodia and result in statelessness for many undocumented Cambodians. Furthermore, without a fair and reliable nationality documentation system, Cambodia is unlikely to reach a repatriation agreement with the United States.

International Relations, House of Representatives, GAO/NSIAD 96-15BR, Briefing Section II, Feb. 29, 1996 [hereinafter Limited Progress].
Electronic Interview with Ratha Panh, Cambodian attorney in Phnom Penh, Cambodia from April 1996 to April 1999 (May 22, 2000) [hereinafter Ratha Panh].
Limited Progress, supra note 202.
Id.
Cambodia Deports More than 60 Illegal Immigrant Chinese, JAPAN POL’Y & POL., Mar. 6, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Library, Asia/Pacific Rim Stories.
See supra notes 205 and 207.
Cambodia to Give Cash for Tip on Illegal Immigrants, ASIAN POLITICAL NEWS, Nov. 1, 1999, available at LEXIS, News Library, Asia/Pacific Rim Stories. Cambodia’s police chief, Hok Lundy, stated that “hundreds of illegal Chinese immigrants and an estimated 70,000-100,000 Vietnamese are living illegally in Cambodia.” Id.
Ratha Panh, supra note 203.
B. Difficulties Establishing Proof of Nationality by the "Effective Link" Doctrine

Absent acceptable documentary evidence, the "effective link" doctrine can establish citizenship. Habitual residence and sufficient connection with the country are important factors in establishing an "effective link." Under the Identity Card Law, residence and a willingness to maintain ties with the country as important criteria in determining nationality. However, corruption and the broad discretion given to Cambodian officials are difficult hurdles to overcome for those refugees who resettled elsewhere but wish to return.

Each state decides for itself what constitutes adequate proof of an "effective link" where documentary evidence is not available. In Cambodia, if the resettled refugee has no citizenship documentation, officials often conduct an interview to decide whether to readmit the refugee. The officials consider several factors, including where the refugee was born, family ties to Cambodia, when the refugee left Cambodia, how long the refugee has lived in his or her current country, and how well the refugee speaks Khmer. Applicants for new identification cards must present, at a minimum, proof of former long-term residence in Cambodia, fluency in the Khmer language, and familiarity with Cambodian culture. It may be necessary to confirm former residence by means of testimony from neighbors or others who can confirm the former residence of the individual concerned. These discretionary factors can be difficult to prove and can provide opportunities for abuse of power by officials.

The ethnic Vietnamese's flight from their Cambodian homes after the Siem Reap massacre in 1993, illustrates the negative impact of this discretion. After the ethnic Vietnamese fled, the Cambodian government later prevented their return, claiming that they were Vietnamese with no history of residence or right to return. However, when the United Nations and human rights groups such as Amnesty International conducted interviews to determine the effective link of the individuals to Cambodia,

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213 Id.
214 WEIS, supra note 74, at 204. As a general rule, the choice of law in determining nationality is the law of the State whose nationality is to be proved. Id.
215 Nou Hak, supra note 32.
216 Id. The above stated factors are also considered in the naturalization procedure in Cambodia. See Nationality Law, supra note 156, art. 8.
217 Id.
218 Amnesty Int'l, supra note 97, at 15-16.
219 Id.
they concluded that the refugees had significant ties to the country.\textsuperscript{220} Many had lived in Cambodia for generations, yet this evidence was insufficient to the Cambodian government, who claimed they lacked sufficient official documentation to prove citizenship.\textsuperscript{221} Some had identity cards, but the cards were issued under previous governments. Under significant international pressure, the Cambodian authorities worked in cooperation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights ("UNHCR"), and Cambodian non-governmental organizations to create a register of ethnic Vietnamese refugees from Cambodia.\textsuperscript{222} 

The broad discretion accorded Cambodian officials in making nationality decisions is not the international norm. For example, in other countries that have experienced an influx of refugees, the countries of origin have usually recognized that it is impracticable or impossible to verify the identity of each individual, and have accepted UNHCR or other records as reliable evidence.\textsuperscript{223} Despite this trend, Cambodia continues to deny such evidence.\textsuperscript{224}

In short, the "effective link" doctrine in concert with the Identity Card Law provides a means to determine citizenship without documentation. However, a refugee's ability to establish an "effective link" to Cambodia becomes more difficult the longer the refugee is away from the country. In addition, the Identity Card Law leaves the "effective link" determination to the discretion of Cambodian officials, who have a history of abuse of power and disregard for human rights.

VII. CURRENT EFFORTS TO NEGOTIATE A REPATRIATION AGREEMENT WITH CAMBODIA

A United States delegation is currently attempting to negotiate an agreement with Cambodia to repatriate convicted aliens.\textsuperscript{225} Although Cambodian officials have conducted interviews with detainees seeking admission to the country, they have not agreed to repatriate any of the convicted aliens. The interviews were conducted in the form of a questionnaire, the purpose of which was to determine whether an "effective link" exists between the detainee and Cambodia.\textsuperscript{226} The questionnaire

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\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{220} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{221} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{222} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{223} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{224} Nou Hak, supra note 32.
\item \textsuperscript{225} Christensen, supra note 31.
\item \textsuperscript{226} Nou Hak, supra note 32.
\end{itemize}
focuses on the detainee’s residency in Cambodia and includes the following lines: “address before departing for the United States,” “present address,” “occupation and place before 1970,” “occupation and place from 1970-1975,” “occupation and place from 1975-1979,” and “occupation and place from 1979 onward.” However, it is likely that many refugees will not be able to establish an “effective link” to Cambodia because they have resided in the United States since they were young, as did Kim Ho Ma.

VIII. RECOMMENDATION

The Supreme Court should affirm the Ninth Circuit in Ma v. Reno and order the INS to release indefinite detainees who have completed their sentences and cannot be repatriated. The INS justifies the indefinite detention of “undeportable” criminal aliens on the assumption that the alien will someday become “deportable.” The INS points to the international duty to readmit citizens and argues that the United States will negotiate repatriation agreements with every country. However, an examination of Cambodian nationality policies demonstrates otherwise.

Cambodia’s exclusive nationality policies, political instability, and xenophobia make a repatriation agreement with the United States unlikely. While Cambodia’s Constitution and its Nationality Law grant the right to travel and reenter the country to “Khmer citizens,” decades of war, changing laws, and corruption have left many Cambodians without documentation of their citizenship. Further, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for refugees who have remained in the United States most of their lives to establish an “effective link” with Cambodia. Moreover, the broad discretion granted to Cambodian nationality officials can lead to arbitrary citizenship determinations. Thus, the INS has based its justification for indefinite detention on a faulty assumption. Detainees should not be punished for the United States’ inability to negotiate a repatriation agreement or because their native country is unwilling to accommodate their return.

227 Questionnaire on file with the author.