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Serious Flaw of Employee Invention Ownership under the Bayh-Dole Act in *Stanford v. Roche*: Finding the Missing Piece of the Puzzle in the German Employee Invention Act

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Serious Flaw of Employee Invention Ownership Under the Bayh-Dole Act in Stanford v. Roche: Finding the Missing Piece of the Puzzle in the German Employee Invention Act

Toshiko Takenaka, Ph.D.*

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Introduction

In *Stanford v. Roche*, the Supreme Court took a very textualist approach and refused to read the text of the Bayh-Dole Act as guaranteeing ownership of federally funded inventions for contractors of the federal government through an automatic transfer from the contractors’ employees.\(^1\) This interpretation effectively eliminated the federal government’s rights under the Act in federally funded inventions if its contractors failed to secure ownership of invention from their employees because these rights are provided through the contractors’ ownership of such inventions.\(^2\) The Bayh-Dole Act aims to implement a uniform policy in the ownership of federally funded inventions and sets out important objectives reflecting specific public interests unique to such inventions.\(^3\) These objectives are achieved through the government’s rights in federally funded inventions to promote commercialization and collaboration between industries and academia.\(^4\) Accordingly, the *Stanford* dissent argued that the majority’s interpretation was inconsistent with the Act’s basic purpose.\(^5\)

Due to lack of resources at technology transfer offices and the complexity of ownership issues involved in academic-industry collaboration at universities, it is not easy for universities to secure the ownership of all inventions made by their

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\(^1\) Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc. 563 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2188, 2197 (2011).

\(^2\) *Id.* at 2201 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

\(^3\) *Id.* at 2200–01.

\(^4\) *Id.* at 2201.

\(^5\) *Id.*
employees.6 This is even more true with respect to inventions made by visiting researchers and student interns who are working under informal relationships with universities that do not fall into the traditional notion of employment.7 Stanford highlights the complexity of ownership issues in inventions resulting from a high-tech environment where researchers and innovations inter-flow beyond the boundaries of firms.8

Many legal and economic scholars cite Silicon Valley’s information sharing environment as the key to its success.9 Interaction of researchers from multiple-firms and the high mobility of such researchers enhance information diffusion and inter-firm relations among firms in a region.10 Researcher interaction improves industrial outputs, as well as economic growth in the high-tech district.11 Despite the numerous benefits praised by economists, such an information sharing culture presents a serious challenge for university technology transfer offices managing intellectual property, particularly controlling the ownership of inventions and procuring patents based on the ownership.12 The Stanford majority’s interpretation of the Bayh-Dole Act substantially increases administration costs at universities associated with promoting practices to secure pre-invention assignments from anyone involved in federally funded research activities. Moreover, universities face due diligence challenges because they cannot prevent their researchers from executing inconsistent assignment contracts when different aspects of research projects are conducted in different institutions in the private and academic sectors.13

Contrary to steady changes in the working environment, the U.S. Patent Act remains relatively unchanged with respect to provisions controlling ownership and inventorship (which is the starting point for determining ownership).14 The statute has a chapter dedicated to the ownership and assignment; however, that chapter in-


7 Id. at 17.

8 Id.


12 Reder, supra note 6, at 1–2.

13 Id. at 16.

cludes only two sections. Although the overwhelming majority of inventions are made by employee-inventors through their pre-invention assignment duty under an employment contract, the U.S. Patent Act is silent on the ownership of inventions resulting from employment, except for invention ownership resulting from federally funded research under the Bayh-Dole Act.

In contrast, patent statutes in major foreign patent jurisdictions include provisions for controlling the ownership of employee inventions. In Germany, a separate law, the Employee Invention Act (EIA), was enacted to provide detailed rules for balancing interests of employee-inventors and their employers; in other words, to balance competing policies under the patent law and labor and employment law. The EIA incorporates a mechanism for employers to secure the ownership of inventions made by their employees; that mechanism protects employers’ interests by giving employers the priority right for claiming to secure the ownership of inventions made by their employee-inventors while protecting employee-inventors’ interests through rights of reasonable compensation when the inventors transfer the ownership to their employers. Many other jurisdictions have adopted a similar mechanism from the EIA. The U.S. Congress also once made an attempt to adopt a similar mechanism by introducing a series of bills based on the German EIA.

This article argues that the current Bayh-Dole Act is incomplete because the Act fails to provide a mechanism for contractors to secure the ownership of federally funded inventions from their employees. Part I of this Article discusses this flaw in the current Bayh-Dole Act, highlighted by *Stanford v. Roche*, and argues that a historical accident resulted in this flaw due to Congress’s failure to pass a series of bills based on the German EIA. Passages in the Bayh-Dole Act suggest that the

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20 German EIA, *supra* note 19, § 6.
21 *Id.* § 9.
22 See CODE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLES [C.P.I.] art. L611-7(Fr) (providing language similar to the German EIA).
Act assumes a transfer by operation of law to secure the ownership of federally funded inventions through a mechanism provided by the German EIA based bills. Without such a mechanism, many federal funded inventions will fall outside of the Bayh-Dole Act if contractors fail to execute written assignments with inventors. Common law ownership rules do not provide any help to contractors because they can guarantee only non-transferable, royalty-free, nonexclusive licenses for the contractors. Many of the contractors, particularly universities, do not practice patents by themselves. Differing state laws and state legislative actions prevent assignment contracts between the contractors and their employee-inventors from securing the ownership of all federally funded inventions, thereby preventing the federal government from implementing a uniform policy.

In order to propose a mechanism for contractors to secure the ownership of federally funded inventions, Part II of this article examines a statutory model based on federal laws for handling inventions closely related to national security. These Acts provide an effective mechanism for securing rights in the ownership of inventions by operation of law. However, the increased administrative costs on both the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO") and applicants would not justify adopting a similar mechanism for the Bayh-Dole Act.

Part III of this article examines the German EIA and compares it with the Bayh-Dole Act. Congress's interest in the EIA resulted in the overall structure of Bayh-Dole Act sharing key features with the EIA and thus it should be easy for the Bayh-Dole Act to adopt an ownership transfer mechanism developed under the EIA. The comparison also reveals the lack of a mechanism in the current Bayh-Dole Act for protecting inventors' rights to compensation when ownership is transferred to employers, although the Bayh-Dole Act does provide inventors a similar right to compensation.

Part IV of this article discusses which aspects of the German EIA should be adopted in the Bayh-Dole Act and how that adoption should take place. It will also propose adopting, from the EIA, a mechanism to protect inventors’ rights to compensation. Moreover, today’s university research environment makes it necessary for the federal government to apply the Bayh-Dole restrictions and conditions to federally funded inventions created by students and visiting researchers, regardless of employment status with the contractors. With just compensation through royalty sharing, the Bayh-Dole Act should be revised to allow contractors to secure the ownership of inventions from these nontraditional employees as long as their inventions resulted from federally funded research activities.
I. Lack of Ownership Transfer Mechanism: Significant Flaw in the Bayh-Dole Act

1. **Stanford v. Roche**

The invention at issue in *Stanford* was a technology based on the polymerase chain reaction (PRC) technique for detecting and quantifying HIV—the virus that causes AIDS—in human blood samples (HIV measurement technology). A Stanford researcher, Dr. Holodniy, completed this invention with other Stanford researchers. In June 1988, Dr. Holodniy executed a pre-invention assignment contract which included the term “I agree to assign or confirm in writing to Stanford and/or Sponsors” with respect to his future inventions. Because he had no prior experience with the PRC technique, he was instructed by his boss to visit a private biotech firm, Cetus, and learn the technique. In February 1989, Dr. Holodniy executed another pre-invention assignment agreement with Cetus when he began his regular visits to Cetus. The contract with Cetus included the term “I will assign and do hereby assign to Cetus” with respect to his future inventions.

After receiving enough training at Cetus, Dr. Holodniy returned to Stanford and completed the HIV measurement technology. Stanford received government funding for its HIV research through the National Institute of Health. On May 14, 1992, Stanford filed a patent application which resulted in three separate patents covering different aspects of the HIV measurement technology. However, Dr. Holodniy did not execute an assignment of the ownership of his invention in the 1992 patent application until May 4, 1995. All three patents included a notation that the invention was made with the aid of federal funding.

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24 Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 583 F.3d 832, 837 (Fed. Cir. 2009), aff’d, 563 U.S. ____, 131 S. Ct. 2188 (2011).

25 *Id.* at 841 (emphasis in original).

26 *Id.* at 837.

27 *Id.* at 842.

28 *Id.* (emphasis in original).

29 *Id.* at 837.

30 Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 583 F.3d 832, 838 (Fed. Cir. 2009), aff’d, 563 U.S. ____, 131 S. Ct. 2188 (2011).

31 *Id.* at 838, 842.

32 *Id.* at 842.

33 *Id.* at 838.
Meanwhile, Roche purchased all PRC related assets from Cetus in December 1991.\textsuperscript{34} Roche began to sell HIV detection kits, which are widely used in hospitals and clinics.\textsuperscript{35} In April 2000, Stanford and Roche began contesting Roche's ownership through the 1989 Holodniy assignment and negotiating possible licensing conditions; the negotiation led to no agreement.\textsuperscript{36} On October 14, 2005, Stanford filed suit against Roche, asserting infringement of the three patents by Roche's HIV detection kits.\textsuperscript{37} Roche answered and counterclaimed against Stanford, alleging that Stanford lacked standing to maintain the suit because Roche possessed ownership of the invention with respect to all three patents.\textsuperscript{38}

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) agreed with Roche that it secured the ownership of Holodniy's invention when it acquired Cetus's PRC assets.\textsuperscript{39} The Federal Circuit applied its own case law to the question of whether contractual language affects a present assignment of patent rights or an agreement to assign rights in the future inventions, and found the Cetus assignment contract to constitute the former and the Stanford assignment contract to constitute the latter.\textsuperscript{40} Under its precedents, the terms "I... hereby assign" in the Cetus assignment contract triggered an automatic transfer of the ownership upon the completion of invention in contrast to the terms "I agree to assign" in the Stanford assignment which needs an additional step to consummate the promise and trigger transfer of the ownership.\textsuperscript{41} Once the invention was completed, the Cetus contract trumped the Stanford contract, although the Stanford contract originated prior to the execution of the Cetus contract.\textsuperscript{42} In denying Stanford's ownership, the Federal Circuit effectively eliminated the federal government's rights in the invention expressly provided in the Patent Act.\textsuperscript{43}

In a seven-to-two vote, the Federal Circuit's conclusion was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court, rejecting the view that the ownership provisions for federally funded inventions in the Bayh-Dole Act override state contract laws and common

\textsuperscript{34} Id. at 837–38.
\textsuperscript{35} Id. at 838.
\textsuperscript{36} Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 583 F.3d 832, 838 (Fed. Cir. 2009), aff'd, 563 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2188 (2011).
\textsuperscript{37} Id.
\textsuperscript{38} Id.
\textsuperscript{39} Id. at 841–42.
\textsuperscript{40} Id.
\textsuperscript{41} Id.
\textsuperscript{42} Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2188, 2202 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
\textsuperscript{43} The Government has a nonexclusive, nontransferable, irrevocable, paid up license to use the invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(4) (2006). It also has a right to require the patentee to grant a license to a third party and may have direct control of the invention under certain circumstances. 35 U.S.C. §§ 203, 202(c)(1), 202(c)(2)-(3) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
law rules controlling invention ownership.⁴⁴ Authored by Chief Justice Roberts, *Stanford* reemphasized the common law ownership rule under precedent by holding that the ownership of an invention belongs to the inventor and rejected Stanford’s position that the ownership of federally funded inventions vested in the inventor’s employer—the federal contractor.⁴⁵ The Supreme Court compared federal laws, which vest the ownership of inventions to the federal government contrary to the common law rule, and found no texts in the Bayh-Dole Act supporting the contractor’s ownership.⁴⁶

The majority also examined the text defining “subject invention” and rejected Stanford’s interpretation that would include all inventions made by the contractor’s employee with the aid of federal funding, contrary to the rule to avoid redundancy in statutory terms.⁴⁷ Instead, the majority adopted an interpretation including only inventions owned by the contractor through a valid and enforceable assignment contract because this interpretation makes every word in the definition meaningful and consistent with a dictionary definition of the word.⁴⁸ This interpretation is further supported by the text of other provisions in the Bayh-Dole Act.⁴⁹ The majority found that the scope of subject inventions under Stanford’s interpretation was overbroad because it included any invention resulting from federally funded research activities, regardless of the inventor’s employment relationship with the contractor or the amount of federal funds used to support the activities.⁵⁰

The majority’s statutory interpretation followed a traditional, formalistic approach in trying to ascertain the ordinary meaning of the words and phrases that the parties disputed in context of the structure of the statute and use of the words and phrases in other provisions. Even though basic policies and objectives were expressly set out in the Bayh-Dole Act, they played no role in its interpretation. Such an interpretation based on textualism often leads to results that Congress did not intend.⁵¹ For these reasons, the Stanford dissent, authored by the strongly purposivist Justice Breyer, criticized the majority’s interpretation as being inconsistent with the Bayh-Dole Act’s basic purposes and undercutting the Act’s ability to implement its objectives.⁵²

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⁴⁴ *Stanford*, 563 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2197.
⁴⁵ *Id.* at 2198.
⁴⁶ *Id.* at 2195–96.
⁴⁷ *Id.*
⁴⁸ *Id.* at 2196.
⁴⁹ *Id.* at 2197–98.
⁵¹ See *id.* at 2201 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority’s conclusion undermines the purpose of the Bayh-Dole Act).
⁵² *Id.*
2. Losing an Essential Piece of the Puzzle of the Bayh-Dole Act: Historical Accident

Although the *Stanford* majority's statutory interpretation was technically correct in restraining its role to confirming plain meaning or resolving ambiguity, Justice Breyer was correct that it led to a result that Congress did not intend or expect, by letting inventors lawfully assign federally funded inventions and taking them out of the scope of the Bayh-Dole Act controls. The majority's interpretation also leads to a conclusion that the common law rule controls the ownership of federally funded inventions if the federal contractors fail to secure the ownership through an assignment contract. Moreover, it suggests that state contract laws and special legislation control the ownership of such inventions even if the contractors diligently try to secure the ownership through an assignment contract. Such a conclusion subjects the ownership of federally funded inventions to a risk of a technical drafting trap. Also, it allows many federally funded inventions out of the Bayh-Dole Act's restrictions, conditions, and allocation rules and makes it impossible for the federal government to implement a uniform ownership rule.

Congress did not intend to bring such results. Justice Breyer offered two solutions for avoiding the results: (1) interpreting the contractors' assignment contract to be consistent to the Bayh-Dole Act's purpose; and (2) interpreting the Bayh-Dole Act as applying the ownership rule under Executive Order 10096, which requires transfer of the ownership of invention by the federally funded employees to the federally funded employers. The first solution cannot avoid the result brought by contractors' failure to execute an assignment contract. The second solution can avoid all unintended results, but the executive order provides no basis to apply its rule to inventors who are not employees of the federal government. Further, the Bayh-Dole Act does not provide a procedure to protect inventors and third-parties.

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53 *Id.* at 2203.

54 *See infra* Part I.4.


56 *Id.* at 2201–02 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

57 *Id.* at 2202–03 (Breyer, J., dissenting).


59 *Id.* at 2203 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

60 *See infra*, Part I.3.B.

However, a mechanism for contractors to secure the ownership of all federally funded inventions from their employee-inventors is an essential part of the Bayh-Dole Act for implementing a uniform policy. Without the mechanism, many federally funded inventions would fall out of the Act's governing scope. As the Stanford majority admitted, reading the definition of "subject invention" to mean all inventions made by the contractor's employees, requiring transfer of the invention ownership to the contractor is plausible enough in the abstract. If Congress intended contractors to secure ownership by operation of law, why did it fail to include an ownership transfer mechanism for their contractors? One can find a possible answer in the Act's legislative history: Congress lost a chance to adopt an ownership transfer mechanism from the German EIA when it failed to pass bills for controlling the ownership of inventions under the employment relationship in the private sector.

Chapter 18 of the U.S. Patent Act was introduced through the enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act to implement multiple goals through a uniform patent policy for ownership allocation and licenses with respect to federally funded inventions. Among the goals, promoting commercialization of federally funded inventions has been the most successful; it is achieved by giving ownership of the inventions to universities and encouraging academic-industry collaboration through ownership.

Interestingly, a review of legislative history reveals that U.S. and German legislators began their efforts leading to the current Bayh-Dole Act and German EIA at the same historical point: the pre-WWII era. The need for spurring scientific and technological development for warfare increased government sponsored research and development in both academic and private sectors and led legislators to adopt

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65 O'CONNOR, ET AL., supra note 63, at 6.
new patent policies for the ownership of patents resulting from the research and development by the end of WWII.66

However, the two Acts developed very differently because of different focuses and social backgrounds. Acts and regulations, which were the roots of Bayh-Dole, aimed to balance rights of the federal government against rights of their employees and contractors; in contrast, regulations leading to the German EIA aimed at balancing rights of employers against rights of their employees regardless of their employment in the private or government sector. At the beginning of efforts to develop a uniform invention ownership allocation policy, the main concern of Congress was to give the federal government access to federally funded inventions, because the U.S. Supreme Court had previously developed a common law rule that employers do not have any rights in the ownership of inventions even if the inventions resulted from the performance of duty under a contract with their employees and contractors.67 To remedy the ownership problem, U.S. employers in the private sector developed the practice of having their employees execute pre-invention assignment contracts.68 Following the trend of acknowledging freedom of contract, U.S. Courts upheld and enforced such contracts.69 U.S. employees were unable to develop a collective power sufficient to enact a law reversing this trend.70 Acknowledging the industry practice, Congress enacted a series of laws to secure the ownership of national security related inventions.71 To modify the common law ownership rule, these Acts adopted clear language taking the ownership of federally funded inventions away from federal employees and contractors and giving it to the federal government.72 The President also issued an Executive Order for the federal government to secure ownership of inventions made by federal employees.73

In contrast, German law had already addressed the need to provide government access to inventions owned by its employees or private persons through the operation of a compulsory license provision in the German Patent Act.74 A more serious need was the removal of a conflict between labor and employment law and

66 Id. at 7.
67 For further discussions see infra Part I.3.B.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 157.
71 Id. at 150–51.
the patent law.\textsuperscript{75} German employee-inventors were able to develop a significant collective bargaining power well before the pre-WWII era and pressed German legislators to enact a law confirming their rights.\textsuperscript{76} The German EIA was enacted to address this need as well as the need to enhance the Nazi policy of advancing technology to develop high-tech weapons, including atomic bombs.\textsuperscript{77}

Despite these different focuses, the Bayh-Dole Act and the German EIA share key features for transferring the ownership of invention.\textsuperscript{78} Since preceding acts and regulations developed in similar time frames, it is very likely that the German EIA strongly influenced the ownership allocation rules and transfer mechanism between contractors and the federal government under the Bayh-Dole Act.\textsuperscript{79} Moreover, this influence is evidenced by Congress's attempts to pass a series of bills based on the German EIA.\textsuperscript{80} In the 1970s, Congress introduced a series of bills to implement a federal policy for controlling the employee invention ownership in the private sector.\textsuperscript{81} These German EIA based employee invention bills could have introduced a mechanism for contractor-employers to secure the ownership of inventions from their employees as an operation of law.\textsuperscript{82} Accordingly, it is likely that the Bayh-Dole Act intentionally left the ownership rules under the contractor-employee relationship to the German EIA based bills. Congress lost an important piece of the puzzle for developing a system for implementing a uniform federal policy in federally funded inventions when it failed to pass the bills. As will be discussed below, some texts in the Bayh-Dole Act support Congress's assumption of incorporating the missing piece with the German EIA based bills. This historical accident brought unintended results, as highlighted in Stanford.

\textsuperscript{75} DIETMAR HARHOF & KARIN HOISL, UNIV. OF MUNICH, INSTITUTIONALIZED INCENTIVES FOR INGENUITY—PATENT VALUE AND THE GERMAN EMPLOYEES' INVENTIONS ACT 8 (2006), available at epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1262.
\textsuperscript{76} Id. at 7.
\textsuperscript{78} See infra, Part III.1 (discussing similarities between German EIA and the Bayh-Dole Act).
\textsuperscript{79} See id. (postulating that German EIA influenced the Bayh-Dole Act).
\textsuperscript{81} H.R. 1483, supra note 80.
\textsuperscript{82} Id. § 412; William P. Hovell, Patent Ownership: An Employer's Rights to His Employee's Invention, 58 NOTRE DAME L.REV. 863, 883–86 (1983); O'CONNOR, ET AL., supra note 63, at 29.
Serious Flaw of Employee Invention Ownership

3. Unintended Results: Common Law Ownership Rules

The Stanford majority confirmed that the common law governs the ownership of federally funded inventions. Under this rule, the ownership of an invention belongs to the inventor. An employer does not have ownership of the invention made by his employee unless there is an express agreement to transfer the ownership to the employer. Without a mechanism to secure the ownership as an operation of law, the Bayh-Dole Act pre-supposes an expressive contract between the contractor and its employees to assign all rights of inventions once the inventions are complete.

However, limited resources at university technology transfer offices may prevent execution of pre-invention contracts with every employee and researcher who engages in federally funded research activities because different teams of researchers, including visiting researchers and student-interns, engage in different aspects of research projects in today’s academic-industry collaboration. If contractors failed to execute an express assignment contract, federally funded inventions remain with inventors unless the exception of “specially hired to invent” applies to the employment relationship between the inventor and employer-contractor. It is unlikely that the employment relationship between contractors and their employee-inventors fall into the exception. The “shop rights” common law rules provide equity for employers but have no value to university-contractors because universities do not practice patents by themselves.

A) Fundamental Rule: Inventors as Original Owners

In the United States, only a natural person or natural persons can be the sole inventor or joint inventors; non-human legal entities, such as corporations, are excluded from inventorship. It is a fundamental rule that ownership of invention is

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86 Regulations issued by the Administrator of the General Services Administration assumed pre-invention assignment agreements between the contractors and their employees. Bayh-Dole implementation Regulations provides a model patent contract. A clause of the contract requires the contractor to agree to secure the ownership of federally funded inventions that the contractor elects to retain title for the Federal agency. 37 CFR § 401.14(a), clause (f)(1); Mary LaFrance, LaFrance on Employee Ownership of Federally-Funded Inventions, 2010 Emerging Issues 4809 at 6 (2010).
87 Reder, supra note 6, at 16.
88 See infra Part I.3.B.
89 See infra Part I.3.B.
90 See infra Part I.3.B.
91 See 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 2.02 (2011) (providing a general discussion of inventorship under U.S. patent law).
originally vested in the inventor.\textsuperscript{92} Thus, the examination of ownership always starts from the determination of inventorship.\textsuperscript{93} Although the ownership issue is often intertwined with the inventorship issue, it is important to note that the inventorship issue—who is a true and original inventor—is a separate question from the ownership issue of who owns property rights in the invention made by the inventor.\textsuperscript{94}

Texts in the Bayh-Dole Act are unclear on whether it follows this fundamental rule and thus made it necessary for the Stanford Court to clarify the meaning of these phrases in terms of the fundamental rule of invention ownership.\textsuperscript{95} The Act defines subject invention as “any invention of the contractor conceived or first actually reduced to practice.”\textsuperscript{96} Nothing in the definition touches upon contractor-employees who conceived or reduced the invention.\textsuperscript{97} It is unclear whether any “invention of the contractor” includes all inventions by such employees.\textsuperscript{98} In the provision for allocating the ownership of subject invention, the Act adopts the phrase “elect to retain title” to describe the contractor’s right.\textsuperscript{99} This suggests the ownership as being vested in contractors because contractors cannot retain the ownership of invention unless they already received it.\textsuperscript{100} In another provision, the term “retention of rights” is used for an employee-inventor to file an application on its own.\textsuperscript{101} This suggests that the Act follows the initial ownership rule exclusive to the inventor.\textsuperscript{102} These phrases seem inconsistent because they suggest entitlement of the ownership for both parties in operation of law.

The rule that the ownership of invention is assignable is another important rule.\textsuperscript{103} Although the Patent Act applies to determine inventorship, federal law

\textsuperscript{92} E.g., Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2188, 2195 (2011).
\textsuperscript{93} 8 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 22.02 (2011).
\textsuperscript{94} Id.
\textsuperscript{95} Stanford, 563 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2196.
\textsuperscript{97} See Stanford, 563 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2200 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[S]ince the ‘contractor’ (e.g., a university or small business) is unlikely to ‘conceiv[e]’ of an idea or ‘reduc[e]’ it ‘to practice’ other than through its employees, the term ‘invention of the contractor’ must refer to the work and ideas of those employees.”).
\textsuperscript{98} Id.
\textsuperscript{99} Id.
\textsuperscript{101} Stanford, 563 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2190.
\textsuperscript{103} Stanford, 563 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2198 n.6 (2011) (distinguishing “title” to be retained by contractors from “rights” to be retained by inventors. “That argument has some force. But there may be situations where an inventor, by the terms of an assignment, has subsidiary rights in an invention to which a contractor has title, as §202(d) suggests.”).
\textsuperscript{104} Id. at 2196.
plays a very small role in the determination of ownership before filing a patent application with the USPTO when rights in the ownership of invention are transferred from the original inventor. An inventor may contract to transfer rights in future inventions before completion of the inventions; nevertheless, rights and obligations for the transfer under such a contract is controlled by state law. Unlike the German EIA, Bayh-Dole has no express provision to limit inventors’ abilities to transfer their rights in the ownership of federally funded inventions to a party other than their employers. Such transfer may occur before or after patent filing.

Texts in the Bayh-Dole Act may read to conflict with another fundamental rule: in principle, a patent should be issued only to an applying inventor although it may be issued to an inventor’s assignee because interests in invention are assignable in law by an instrument in writing. This rule that applications can be assignable by an instrument in writing is codified in the Patent Act. The statute makes clear that a patent application must be filed by the inventor, even if rights in the invention are transferred to a third-party. In contrast, the Bayh-Dole Act requires contractor-employers, instead of their employee-inventors, to file domestic and foreign patent applications. This conflict with the fundamental rule also makes unclear who is the original owner, because the right of the contractor is defined as one to “elect to retain title to a subject invention” throughout the Act.

These texts, inconsistent with the fundamental rules, would make sense if Congress enacted Bayh-Dole with an assumption that contractors would secure ownership of inventions through the mechanism found in the German EIA based bills. The phrase “any invention of the contractor” should be read to mean those for which the employer-contractor secures ownership by exercising the right to claim the invention while preventing any disposition of federally funded inventions

105 8 Chisum, supra note 93, § 22.03.
106 See Stanford, 563 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. at 2201 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (expressing his opinion that there should be a limitation to prevent inventors from unilaterally terminating their assignment agreements their employer-contractors through a separate assignment to transfer the ownership of federally funded invention to a third party).
107 See id. at 2202–03 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining how an assignee receives an equitable title when interests in invention is assigned from the inventor before filing a patent application: the assigner secures title of the invention when an application is filed by the inventor).
108 Id. at 2194–95.
113 H.R. 1483, 92d Cong. (1971) (also known as the “Moss Bills”).
to a party prior to the contractor’s exercise of the right.\textsuperscript{114} When the contractor fails to exercise the right, the ownership remains with the employee-inventor. Thus, the term “retain” is used for both contractor and inventor.\textsuperscript{115}

Further, the contractor’s duty of filing a patent application is parallel to the employer’s duty of patent application in the bills.\textsuperscript{116} However, the bills made clear that the application must be filed in the name of the inventor, and thus the text in the Bayh-Dole Act should also read the same way.\textsuperscript{117} In short, these texts tend to support Congress’s intent to introduce a mechanism for employer-contractors to secure the ownership made by their employees though the German EIA bills.

B) Employers’ Rights in Employee Inventions Under U.S. Common Law

U.S. common law gives employers very limited rights in inventions made by their employees even if they are hired to invent.\textsuperscript{118} This is particularly true with respect to university researchers because many of them are hired to teach and conduct basic research. Without any written assignment contract, the majority of inventions fall out of the scope of the Bayh-Dole Act, even if they resulted from federally funded research activities.

As the Stanford majority noted, it is often true that property rights in fruits of labor belong to his employer.\textsuperscript{119} This rule does not apply to patents because mere employment is not sufficient to transfer the ownership of employee inventions to the employer.\textsuperscript{120} In general, the ownership of inventions belongs to inventors and does not transfer to their employers unless the inventors expressly agree to assign the inventions.\textsuperscript{121} As early as 1843, the Supreme Court had assumed that ownership of employee inventions went to the inventor.\textsuperscript{122} However, the Supreme Court tried to account for the interests of employers by giving royalty free, non-exclusive licenses known as “shop rights.”\textsuperscript{123}

\begin{flushleft} \textsuperscript{114} Id. § 412. \\
\textsuperscript{115} Id. § 413. \\
\textsuperscript{116} Id. § 421. \\
\textsuperscript{117} Id. \\
\textsuperscript{118} See 8 CHISUM, supra note 93, § 22.03 (providing a general discussion of employer’s rights in employee inventions under U.S. patent law). \\
\textsuperscript{119} Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2188, 2196 (2011). \\
\textsuperscript{120} Id. \\
\textsuperscript{121} Id. at 2195. \\
\textsuperscript{122} 8 CHISUM, supra note 93, § 22.03. \\
\textsuperscript{123} Id. \end{flushleft}
Beginning from the first Patent Act in 1790, the U.S. patent system has granted patents only to applications filed by the first and true inventors. The same first Patent Act presupposes an invention made by multiple joint-inventors. The employer of an inventor, however, cannot be qualified as a co-inventor. Regardless of financial contributions or instructions given by a natural person-employer, such employer cannot obtain any rights in the ownership of an invention unless she is a joint inventor of a technology that resulted from joint labors with her employee-inventor. To qualify as a joint-inventor, she must make a contribution to the conception of the invention. This is in stark contrast to the ownership of authorship under U.S. Copyright Law, which gives the ownership directly to employers under the work-for-hire doctrine.

Therefore, universities cannot be co-inventors, and thus, can secure the ownership of invention only when they receive the ownership from inventors through an express assignment agreement. To protect interests of employers who fail to execute an express agreement, U.S. courts developed common law rules to give some rights to such employers: (1) if an employee is specially hired to make the particular invention or (2) if an employee is hired to make inventions in general. As employers, universities should also obtain these rights when their employment with inventors meets these conditions; however, as will be discussed below, it is unlikely that the employment relationship between universities and their inventors meets the second condition. Thus, the common law rule does not help universities secure ownership of federally funded inventions.

Interestingly, the foundation of the current common law rule of ownership allocation was developed through the federal government's struggles over the ownership of its employees' inventions. One of the earliest cases disputing the ownership of an employee invention was United States v. Burns. In this case, the inventor was a Major in the United States Army, and his duty had nothing to do with making inventions. He invented a tent during his employment and obtained a patent on the invention. Although the Army initially agreed to pay a royalty for a license

124 Patent Act of 1790, §6. Since patent applications were not examined under 1790 Act, a patentee needed to produce evidence that he was the first and true inventor to enforce his patent in court.
125 Id. § 1; see also 1 CHISUM, supra note 91 (providing a general discussion on multi-inventor patents).
126 1 CHISUM, supra note 91 (citing Steams v. Barret, 22 F.Cas. 1175, 1181 (C.C.D. Mass. 1816)).
127 Stern v. Trs. of Columbia Univ., 434 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see also 1 CHISUM, supra note 91, § 2.02[2][a].
129 1 CHISUM, supra note 91, § 2.03.
130 79 U.S. 246, 251 (1870).
131 Id. at 252.
132 Id.
to use his patented tent, it later attempted to avoid payment. While affirming the Court of Claims' judgment to order the payment, the Supreme Court commented in dictum as to the government's rights in the ownership of invention: "[i]f an officer in the military service, not specially employed to make experiments with a view to suggest improvements, devises a new and valuable improvement in arms, tents, or any other kind of war materials, he is entitled to the benefit of it, . . . the government cannot, after the patent is issued, make use of the improvement any more than a private individual, without license of the inventor or making compensation to him."\(^{134}\)

In dicta, the Court likewise commented on the applicability of the ownership rule to private employee-inventors.\(^{135}\) This ownership rule, exclusive to inventors, was further reinforced in Solomons v. United States,\(^{136}\) another case involving a federal government employee in which the Court held that the mere presence of an employment contract with an inventor does not give rise to any rights in the invention for his employer. As a result, the ownership rule, exclusive to inventors, took a firm root as a common law rule in U.S. case law.

Although U.S. courts have consistently denied any rights in the ownership to non-inventors, based solely on the invention resulting from the performance of an employment contract, they have been concerned about fairness and equity with respect to interests to employers who provided physical facilities and financial support for making the invention.\(^{137}\) Such concerns led to the development of two exceptions to the ownership exclusive to the inventor rule: (1) non-exclusive, personal, non-transferable licenses called shop rights and (2) a duty of assignment based on the contract to hire inventors for inventing particular subject matter.\(^{138}\) The McClurg case, decided in 1843, involved an invention made by an employee of a private firm.\(^{139}\) In that case, the Supreme Court affirmed a circuit court's finding that presumed a license with respect to an improvement made by the inventor in the course of his employment.\(^{140}\)

Relying on McClurg, the Court endorsed the presence of an implied license in another case involving an employee-inventor of a private firm, Hapgood v. Hewitt.\(^{141}\) However, the Court clearly distinguished the nature of employment giv-

\(^{133}\) *Id.* at 253.

\(^{134}\) *Id.* at 252.

\(^{135}\) *Id.*

\(^{136}\) 137 U.S. 342 (1890).

\(^{137}\) 8 CHISUM, supra note 93, § 22.03[1][d].

\(^{138}\) *Id.* § 22.03.

\(^{139}\) McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. 202, 205 (1843).

\(^{140}\) *Id.* at 204.

\(^{141}\) 119 U.S. 226, 233 (1886).
Serious Flaw of Employee Invention Ownership

ing rise to a license from that of employment giving rise to a duty to assign rights in
the ownership of invention.\textsuperscript{142} Although the inventor was hired to invent in general,
such employment gave rise only to a personal and non-transferable license.\textsuperscript{143} The
Court denied the plaintiff's claim to transfer the ownership of invention.\textsuperscript{144}

The concept of an implied license was further elaborated in the context of the
employment law rule in the government employer case discussed above, \textit{Solomons}.\textsuperscript{145} The Court made it clear that if an employee was hired to invent some-
thing, he had thereby given his employer an irrevocable license to use his inven-
tion.\textsuperscript{146} The Court justified the implied license by relying on the fact that the inven-
tor "recognized [his] obligations of service flowing from his employment and the
benefits resulting from his use of property, and the assistance of the co-employees,
of his employer."\textsuperscript{147} In short, the Supreme Court acknowledged the fundamental
employment rule.

Nevertheless, the Court decided to maintain the supremacy of the ownership-
exclusive-to-the-inventor rule while granting a license to compensate employers for
their loss of rights in the ownership of inventions, a type of property resulting from
their employees' labor.\textsuperscript{148} The Court later called this royalty free non-exclusive li-
cense a shop right stating that "where a servant, during his hours of employment,
working with his master's materials and appliances, conceives and perfects an in-
vention for which he obtains a patent, he must accord his master a nonexclusive
right to practice the invention."\textsuperscript{149} Since employee-inventors receive federal funds
from universities, as well as assistance of co-workers and access to facilities, uni-
versities are clearly entitled to a "shop right" for federally funded inventions made
by their employees; however, such right has no value to universities because uni-
versities do not practice inventions by themselves and a shop right is non-
transferable.\textsuperscript{150}

In addition to being subject to shop rights, U.S. employees are under a duty to
transfer rights in the ownership of their inventions if the nature of employment indi-
cates that the employees are specially hired to invent a specific machine or pro-

\textsuperscript{142} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{143} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{144} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{145} \textit{Solomons v. United States}, 137 U.S. 342 (1890).
\textsuperscript{146} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{147} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{148} \textit{Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc.}, 563 U.S. \_
\textsuperscript{149} 131 S. Ct. 2188, 2195 (2011).
\textsuperscript{149} \textit{United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp.}, 289 U.S.178, 188 (1933).
\textsuperscript{150} \textit{Hapgood v. Hewitt}, 119 U.S. 226, 233 (1886); 8 \textit{CHISUM, supra} note 93, § 22.03[1][c].
It is unlikely that the employment relationships between universities and their employees fall into this category. In *Standard Parts Co. v. Peck*, the employment contract between a private employer and its employee expressly indicated that the inventor was hired to develop a process and the associated machinery for the production of a part used in a particular product of the employer. Although the contract was silent with respect to patents resulting from the development, the Court affirmed the district court's decree ordering the employee to transfer the ownership of patents to his employer. Even if a researcher is hired to conduct a particular research project identified in a funding agreement, it is unlikely that the employment contract with the university satisfied the degree of subject matter specification, with respect to a particular invention, that would give rise to an ownership assignment duty.

U.S. common law requires employers to give full notice during employment contract negotiations to their employee-inventors regarding the transfer of invention ownership subject to the employment contract, because the “specially hired to invent” doctrine is an exception to the ownership rule exclusive to inventors. U.S. courts have repeatedly held that an employment contract to hire an employee for inventing something in general does not give rise to a duty of assignment. In another case involving a government employee, *United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp.*, the Supreme Court emphasized the distinction between the contract of hiring an inventor for conducting research and making inventions in general, and that of hiring an inventor for making a particular invention. According to the majority in *Dubilier*, hiring an employee to create an invention gives rise to an ownership assignment duty with respect to that employee’s inventions only if such inventions are the precise subject of the employment contract. Accordingly, the terms of an employment contract must be clear enough to define which invention the employer paid for so that the ownership of that invention can be transferred to the employer. The Court highlighted the distinction between rights in the ownership of inventions and other types of properties resulting from regular labor; only the former was said to result from inventive activities showing an exercise of unique creativity beyond ordinary skill.

Due to this special nature of inventions, rights in the ownership of the invention do not transfer to employers unless employees specially bargained for and

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151 8 CHISUM, supra note 93, § 22.03[2].
152 264 U.S. 52, 59 (1924).
153 Id. at 59–60.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 189–190.
agreed to the compensation for the inventions when they entered into the employment contract. It is rare for universities to have an employment contract detailing tasks for university researchers. Further, university researchers engage in basic research, which usually results in inventions that need further investment prior to commercialization. University inventors do not have opportunities to bargain for such inventions when they are first employed by universities because their inventions are unforeseeable at the initial time of employment.

The Court also used this special nature of invention to define the scope of shop rights. Employers are entitled to a license to use the invention, but have no right to demand a transfer of the ownership of invention because the invention is the original conception of the employee; thus, it should remain the property of the employee. In *Dubilier Condenser Corp.*, the employment contract only stipulated that the inventor was hired to conduct research in general. This finding led to the Court's refusal to transfer patents held by the employee-inventor to the federal employer. Thus, *Dubilier* also implies that universities can only obtain a shop right.

This reluctance to infer a contract to assign rights in the ownership of an invention is supported by the patent policy of promoting innovations through inventions. To preserve incentives to invent, U.S. case law prevents employers from taking away property rights in the invention and secures opportunities for employee-inventors to bargain with their employers for the fair value of their inventions. In other words, the patent policy of promoting innovation through rewards to inventors is supported through the bargaining between inventors and their employers over a transfer of property rights in inventions.

The Bayh-Dole Act touches upon neither shop rights nor the "specially-hired doctrine." Under the common law ownership rule, in addition to the contractors, the government may have a shop right with respect to inventions made by its contractors' employees, depending on the nature of the contract. Some may view the provision to require an agreement in the contract with respect to the government's right to use the invention as simply confirming the common law shop rights.

The Bayh-Dole Act's legislative history rejects such a view and instead supports a view that the right is created only through an express license with the con-

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158 *See* Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (discussing the difficulties facing universities arising from their focus on basic research).


160 *Id.*

161 *Id.* at 188–89.

162 *Id.* at 193.

163 *Id.* at 189–90.

tractor. In an early effort to develop a uniform patent policy concerning federal employees, the government issued an executive order defining the types of employment that give rise to the duty to transfer the ownership of invention and to a “shop right.” An Attorney General report leading to the executive order also included a recommendation for the ownership of federally funded inventions developed by government contractors. It did not recommend using the definitions for deciding the ownership of contractor inventions; instead, it adopted a general rule to retain government ownership of such inventions with some exceptions. The recommendation required inclusion of a clause granting the government a right to use the invention and “March-in Rights” in a contract between a federal agency and its contractor when an exception applies and the government allows the contractor to retain ownership of federally funded inventions. This recommendation was implemented by the Kennedy Administration in 1963. Since the Bayh-Dole Act codified the government’s rights, the rights to use the invention under the Act should be viewed separately from a shop right under the common law ownership rule. Thus, these rights should be available only through an express license from the contractors who hold the ownership of inventions and patents.

Throughout the legislative history of the Bayh-Dole Act, Congress paid very little attention to contractor-employee relationships during the development of the best practice of ownership allocation because this exercise focused on the allocation between the government and its contractors. This relationship was only discussed with respect to the German EIA based bills. In other words, implementation of the best ownership allocation relied on the assumption that contractors are able to secure ownership of all inventions that fall into the definition of “subject invention” through pre-invention assignment contract practice until the bills introduce an ownership transfer mechanism in operation of law. Unfortunately, this assumption has not always proven true, as illustrated in Stanford. Moreover, Congress has never been able to pass the contemplated bills. The common law rule is not helpful for contractors, particularly universities, in securing the ownership of invention if they fail to execute an assignment contract. If a contractor fails to secure ownership of a federally funded invention, the federal government loses rights in that in-

167 Id. at 5; O’CONNOR, ET AL., supra note 63, at 8.
168 O’CONNOR, ET AL., supra note 63, at 8.
170 O’CONNOR, ET AL., supra note 63, at 15.
vention because government rights in inventions can only be secured through agreements with its contractors.

4. Unintended Results: Non-Uniform Assignment under State Contract Law and Special Legislations

Even if contractors execute an express assignment contract with their employees, it is unclear whether the assignment duty is enforceable if the duty includes assignments of all inventions which fall into the definition of subject inventions: "conceived or first actually reduced to practice in the performance of work under a funding agreement." The Stanford majority suggested that such an assignment duty is overbroad. Moreover, the enforceable scope of such assignment agreements may differ from one state to another. This non-uniformity in securing the ownership of federally funded inventions through pre-invention assignment contracts hinders the goals of the Bayh-Dole Act.

Despite the important role played by pre-invention assignment contracts in implementing federal policy, U.S. courts leave interpretation and enforceability of contract terms to the governance of state policies through the application of state contract law. The Supreme Court empowered state courts to develop their own laws governing state questions regarding such invention issues as ownership and transfer of patents. However, state courts in general acknowledge the significance of federal case law and follow the precedent of the Supreme Court. This has led to a development of fairly uniform common law rules in ownership and assignment enforceability throughout state and federal courts in the United States.

Although the uniform common law requires an express agreement to transfer ownership, state law generally governs such an agreement, with some exceptions. One such exception arises when there is a question as to whether a patent assignment clause created an automatic assignment. This issue is governed by federal law because it closely relates to the question of standing in patent cases governed by federal laws. Under Federal Circuit case law, the contract language "agree to assign" indicates a mere promise to assign; thus, the assignment of future inventions does not occur unless a subsequent written instrument executes the assign-

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174 8 CHISUM, supra note 93, § 22.03[4].
175 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
177 See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 583 F.3d 832, 837 (Fed. Cir. 2009), aff'd, 563 U.S. ____, 131 S. Ct. 2188 (2011).
179 Roche, 583 F.3d at 841.
ment. In contrast, the language "do hereby assign" or "will assign" indicates a present assignment and rights in the inventions are automatically transferred to the employer as soon as the inventions are completed. Accordingly, whether a contractor secures a transfer of ownership of a federally funded invention depends on the terms used in the pre-invention assignment contract that the contractor and its employees agreed upon, leaving contractors to easily fall into a technical drafting trap. Although it is likely that state courts also follow Federal Circuit case law, they may apply their own law, which may lead to a different conclusion with respect to the ownership of a federally funded invention.

Furthermore, differing state public policies regarding the ownership of an assignment agreement in employment contracts lead to non-uniformity in the scope of inventions for which contractors can secure ownership of federally funded inventions from their employees. In general, employers are not required to pay any additional compensation as a consideration for a transfer of rights in an invention. This is because U.S. courts view the payment of salary, assistance of co-employees, and right to use an employer's facility as constituting sufficient consideration. Legal scholars have criticized the case law endorsing U.S. industry pre-invention assignment practice without any compensation and some argue that lack of additional compensation dampens incentive to invent and contradicts the federal patent system policy under the Copyright and Patent Clause. These academic views are not persuasive to U.S. courts, which refuse to find any right that the constitutional clause gives to inventors. Since the common law ownership rules require pre-invention assignment agreements to be not only expressive, but also clear (in order to give a notice to inventors with respect to what they give up in exchange for their

180 Id.
181 Id. at 842; see also Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2188, 2198 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (criticizing this interpretation distinguishing two equitable claims based on the terms in pre-assignment contracts and urging the application of the previous rule that treated two claims equally and gave the ownership of invention to Stanford because the Stanford contract came first and then subsequently obtained a post-invention assignment).
182 Stanford, 563 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2203 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
184 E.g., Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Miller, 22 F.2d 353, 355 (9th Cir. 1927).
185 See, e.g., Parker, supra note 183, at 604–05; Bartow, supra note 183, at 683–84; Mark B. Baker & Andre J. Brunel, Restructuring the Judicial Evaluation of Employed Inventors’ Rights, 35 St. Louis U. L.J. 399 (1991); Steven Cherensky, A Penny for Their Thoughts: Employee-Inventors, Pre-Invention Assignment Agreements, Property, and Personhood, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 597 (1993).
salary) courts consider the inventor’s salary as sufficient consideration to enforce the agreement.\footnote{Aetna-Standard Eng’g Corp. v. Rowland, 493 A.2d 1375, 1379 (Pa. 1985).} Although U.S. courts favor enforcing an express assignment contract, if an employee’s duties of assignment are overbroad, they may decline to enforce an agreement literally.\footnote{Dratler, supra note 68, at 142.} Courts may reinterpret the overbroad agreement to limit the duties within a reasonable scope.\footnote{Id. at 142–44 (discussing Guth v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 72 F.2d 385, 387–88 (7th Cir. 1934)); see also Universal Winding Co. v. Clarke, 108 F. Supp. 329 (D. Conn. 1952).} In some states, an employment contract including an overbroad assignment agreement is void and unenforceable.\footnote{These states currently include California, Minnesota, North Carolina, Washington and Nevada. O’CONNOR, ET AL., supra note 63, at 85.} In general, legislation enacted in these states prevents employers from enforcing a contract obligating a transfer of rights in the ownership of the invention that is developed entirely on the employee’s own time unless (1) the invention relates to employer’s business or to the employer’s actual or “demonstrably anticipated” research and development or (2) the invention results from work performed by the employee for the employer.\footnote{LaFrance, supra note 104, at 96.} In contrast, only one state, Nevada, has enacted legislation which allows transfer of rights in the ownership of invention automatically without any express agreement if the invention is made during the term of employment and falls within the scope of the employee’s job description.\footnote{Id. at 88} In some states, a contract to transfer rights in the ownership of any invention made during the term of employment may be valid and enforceable regardless of the invention’s relation to the inventor’s duties or the employer’s business, as long as the invention resulted from work the employee conducted for his employer.\footnote{Cubic Corp. v. Marty, 229 Cal Rptr. 828, 836 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).}

In short, the ownership of an invention may or may not transfer to contractors depending on the state law which governs the employment relationship. There is no uniform federal law to govern the enforceable scope of an employee invention assignment agreement. When Congress failed to pass the German EIA based bills, it also lost a chance to develop a uniform policy to govern assignment contracts for employee inventions, including federally funded inventions.\footnote{H.R. 1483, 92d Cong. (1971).} Furthermore, the \textit{Stanford} majority’s comment on the scope of subject invention suggests its interest in overriding state contract laws and special legislations while preventing the enforcement of overbroad assignment duties.\footnote{9} This leads to another uncertainty:
whether the ownership of a federally funded invention may or may not transfer to contractors.

Finally, the Stanford majority’s interpretation of the Bayh-Dole Act does not prevent employee-inventors from transferring the ownership of federally funded inventions to a party other than their employer-contractors. Stanford could not have avoided its loss of ownership even if it had executed an automatic assignment with the inventor because the inventor already executed an assignment contract with a third-party prior to the Stanford assignment. In academic-industry collaborations, researchers move back and forth between universities and industry partners and conduct different aspects of research projects in various locations with different research teams. Researchers contract for multiple assignments with a variety of terms throughout projects, which often leads to inconsistent duties, as highlighted in Stanford. With limited resources, it is impossible for contractors to conduct due diligence on all researchers with respect to their prior assignments.

II. Ownership Transfer Mechanism Under Federal Laws for Handling National Security Related Inventions

Since a uniform policy could be implemented through contractors’ ownership of federally funded inventions, the Bayh-Dole Act should adopt a mechanism for transferring such ownership to contractors. Congress has already incorporated such a mechanism in federal laws for handling inventions closely related to national security. Statutes and regulations dealing with such inventions provide mechanisms for securing the government’s ownership through an automatic transfer by operation of law. They also provide procedures for inventors and their assignees to challenge the federal government’s ownership and protect their interests. Stanford urged the Supreme Court to read the Bayh-Dole Act to implicitly adopt a similar mechanism. The Court rejected Stanford’s interpretation because the Act does not include language that clearly negates the common law ownership rules and lacks procedures to protect inventors and third-parties who did not receive federal funds. This suggests that the Bayh-Dole Act could be revised to adopt the

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195 See Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2188, 2198 (2011) (“Stanford’s reading suggests that the school would obtain title to one of its employee’s inventions even if only one dollar of federal funding was applied toward the invention’s conception or reduction to practice.”).
196 Id. at 2201.
197 Reder, supra note 6, at 16.
198 See infra Part II.1-2.
199 See infra Part II.1-2.
201 Id. at 2195–96.
202 Id. at 2196–98.
mechanism from these federal laws by including language that vests the ownership in contractors and adopts a procedure to protect third-parties; however, such a revision may not be feasible because it would substantially increase the administration costs of both the USPTO and contractors.

1. Atomic Energy Act

The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA) was enacted by Congress to secure the government’s ownership of subject inventions by operation of law.\(^{203}\) A “subject invention” under the AEA is an invention that relates to the utilization of special nuclear material or atomic energy in atomic weapons (“NMAE invention”), and thus, is closely related to national security.\(^{204}\) The AEA includes a declaration of the strong federal policy for using the invention to improve the general welfare and avoid its use in an atomic weapon.\(^{205}\) Reflecting this policy, the AEA prevents the USPTO from issuing a patent to a NMAE invention as long as it is used in an atomic weapon.\(^{206}\) It makes it clear that the federal government’s ownership of the invention falls into the definition of an NMAE invention by operation of law. The AEA defines the government’s ownership of a subject invention using language that is very different from that in the Bayh-Dole Act defining ownership. Under the AEA, any NMAE invention is “vested in and . . . the property of the [Atomic Energy] Commission if the invention is made or conceived in the course of or under any contract . . . or arrangement entered into with or for the benefit of the Commission.”\(^{207}\)

In order to secure the federal government’s ownership of an NMAE invention by operation of law, the AEA provides a mechanism for discovering any NMAE inventions included in a patent application filed by an inventor, regardless of whether the inventions resulted from federal funds.\(^{208}\) Like the Bayh-Dole Act with respect to contractors, the AEA imposes an obligation on all applicants to file statements explaining the full facts surrounding the making and conceiving of the inventions when they file patent applications for NMAE inventions.\(^{209}\) The AEA requires the USPTO to forward copies of the application and the statement to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) as soon as the USPTO concludes that the invention is in the condition of allowance.\(^{210}\) The USPTO must then issue a patent


\(^{206}\) Id. § 2181.

\(^{207}\) Id. § 2182.

\(^{208}\) Id.

\(^{209}\) Id.

\(^{210}\) Id.
directly to the AEC, if the Commission so directs. The AEA also provides applicants with the right to challenge the Commission’s ownership of invention if applicants believe that the invention was not made or conceived in the course of any contract or arrangement with the AEC.

The AEA imposes a duty on inventors to file either a report of an invention with the AEC or a patent application with the USPTO if they have made an NMAE invention. Ownership disputes are resolved through interference procedures at the USPTO. The AEA reinforces the government’s ownership by negating any potential waiver and by giving authority to the AEC to request that the USPTO transfer ownership of the patent in the NMAE invention to the AEC if an applicant is found to have submitted a statement containing materially false statements.

It should be noted that NMAE inventions are different from other inventions because the federal government is able to prevent the USPTO from issuing a patent even if the government does not have any rights in the ownership of the inventions. Both the AEA and the Invention Secrecy Act give the government the authority to dispose of an inventor’s rights in any patent deriving from a particular invention. Under the Invention Secrecy Act, the USPTO screens patent applications to find those associated with NMAE inventions and may issue an order to keep the invention secret, regardless of government ownership, if disclosure of such invention might be detrimental to national security regardless of government ownership. If such an order is issued, the grant of the patent is withheld as long as the disclosure is deemed to be detrimental to national security. The only remedy for an applicant’s loss of patent rights is monetary compensation. Further, whenever a patent is issued on an NMAE invention, the AEA provides the AEC with the right to use the invention, as well as the right to issue a compulsory license for a third party to use the invention.

2. National Aeronautics and Space Act

Inventions relating to aeronautical and space activities are another type of invention closely related to national security. Congress felt it necessary to promote

211 Id.
212 Id.
213 Id. § 2181.
214 Id. § 2182.
215 Id.
216 1 CHISUM, supra note 91, § 1.06[4].
218 Id.
219 Id.
220 Id. § 183.
such activities in order to improve general welfare and national security; thus, it enacted the National Aeronautics and Space Act (NAS Act). Under the NAS Act, aeronautical and space activities include (1) research into and the solution of problems related to flight within and outside the earth’s atmosphere; (2) the development, construction, testing, and operation of aeronautical and space vehicles for research purposes; and (3) such other activities as may be required for the exploration of space. Due to a strong federal policy in favor of promoting national security, the NAS Act, like the AEA, clearly transfers the ownership of federally funded inventions to the government by operation of law via the following provision: “such invention shall be the exclusive property of the United States . . .”

The NAS Act provides a mechanism, similar to the mechanism found in the German EIA, for securing government ownership of subject inventions. The NAS Act requires all applicants to file a statement surrounding the circumstances under which the invention was made so that the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (“NASA”) can determine whether the invention resulted from the performance of any contract work with NASA. The NAS Act also gives NASA the authority to request that the USPTO issue a patent directly to NASA on behalf of the federal government. Finally, the NAS Act also provides an applicant with the ability to challenge NASA’s decision regarding ownership through interference procedures at the USPTO.

It is likely that many aeronautical and space activity related inventions fall into the category of those inventions that would, if disclosed, be detrimental to national security. Thus, through the Invention Secrecy Act, the government has a right of disposition with respect to such inventions, so long as it provides fair compensation to applicants.

3. Applicability of the Ownership Transfer Mechanism to the Bayh-Dole Act

Unfortunately, the mechanisms included in the AEA and NAS Acts that secure the government’s ownership of federally funded inventions are an ill fit to the Bayh-Dole Act. Both the AEA and the NAS Acts impose heavy burdens on the USPTO to screen inventions and to inform the government if any invention falls within the scope of the Acts so that the related federal agencies can determine if the

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227 Id.
government has any right in the ownership of an invention. The Acts also require applicants to submit a statement regarding the circumstances under which the invention was made. This screening process is feasible at the USPTO only because the categories of inventions to which the Acts apply are narrowly tailored and the number of applications relating to inventions falling within the categories is relatively small. Expanding the categories of inventions to cover all types of inventions that contractors could create during research and development is impossible. Imposing on contractor-applicants a duty to file a statement reporting inventive activities unnecessarily increases administrative burden on both the USPTO and applicants. In short, the increased administrative burden makes it impractical for the Bayh-Dole Act to adopt the ownership transfer mechanism from the AEA or NAS Acts.

III. Ownership Transfer Mechanism Under the German EIA

As Congress has done in the past, it can reasonably look for an ownership transfer mechanism in foreign employee invention systems, such as the German EIA, which is already a model for many Asian and European countries. This is particularly true with the Bayh-Dole Act because texts in the Act suggest that the Act assumed that the ownership rules for employee inventions in the failed bills, which were based on the German EIA, would be enacted. Overall, the German EIA’s mechanism for securing rights in the ownership of invention is very similar to the one in the Bayh-Dole Act, sharing the following five key features: (1) inventor’s duty to report; (2) employer’s rights to claim the ownership of an invention resulting from the performance of an employment or research contract; (3) duty to file domestic and foreign patent applications; (4) retention of the ownership of an invention by its inventor if no one exercises a superior right to claim; and (5) right of reasonable compensation for transfers of rights in the ownership of inventions. Moreover, the fundamental ownership rules under German Patent Law are the same as the rules under U.S. Patent Law. Legislative histories of these Acts reveal a cornerstone event in one country followed by a similar event in the other, which suggests that U.S. and German governments were aware that they

229 Id.
230 See supra Part I.2.
231 German EIA supra note 19, § 5.
232 Id. § 6.
233 Id. §§ 13–14.
234 Id. § 8.
235 Id.
236 See infra Part III.2.A.
were engaging in similar exercises. Reflecting the risk adverse German culture that prefers written rules and detailed codes of conduct, the German EIA contains more detailed procedures for transferring ownership and more specific mechanisms to protect employee interests than the Bayh-Dole Act.237

1. Origin of Common Key Features: Possible Legislative Interaction

The German EIA provides a comprehensive mechanism for employers to secure all property rights in the ownership of inventions made by employees.238 Due to Germany’s unique practice of compromising between public interests based on employment and patent law, the German legislature enacted a law independent from German Patent Law that included both details for rights and obligations between employees and their employers and procedures to transfer rights in the ownership of inventions from employee-inventors to their employers.239

In Germany, the effort to clarify ownership and compensation started at the beginning of the 20th Century as the number of employee-inventors increased.240 This was also the time when Congress began to examine the government’s rights to use inventions made by private persons, as well as those made by federal employees, eventually leading to the Bayh-Dole Act.241 During WWI, German employee-inventors were able to develop a collective bargaining power that led to the first collective labor agreement in the chemical industry in 1920, which dealt with ownership and compensation for employee inventions.242 Other industry sectors followed this example.243 In 1942, during WWII and after several failed attempts to replace the collective labor agreements with a generally applicable law, the Minister of Armament, motivated by the necessity of promoting technological advancement, issued a regulation to handle employee inventions.244 The 1942 regulation already included a number of the key features of the ownership transfer mechanism that would later be contained in the modern German EIA.245 The regulation was revised in 1943 to add guidelines for calculating the amount of remuneration based on a list of factors.246

237 See infra Part III.2.B.
238 See infra Part III.2.B.
239 HARHOFF & HOISL, supra note 75, at 8.
240 Id. at 7.
241 O’CONNOR, ET AL., supra note 63, at 4.
242 HARHOFF & HOISL, supra note 75, at 7 n.6 (stating the name of the landmark agreement of April 27, 1920: Reichstarifvertrag für die akademischgebildeten Angestellten der chemischen Indusries).
243 Id. at 7.
244 Id. (stating the name of the regulation: Verordnung über die Behandlung von Erfindungen von Gefolgschaftsmitgliedern ("Provisions on the Handling of Inventions of Subordinates").
245 Id.
246 Id. (stating the name of the revised regulation: Richtlinien für die Vergütung von Gefolgschaftserfindungen ("Guidelines for Subordinate Inventions").
That same year, President Roosevelt requested that the United States Attorney General develop a uniform patent policy for federal employees and contractors. A report was published by the Attorney General a few years later in response to the President's request. The report recommended a mechanism that decided the ownership by classifying inventions developed by federal employees into three categories, which are somewhat similar to the categories of inventions under the German EIA.

As soon as it recovered from the aftermath of WWII, the German government resumed its effort to enact a law that would allocate ownership rights in employee inventions and provide for inventor compensation. Although introduced in 1952, the first bill failed to be enacted into law due to overly lengthy discussions. The current German Employee Inventions Act became effective in 1957, including all five key features. The Act was revised in 1959 to incorporate official guidelines for calculating the amount of inventor remuneration.

It is also interesting to note that in 1963, only a few years after the enactment of the German EIA, the U.S. government published the Kennedy Patent Policy, which was most influential with respect to the Bayh-Dole Act as it recommended all of the key features in that Act's current provisions. Although the Kennedy Patent Policy was never implemented as a government-wide patent policy, many federal agencies adopted their own policies incorporating a few or all of its key features. The key features of the Kennedy Patent Policy survived modification by the Nixon Administration and were finally codified when the Bayh-Dole Act was enacted in 1980.

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247 O'CONNOR, ET AL., supra note 63, at 6.
248 Id. at 6–7 (referring to the Dep't of Justice, Investigation of Government Patents and Practices and Policies, Reports and Recommendations of the Attorney General to President of 1947).
249 Id.
250 Germany was divided into West Germany (Federal Republic of Germany) and East Germany (German Democratic Republic) over the period between 1949 and 1990. East Germany had its own employee invention system during the period.
251 HARHOFF & HOISL, supra note 75, at 7–9.
252 Id. at 8.
253 Id. at 9.
255 O'CONNOR, ET AL., supra note 63, at 11.
257 O'CONNOR, ET AL, supra note 63, at 11.
Likewise, all five key features in the German EIA have remained the same since its enactment in 1957. The EIA was recently revised in 2002 and 2009, but these revisions did not significantly affect the key features.

In parallel to the above exercise leading to the Bayh-Dole Act, the U.S Congress also examined a series of bills starting the 1970s followed by the last bill in 1982. Many provisions of these bills are effectively translations of the German EIA. These bills confirm Congress’s strong interests in the German EIA, which would have resulted in a clear influence on the overall structure of the Bayh-Dole Act.

2. Ownership Rules Under the German EIA

A) Fundamental Rule: Inventors as Original Owners

Under German patent law, a right to patent is initially vested only in the sole inventor or co-inventors who have made creative contributions to the invention. An employer cannot be an inventor or co-inventor unless he or she makes such a contribution. Additionally, only a natural person can make such a contribution; thus, a legal entity cannot be an inventor. This fundamental rule is universal to all branches of intellectual property, including copyright, in the German legal system. There is no “work for hire” exception to the rule as there is in U.S. copyright law.

Because ownership in both German and U.S. patent law always originates from the inventor, an examination of inventorship is a sensible starting point for determining ownership. While patent law applies to determine who is the inventor, unlike U.S. patent law, German patent law plays a very limited role in determining the ownership of an invention before the patent application is filed. In general, the property and contract principles found in the German Civil Codes govern the assignment of property rights, including those in the ownership of an invention. Regarding the ownership of property rights resulting from the performance of duty under an employment contract, German labor and employment law may provide a

258 TRIMBORN, supra note 19, at 2.
263 Id.
special rule governing contracts between employers and their employees that reflects public policy regarding the ownership of property rights resulting from the performance of duty under an employment contract. German labor and employment law makes it clear that the fruits of employees' labor belong to their employers. This ownership rule conflicts with the patent law rule, which vests original ownership in inventors. To remove this conflict while achieving the public policies of both patent law and labor and employment law, German legislators enacted the EIA, which governs the assignment of invention ownership rights between employers and employees.

B) Employers' Rights in Employee Inventions Under the German EIA

Under the German EIA, the patent law rule that inventors are original owners prevails over the employer-friendly rule of employment law. Thus, the German EIA's rule is perfectly in-line with U.S. law in vesting original ownership rights in employee-inventors. However, the German EIA differs from the U.S. rule by guaranteeing employers a right to claim either the transfer of ownership of employees' inventions or an exclusive license to use those inventions. In other words, the German EIA limits the parties' freedom of contract and makes any contract conflicting with a provision of EIA void.

Due to the mandatory nature of the German EIA, and the strong public policies it reflects, the German EIA clearly defines the scope of inventions that it governs. The Act covers any technical subject matter, regardless of its patentability, as long as it is made by an employee-inventor. Under German employment law, an employee is a person who is bound by instructions on the grounds of an employment relationship and obliged in personal dependence on another, the employer. The technical subject matter that the German EIA governs is classified into inventions and technical improvement proposals. Inventions are distinguished from technical improvement proposals in that inventions qualify for protection under ei-

266 Id. § 21(1)(a).
268 TRIMBORN, supra note 19, at 2.
269 See generally German EIA, supra note 19.
270 German Patent Act, supra note 262, § 6; TRIMBORN, supra note 19, at 1.
271 Id. § 21(1)(a).
272 Id. § 22.
273 Id. § 1; HARHOFF & HOISL, supra note 75, at 9.
274 TRIMBORN, supra note 19, at 12.
275 German EIA, supra note 19, §§ 2–3.
Serious Flaw of Employee Invention Ownership

Subject matter that may not be the subject of a patent falls into the category of technical improvement proposals and is not subject to various duties relating to patent applications. Patentable inventions are further classified into two types: service inventions (also known as “tied” inventions) and free inventions. An invention made during a term of employment is a service invention if (1) it resulted from the employee’s tasks in the employer’s business or public administration, or (2) it is essentially based upon the experience or activities of the employer’s business or public administration. Any inventions that do not fall into the definition of service invention are free inventions.

The German EIA guarantees employers the right to claim ownership of all property rights in service inventions. Before the 2009 revision, an employer had to submit a document that met certain formality requirements under the Civil Code. The revision eliminated the formality requirement and made it possible for employers to make a declaration by e-mail or facsimile. Accordingly, ownership transfer under the German EIA was not automatic; thus, the German EIA was different from the U.S. AEA and NAS Acts, in which assignment of invention ownership rights was automatic as an operation of law. Like an assignment based on the “agree to assign” term in Stanford, an assignment under the German EIA is executed only when the inventor’s employer exercises its right to claim ownership. This pre-2009 requirement of a written instrument to execute an assignment is also similar to the practice widely adopted by U.S. employers of using “agree to assign” terms in pre-invention assignment contracts.

Failing to exercise the claiming right may forfeit the employer’s right in the ownership of service inventions under the German EIA. The EIA lets employee-inventors retain ownership rights and gives freedom to assign ownership to a third-party, including the employer’s competitor, if their employers do not exercise their

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276 Id. § 2.
277 Id. § 3.
278 Id. § 4(1).
279 Id. § 4(2).
280 German EIA, supra note 19, § 4(3).
281 Id. § 6(1).
282 German Civil Code, supra note 267, § 126b.
283 Petersen-Padberg & Müller, supra note 259, at 3.
285 See Arachnid, Inc. v. Merit Industries, Inc., 939 F.2d 1574, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (providing an example of an “agree to assign” clause).
286 German EIA, supra note 19, § 8.
claiming rights within the "four months from the receipt of proper report."\textsuperscript{287} The 2009 revision remedied this problem by introducing a presumption of employers' proper exercise of their claiming right unless they send out a declaration negating their claim and releasing their rights to the invention within four months of receiving an invention report from the employee.\textsuperscript{288} This assumption made the EIA's ownership transfer mechanism complete in terms of protecting employers from loss of their rights in service inventions because of their negligence or ignorance of EIA provisions.

The German EIA further protects employers' rights by voiding any transactions that transferred ownership of a service invention prior to the employer's exercise of its claim if those transactions affect the employer's right.\textsuperscript{289} As of the 2009 revision, any prior transactions become void when the four month period for declaring the release of a service invention expires.\textsuperscript{290} After an employee submits a report, the employer has two months to request supplemental information for the report.\textsuperscript{291} Upon the expiration of this two month period, a report is deemed to be complete and triggers the four month period for declaring the release of the invention. Without a timely declaration of release, all property rights in the ownership of service inventions transfer to the employer.\textsuperscript{292}

Although the Bayh-Dole Act adopted the same default rule and claiming right, the Bayh-Dole Act lacked any mechanism to secure the transfer of ownership rights between contractors and their employees. Even though the Act gives contractors a claiming right with respect to their federal funding employer, it provides no express right to claim ownership of inventions made by the contractors' employee-inventors.\textsuperscript{293} Whether contractors can secure ownership of such inventions depends on state contract law and special legislation that may limit the enforceability of pre-invention assignments, despite contractors' duties under the current default rule to transfer rights in such inventions to the federal funding agency if contractors do not exercise their right to elect title.

Under the German EIA, the complete ownership transfer mechanism functions only with respect to service inventions. To distinguish free inventions from service inventions, the EIA imposes a duty on employees to prepare a report on all inventions as soon as they complete them, unless such inventions are obviously un-
related to the employers’ business.294 A report regarding a service invention must include information sufficient to understand and describe the technical problem, its solution, and how the invention was made.295 To meet this duty, German inventors are required to keep records, similar to those necessary to establish first-to-invent priority under the U.S. patent system.296

If an employer decides that an invention is a free invention, the employee does not need to prepare a detailed report showing inventive activities.297 However, the report must always include sufficient information for the employers to confirm that the nature of the invention is actually outside of the definition of a service invention.298 Accordingly, the German EIA incorporates language clarifying the scope of inventions that are governed by the mandatory ownership transfer mechanism from employees to employers.

The Bayh-Dole Act also imposes a duty on contractors to disclose each subject invention to the federal funding agency within a reasonable time.299 However, the scope of inventions under the duty of disclosure is not clear from the definition of “subject invention.”300 The Stanford Court interpreted the scope of subject invention to include “those owned by or belonging to the contractor.”301 It follows that contractors fall out of the duty to disclose if they fail to secure ownership of federally funded inventions due to the lack of written assignment or enforceability of such assignment due to the state contract policy.302 Moreover, the Bayh-Dole Act does not impose any duty of disclosure on contractor employee-inventors, but instead solely relies on contracts between inventors and contractors.303 Because state law also controls here, it is unclear whether these contracts are enforceable with respect to the same scope of inventions for all contractors’ technical employees who might be involved in federally funded research activities.

Under the German EIA, the transfer of ownership rights through exercising a claiming right also results in a variety of obligations on employers. First, the EIA imposes a duty on employers to pay a reasonable remuneration by providing em-

294 Id. §§ 5(1), 18.
295 Id. § 5(2).
296 Id.
297 See TRIMBORN, supra note 19, at 22–24 (providing a general discussion of the duty to report).
298 German EIA supra note 19, § 18(1).
301 Stanford, 563 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2196.
302 See supra Part I.4.
303 See 37 C.F.R. § 401.14(f)(2) (containing a model patent contract included in Bayh-Dole Implementation Regulations that includes a clause to require contractors to impose a duty on their employees, except for clerical and nontechnical employees, to disclose their inventions).
ployees a right to compensation from the transfer of invention ownership to the employers. However, an employee cannot enforce his right unless his employer starts utilizing the patent. The EIA requires employers to take into account multiple factors for calculating compensation. Due to the complexity of considering multiple factors, the EIA recommends consulting with established guidelines for calculating the amount of remuneration.

Second, the EIA imposes a duty on employers to file a German patent or utility model application without delay. Employers are not released from this duty unless their employee-inventors agree to forego the patent application or the employer protects the invention as a trade secret. However, employers can only choose the latter option if they inform the employee-inventor of their decision to use trade secret protection while acknowledging patentability of the disclosed invention under German patent or utility model law. If an employer fails to file a patent application within a reasonable time, the EIA authorizes employees to file applications under the name of the employer at the expense of the employer. However, the Act does not give an option that allows employees to file applications in their own names even if their employers fail to file an application.

Third, the EIA provides a right for employers to file foreign applications based on ownership of inventions acquired through claiming rights in employee inventions. However, that right functions to impose a duty on employers to file foreign applications. Otherwise, the employees can request a release to file foreign applications on their own, if the employers are not interested. Employers must inform their employees of their intent to release foreign applications early enough to allow employees to file an application within the priority period under the Paris Convention. Although it is very unlikely that employees are interested in securing patents in foreign countries where their employers are not interested in exploiting the invention, if an employee-inventor does file and secure a patent in a foreign country, the resulting rights and licenses may be assigned and granted to any per-

304 German EIA, supra note 19, § 9(1).
305 REITZLE, ET AL., supra note 19, § 9.
306 German EIA supra note 19, § 9(2).
307 Id. § 11.
308 Id. § 13.
309 Id. § 13(2).
310 Id. § 17(1).
311 German EIA, supra note 19, § 13(3).
312 See id. (providing employee rights but not the right to file in one’s own name).
313 Id. § 14(1).
314 Id. § 14(2).
son, including the employer’s competitors. For equity purposes, the EIA provides a compulsory license for the employer if its employee obtains a foreign patent on the employee’s invention.\textsuperscript{316}

Fourth, the EIA imposes a duty on employers to communicate with employee-inventors regarding patent prosecution.\textsuperscript{317} This communication is particularly critical if the employer decides to abandon a patent application or patent right, which subsequently gives rise to employees’ right to continue the patent application or maintain the patent right.\textsuperscript{318} To avoid this cumbersome duty, employers in major German companies often offer a lump-sum payment to their employees to compensate for waiving this communication right.\textsuperscript{319}

The Bayh-Dole Act imposes similar obligations on contractors when they elect to retain rights in the ownership of federally funded inventions.\textsuperscript{320} However, the Bayh-Dole Act does not include a mechanism to effectively enforce these obligations. For example, the Act requires non-profit organizations to compensate employee-inventors through royalty sharing.\textsuperscript{321} The Act provides neither methods of calculation nor sanctions for violations. Because the Act gives broad discretion to contractors-employers, it is very difficult for inventors to dispute their share of royalties.

The Bayh-Dole Act also requires contractors to file domestic and foreign patent applications prior to any statutory bar date.\textsuperscript{322} The Act provides a sanction for failing to meet this requirement, but that sanction is simply to return ownership of the invention to the federal agency so that that agency can file a patent application.\textsuperscript{323} Bayh-Dole regulations require elections to retain rights to be made 60 days prior to the date of the statutory bar; however, the Act does not require that there be notice to the agency with respect to a patent application.\textsuperscript{324} Without any notice, it is very unlikely that the federal agency would discover the contractor’s failure to file a patent application early enough to prepare a patent application on its own and file it prior to a statutory bar date. Even if the federal agency discovers the violation, it

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{316} German EIA, supra note 19, § 14(3).
\textsuperscript{317} Id. § 15.
\textsuperscript{318} Id. § 16.
\textsuperscript{319} See TRIMBORN, supra note 19, at 31 (explaining that in general German companies pay 50 to 300 euros for buying out the rights of foreign patent applications and the rights of patent prosecution communication).
\textsuperscript{321} Id. § 202(c)(7).
\textsuperscript{322} Id. § 202(c)(3).
\textsuperscript{323} Id.
\end{quote}
is unlikely that the agency would file a patent application because federal agencies are very reluctant to interfere with contractors' technology transfer activities.325

Finally, the Bayh-Dole Act does not create any duty on the part of either the federal government or contractors to communicate with inventors about a patent filing or prosecution of their inventions. There is no mechanism for inventors to exercise their rights and request to retain ownership of inventions if their employers choose not to file for patent protection.326 If a patent application is not filed, inventors are deprived of their rights for compensation from the transfer of invention ownership, even if contractors elect to retain title of their inventions.

In contrast, the German EIA incorporates a mechanism to protect employees' compensation rights by allowing them to file domestic and foreign patent applications in a timely fashion if their employers fail to file a patent application.327 Since these rights of compensation are supported by employers' ownership of exclusive rights to practice the invention, employees do not have any compensation right unless a patent application is filed. The EIA further protects employees' compensation rights by giving them opportunities to continue prosecution and maintain patents if their employers decide to abandon a patent application or patent right.328 Employees lose their rights to compensation if a patent application does not result in a patent grant or a granted patent is invalidated. The EIA is based on the clear principle that in the absence of compensation, ownership should be returned to employees, because there is no longer justification for employers to retain ownership.

The Bayh-Dole Act includes none of these mechanisms that guarantee inventors' rights to compensation. Since contractors' technology transfer offices for many non-profit organizations are understaffed, many inventors are frustrated with delays in filing patent applications and loss of patent rights. Moreover, Stanford forces these contractors to adopt the practice of using contract terms to trigger assignments as soon as inventions are completed. Such practice should substantially increase the number of inventions that contractors secure through pre-invention assignments.329 It is impossible for contractors to file applications for all inventions. Federal agencies obtain ownership in many of these inventions because contractors either refrain from electing to retain title or violate the duty of timely filing.330 It is

327 German EIA supra note 19, § 14(1)(2).
328 Id. § 16.
very unlikely that the agencies would file patent applications for such inventions prior to the statutory bar dates.

IV. Finding the Missing Piece of the Puzzle: Making the Bayh-Dole Act Complete

1. Adoption of Ownership Transfer Mechanism Under the German EIA

Unlike the ownership transfer mechanisms under the AEA and NAS Acts, the ownership transfer mechanism under the German EIA does not increase the administrative burden of the USPTO or applicants. The mechanism fits well within the Bayh-Dole Act because it was examined by Congress for adoption in the 1970s and 1980s and the German EIA and Bayh-Dole share common features for allocating ownership.331 It is unlikely that U.S. industries and the legal community would oppose introducing the EIA ownership transfer mechanism because the introduction of the mechanism was not a factor that caused the past bills to be rejected by Congress; the bills failed because of opposition to imposing a duty on employers to pay a mandatory compensation.332 Industry representatives criticized the mandatory compensation as being unfair to employers and impossible to administer.333

Adopting an ownership transfer mechanism in the Bayh-Dole Act should be relatively simple and easy. The current Bayh-Dole provision for contractors’ rights to retain title of federally funded inventions334 is textually very similar to the German EIA provision protecting employers’ claiming rights.335 Thus, the Bayh-Dole Act can be revised to clarify that an employee-inventor’s ownership rights to any subject invention automatically transfers to the employer-contractor when the contractor elects to retain title in the invention under the current provision.336 At this time, the Act only requires contractors to send written election notice to the federal funding agency.337 This written notice executes a contractor’s right to retain title to a subject invention when received by the federal agency unless one of the exceptions allows the agency to receive title of the invention.338 The current provision can be revised to require contractors sending notice to employee-inventors to exe-

331 See supra Part 1.2.
332 Dratler, supra note 68, at 184 n.204.
333 Id.
334 35 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2006) (“Each nonprofit organization or small business firm may, within a reasonable time after disclosure as required by paragraph (c)(1) of this section, elect to retain title to any subject invention ... .”).
335 German EIA, supra note 19, §6 ([1] The employer can claim the right to a service invention on an unrestricted or restricted basis. [2] The claiming of right occurs by written declaration to the employee. The declaration shall be submitted as soon as possible, and no later than four months from the receipt of the proper report.).
337 Id. § 202(c)(2).
338 Id. § 201(a).
cute transfers of the ownership of subject inventions upon the receipt of notice by the employee-inventor.

To clarify the effect of an employer's election to retain ownership of an invention, Congress may recycle a provision from the employee invention bills, modeled after the German EIA, and prevent inventors from assigning their inventions to third-parties.\(^3\) Such a provision would make it clear that a contractor's right to elect to retain title of federally funded inventions cannot be terminated unilaterally by an inventor through separate agreements to assign the ownership of his invention to third-parties during the statutory two year period in which contractors are required to elect title of the inventions.\(^4\) This would give priority to contractors' election rights over any other rights arising from private contracts and prevent inventors from assigning their inventions to third-parties. Once the statutory time period expires without a contractor's exercise of its election right, inventors should retain ownership of the invention and be free to assign such ownership to third-parties for commercialization. The current Bayh-Dole Act provides inventors a right to request retention of invention ownership from federal agencies\(^5\) and such requests must be granted unless the agency itself files a patent application within a reasonable time and prosecutes the application for commercialization.

For the mechanism to function effectively, the Bayh-Dole Act should be revised to clarify the scope of subject inventions in which the ownership is transferred by contractor's election. The Stanford majority's decision that "subject inventions" excludes inventions that contractors failed to secure because of contract drafting traps or limitations on state legislation undermines the Act's basic objective for implementing a uniform federal policy and conflicts with Congress' intent to incorporate a mandatory compensation provision into the Bayh-Dole Act for non-profit organizations.\(^6\) It is likely that Congress included the mandatory compensation provision—despite strong criticism, a major reason for the failed bills—because it viewed the provision as necessary to justify taking invention ownership through contractors from inventors. The definition of subject inventions must be revised to include all inventions made by contractors' employees so that contractors can secure ownership of such inventions through the ownership transfer mechanism.

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339 H.R. 5605 § 412(b)(c) (1975) ("Any disposition of a service invention by the employee prior to the time of the declaration of a claim by the employer which impair the employer's rights under this section is invalid to the extent that it impairs such rights."); German EIA, supra note 19, § 7.
340 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(2); Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2188, 2200–01 (2011). (Breyer, J., dissenting) (asserting that the current Bayh-Dole Act also guarantees the priority of contractors' election right over any rights arising from private contracts).
342 Id. § 202(c)(7).
Moreover, Congress could use the mandatory compensation provision to endorse contractors securing ownership of inventions made by inventors outside the employment relationship. Congress may have assumed a pre-invention assignment between contractors and their employees, including faculty members and students who do not fall into the category of hired-to-invent, and provided the mandatory compensation to justify employers taking ownership of those inventions, regardless of the common law. However, it may not have anticipated today’s research environment where researchers inter-flow beyond the rational notion of a single legal entity and interact with students throughout the invention process. Obviously, the Stanford Court rejected such a broad scope of invention to be governed by the Bayh-Dole Act when it excluded from “subject invention” an invention which was conceived and reduced to practice when the inventor was not an employee of a contractor or when the inventor received an insignificant amount of federal funding toward the invention. However, such a restrictive interpretation of subject inventions will exclude many inventions which the federal government funded and which should be under the Bayh-Dole conditions and restrictions to promote special public interests for commercialization. To reflect the research environment resulting from academic-industry collaboration, Congress should consider applying the Bayh-Dole Act to any inventions resulting from the performance of work under a funding agreement or the Bayh-Dole Act by revising the definition of subject invention to include any invention made by any inventor, regardless of employment status, as long as the invention resulted from the performance of work under a funding agreement.

To ensure that such inventions are subjected to the ownership transfer mechanism, the revised Bayh-Dole Act must require any inventors involved in federally funded research to disclose their inventions. It is not sufficient to impose such duties through contracts between contractors and inventors because inventors may not be employees. Further, state contract laws may prevent enforcement of the disclosure duty for non-employees.

The Stanford Court indicated a concern over the lack of procedures for protecting rights of inventors and third-parties that have been involved in federally funded research but did not receive funds from a federal agency. To address a

343 Reder, supra note 6, at 17 (noting that in academic-industry collaborations, employee status of researchers is often unclear because many of them work as consultants, temporary staffs, interns and contract workers).

344 Stanford, 563 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2198.

345 It can use provisions from the past bills with respect to the content and procedures for disclosing subject inventions. H.R. 5605 § 411(a) (1975) (“An employee who has made a service invention must give written notice of the service invention to his employer without undue delay...”). However, the definition of employee must be expanded to reflect the modern research environment at universities.

similar concerns over disputes between inventors and their employers with respect to the scope of inventions that employers can claim through transfer of the ownership, the past employee invention bills incorporated judicial review and arbitration at the USPTO.\(^4\) The Bayh-Dole Act may be revised to include these procedures to protect the interests of inventors and third-parties. For employers of visiting researchers who used federal funding and received ownership of invention, the common law rules guarantee a shop right, which will give employers bargaining power to negotiate with the researchers for an exclusive license.

2. Adoption of Compensation Right Protection Mechanism Under the German EIA

The Bayh-Dole Act should also be revised to adopt a mechanism similar to the one found in the German EIA that would protect employee-inventor’s rights for compensation by allowing employee-inventors to file patent applications if their employer-contractors fail to file. Guaranteeing compensation to employee-inventors is essential for securing the ownership of all federally funded inventions. Since the term “subject invention” should be redefined to include all inventions made by any researchers who engage in the research with federal funding, the scope of subject inventions under the new definition would be much broader than the scope of inventions suggested by the Stanford Court\(^4\) or covered by the common law and state contract laws, both of which allow automatic transfer of invention ownership upon the completion of invention, regardless of express assignment agreements.\(^4\) The Bayh-Dole Act’s strong federal policy of promoting important public interests justifies such takings regardless of inventors’ employment status,\(^5\) while the Fifth Amendment requires the federal government to compensate inventors.\(^6\) Accordingly, the Act provides inventors a right of compensation when the ownership of invention is transferred to their employer-contractors.

However, the current Bayh-Dole Act is incomplete because it lacks a mechanism to protect inventors’ right to compensation. The Act only allows inventors to exercise their rights to compensation if contractors license their employee-inventor’s inventions and receive royalty revenues.\(^7\) If contractors elect to retain title in an invention but fail to file a patent application, employees’ rights to compensation are effectively eliminated. Without compensation, neither the federal agency nor the employer-contractor have justification for receiving ownership of

\(^{5}\) See Stanford, 563 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. at 2201 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasizing important public interests the Bayh-Dole Act aims to promote).
\(^{6}\) U.S. CONST. amend. V.
inventions from inventors who did not have a chance to bargain for the ownership of their inventions and failed to receive salaries reflecting compensation for such.

Thus, the Bayh-Dole Act should be revised to impose a duty on contractors to send notice to the relevant federal agencies, as well as the employee-inventors when patent applications are filed with the USPTO. As provided in the German EIA, if an employee does not receive notice that the employer is pursuing a patent application within a reasonable time after the employer has elected to retain title of the invention, the employee should be able to file a patent application on behalf of the contractor. A similar mechanism should be also incorporated with respect to foreign patent applications.

Contractors may have concerns over the costs of reimbursing inventors for filing. However, such costs would be marginal and basically involve the cost of a provisional application if the patent application is abandoned before any additional costs are incurred. To allow employee-inventors to continue the patent prosecution, the Bayh-Dole Act should be revised to give ownership of inventions back to inventors if neither the federal agency nor the contractor is interested in prosecuting patents, as provided in the German EIA. Ownership should be returned to the employee-inventor if the contractor wants to abandon the patent. Once the patent prosecution or patent is abandoned, the government and contractors lose justification for retaining ownership because employee-inventor’s rights of compensation are eliminated. Thus, if inventors are interested in pursuing patent prosecution and commercializing their own inventions, the ownership of invention should be returned to the employee-inventor. However, the government should retain rights to use the invention and “March-in Rights” once the employee obtains patents as provided in the current provision. If inventors are willing to invest their time and money to successfully commercialize the invention, this mechanism will contribute to the goals of the Bayh-Dole Act instead of wasting all of the efforts and investments already made by the government and contractors.

Conclusion

While the Stanford Court’s interpretation of the Bayh-Dole Act is technically correct, it is—as the dissent points out—inconsistent with the Act’s basic purpose. Stanford highlights a serious flaw in the current Act. Under the current system, Stanford could not have avoided the result even if the inventor had executed an assignment contract with the private firm prior to its own assignment contract. U.S. courts should have given priority to the private firm. As illustrated in Stanford, it is difficult for a university to argue that it was a bona fide purchaser if the private firm is a research partner and the university is aware of the collaboration. The Act

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353 German EIA, supra note 19, §13.
354 Id. § 16.
should adopt a mechanism from the German EIA that allows contractors to secure ownership of federally funded inventions.

Such mechanisms will avoid a result that Congress did not intend: many federally funded inventions falling outside the scope of the Bayh-Dole Act due to contractors’ failures to secure ownership of such inventions. Instead, contractor-employers would be able to secure ownership of federally funded inventions automatically from inventors when they elect to retain title. The mechanism effectively prevents inventors from lawfully assigning the ownership of federally funded inventions to third-parties. The Bayh-Dole Act should also be revised to protect inventors’ rights to compensation so that the government can take the ownership of federally funded inventions from its contractors with just compensation.

Moreover, the Act should be revised to expand the scope of “subject invention” to include any invention resulting from federally funded research, regardless of the inventor’s employment status with the contractors. In today’s academic-industry collaborative research environment, researchers move from one institution to another with informal employment statuses. Unless the government can reach out to those inventions made by inventors without any formal employment contract, it cannot implement a uniform policy for federally funded inventions. Strong public interests involved in the Bayh-Dole Act should justify the government reaching out to all inventors involved in federally funded research while guaranteeing compensation with the inventors through royalty sharing.