2007

Pro Se Executors—Unauthorized Practice of Law, or Not?

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PRO SE EXECUTORS—UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW, OR NOT?

MICHAEL HATFIELD*

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I. STATUTORY PROBATE COURTS, EXECUTORS AND ESTATE ADMINISTRATION IN TEXAS

There is a well known and continuing split among Texas's seventeen statutory probate courts.\(^1\) The split regards the rights of the person named executor to probate a will or otherwise appear in court without hiring a lawyer.\(^2\) Eight of the courts permit it, but nine insist an executor doing so would be engaging in the unauthorized practice of law and, thus, cannot be permitted.\(^3\) Depending upon how the split is resolved, either nine of the statutory probate court judges are denying executors their pro se appearance rights otherwise guaranteed under Texas law or eight of the courts are assisting the unauthorized practice of law.\(^4\) A recent Waco Court of Appeals decision denying pro se rights to an executor is likely to widen the split.\(^5\)

In practical terms, the court split also means that whether an executor is required by a court to hire a lawyer depends on a matter of geography.\(^6\) To

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\(^1\) See infra notes 45-54.
\(^2\) See infra notes 45-54.
\(^3\) See, e.g., Travis County Court Policy Regarding "Pro Se" Applicants, http://www.co.travis.tx.us/probate/pdfs/pro_se.pdf. (last visited Mar. 20, 2007). The eight courts permitting executors to appear pro se are: Bexar County Probate Court Number 1, Bexar County Probate Court Number 2, Dallas County Probate Court Number 3, El Paso County Probate Court, Galveston County Probate Court, Harris County Probate Court Number 1, Harris County Probate Court Number 4, and Tarrant County Probate Court Number 1. Memorandum from Nicholas Davis, Student, Texas Tech University School of Law, to Michael Hatfield, Associate Professor of Law, Texas Tech University School of Law (July 14, 2006) (on file with author). Dallas County Probate Court Number 1, Harris County Probate Court Number 3 and Hidalgo County Probate Court each allow the executor to appear pro se so long as the executor is the sole beneficiary. Id. A special thanks to Nicholas Davis of Texas Tech University School of Law for discussing these court policies with the court clerks.
\(^5\) See generally Steele v. McDonald, 202 S.W.3d 926 (Tex. App.—Waco 2006, no pet. h.) (per curiam).
\(^6\) See supra note 3.
exacerbate the role of chance, it is not simply a matter of geography but a matter of docket ordering for some executors because some probate judges in counties with more than one probate court have conflicting policies.\textsuperscript{7} For example, an executor appearing to probate a will in Harris County may or may not be forced to hire a lawyer depending upon which one of the four Harris County probate court’s docket his or her case lands when the court clerk accepts the filing.\textsuperscript{8} One Houstonian in a clerk’s office is told he or she has different legal rights than the Houstonian ahead or behind him or her in a bureaucratic queue.\textsuperscript{9}

This Article clarifies why under Texas law an individual named as executor in a will has the right to offer the will for probate and otherwise appear in a probate court without hiring a lawyer.\textsuperscript{10} This Article first provides an overview of the independent administration provisions of the Texas probate code before reviewing the unauthorized practice of law prohibition and the pro se exception. After establishing that executors qualify for the pro se exception in Texas because executors appearing in court are exercising their own management rights—rather than the rights of “the estate” or the beneficiaries—the Article explores suggestions of court reform to be considered in light of these pro se rights. The Article concludes with the suggestion that it is probably unwise for most executors to proceed pro se regardless of their right to do so.

\textsuperscript{7} Id.
\textsuperscript{8} Id.
\textsuperscript{9} Id.
\textsuperscript{10} As it is the most common form of estate administration, the paradigm considered in the Article will be an independent administration in which there is no will contest or other litigation. Throughout this Article, the presumption is that there is no contest between which of more than one alleged wills is the valid one. All references to probate and estate administration are to those not involving legal contests or disputes of any kind. The term “probate court” is intended to mean those courts with original probate jurisdiction, whichever court that may be in a particular county. \textit{See infra} note 44.
A. Historical Model of Ease

The term "probate"\(^{11}\) should not have the same connotations to Texans\(^{12}\) as it does to those living or owning real property in many other states. Texas has provided a "plain" and "layman"-friendly probate system since the 19\(^{th}\) century.\(^{13}\) While the expenses and complications of probate systems elsewhere sustain substantial probate avoidance planning, Texans have never had the same generalized need to avoid probate.\(^{14}\) Indeed, because the Texas probate system is "much different and typically much simpler" than other systems, the State Bar of Texas considers it unethical for Texas lawyers to make undue comparisons between the Texas system and others.\(^{15}\) It is also unethical for Texas attorneys to claim that the Texas probate system is inherently lengthy, expensive, complicated, or always to

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\(^{11}\) The term "probate" refers to both the court procedure by which a will is proved to be valid or invalid (the technical meaning) and to the legal process wherein the estate of a testator is administered (the popular meaning). See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1202 (6th ed. 1990). Generally, in this Article, the latter meaning will be intended except when reference is specifically made to probating the will.

\(^{12}\) The term "Texan" is used to refer to individuals residing in Texas or owning real property located in Texas. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 6 (Vernon 2003); 17 M.K. WOODWARD & ERNEST E. SMITH, III, TEXAS PRACTICE: PROBATE AND DECEDEANTS' ESTATES §§ 44-45 (1971 & Supp. 2006); 2 NIKKI DESHAZO ET AL., TEXAS PRACTICE GUIDE: PROBATE § 14:36 (2006).

\(^{13}\) See W.S. SIMKINS, THE ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES IN TEXAS 8 (3d ed. 1934) ("[T]he Legislature, August 9, 1876, framed a complete system of procedure and laws for the administration of estates in Texas. It will be seen . . . that the law of 1876 is only a reproduction of the law of 1848 . . . . This Act of 1876 was intended by the Legislature to be a plain and definitive system of rules to govern executors and administrators . . . and to make it possible for the layman to perform his duties without appealing for instruction from the court in the various steps to be taken." (emphasis added)); see also Minter v. Burnett, 90 Tex. 245, 38 S.W. 350, 354 (1896) ("We think that the legislature intended, by the enactment of the law of 1876 to make plain and definite rules to govern administrators and executors in the discharge of their duties, because it is not unfrequently [sic] the case that they must perform those duties without having the instruction of the court with reference thereto.").

\(^{14}\) Of course, specific Texas clients may be well advised to avoid probate in certain situations, but in other states avoiding probate is a near-universal estate planning objective. See, e.g., Thomas M. Featherston, Jr., Wills and Living Trusts—What's Best for the Client?, in WILLS, ESTATES, AND PROBATE: A SATELLITE BROADCAST A4 (State Bar of Texas 2000); Bernard E. Jones, Revocable Trusts, in 3RD ANNUAL BUILDING BLOCKS OF WILLS, ESTATES AND PROBATE 2002 5, 5-28 (Texas Bar 2002).

be avoided.\textsuperscript{16} Texas has long had the type of probate system other states are now moving towards.\textsuperscript{17}

\section*{B. Probating Wills in Texas}

Probating a will in Texas requires only three separate documents, typically consisting of no more than four total pages.\textsuperscript{18} The will and a written application for its probate are delivered to the court clerk, who then posts public notice.\textsuperscript{19} A court hearing is usually scheduled for the first Monday following ten days after the notice is posted.\textsuperscript{20} The court hearing rarely takes more than five minutes and consists of no more than a recitation of the facts necessary to support the application (e.g., that the decedent was domiciled in the county).\textsuperscript{21} A simple order is presented for the judge’s signature, and, when signed, the will is admitted to probate.\textsuperscript{22}

It is with the court’s admission of a will to probate that the testator’s directions become legally operative.\textsuperscript{23} Ensuring that a document is a valid will is the responsibility of the probate courts.\textsuperscript{24} With the court’s order that a will is admitted to probate, the testator’s intentions for his or her property are effected.\textsuperscript{25} These intentions may include deviating from the intestacy scheme, providing certain tax benefits for the beneficiaries, or providing

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{16} Id.\textsuperscript{16} \footnote{For example, Texas has chosen to keep its own comprehensive probate code rather than adopt the Uniform Probate Code being considered and adopted in other states because the improvements made in probate law by the Uniform Probate Code have long been part of Texas law, such as the streamlined, independent administrations of decedents’ estate. C. Boone Schwartzel, \textit{Is the Prudent Investor Rule Good for Texas?}, 54 \textit{Baylor L. Rev} 701, 846 n.472 (2002) (citing \textit{Unif. Trust Code}, Prefatory Note (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. (2002 Supp. 29)).}
\item \textsuperscript{17} Id.\textsuperscript{17} \footnote{See 24 William V. Dorsaneo III \& Lennart Larson, \textit{Texas Litigation Guide} § 390.02(1) (2006).}
\item \textsuperscript{18} Id.\textsuperscript{18} \footnote{\textit{Tex. Prob. Code Ann.} §§ 81(a), 128(a) (Vernon 2003); see \textit{Woodward \& Smith}, supra note 12, § 282.}
\item \textsuperscript{19} Id.\textsuperscript{19} \footnote{This is the earliest time at which a hearing can be scheduled. \textit{Tex. Prob. Code Ann.} §§ 128(c), 33(f), (g).}
\item \textsuperscript{20} Id.\textsuperscript{20} \footnote{\textit{Woodward \& Smith}, supra note 12, § 333.}
\item \textsuperscript{21} Id.\textsuperscript{21} \footnote{\textit{Tex. Prob. Code Ann.} § 89 (Vernon 2003 \& Supp. 2006).}
\item \textsuperscript{22} Id.\textsuperscript{22} \footnote{\textit{Id.} § 94; see \textit{generally} 3 William J. Bowe \& Douglas H. Parker, \textit{Page on Wills} § 26.8 (2004).}
\item \textsuperscript{23} Id.\textsuperscript{23} \footnote{\textit{Tex. Prob. Code Ann.} §§ 84, 88 (Vernon 2003 \& Supp. 2006).}
\item \textsuperscript{24} Id.\textsuperscript{24}
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
certain specific benefits for minor, disabled, or other beneficiaries needing management assistance or creditor protection.\(^\text{26}\)

Because the effects of a will are so important, whoever possesses the will when the testator dies is required to deliver the document to the probate court clerk.\(^\text{27}\) The person in possession is not required to begin the process of probating the will, only to make it available for anyone qualified to probate it.\(^\text{28}\) In order to be qualified to probate a will, a person must be named as the executor in the will or have a beneficial interest in it—that is, be a beneficiary or a creditor of the estate.\(^\text{29}\)

C. Administration Independent of Court Oversight

"The vast majority of estates in Texas involve Independent Executors."\(^\text{30}\) These provisions are "one of the most significant developments in American probate law" because of their simplicity.\(^\text{31}\) Independent administration means that the independent executor rather than

\(^\text{26}\) Woodward & Smith, supra note 12, § 398.


\(^\text{28}\) There is no requirement that a will ever be probated. See, e.g., Stringfellow v. Early, 15 Tex. Civ. App. 597, 40 S.W. 871, 874 (Tex. Civ. App.—Austin 1897, no writ).

\(^\text{29}\) Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 3(r), § 76.

\(^\text{30}\) Sharon B. Gardner & Patrick J. Pacheco, The Texas Probate Process from Start to Finish, in 5th Annual Building Blocks of Wills, Estates and Probate 5.1, 5.1–12 (Texas Bar 2004). Estates may be administered independently of court involvement beyond the probate hearing in two situations. The most common situation is that the will requires independent administration. Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 145(b). Otherwise, in the case of wills that do not require it or in the case of intestate estates, the sole condition for independent administration is consent of the beneficiaries or, as in the case of an intestate estate, the heirs. Id. § 145(c)–(e).

\(^\text{31}\) Woodward & Smith, supra note 12, § 491. However, independent administration is not the only simple means of estate administration in Texas, even if it is the most common. The Texas Probate Code provides several alternatives for simple estate administration. Wills can be admitted as muniments of title rather than being offered for probate with title being passed to beneficiaries without the need for any estate administration. Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 89A. Surviving spouses can administer community property without any court proceedings at all. Id. §§ 156, 160, 177. The use of affidavits in connection with certain estates and contractual settlement agreements for any estate can be substituted for court involvement in estate administration. Id. §§ 52, 137; see, e.g., Stringfellow, 15 Tex. Civ. App. at 603, 40 S.W. at 874; Estate of Morris, 577 S.W.2d 748, 752–53 (Tex. Civ. App.—Amarillo 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.). Thus, in Texas, the general expectation is that the probate system is one of flexibility, simplicity, and efficiency.
The probate court judge bears sole responsibility for the administration. The expectation of independent estate administration is so well established as the norm in Texas, that suggestions of court-dependent administration are limited to problematic estates.

The only court proceeding required under independent administration is the hearing to probate the will. Thereafter, the independent executor must submit three additional documents usually consisting of no more than five pages total: a single-paragraph oath, a short affidavit regarding notice to creditors, and an inventory of the estate's assets. These documents are submitted to the court clerk. No additional contact between the executor and the court is required. For example, there is no requirement that the judge oversee the executor or review the fees or that the executor close the administration.

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32 TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 36, 145(h), (q); WOODWARD & SMITH, supra note 12, §§ 75, 497; 1 NIKKI DESHAZO ET AL., TEXAS PRACTICE GUIDE: PROBATE § 1.24 (2006).

33 For example, dependent administration might be favored when the estate is insolvent or where disputes between the executor and beneficiaries are expected. For discussion see Gardner & Pacheco, supra note 30, at 18.

34 TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 145(h); WOODWARD & SMITH, supra note 12, §§ 75, 497; 1 DESHAZO ET AL., supra note 32, § 1:24.


36 TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 294; 17 WOODWARD & SMITH, supra note 12, § 500; 1 DESHAZO ET AL., supra note 32, § 1:30.

37 TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 145(h), 250, 251. Of the three court filings required, the inventory is the most legally complex. It requires not only valuation but a characterization of marital property as either separate or community. This characterization can be complex whenever a decedent was married and (a) either or both spouses at any time lived outside of Texas while married and acquired significant property during such time; (b) either or both spouses inherited or were given significant property; (c) either or both spouses owned significant property prior to marriage; or (d) there was a pre-marital or post-marital property agreement between the spouses. 18 WOODWARD & SMITH, supra note 35, §§ 791, 800; 1 DESHAZO ET AL., supra note 32, § 1:29; 2 DESHAZO ET AL., supra note 12, § 9:30.

38 1 DESHAZO ET AL., supra note 32, § 1.28.

39 Id.

40 Id.
D. Attorneys' Involvement in Independent Administration

Executors offering a will for probate are entitled to hire a lawyer at the estate's expense. While estate administration may become complex in terms of dealing with third parties (e.g., those with custody of estate assets) or in terms of dealing with tax or asset management issues (e.g., locating and valuing assets or managing active businesses), there is little complexity in the probate court work required by an independent administration. In a law firm, the requisite documents can be prepared by a legal assistant and then reviewed by the attorney, who may expect to offer multiple wills for probate in one docket session. While lawyers in other states often charge high fees for probate court, Texas lawyers' fees are far more likely to be charged for the practical, non-court work involved in an estate administration rather than probate court appearances.

E. Probate Courts

A will may be offered for probate in the county in which the decedent resided, if any, or otherwise in the county in which the decedent's property is located. In counties without a statutory probate court, wills are offered for probate in the constitutional county court, or, in certain instances, the statutory county court. However, in a county with a statutory probate court, the statutory probate court is the only court with probate jurisdiction.

With original and exclusive jurisdiction over probate matters, the statutory probate courts of Texas are located in ten of the state's most

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42 1 DESHAZO ET AL., supra note 32, § 1.28.
43 While total lawyers fees for an estate administration may vary from about $1,200 to about $10,000 in Texas (depending upon the nature of the estate and the issues it raises), even in the state's largest city, total legal fees and court costs for the probate hearing (independently of other estate administration legal fees) should not be expected to exceed $800. See David P. Hassler et al., Getting Down to Bidness: A Survey on Economics, Practice Management and Life Quality Issues for Texas Estate Planning and Probate Attorneys At The Turn of the Century, in ESTATE PLANNING AND PROBATE 3 (Texas Bar CLE 2000); Jones, supra note 14, at 29.
44 For a more complete overview of venue, see, e.g., 17 WOODWARD & SMITH, supra note 12, § 6; 2 DESHAZO ET AL., supra note 12, § 14:36.
45 TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 4-5; see TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 25.0003(d) (Vernon 2004 & Supp. 2006); 17 WOODWARD & SMITH, supra note 12, § 1.
populated counties: Bexar (two courts), Collin, Dallas (three courts), Denton, El Paso, Galveston, Harris (four courts), Hidalgo, Tarrant (two courts), and Travis.\textsuperscript{47} The exclusive nature of the jurisdiction means that in probate-related cases, parties do not have recourse to a district court.\textsuperscript{48} About half of Texans live in the high population counties with specialized statutory probate courts.\textsuperscript{49} As mentioned above, eight of the specialized courts currently permit executors to appear without a lawyer, while nine require it.\textsuperscript{50}

On October 18, 2006, the Waco Court of Appeals spread the confusion beyond the most populous counties by denying an executor the right to proceed pro se in a hearing unrelated to the probate of a will.\textsuperscript{51} A vigorous dissent by the Chief Justice argued that the majority had adequately considered neither the law nor the consequences.\textsuperscript{52} The Chief Justice lamented the ending of the independent administration system in Texas heralded by such pro se denials,\textsuperscript{53} which is a concern echoed elsewhere\textsuperscript{54}—and now in this Article.

II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW PROHIBITION

Though providing legal services for oneself has never been considered "unauthorized," no one is entitled to engage in the unauthorized practice of

\textsuperscript{47} The Statutory Probate Courts' contact and other information is available at Texas Courts Online, http://www.courts.state.tx.us/courts/probate.asp (last visited Mar. 21, 2007).


\textsuperscript{49} The population of Texas is estimated to be about 23 million with about 12.2 million Texans living in the following counties each of which having one or more specialized statutory probate court: Bexar, Collin, Dallas, Denton, El Paso, Galveston, Harris, Tarrant, and Travis. The population estimates may be found on the U.S. Census Bureau web site at U.S. Census Bureau, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/48000.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2007). The current list of statutory probate courts (with their contact information) may be found on the Texas Courts Online web site at Texas Courts Online, http://dm.courts.state.tx.us/OCA/DirectorySearch.aspx (last visited Mar. 21, 2007).

\textsuperscript{50} See supra note 3.

\textsuperscript{51} See Steele v. McDonald, 202 S.W.3d 926, 928 (Tex. App.—Waco 2006, no pet. h.) (per curiam).

\textsuperscript{52} Id. at 930–31.

\textsuperscript{53} Id.

\textsuperscript{54} See discussion infra note 118.
law. This prohibition is the general norm in the United States (though not necessarily elsewhere). It prevents non-lawyers from representing others in court or advising others as to the law. Though well established in general terms, there are many exceptions to the rule, and the organized bar’s interest in enforcing it has waxed and waned over the past century.

A. The 20th Century Ebb and Flow

The organized bar’s campaign against the unauthorized practice of law was born, matured, and all but retired into an un-enforced letter during the course of the 20th century. The historical concern was so low that when the American Bar Association adopted its first Canons of Ethics in 1908, the issue was not even addressed. The campaign against unauthorized practice began in 1914 as an effort to curtail competition with lawyers from banks and title companies. This campaign gained momentum during the Great Depression when the American Bar Association organized its first unauthorized practice committees, which eventually were successful at

56 Perhaps also surprising to Americans would be knowing that the prohibition against “the unauthorized practice of law” is unknown in most of the world, including Europe. Ronald D. Rotunda & John S. Dzienkowski, Legal Ethics: The Lawyer's Deskbook on Professional Responsibility § 5.5-3(a) (2006-07 ed.).
58 Id.
59 From the American Revolution through the Civil War, there was no substantial effort by the bar to stop “unauthorized” practice. See Denckla, supra note 57, at 2583–86; Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 6–11 (1981); see also Standing Comm. on Lawyers’ Responsibility for Client Protection, American Bar Association 1994 Survey and Related Materials on the Unauthorized Practice of Law/Nonlawyer Practice, at xii–xv (1996) [hereinafter ABA Survey]. After the Civil War, bar associations began lobbying for passage of legislation that prohibited non-lawyers from making court appearances. Denckla, supra note 57, at 2582–83. Roscoe Pound’s theory of the evolution of legal systems begins with the first step of a desire to administer justice without lawyers which manifests itself in a hostility to a formal bar. The appropriate role of lawyers in the American justice systems has been the subject of debate since the beginning, even though it is hard for contemporary lawyers to imagine how that could even be possible. Pound’s orientation to the lawyers and the administration of justice sets the tone for the ABA Survey, supra, at xi.
60 Denckla, supra note 57, at 2583.
61 Id. at 2582–84.
divvying-up legally-significant work through negotiations with the banks and title companies, as well as the insurance companies, realtors, accountants, and other competing industries and professions. By the 1960s, federal anti-trust issues raised by these negotiated professional boundaries began to weaken the bar’s campaign. By the end of the 20th century, the campaign had weakened to the point that the American Bar Association and many states disbanded their committees on unauthorized practice. Legal reformers began calling into question whether or not the rule actually provided any public benefit—or only provided an economic benefit to lawyers—and even members of the bar began calling for the minimization rather than the defense of the professional walls encircling the law.

Coinciding with the national Great Depression-era campaign, Texas enacted its first statute against the unauthorized practice of law in 1933. The statute was drafted by the first unauthorized practice of law committee to be appointed by the Texas Bar Association, the predecessor of the State Bar of Texas. As did the national campaign, the Texas campaign began to

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62 Rhone, supra note 59; Denckla, supra note 57, at 2584–85. Initially articulated by the bar in terms of economic self-interest, the public justification for the prohibition was eventually changed to protecting the public (though the public itself has not given much support to the bar’s efforts and the empirical research indicates the public has suffered little, if any, as a result of non-lawyers practicing law). Rhone, supra note 59, at 3–6; Restatement, supra note 55 cmt. a–c.

63 Denckla, supra note 57, at 2584; ABA Survey, supra note 59, at xv–xvi.


66 See In re Nolo, 991 S.W. 2d at 770–71; Gilstrap & de la Garza, supra note 65. In 1939, the State Bar of Texas created the Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee:

The Texas Supreme Court initially adopted rules that authorized the UPLC to assist local grievance committees to investigate UPL, but did not authorize the UPLC to prosecute lawsuits. The UPLC’s role was largely advisory. The investigation and prosecution of UPL was left to the local grievance committees.

In 1952, the Texas Supreme Court adopted rules establishing the UPLC as a permanent entity and giving the UPLC investigative and prosecutorial powers, as well as the duty to inform the State Bar and others about UPL. From 1952 to 1979, the
falter in the latter part of the 20th century, which ended with the failure of a high profile unauthorized practice prosecution against a national accounting firm—and many Texas lawyers advocating a fundamental re-thinking of the sharp divide between the practice of law and other professions.67

B. Defining the Unauthorized Practice of Law

An enduring problem in enforcing the unauthorized practice prohibition has been defining the practice of law.68 Within a given state, definitions and standards may be found in statutes, case law, and the disciplinary rules of the bar.69 These are often not uniform within the state and are not consistent between the states.70 As the problems of vagueness and circularity in definition appear insurmountable, the contemporary trend is to avoid any attempts at a precise or exhaustive definition, preferring instead an ad hoc approach somewhat similar to Justice Stewart’s “I know it when I see it” approach to defining obscenity.71

Some of the difficulties in defining unauthorized practice involve Constitutional concerns, but others involve accepting the practical needs of public access to law-related services.72 Across jurisdictions, a variety of activities that seem likely to be the practice of law by conceptual standards are exempted from the definition of unauthorized practice, including

UPLC’s members were appointed by the State Bar. In 1979, the UPL statute was amended to require that members of the UPLC be appointed by the Supreme Court. Gilstrap & de la Garza, supra note 65.

68ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 56, § 5.5-3(b).
70Denckla, supra note 57; ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 56, § 5.5-3(b).
72For a critical assessment in terms of Constitutional and public policy concerns, see, e.g., Rhode, supra note 59.
allowing non-lawyers to prepare documents related to real estate transfers,\textsuperscript{73} the sale of legal forms,\textsuperscript{74} and even assistance in preparing forms.\textsuperscript{75} More substantial practical deviations are to be found in exceptions for allowing non-lawyers to represent others in legal proceedings. Many states permit non-lawyers to represent others in administrative proceedings (e.g., workers' compensation proceedings), and some states permit non-lawyers to appear in court on behalf of others in specific situations—such as small claims courts, law clinic representations, and domestic violence situations.\textsuperscript{76} The federal rules even permit non-lawyers to represent others in the United States Tax Court, which travels across the country holding trials in states with local laws that prohibit non-lawyer representation in court.\textsuperscript{77}

\textsuperscript{73}Denckla, supra note 59, at 2590; \textit{RESTATEMENT}, \textit{supra} note 55. \textit{Compare}, e.g., Pope County Bar Ass'n v. Suggs, 624 S.W.2d 828, 830–31 (Ark. 1981) (holding real estate brokers may complete standardized forms for simple real-estate transactions), \textit{and Miller}, 463 N.E.2d at 253 (holding both banks and real-estate agencies may fill in blanks on approved mortgage forms, so long as no individual advice given or charge made for that service), \textit{and In re First Escrow, Inc.}, 840 S.W.2d 839, 848–49 (Mo. 1992) (holding escrow closing companies, real estate brokers, lenders, and title insurers may use standard forms for standardized real-estate transactions, so long as no advice given or separate fee charged for that service), \textit{and In re Opinion No. 26 of the Comm. on Unauthorized Practice of Law}, 654 A.2d 1344, 1348 (N.J. 1995) (per curiam) (holding, despite the fact that many aspects of residential real-estate transaction involves practice of law, real estate brokers and title-company officers may control and handle all aspects of such transactions, after fully informing parties of risks of proceeding without lawyers), \textit{with}, e.g., State Bar v. Ariz. Land Title & Trust Co., 366 P.2d 1, 14 (Ariz. 1961) (holding real estate agents may not fill out standardized forms in land-sale transactions), \textit{and Ky. State Bar Ass'n v. Tussey}, 476 S.W.2d 177, 179 (Ky. 1972) (per curiam) (holding a bank officer's act of filling out mortgage forms constitutes unauthorized practice).

\textsuperscript{74}Denckla, \textit{supra} note 57, at 2591.

\textsuperscript{75}Id.

\textsuperscript{76}ABA \textit{SURVEY}, \textit{supra} note 59, at 34–43 (see especially the study of California, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Washington).

\textsuperscript{77}Attorneys, accountants, actuaries, and other agents are permitted to represent others before the Internal Revenue Service, though actuaries and other agents are subject to specific limitations on their practice. 5 U.S.C. § 500(e) (2000); 31 C.F.R. § 10.3 (2005). Non-lawyers are also allowed to practice before the U.S. Tax Court as a result of Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, § 7452. The provision states that no person is to be denied admission to practice before the Tax Court because of failure to be a member of a particular profession (i.e., an attorney). The provision gives the Tax Court the right to make the rules regarding practice before the court. Tax Court Rule § 200(a)(3) allows non-attorneys to practice before the court by passing a written examination. Baker, \textit{supra} note 67. The federal law permitting the non-lawyer practice pre-empts the state law prohibiting it. \textit{See} Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 384 (1963).
C. The Texas Approach to the Unauthorized Practice Prohibition

The Texas Supreme Court has the ultimate authority to regulate the practice of law in Texas, including the definition of the unauthorized practice of law. However, the Texas legislature has enacted both criminal and civil statutes prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law. The criminal statute very narrowly addresses only the issue of individuals falsely holding themselves out as lawyers. The civil statute is Chapter 81 of the State Bar Act and is intended to be the primary deterrent. It authorizes the Supreme Court to appoint a committee charged with eliminating the unauthorized practice of law, which it defines as:

[The preparation of a pleading or other document incident to an action or special proceeding or the management of the action or proceeding on behalf of a client before a judge in court as well as a service rendered out of court, including the giving of advice or the rendering of any service requiring the use of legal skill or knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract, or other instrument, the legal effect of which under the facts and conclusions involved must be carefully determined.]

Even though the statute defines the practice of law, it acknowledges that the issue is ultimately one for the Texas Supreme Court rather than the legislature. In its rules for admission to the bar, the Texas Supreme Court has defined the practice of law as “drafting and interpreting legal documents and pleadings, interpreting and giving advice regarding the law, or preparing, trying or presenting cases before courts, departments of

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78 A good overview of these laws can be found in the October 2004 Texas Bar Journal article authored by the chair of the Texas Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee. See Gilstrap & de la Garza, supra note 65.
79 TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1; TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 81.061 (Vernon 2005); see In re Nolo Press/Folk Law, Inc., 991 S.W.2d 768, 769–70 (Tex. 1999).
80 TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. §§ 38.122–.123 (Vernon 2003); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 88.103–.104.
81 TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. §§ 38.122–.123.
82 TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 88.103–.104.
83 Id.
84 Id. § 81.101(a).
85 Id. § 81.101(b).
government or administrative agencies." 86 In case law, Texas courts have defined the practice of law to include "all advice to clients [express or implied] and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law." 87

However, non-lawyers in Texas are now legally entitled to represent others in a variety of situations: the U.S. Tax Court; certain specialized Texas courts; 88 and before specific Texas and federal agencies. 89 Non-lawyers enrolled in law school have a limited license to practice law. 90 As for providing legal advice and document preparation, in certain situations non-lawyers are authorized to provide services to transfer mineral or mining interests in real property and other real property interests, 91 as well as provide advice and document preparation assistance for medical powers of attorney and the designation of guardians which are two legally powerful documents. 92

D. Pro Se Representation and the Unauthorized Practice of Law

The prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law only prohibits the unauthorized practice of law by non-lawyers. 93 So even though it is the practice of law, providing legal services for oneself has never been considered unauthorized. 94 For example, one can draft one's own will or appear in court on one's own behalf, even when doing either of those for another would be the unauthorized practice of law. 95 The unauthorized

86 TEX. R. GOVERN. BAR ADM'N XIII(c)(2)(B) (West 2006).
89 See, e.g., TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.011(37) (Vernon 2006) (Tex. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n); 28 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 1.8 (West 2006) (Tex. Dep’t of Ins.).
90 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 81.102 (b)(2)-(3).
91 Id. § 83.001.
92 Id. § 81.1011.
93 RESTATEMENT, supra note 55, § 4 cmt. d.
94 Id.
95 Id.
practice prohibition only applies to a person seeking to advise or represent another person.  

A historical principle of British common law, the right to advise or represent oneself in legal matters—pro se representation—was statutorily codified at the federal level with the Judiciary Act of 1789 and then adopted by states—including Texas—with either their adoption of the British common law or by statute. American courts have described the right as fundamental and moral. However, because it has always been given statutory protection, the issue of a Constitutional right to appear pro se has never arisen for review, except in criminal cases, in which it has been

96 Id.; ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 56, §§ 5.5–6(b).


99 The Supreme Court needed to specifically recognize a Constitutional right to proceed pro se in criminal cases because the pro se right can conflict with the Constitutional right to competent counsel in criminal cases. Since the Supreme Court has recognized the right as a more fundamental Constitutional right than the right to competent counsel, it would be hard to argue the Supreme Court would not recognize the right in a civil context in which there is no competing Constitutional right. Nevertheless, the court has never had the opportunity and given the statutory protection of the right, it seems an issue unlikely to ever arise for review. As the Reporter’s Notes to Comment D of § 4 of the Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers says:

The seminal decision extending the federal constitutional right of pro se representation to an accused in a criminal case is Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975). In effectuating the right, the court is required to warn a defendant adequately of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation in order that the waiver of the right to counsel be knowing and voluntary. Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S. Ct. at 2541; e.g., United States v. Sandles, 23 F.3d 1121 (7th Cir. 1994), and authority cited. On the power of the court to appoint “standby counsel” for an accused proceeding pro se, even over objection by the accused, see Faretta v. California, supra., 422 U.S. at 834 n.46; McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 184, 104 S. Ct. 944, 954, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984). On the general desirability of doing so, see e.g., United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 740 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 908, 109 S. Ct. 3221, 106 L. Ed. (1989). There is, however, no constitutional right to the assistance of standby counsel. E.g., United States v. Betancourt-Arretuche, 933 F.2d 89 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 959, 112 S. Ct. 421, 116 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1991); United States v. La Chance, 817 F.2d 1491, 1498 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 928, 108 S. Ct 295, 98 L. Ed. 2d 255 (1987). An accused also has no right to a “hybrid” representation, part pro se and part standby counsel. See McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 178, 104 S. Ct. at 951. On the rule that a mid-trial election by an accused to invoke the right to proceed pro se does not relieve long-
recognized.100 The Texas statute recognizing the right follows both the federal statute and other state statute formats, simply stating that "any party to a suit may appear and prosecute or defend his rights therein, either in person or by an attorney of the court."101

The right to proceed pro se is a personal right and can only be exercised by the person having the right.102 This means, for example, that a non-lawyer owner, officer, or other agent of a business entity does not have the right to appear in court in order to prosecute or defend the business entity's rights.103 Texas courts have followed this general rule with respect to standing counsel from responsibility to continue as standby counsel, see United States v. Cannistraro, 799 F. Supp. 410 (D.N.J. 1992).


100 TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10 (amended 1918) (providing specifically that Texas criminal defendants have the right to appear without counsel).


102 RESTATEMENT, supra note 55, § 4 cmt. d.

103 The Reporter's Notes to Comment E of § 4 of the Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers says:

See generally C. Wolfram, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 13.7 (1986). On the rule that a corporation or similar entity can appear in court only through a lawyer, see, e.g., Osborn v. Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 830, 6 L. Ed. 204 (1824); Commercial & R.R. Bank v. Slocomb, Richards & Co., 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 60, 65, 10 L. Ed. 354 (1840); Capital Group, Inc. v. Gaston & Snow, 768 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Wis. 1991) (president and sole shareholder of professional-services corporation could represent himself pro se, but could not represent corporation in either of those capacities or by assignment of its cause of action), citing authority; Nicollet Restoration, Inc. v. Turnham, 486 N.W.2d 753 (Minn. 1992) (corporation appearing in trial court must be represented by lawyer, despite fact that court proceeding originated in small-claims court where no such rule applied); Salman v. Newell, 885 P.2d 607 ( Nev. 1994) (trust could not proceed pro se, and nonlawyer trustee could not represent trust); E & A Assocs. v. First Nat'l Bank, 899 P.2d 243 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994) (nonlawyer general partner could not represent partnership). Some courts have made narrow exceptions where the proceeding would not be unduly impaired, in view of the nature of the litigation, or where enforcing the rule would effectively exclude the entity from court. E.g., In re Unauthorized Practice of Law Rules, 422 S.E.2d 123 (S.C. 1992) (business may be represented in civil-magistrate proceedings by nonlawyer); Vermont Agency of
corporations finding that the corporation’s non-lawyer agents are not appearing to defend their personal rights but rather the corporation’s and, thus, do not qualify under the pro se exception.  

The corporate variety of the pro se right allows the corporation’s in-house, employee-lawyer to represent it in court rather than requiring the corporation to hire outside legal counsel. Since the in-house, employee-lawyer is an agent of the corporation, his or her appearance in court is considered to be the corporation’s appearance. Even though corporations cannot practice law, they are allowed this type of pro se appearance so long as the subject of the legal proceedings is the corporation’s own rights and not the rights of others. To allow the latter would be to allow the corporation to practice law for another’s benefit.

III. TEXAS EXECUTORS AND THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW

A. Whose Rights Are At Stake?

Texas courts that deny executors’ pro se rights do so out of concern over the unauthorized practice of law. There is no law that explicitly mandates the retention of an attorney by an executor. The probate code authorizes executors to hire attorneys with estate funds, but it is otherwise silent as to the attorney-executor relationship. There are innumerable cases involving this right to use estate funds to hire an attorney for the executor, but none of these cases premise the right on the legal necessity of the hire. The allowance of the expense has never been construed to mean it is obligatory.

Natural Resources v. Upper Valley Regional Landfill Corp., 621 A.2d 225 (Vt. 1992), and authority cited.

RESTATEMENT, supra note 55, § 4 cmt. e.

104Kunstoplast of Am., Inc. v. Formosa Plastics Corp., 937 S.W.2d 455, 456 (Tex. 1996) (holding that, “[g]enerally, a corporation may be represented only by a licensed attorney.”); Custom-Crete, Inc. v. K-Bar Servs., Inc., 82 S.W.3d 655, 659 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, no pet.) (determining that though a non-attorney corporate representative’s letter which denied breach of contract claims against corporation was sufficient to avoid no-answer default judgment, it was not sufficient to raise objection to lack of notice).

105See, e.g., Judge Guy Herman, Travis County Probate Court No. 1, Court Policy Regarding “Pro Se” Applicants (Applicants without an Attorney), available at http://www.co.travis.tx.us/probate/pdfs/pro_se.pdf (last visited May 1, 2007).

106See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 242 (Vernon 2003).

107See, e.g., Callaghan v. Grenet, 66 Tex. 236, 18 S.W. 507, 508 (1886); Williams v.
The unauthorized practice of law concern with respect to executors is whether or not they qualify for the pro se exception in Texas. The legal question is whether an executor, as the party appearing in court, would be the person whose rights are being prosecuted or defended.108 The statute guarantees the right to appear in person without an attorney so long as the party appearing is the party with the rights at stake. When an executor appears in a Texas probate court, is the executor appearing in person to prosecute or defend his or her own rights, or is the executor appearing in person to prosecute or defend another person’s rights? If the latter, who is this other person? Is the estate this other person? Are the beneficiaries this other person?

Conceptually, there are three options for settling the rights of executors to appear pro se. One option—the entity approach—is to claim that the rights at stake in probate court proceedings belong to the estate. The second option—the “Minnesota rule”—is to claim that the rights belong to the beneficiaries. The third option is to claim that the rights belong to the executor. In chart form, the options are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Appearing</th>
<th>Party With Rights</th>
<th>Pro Se Representation?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Executor</td>
<td>Estate</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executor</td>
<td>Beneficiaries</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executor</td>
<td>Executor</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, whether or not the executor qualifies for pro se representation depends upon whether the executor is representing his or her own rights in the proceeding. This Article argues that the third option is required under Texas law. It rejects both the entity approach (the first option) and the Minnesota rule (the second approach).


108 See TEX. R. CIV. P. 7 (“Any party to a suit may appear and prosecute or defend his rights therein, either in person or by an attorney of the court.”).
B. Rejecting The Entity Approach

As discussed above, the general rule in Texas and elsewhere is that a non-attorney owner, officer, or other agent of a business entity does not have the right to appear in court to prosecute or defend the business entity’s rights. There is no pro se right in the entity’s non-attorney agents because those agents’ rights are not at stake in any court appearance. In Alabama, Maine and South Carolina, the courts have extended the reasoning of this business entity rule to estates without addressing the fundamental question.

When solving the pro se rights equation for an executor, the fundamental question is whether a non-attorney executor relates to the estate in the way that a corporation’s non-attorney officer or other agents relate to the corporation. While we may casually speak of an executor representing “the estate,” the question with respect to pro se representation is how legally similar are the two relationships.

An estate is very much unlike a corporation because it is not a legal entity. It can neither sue nor be sued. The “estate” is no more than the property owned by the decedent at death and is legally defined as such. Because estates are not entities with legal rights, the Texas cases in which corporate agents are prohibited from appearing on behalf of the corporation are not analogous.

Proponents of the entity approach could point to the exceptions to the general rule, such as giving estates entity-like rights to be a partner in a

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109 See supra Part II.D.
110 RESTATEMENT, supra note 55, § 4 cmt. e.
111 The Alabama Supreme Court adopted the reasoning that an estate is a legal entity in Ex parte Ghafary, 738 So. 2d 778, 779-80 (Ala. 1998), and affirmed it in Godwin v. State ex rel. McKnight, 784 So. 2d 1014, 1015 (Ala. 2000) in which it asserted, without further analysis, that the executor’s filings were “on behalf of” the estate.
112 The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine adopted the reasoning that an estate is a legal entity in State v. Simanonok, 539 A.2d 211, 212 (Me. 1988).
113 The Supreme Court of South Carolina adopted the reasoning that an estate is a legal entity in Brown v. Coe, 616 S.E.2d 705, 707–08 (S.C. 2005).
Texas partnership. However, the Texas Supreme Court has consistently dismissed any claims that an estate should be treated as an entity as a general rule in Texas and has specifically denied that an estate is the party with rights in a lawsuit.

C. The Minnesota Rule

At the height of the organized bar’s twentieth century campaign against banks providing legal services, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a bank serving as executor does not have the right to proceed pro se. This kept the bank’s lawyers from appearing in probate court on behalf of the bank, which required the bank to hire outside legal counsel. This “Minnesota rule” has been followed in the Supreme Courts of Arkansas, Wisconsin, Kentucky and Florida but rejected by the Supreme Court of Ohio (even though it was considering the same issue in the same Great Depression-era anti-bank legal environment).

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118 Henson, 734 S.W.2d at 649; Price, 522 S.W.2d at 691; Dueitt, 802 S.W.2d at 861; see 17 WOODWARD & SMITH, supra note 12, § 171; TEXAS PROBATE, ESTATE AND TRUST ADMINISTRATION §§ 46.01-0.2 (KENNETH MCLAUGHLIN, JR., ed. Consultant, 1993); 17 WOODWARD & SMITH, supra note 12, § 178; 29 TEX. JUR. 3D Decedents' Estates § 544 (2006) (for discussion of the general rule that only the executor has the right to be the party to the suit and some of the exceptions to the general rule); HEDGES & LIBERATO, supra note 115, § 5:38.

119 See supra Part II.A.


121 See C. D. Sumner, Annotation, Necessity That Executor or Administrator Be Represented By Counsel in Presenting Matters in Probate Court, 19 A.L.R.3d § 1104 (1968 & Supp. 2006). But a too-brief review could leave the impression that the Minnesota rule is more settled law than it is. For example, this secondary source cites all of the cases described, but cites the Ohio case (described below) in support of the proposition even though the Ohio case rejected the Minnesota rule. As to the other cases cited by the American Law Reporter, none are on point though close. E.g., Nebraska ex rel. Wright v. Barlow, 132 Neb. 166, 271 N.W. 282, 282–86 (1937) (involving a criminal case against a man who held himself out as a lawyer and had given advice to executors and administrators; the pro se exception was not relevant); Grand Rapids Bar Ass'n v. Denkema, 290 Mich. 56, 287 N.W. 377, 377–84 (1939) (regarding a real estate broker providing legal services; although dicta recites the Minnesota rule, the broker had provided legal advice to executors and administrators but had not himself appeared as such so the pro se exception was not relevant); Detroit Bar Ass'n v. Union Guardian Trust Co., 282 Mich. 707, 281 N.W. 432, 432–34 (1938) (regarding a corporation using non-lawyers to appear in court on its behalf, which is not permitted since the non-lawyers are representing the corporation, not themselves; the issue was a corporation’s general pro se rights rather than an executor’s specific pro se rights). The Denkema case cites several older cases along with the Otterness case, but the older cases are all examples of
1. Minnesota

The seminal Minnesota case was a 1930 professional discipline case, \textit{In re Otterness}.\textsuperscript{122} An attorney who was a salaried employee of a bank took his legal fees—charged for the probate court work that he did—and turned them over to the bank.\textsuperscript{123} The Minnesota Supreme Court censured the attorney.\textsuperscript{124} The bank was not permitted to practice law in Minnesota, and the attorney was facilitating its practice because the probate court work profited the bank.\textsuperscript{125} The pro se exception was a potential defense since had it qualified, the bank would not have been engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, and the attorney would not have been guilty of assisting it.\textsuperscript{126} That is, while the bank could not appear in probate court on behalf of the beneficiaries of the estates, if its court appearances were for its own benefit as executor of the estates, it would not be engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. Rather, it would be covered by the pro se exception. Dismissing the potential pro se defense, the court cited, explained, and distinguished the pro se exception in a single short paragraph: as the bank had no beneficial interest in the estate, it had no right to appear pro se.\textsuperscript{127} According to the Minnesota court, the only exception would be if the bank were to defend personal rights as an executor, such as if it were to defend against a fiduciary misconduct charge.\textsuperscript{128}

2. Arkansas

In the 1954 case of \textit{Arkansas Bar Ass'n v. Union National Bank of Little Rock}, the Arkansas Supreme Court followed the Minnesota rule when it too considered a bank’s use of salaried attorneys to engage in the practice of law in the probate courts.\textsuperscript{129} Again addressing the pro se exception in a

\textsuperscript{122} Otterness, 232 N.W. at 318.
\textsuperscript{123} \textit{id.} at 319.
\textsuperscript{124} \textit{id.} at 320.
\textsuperscript{125} \textit{id.} at 319.
\textsuperscript{126} See supra Part II.D.
\textsuperscript{127} Otterness, 232 N.W. at 320.
\textsuperscript{128} \textit{id.} at 320.
\textsuperscript{129} See Arkansas Bar Ass'n v. Union Nat'l Bank of Little Rock, 224 Ark. 48, 273 S.W.2d 408, 409–10 (1954).
situation in which it could be used defensively by a bank, the court opined that the bank executor was not acting on its own behalf but on behalf of the beneficiaries, and thus the bank executor did not qualify for the pro se exception. Almost fifty years later, the Arkansas Supreme Court reaffirmed this as the rule in Arkansas.

3. Kentucky

As in Minnesota and Arkansas, it was banks allegedly engaged in the practice of law in the probate courts that brought the issue of pro se executors to the Supreme Court of Kentucky in the 1965 case, Frazee v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co. Specifically, the court was considering contempt proceedings against five banks for the unauthorized practice of law through their salaried employee-attorneys. The banks claimed protection under a Kentucky statute that explicitly confirmed pro se rights to fiduciaries. The court invoked its superiority over the legislature on these issues and disregarded the statute. Citing its own cases against unauthorized practice, but offering no further analysis, the court simply stated that "fiduciaries are in no different position" than other unlicensed persons without a "beneficial interest in the corpus of the estate." Thus, the court denied the banks the right to appear pro se.

4. Wisconsin

The first state supreme court to consider the pro se executor issue outside the context of preventing banks from practicing law for profit was that of Wisconsin in the 1965 case, State ex rel. Baker v. County Court of Rock County. An individual executor fired his attorney and then made pro se filings. The courts rejected the filings and ordered the executor to

130 Id. at 410–11.
132 See Frazee v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 393 S.W.2d 778, 781 (Ky. 1965).
133 Id.
134 Id. at 781–82.
135 Id. at 783.
136 Id. at 782.
137 State ex rel. Baker v. County Court of Rock County, 29 Wis. 2d 1, 138 N.W.2d 162, 165 (1965).
138 Id. at 164.
hire an attorney.\textsuperscript{139} As was required in the Wisconsin probate process, the executor had requested the probate court to review and adjudicate the rights of the beneficiaries in certain distributions.\textsuperscript{140} The probate court thought that it was rare for beneficiaries to hire their own attorneys to review these procedures, thus the court reasoned it was incumbent upon the executor to hire an attorney; otherwise, the legal rights of the beneficiaries would go unrepresented by an attorney, placing an undue burden of review on the court.\textsuperscript{141}

However, the Wisconsin court deviated from the Minnesota rule in two significant ways. First, it opined that not all pro se court filings by an executor are prohibited, but only those that raise complex legal questions.\textsuperscript{142} Second, the court made clear that it rejected the notion that even a beneficially interested executor could appear pro se.\textsuperscript{143} The court’s reasoning was that executors are officers of the probate court, and as part of their management by the court, they must obey any orders to hire an attorney, which the court has good reason to do in order to manage its own burden of reviewing pleadings.\textsuperscript{144}

5. Florida

The Florida Supreme Court followed the Minnesota rule in its 1974 case \textit{State ex rel. Falkner v. Blanton}.\textsuperscript{145} Like the Wisconsin court, the Florida Supreme Court considered the pro se appearance rights of an individual executor outside of the context of prohibiting banks from practicing law in the probate court.\textsuperscript{146} However, in its single paragraph opinion, the court distinguished itself from the Wisconsin court by holding that an individual executor would have pro se rights so long as the executor was the sole beneficiary of the estate.\textsuperscript{147} Unlike the Wisconsin court, it did not distinguish between simple and complex proceedings.
6. Ohio's Rejection of the Minnesota Rule

Like the situations considered in Minnesota, Kentucky, and Arkansas, in 1937 the Ohio Supreme Court considered banks that were engaged in estate planning and probate court work in *Judd v. City Trust Savings Bank.* It held that the bank could not provide estate planning for clients, even if it were named as the fiduciary in the estate planning documents. However, it also held that banks were covered by the pro se exception (and thus not engaged in the unauthorized practice of law) if their salaried attorney-employees appeared in probate court on behalf of the banks as executors. The court noted that executors are bound to fulfill various duties and that they are personally liable for mismanagement, misconduct, or neglect in connection with these duties. Banks employed the attorneys so that the bank could discharge its duties without being subject to suit. The court noted that any beneficiary dissatisfied with the way in which the executor discharges its duties can sue the executor. Nevertheless, as a result of their pro se rights, the bank-executors could represent themselves in court (through their salaried-employee attorneys) without being engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. Thus, the Ohio Supreme Court rejected the notion that the executors were only representatives of the beneficiaries' interests and focused instead on the executor's personal liability in discharging its duties.

**D. Rejecting the Minnesota Rule in Texas**

Texas courts should reject the Minnesota rule for multiple reasons, especially because it is inconsistent with contemporary Texas Supreme Court jurisprudence.

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148 *See Judd v. City Trust & Sav. Bank,* 133 Ohio St. 81, 12 N.E.2d 288, 291 (1937). In Ohio, once the bank is appointed, it "can handle all probate and other legal work necessary to execute the trust." 2 ANGELA G. CARLIN, BALDWIN'S OHIO PRACTICE MERRICK-RIPPNER PROBATE LAW § 53:6 (2006).

149 *Judd,* 12 N.E.2d at 291.

150 *Id.* at 293.

151 *Id.* at 292–94.

152 *Id.* at 292.

153 *Id.* at 293.

154 *Id.* at 292–94.
1. The Historical Battle Between Banks and the Bar

The Minnesota rule emerged during the turf battle between attorneys and bank trust officers over who had what capacities in estate administration. This turf battle was the twentieth century genesis of the campaign against the unauthorized practice of law, and the initial Minnesota case, the Kentucky case, the Ohio case, and the Arkansas case all have to be seen in this greater historical context. The Kentucky court was not only siding with the bar over the banks in the contempt proceeding against the banks, but also was defending its own turf against the legislature; the court was asserting its rights over the legislature’s when it rejected both the substance and the form of the legislature’s permission for fiduciaries to appear pro se (permission one surmises that may have been granted after the banks’ lobbying).

As the pro se exception was a potential defense for the banks, it was removed with cursory reasoning by those courts following the Minnesota rule. As discussed above, corporations cannot appear pro se through their non-lawyer employees. Thus, the right for a corporation to appear pro se is simply the right not to spend their funds on outside legal counsel. The banks that were providing probate services did so with their in-house legal counsel in order to make a profit. Had the courts concluded that it was the banks’ rights at stake in the probate proceedings, the banks could have continued to make a profit with their in-house legal counsel. But by concluding the banks were not acting for their own benefit but for the beneficiaries, the banks were not permitted to proceed with their in-house legal staff in competing with lawyers for probate services.

The Minnesota rule courts were explicitly interested in stopping bank competition for probate services. There is nothing said about protecting the public from ill-prepared non-lawyers since, after all, those who were representing the banks were, indeed, lawyers. Historically, this type of economic defensiveness by the bar eventually led to anti-trust concerns, which eventually led to the decline in the zealfulness of unauthorized
practice prosecutions. In the early days, it was not shameful for the bar to assert that economic interests were behind its unauthorized practice prosecutions. Eventually, of course, this did become shameful, and the justification gave way to expressing concerns about protecting the public. In an age in which access to justice is a greater concern than economic protectionism, and in an age in which there are so many exceptions to the unauthorized practice prohibition, the zealousness of the Minnesota rule courts to restrict judicial access is anachronistic.

2. Failure to Respect the Executor-Beneficiary Fiduciary Relationship

Focusing on denying banks their profit-center of employed probate court attorneys, most of the Minnesota rule courts did not focus on the uniqueness of the executor-beneficiary relationship. However, the uniqueness of the executor-beneficiary relationship is essential to understanding the pro se rights of executors. What the Minnesota rule courts have done is to treat executors as legally transparent—as agents of the beneficiaries—just as the employee-attorneys were agents of the banks. This made their reasoning syllogistic but at odds with the intentional division of management rights from beneficial interests. None of the courts discussed this division. These courts’ conclusion that the executors have no right to appear in court followed directly from their observation that the beneficiaries have the beneficial interests.

However, by definition, executors have special, specific, and statutory rights and duties that are not derived from beneficial interests. The unique

161 See supra Part II.A.
162 See Denckla, supra note 57, at 2584; see also Rhode, supra note 59, at 9; see generally RESTATEMENT supra note 55, § 4 cmt. c. Initially articulated by the bar in terms of economic self-interest, the bar eventually changed the public justification for the prohibition to protecting the public (though the public itself has not given much support to the bar’s efforts and the empirical research indicates the public has suffered little, if any, as a result of non-lawyers practicing law). Rhode, supra note 59, at 3; see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 55, cmt. b–c.
163 See Rhode, supra note 59, at 9.
164 The exception was the Wisconsin court which focused on the executor’s relationship to the court during estate administration. Baker v. County Court, 138 N.W.2d 162, 166 (Wis. 1965).
165 See supra Part III.C.1–5.
166 See Ark. Bar Ass’n v. Union Nat’l Bank of Little Rock, 273 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Ark. 1954); Falker v. Blanton, 297 So. 2d 825, 825 (Fla. 1974); Frazee v. Citizens Fid. Bank & Trust Co., 393 S.W.2d 778, 782–83 (Ky. 1965); In re Otterness, 181 Minn. 254, 232 N.W. 318, 320 (Minn. 1930).
rights of the executor are reflected in the specific statutory entitlement of the person nominated to be executor to probate the will (even though the only other persons entitled to probate the will are those who have a beneficial interest in the estate.) When a nominated executor appears in court to probate the will, he or she is acting pursuant to a specific statutory definition distinct from any beneficial interest. While the beneficiaries of the will may receive a benefit by its probate, the executor's choice to probate the will is personal. There is no duty to probate the will. Thus, the nominated executor cannot be forced to do so by the beneficiaries. Failing to probate the will does not reduce his or her qualification to be appointed executor. Furthermore, the beneficiaries' rights are not affected either way. The nominated executor prosecutes his or her personal rights when probating the will. To put an even finer point on it, when the nominated executor probates the will, he or she, by definition, has yet to assume the role of executor and thus has no duties or obligations to the beneficiaries. Thus, it is incoherent to claim the executor's right to probate the will is somehow derived from the beneficiaries' interests. And in the Texas independent administration system, this is the only court appearance required.

Additionally, under the Texas Probate Code, even though not a beneficiary of the estate, the executor has the sole right to collect, possess, and manage the assets of the estate in his or her personal prudent discretion. This is true even though title to the assets of the estate vests immediately in the beneficiaries upon the testator's death (which is

167 See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 76 (Vernon 2003); 17 WOODWARD & SMITH, supra note 12, § 243.
168 TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 76; 17 WOODWARD & SMITH, supra note 12, § 243.
169 TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 76; 17 WOODWARD & SMITH, supra note 12, § 243.
170 The custodian of the will upon the testator's death should deliver it to the proper court clerk, but there is no duty to probate a will in Texas. See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 75; see also 74 TEX. JUR. 3D WILLS § 361 (2003).
171 See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 78 (providing the only grounds on which an executor can be disqualified from serving); 17 WOODWARD & SMITH, supra note 12, § 252; 1 DESHAZO ET AL, supra note 32, § 5:14.
172 See TEX PROB. CODE ANN. § 76; 17 WOODWARD & SMITH, supra note 12, § 243.
173 See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 37, 230, 232; Blinn v. McDonald, 92 Tex. 604, 46 S.W. 787, 790 (1898); Morris v. Ratliff, 291 S.W.2d 418, 421 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Freeman v. Banks, 91 S.W.2d 1078, 1080 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1936, writ ref'd); see also 17 WOODWARD & SMITH, supra note 12, § 171; 18 WOODWARD & SMITH, supra note 35, §§ 693, 697.
necessary to avoid a lapse in legal title at death). The executor’s management right includes the exclusive right to bring estate-related lawsuits. Those lawsuits must be brought by the executor in the name of the executor rather than in the name of the estate or the beneficiaries. Since the beneficiaries do not have the right, the executor certainly does not derive the right from them. The beneficiaries have no right to manage the executor, and even by pooling all of their rights, the beneficiaries cannot remove the executor for the exercise of his or her discretion one way rather than another so long as he or she discharges the legal duties and abides by fiduciary principles. For example, the executor can decide whether or not to pursue a malpractice claim against the testator’s estate-planning attorney. None of the beneficiaries—acting individually or unanimously—could bring such a claim, nor could they force the executor to bring such a claim. It is the statutory authorities given exclusively to the executor that are at stake when the executor appears in court. Conceptually, the executor might be said to be an agent of the testator but cannot be said to be the agent of the beneficiaries. Though the beneficiaries are destined to be the ultimate recipient of the property, it does not follow that the executor is their mere representative: the executor’s rights to manage the estate are distinct from the beneficiaries’ interests and are not derived from them.

174 Tex. Prob. Code Ann. §§ 37, 230, 232; Blinn, 46 S.W. at 790; Morris, 291 S.W.2d at 421; Freeman, 91 S.W.2d at 1080; see 17 Woodward & Smith, supra note 12, § 171; 18 Woodward & Smith, supra note 35, §§ 693, 697.


178 Belt v. Oppenheimer, 192 S.W.3d 780, 789 (Tex. 2006) (holding that a malpractice claim in the estate-planning context may be maintained in Texas only by the estate planner’s client or the client’s personal representative).

179 Id.
As the Ohio court noted, the executor is given these management rights subject to high fiduciary duties, and the beneficiaries are given no rights at all other than to sue if the duties are unfulfilled. ¹⁸⁰ This is the essence of the fiduciary relationship between the executor and the beneficiaries. Under Texas law executors are given the exclusive management rights but owe the beneficiaries the highest duties of good faith, fidelity, loyalty, fairness, and prudence. ¹⁸¹ The Minnesota rule reduces the executor’s court appearance rights in an apparent attempt to ensure protection of the beneficiaries’ interests, but this ignores the role of fiduciary duties for that purpose. ¹⁸² The law imposes these duties precisely because the law gives the executor the exclusive rights to manage the estate. Because of these duties, the executor’s bond or personal assets protect the beneficiaries. It is this liability that ensures the executor’s prudent exercise of the management rights. Because of this liability exposure, the Ohio court described the executor’s interest in avoiding a fiduciary suit as “very real, vital, and substantial . . . ” ¹⁸³ In contrast, the Minnesota rule cases do not mention these duties or analyze the fiduciary relationship. ¹⁸⁴ Instead, they simply reject the executor’s management rights by reciting the undisputed fact that it is the beneficiaries who receive the property. ¹⁸⁵

3. Inapplicability of Wisconsin Rationale

The unique reasoning of the Wisconsin court deserves special mention as to why Texas courts should reject it specifically along with the Minnesota rule generally.

Unlike the other Minnesota rule cases, the Wisconsin court did not attempt to settle who had the right to appear in court merely by reciting who

¹⁸⁰ Using the Minnesota rule, courts could have protected both the historical understanding and their objective of denying pro se rights to bank executors simply by finding it a violation of the executor’s fiduciary duties to proceed pro se; however, the courts did not give this type of fiduciary analysis. Instead, the courts derived the right to appear in court from beneficial interests—deciding who had the right to appear with reference to who had the rights to benefit. Judd v. City Trust & Sav. Bank, 133 Ohio St. 81, 12 N.E.2d 288, 292–94 (1937).

¹⁸¹ Humane Soc’y of Austin & Travis County v. Austin Nat’l Bank, 531 S.W.2d 574, 577 (Tex. 1975); McLendon v. McLendon, 862 S.W.2d 662, 670 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1993, writ denied); Ertel v. O’Brien 852 S.W.2d 17 (Tex. App.—Waco 1993, writ denied).

¹⁸² See supra Part III.C.1–5.

¹⁸³ Judd, 133 Ohio St. at 91, 12 N.E.2d at 293.

¹⁸⁴ See supra Part III.C.1–5.

¹⁸⁵ See supra Part III.C.1–5.
had the beneficial interest. Instead, the Wisconsin court’s reasoning invoked the complexity of the Wisconsin probate system and the need of the executor to have the court make determinations. However, the Texas probate system has been designed without undue complications, and executors do not seek the type of determinations that the Wisconsin system requires. Indeed, the premise of complexity is essential to the Wisconsin holding because the court reasoned that not all court appearances required a lawyer, only the ones involving complex issues.

The Wisconsin court also based parts of its reasoning on the fact that most beneficiaries do not hire an attorney to review their rights. The court then concluded that the executor must hire one so that the beneficiaries’ rights are protected. This, too, is specifically unpersuasive in Texas because under Texas law an executor’s attorney has no duty to the beneficiaries but only to the executor.

4. “Practice of Law” Outside the Courtroom

Under the Minnesota rule, executors are engaged in the unauthorized practice of law whenever an attorney fails to represent them in court. A consequence of this rule is that executors are engaged in the unauthorized practice with respect to a variety of non-courtroom tasks as well.
discussed above, the Texas standards for unauthorized practice include not only court appearances, but providing services that have a legal effect that must be carefully determined or taking any action in a matter that is connected with the law. Delineating which of the executor’s management tasks did not require the executor to obtain a legal opinion would be considerably impractical if every legally significant decision the executor made might be considered the practice of law. Defending the executors’ right to appear pro se in probate court also defends the executors’ right to manage the estate without the obligation of anxiously securing legal opinions to avoid the unauthorized practice of law outside of the courtroom. Individuals managing their own affairs have the right to make legally significant decisions for themselves and so should executors, who can be sued by the beneficiaries for failing to act as a prudent individual would in managing those affairs.

In some of those states adopting the Minnesota rule, the courts have been forced to consider which of an executor’s out-of-court tasks do require an executor to hire an attorney. Historically, as explained above, the goal of the Texas probate system has been to allow non-lawyers to administer the estate without seeking permission at every turn. Prohibiting the executor’s performance of non-courtroom tasks would defeat the purpose of the simplified independent administration system by replacing the judge’s management of the estates in Texas with attorneys. Legal fees and

legal skill or knowledge . . . the legal effect of which under the facts and conclusions must be carefully determined”).


196 This is due to the breadth of action that can be potentially considered the practice of law. See Crain, 11 S.W.3d at 332–33 (noting that, though TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 81.101(a) (Vernon 1988) defines the practice of law, its definition is not exclusive and that courts are free to determine what actions constitute the practice of law). Indeed, “[t]he practice of law embraces, in general, all advice to clients and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law.” Id. at 333.

197 See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 230 (Vernon 2003) (imposing a duty upon the executor to care for the property of the estate “as a prudent man would take [care] of his own property”).

198 See, e.g., Frazee v. Citizens Fid. Bank & Trust Co., 393 S.W.2d 778, 784–85 (Ky. 1965).

199 See 17 WOODWARD & SMITH, supra note 12, §§ 44–45; 2 DeSHAZO ET AL., supra note 12, § 14:36; see also TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 6.

200 Steele v. McDonald, 202 S.W.3d 926, 930 (Tex. App.—Waco 2006, no pet. h.) (per curiam) (Gray, J., dissenting) (noting that “Texas has long been recognized for the truly effective
complications would certainly increase beyond the current level if there were a legal obligation of an attorney to review all of an executor's legally significant letters, agreements, and decisions to ensure that the executor is not engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.

5. Professional Responsibility and Liability Issues Under the Minnesota Rule

The Minnesota rule has disturbing, unintended ethical consequences for Texas lawyers, which is another set of reasons to reject it.

a. Executors Practicing Law Outside the Courtroom

A Texas attorney cannot ethically assist anyone engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. If the executor is at risk for engaging in the practice of law by making legally significant out-of-court decisions during the estate administration, the attorney has an obligation to ensure that his or her client has not crossed the line into the practice of law in order to ensure he or she is not assisting in unauthorized practice. As a practical matter, the attorney's job would be transformed from advising the executor when requested to supervising the executor at all times. This would be necessary to make sure the attorney has not unwittingly helped the executor engage in the practice of law. Thus, it is not only a matter of increased legal fees for the attorney reviewing all of the executor's legally significant decisions but also a question of what level of supervision and detailed instruction is ethically required of the Texas lawyer in order to keep the client from engaging in the practice of law.

b. Unbundled Probate Services

If an executor has the right to proceed pro se, then a Texas attorney is able to provide unbundled legal assistance in probate court without breaching any ethical duties. For example, if an executor has the right to proceed pro se, an attorney might draft the application for the probate of the will and send the executor to court with it. However, if the executor does

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independent administration of a decedent's estate and that preventing an executor from proceeding pro se threatens the continuing vitality of this process).


202 Id.
not have the right to proceed pro se, drafting the documents for the proceeding would be ethically prohibited. This type of unbundled assistance might provide a significant cost savings for some clients and may even be provided pro bono, especially to the attorney’s friends and family.

c. Knowing the Client’s Identity

The fundamental issue in the executor’s right to proceed pro se is whether the executor is prosecuting the executor’s rights or the beneficiaries’ rights. Under the Minnesota rule cases, the claim is that the executor is prosecuting the beneficiaries’ rights when he or she appears in court. This, those cases conclude, is why the executor cannot appear pro se. This would mean that when the executor’s attorney appears in court, it is to represent the estate’s beneficiaries. Thus, if the executor does not have pro se rights, then the executor does not have the right to an exclusive attorney-client relationship with his or her attorney. As discussed below, the right of the attorney and the executor to an exclusive attorney-client relationship is well established in Texas law. The attorney’s certainty that he or she is advising the executor as to the executor’s rights is a corollary to knowing the attorney is not obligated to advise all of those with beneficial interests in the estate (including creditors) as to their rights. It is this certainty that allows the attorney to behave both ethically and competently, knowing who the client is—and, just as importantly, who the client is not.

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203 Id.
204 The general purpose of independent administration is to free the independent executor of “onerous and expensive judicial supervision.” Corpus Christi Bank & Trust v. Alice Nat’l Bank, 444 S.W.2d 632, 634 (Tex. 1969). If the executor is forced to retain an attorney for all in and out of court activities that may be considered the practice of law, this purpose would be frustrated.
205 See, e.g., In re Otterness, 232 N.W. 318, 320 (Minn. 1930) (holding that an “executor, administrator, or guardian, as such, has no right to conduct probate proceedings . . . ”).
206 See supra Part III.C.1–5
207 See supra Part III.C.1–5.
208 See infra Part III.D.6.a.
209 See Huie v. DeShazo, 922 S.W.2d 920, 924, 925 (Tex. 1996) (noting that the attorney-client privilege serves the same purpose in the trustee-attorney relationship and that an executor/trustee who retains an attorney to advise him regarding administration of the trust is the true client).
6. Texas Supreme Court Jurisprudence and the Minnesota Rule

The Minnesota rule cases are also inconsistent with contemporary Texas Supreme Court jurisprudence. One Texas Supreme Court case explicitly affirms the right of an executor to appear pro se, while another makes clear that the attorney-client relationship is between the executor and the attorney (not the estate or the beneficiaries).

a. Pro Se Rights of an Executor

In the 1983 case *Ex parte Shaffer* the Texas Supreme Court considered whether a Texas executor had pro se rights in probate court. In the case, the executor was sued for an alleged breach of his fiduciary duty. Before the trial, the executor's attorney withdrew. The Dallas County Probate Court Number 3 ordered the executor to retain a new attorney, which the executor failed to do. The judge ordered the executor to be held in the county jail in contempt of court until he hired an attorney. The Texas Supreme Court held the probate judge's order void. The Texas Supreme Court's reasoning was short and blunt, “Counsel cites no authority, and indeed we can find none, which allows a court to ... require any party to retain an attorney. Ordering a party to be represented by an attorney abridges that person's right to be heard by himself.”

Presumably because the Texas Supreme Court believed the facts were directly covered by the pro se rule, it did not detail its application of the rule. The court's brevity provides an ambiguity for those who favor the Minnesota rule. Those proponents can argue the case simply affirms that an executor is permitted to proceed pro se when he or she is personally liable—allegations of fiduciary duty breaches—and not when it involves

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210 *Ex parte Shaffer*, 649 S.W.2d 300, 302 (Tex. 1983).
211 *Huie*, 922 S.W.2d at 921.
212 *Shaffer*, 649 S.W.2d at 302.
213 *id.* at 301.
214 *Id.*
215 *Id.*
216 *Id.*
217 *Id.* at 302.
218 *Id.*
219 See *id.* (noting no authority was cited for the proposition that any individual is required to retain an attorney).
estate claims. The initial Minnesota case indeed determines this is a pro se right.220

While superficially plausible, this Minnesota rule distinction is inherently problematic. It makes a distinction between an attorney for the estate (when no one is claiming the executor has mismanaged it) and an attorney for the executor (whenever there is a claim of mismanagement).221 It envisions two attorneys for each executor: one to advise the executor on how to prudently handle estate business and one to defend the executor from any suits claiming the executor failed to prudently handle estate business. It is impossible to segregate the executor’s need for legal advice in this way. The executor is always exposed to personal claims of wrongdoing when making decisions in administering the estate, and Texas law does not require the hiring of a second attorney to advise the executor when a fiduciary claim is made.222 Texas law permits the executor’s use of estate funds in defense against claims of his or her personal wrongdoing; even if the executor fails in his or her defense, so long as the executor defended the actions in good faith, the executor is entitled to use estate funds for the attorney.223 There is no such person as the attorney for the estate. The estate funds legal representation for the executor for routine advice and for defense against fiduciary claims.224 It is the executor’s rights at stake in both situations.

b. Whose Rights Are At Stake?

In the question of the 1996 case *Huie v. DeShazo*, the Texas Supreme Court answered whose rights are the subject of legal representation when a trustee hires an attorney.225 The Texas court rejected the trends in other states to make the beneficiaries’ rights or the trust estate’s rights the subject

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221 *Huie* v. *DeShazo*, 922 S.W.2d 920, 924 (Tex. 1996) (expressing concern that a limitation on the attorney-client relationship between a trustee/executor could cause them to forsake seeking legal advice regarding their management duties).

222 TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 230 (Vernon 2003) (imposing on the executor a duty to care for the estate assets as a prudent person would care for his own); Humane Soc’y of Austin & Travis County v. Austin Nat’l Bank, 531 S.W.2d 574, 577, 580 (Tex. 1975) (noting the executor’s duty to preserve the assets of the estate and not to engage in conflicts of interest); see *Shaffer*, 649 S.W.2d at 302.

223 TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 149C(c); 1 *DESHAZO ET AL.*, *supra* note 32, § 5:75.

224 See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. §§ 242, 243.

225 *Huie*, 922 S.W.2d at 924–25.
of the legal representation and continued instead with the historical view that it is the fiduciary’s rights. The court held that trustees have a right to confidential legal advice in how to manage their trust estates and how best to discharge their duties to the beneficiaries. The trustee is the personal client of the attorney, not a legally transparent representative of the beneficiaries. This is true even when trust estate funds are used to compensate the attorney and even when the beneficiaries are bringing legal claims against the trustee personally.

The right of trustees to pay the attorney with trust estate funds while expecting the attorney to represent the trustee to the exclusion of the beneficiaries is indistinguishable from the right of executors to do so. Executors’ standards of performance are the same as those of trustees, and nothing in the Texas Supreme Court’s reasoning would mark a difference between executors and trustees. As the executor’s—rather than the beneficiaries’—rights are the subject of any legal representation of the executor, it follows that these are the relevant rights at stake when an attorney appears in probate court. Since an attorney would appear in court to prosecute or defend the executor’s exclusive right to manage the estate, the executor has the right to appear pro se in court with respect to his or her same rights.

The Texas Supreme Court did not hesitate to reject the view that the beneficiaries are the “real” clients with the “real” interests at stake, which is the principle of the Minnesota rule cases. Instead, the Texas Supreme

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226 *Id.* at 924–27.
227 *Id.*
228 *Id.* at 921 (holding that only the trustee, not the trust beneficiary, is the client of the trustee’s attorney).
229 *Id.* at 922 (noting that the suit was brought by a beneficiary and that the trustee’s attorney was compensated with trust funds).
230 See Russell v. Moeling, 526 S.W.2d 533, 535 (Tex. 1975) (noting the executor has the right to make necessary payments and disbursements out of the estate and in particular for the payment of attorney’s fees under TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 243 (Vernon 2003)).
231 See Humane Soc’y of Austin & Travis County v. Austin Nat’l Bank, 531 S.W.2d 574, 577 (Tex. 1975) (noting the fiduciary duty of an executor in the administration of an estate is the same as that of a trustee); McLendon v. McLendon, 862 S.W.2d 662, 670 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1993, writ denied); Ertel v. O’Brien, 852 S.W.2d 17, 20 (Tex. App.—Waco 1993, writ denied); Geeslin v. McElhenney, 788 S.W.2d 683, 684 (Tex. App.—Austin 1990, no writ).
232 See, e.g., Huff v. Huff, 132 Tex. 540, 124 S.W.2d 327, 328–330 (Tex. 1939) (involving an executor’s right to offer a will for probate and the ability to recover attorney’s fees and expenses from the estate where the right to make such offer is challenged).
233 *Huie*, 922 S.W.2d at 925 ("We conclude that, under Texas law at least, the trustee who
Court reasoned along the lines of the Ohio Supreme Court focusing on the legal rights to manage rather than the rights to benefit.\textsuperscript{234} As the Ohio court made explicit, it is the executor’s personal liability for mismanagement that ensures proper management—and not a requirement that the executor hire an attorney to represent the beneficiaries’ interests.\textsuperscript{235}

\section*{E. Waco Court of Appeals}

On October 18, 2006, the Waco Court of Appeals considered a ruling in the 77\textsuperscript{th} District Court (Limestone County) in which an independent executor had discharged his attorney after the appeal was perfected.\textsuperscript{236} With no attorney appearing on the executor’s behalf, the court was prompted to consider whether an independent executor had the right to appear pro se.\textsuperscript{237} Without the benefit of a briefing, the court answered itself.\textsuperscript{238}

Claiming in one sentence that it was “not at all clear” whether or not an independent executor could appear pro se under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 7, the court began the next sentence by concluding that “a plain reading” of the rule suggests the independent executor cannot appear pro se.\textsuperscript{239} There was not any reasoning between the sentences, which introduced and attempted to resolve the issue without asking the fundamental question as to whose rights are at stake when an independent executor appears pro se.\textsuperscript{240} Begging this very question, the court wrote and concluded that the independent executor “is litigating rights in a representative capacity rather than on his own behalf.”\textsuperscript{241} In dissent, the Chief Justice clarified that the independent executor has all the rights of the

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\textsuperscript{234}Id. at 925 (dismissing the notion that no attorney-client privilege exists between a trustee and an attorney retained to assist the trustee in the administration of the trust and concluding that the trustee, not the beneficiaries, is the true client). For a discussion of the referenced Ohio case, \textit{Judd v. City Trust Sav. Bank}, 12 N.E.2d 288 (Ohio 1937), see \textit{supra} Part III.C.6.
\textsuperscript{235}\textit{Judd}, 12 N.E.2d at 293 (noting the trustees are personally accountable for mismanagement, misconduct or neglect regarding the estate in their charge but that they may “act for themselves in the execution of their offices, in and out of court, if . . . they care to assume the burden . . .”).
\textsuperscript{236}\textit{Steele v. McDonald}, 202 S.W.3d 926, 927 (Tex. App.—Waco 2006, no pet. h.) (per curiam).
\textsuperscript{237}Id. at 928.
\textsuperscript{238}Id. at 931 (Gray, J., dissenting).
\textsuperscript{239}Id. at 928 (majority opinion).
\textsuperscript{240}Id.
\textsuperscript{241}Id.
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decedent, including the right to appear pro se.\textsuperscript{242} The majority did not consider this claim, nor otherwise investigate whose rights were involved in managing the estate.\textsuperscript{243}

Except for a case denying pro se rights to non-attorney representatives of corporations, no Texas cases were cited in the opinion.\textsuperscript{244} No mention was made of\textit{Ex parte Shaffer} or\textit{Huie v. DeShazo}. Further, much to the dismay of the dissenting Chief Justice, no mention was made of the Texas independent estate administration system or the rights of independent executors.\textsuperscript{245}

Instead of considering Texas law, the opinion cites a jumble of out-of-state cases, including state intermediate appellate court cases and federal circuit cases rather than authoritative statements from the respective state supreme courts.\textsuperscript{246} The Waco court did cite the supreme courts of Alabama, Maine and South Carolina, which each had concluded the estate is a legal entity.\textsuperscript{247} Being persuaded by this reasoning, the Waco court failed to cite the Texas law to the contrary.\textsuperscript{248} It did cite the Wisconsin supreme court case that adopted the Minnesota rule and the recent Arkansas case that reaffirmed the Minnesota rule in Texas—but it failed to consider the distinction between the two (i.e., that the Wisconsin rationale presumed legal complexities).\textsuperscript{249} It also failed to cite any opposing authorities (such

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\item \textsuperscript{242} \textit{Id.} at 930 (Gray, J., dissenting).
\item \textsuperscript{243} \textit{See id.} at 927–30 (majority opinion) (discussing the merits without discussing the position that the executor is litigating his own rights).
\item \textsuperscript{244} \textit{Id.} at 928 n.2 (citing Kunstoplast of Am, Inc. v. Formosa Plastics Corp. USA, 937 S.W.2d 455, 456 (Tex. 1996)).
\item \textsuperscript{245} \textit{Id.} at 930–31 (Gray, J., dissenting).
\item \textsuperscript{246} \textit{Id.} at 928 (majority opinion). For example, rather than considering the case law issued by the Minnesota, Kentucky, Florida, and Ohio supreme courts discussed above in subpart III.C., the court cited lower court rulings from Illinois and Nebraska, as well as cases from the 6\textsuperscript{th}, 8\textsuperscript{th}, and 11\textsuperscript{th} federal circuits without acknowledging that only the supreme court of a state speaks authoritatively as to its law. With no shortage of state supreme court cases, this is a curious string of citations. \textit{Id.} at 930–31 (Gray, J., dissenting) (noting that the position of the majority was not supported by the out of state authority and that, unless those other states had systems similar to the Texas independent administrator system, reliance upon their case law is suspect and misplaced).
\item \textsuperscript{247} \textit{Id.} at 928 (majority opinion).
\item \textsuperscript{248} Henson v. Estate of Crow, 734 S.W.2d 648, 649 (Tex. 1987) (holding an estate of a deceased person is not a legal entity); Price v. Estate of Anderson, 522 S.W.2d 690, 691 (Tex. 1975); Dueitt v. Dueitt, 802 S.W.2d 859, 861 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ); see also \textit{29 TEX JUR. 3D Decedents' Estates} § 584 (2006); \textit{HEDGES & LIBERATO, supra} note 115, § 5:38; \textit{17 WOODWARD & SMITH, supra} note 12, § 178.
\item \textsuperscript{249} Steele, 202 S.W.3d at 928.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
as the Ohio supreme court) or Texas-specific considerations (such as the peculiarities of the Texas independent administration system).  

The Chief Justice addressed many of these shortcomings. He reminded the majority that the independent executor has the management rights that belonged to the decedent. He criticized the majority for deciding an issue without any briefing, and for its misplaced discussion of and reliance on out-of-state authority, which, he pointed out, the court failed to acknowledge is divided. The Chief Justice’s primary concern was the majority’s failure to consider the peculiarities and value of the independent administration system and how their expansive holding would mean nothing could be done in any probate judicial proceeding without an attorney. With considerable justification, as explained above, the Chief Justice concluded his dissent, “This is not the law. Further, this holding will come as an enormous surprise to the personal representatives of estates that have been and are currently being probated and who regularly represent the estate as independent executor in judicial proceedings without being represented by counsel.”

F. Conclusion

Under Texas law, executors are representing their own rights when they (or their attorney) appear in probate court. Because under Huie v. DeShazo, an attorney could appear in court on behalf of the executor’s exclusive right to manage the estate, the executor has the right to appear pro se in court with respect to those same rights. Ex parte Shaffer must be interpreted as the Texas Supreme Court specifically guaranteeing this right. The Minnesota rule has never been adopted in Texas and is inconsistent with both Huie v. DeShazo and Ex parte Shaffer. Independently of these Texas Supreme Court cases, the Texas courts should reject the Minnesota rule because it obliterates the distinction between vesting management

250 Id. at 927–30 (discussing the merits without citation to the supreme court of Ohio or discussion of the Texas independent administration system).
251 Id. at 930 (Gray, J., dissenting).
252 Id. at 930–31.
253 Id. at 931.
254 Id.
255 922 S.W.2d 920, 924–25 (Tex. 1996).
256 See generally 649 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. 1983).
257 See generally Huie, 922 S.W.2d 920; Shaffer, 649 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. 1983).
rights in executors and beneficial interests in beneficiaries. The Minnesota rule also disregards the role of fiduciary duties in regulating the executor-beneficiary relationship. Adopting the Minnesota rule in Texas would raise professional responsibility issues for Texas attorneys involved in estate administration, such as forcing them into hyper-vigilant supervision of their executor-clients to ensure their clients were not inadvertently practicing law outside of the courtroom. More importantly, the adoption of the Minnesota rule’s reasoning that it is the beneficiaries’ interests that are the subject of legal representation would contradict the reasoning in Huie v. DeShazo that the executor’s attorney owes no duties to the beneficiaries.

IV. IMPLICATIONS OF PRO SE RIGHTS

Having demonstrated that executors have pro se rights in Texas, it is timely to consider the implications. The chief implication for the probate court system is how best to accommodate pro se executors. Attorneys need to be aware of the professional responsibility implications that denying pro se rights to executors would have, as discussed above, but should also discuss with their clients their desires regarding permitting, prohibiting, or regulating their chosen executors’ pro se activities. For executors, the question becomes not whether or not they can proceed pro se but under what, circumstances, if any, they ought to.

A. Probate Court System Reforms

With some limited exceptions, the general rule is that a pro se litigant is held to the same courtroom procedures and standards as an attorney. Thus, there is no legal mandate of special accommodations. However, the

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258 See supra Part III.C.
259 See supra Part III.C.
260 See 922 S.W.2d at 924–25.
261 See, e.g., Bailey v. Rogers, 631 S.W.2d 784, 786–87 (Tex. App.—Austin 1982, no writ) (holding in a civil proceeding in which a plaintiff decided to proceed pro se, no allowance would be made for the fact that plaintiff was not a lawyer); but see, e.g., Bradlow, supra note 99, at 671–76 (noting areas of special treatment given to pro se defendants); Holt, supra note 99, at 168–73 (noting the duties owed to pro se litigants and discussing a Minnesota program which seeks to assist such litigants).
judicial trend is towards providing special accommodations in a way calculated to balance both access to justice and judicial efficiency.262

Any accommodation of pro se executors must reflect the obvious fact: non-lawyers are unlikely to know as much about the law as lawyers. With respect to executors appearing pro se, one concern is that the interests of the beneficiaries will not be well served because the executor does not know what to do when. The other concern is that executors not knowing what to do when increases the work load of judges and court staff and decreases the efficiency of the probate system.

Considering how best to respond to the concerns for beneficiaries’ interests and judicial efficiency when executors proceed pro se requires an understanding of how other jurisdictions accommodate pro se petitioners and the uniqueness of the Texas probate court systems.

1. National Experience

The problems of pro se representation are well studied, and many different courts are experimenting with solutions. Pro se representation is on the rise both at the federal and state levels, with more than one third of the cases filed in federal district court being pro se.263 There is abundant scholarly and professional literature on pro se representation, including research on the correlation of the number of pro se cases with the financial inability to hire counsel.264 Almost every state participated in a recent national conference on making the judicial system more accessible to pro se litigants,265 and forty-five percent of all jurisdictions have established some sort of pro se assistance program or service to increase the ability of pro se litigants to participate effectively in the judicial system and, thereby, increase both the effectiveness and the efficiency of the judicial system as a

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262 See Holt, supra note 99, at 171–73.
263 See Buxton, supra note 97, at 112 (discussing a study of ten U.S. District courts over a three year period that found that 37% of cases filed were by pro se defendants).
265 Buxton, supra note 97, at 118.
These programs range from providing basic information and forms to providing on-site, pro bono legal counsel.

2. Unique Texas Probate Court Considerations

Accommodating pro se executors requires acknowledging the uniqueness of the simplified executor-centered independent administration provisions of Texas probate. They are relatively informal and easy to use. The purpose of the probate proceedings is simply to publicize basic information about the decedent, the decedent’s will, and the property the decedent owned. As mentioned above, the court proceeding to probate a will in Texas requires only about four pages of simple documents and five minutes of time with the judge. These provide basic information and do not require articulating legal doctrines or theories.

Additionally, we have to remember that the probate court’s work is not optional. Because of death’s universality, the probate court’s jurisdiction is also universal. It affects Texans of the lowest and highest economic situations. In this context, given that the national rise in pro se appearances has been correlated with an increase in financial inability to retain an attorney, the dominant concern should be to ensure that estates of insufficient value to secure legal services are able to secure legal access.

3. Potential Court Responses

Bearing in mind the uniqueness of the Texas probate system, several reforms and experiments in other jurisdictions might be useful to increasing the effectiveness of pro se executors and judicial efficiency without decreasing the financial efficiency of the courts.

a. Education and Orientation

The most basic accommodation for pro se executors would be for the court to provide generic information through a web site or otherwise, including explanations of laws and court procedures, as well as form

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266 Id.
267 Id.
268 See supra Parts I.B, I.C.
269 See supra Part I.B.
270 See supra Part I.B.
271 See Buxton, supra note 97, at 105, 112.
pleadings.\textsuperscript{272} Another simple accommodation that is used in some courts is to provide video recorded programs providing the basic information, while other courts sponsor courses for pro se litigants in which lawyers, paralegals, or court staff provide orientation to the court system and basic instructions.\textsuperscript{273}

b. Assistance

A more involved level of accommodation for pro se executors would be to provide assistance in completing specific forms or addressing specific issues. This level of accommodation might range from the use of a document examiner who would review documents to ensure they comply with basic requirements to the use of a staff attorney who would serve as a facilitator by providing more specific information on procedure and assistance in preparation of court documents.\textsuperscript{274} In some states, lawyers providing pro bono representation or law students enrolled in law clinics are also used to provide this level of assistance in some courts.\textsuperscript{275}

c. Covering Expenses

A fee charged to pro se executors should cover the courts’ costs for such programs and, perhaps, even offset other court expenses.

4. Coordinated Legislative Response

While the probate courts could undertake these reforms on their own, the legislature could play a substantial role in ensuring the willingness of judges, court staff, and lawyers to be involved in these reforms. The legislature should statutorily limit causes of actions against lawyers or others that might arise from providing assistance to pro se representatives.

B Advising the Testator and Drafting the Will

Because the testator’s intention is the guide in estate administration, the will should reflect the testator’s intention with respect to pro se estate

\textsuperscript{272}Id. at 116 (noting that a “pro se litigant’s lack of familiarity with means of research, terminology, and pleading forms renders the system virtually unintelligible [to them]”).
\textsuperscript{273}Id. at 119.
\textsuperscript{274}Id. at 121.
\textsuperscript{275}Id. at 123–24.
administration.²⁷⁶ The risks of pro se administration—that is, the executor’s exposure to fiduciary litigation and the beneficiaries’ exposure to losing property due to the executor’s mistakes—as well as the potential cost savings of it should be discussed with the testator. The testator should be left with the final word.

1. Prohibiting Proceeding Pro Se

The will could prohibit pro se representation by conditioning the executor’s appointment on his waiving any right to proceed pro se. Since the practice of law is not limited to courtroom appearances (which can be easily prohibited), the complication in drafting would be to define the prohibition in a way that would not impair the out-of-court activities an executor might be qualified to do without legal assistance but that might arguably fall within the definition of the practice of law.²⁷⁷ For example, would preparing forms to make an insurance claim on estate property be the practice of law when the benefit of the insurance would be for the beneficiaries? While conceptually identical to prohibiting pro se representation, requiring the executor to hire an attorney for representing the executor in court would avoid the hard task of defining what exactly the executor could and could not do.

2. Providing Flexibility

The testator may prefer to provide flexibility to the executor. For example, if the testator’s child is sophisticated and the testator’s estate is relatively simple, the testator might wish to appoint the child as executor and allow her to make the decision at the time. If the testator is not adverse to the executor proceeding pro se, he might consider explicit provisions addressing the situation. For example, perhaps he would like to prohibit the beneficiaries from suing unless the executor was grossly negligent in deciding to proceed pro se, or perhaps he would permit the executor to proceed pro se only if she posted a bond. Perhaps the most practical provision would be to allow the executor to proceed pro se only with the beneficiaries’ consent.

²⁷⁶ First United Methodist Church of Marlin v. Allen, 557 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Tex. Civ. App.—Waco 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (noting the primary concern in construing a will is to ascertain the intent of the testator).
²⁷⁷ See supra Part III.D.4.
C. Should Executors Appear Pro Se?

While executors have the legal right in Texas to proceed pro se, it is unclear when, if ever, they should. Executors choosing to go without legal counsel run the risk of being sued for breaching duties to the beneficiaries. An inherent disadvantage to defendants of such suits is that the plaintiffs have the benefit of hindsight, which is denied at the time the balancing of risks and benefits must be made. Complicating any sort of risk-benefit calculus by the executor is that the executor never knows what he or she does not know. The executor lacks the information, strategies, and experience of a good lawyer, which means the executor is quite unlikely to discern the real dangers of proceeding pro se. The real danger is not that an application for probate will have to be amended to include some overlooked information, but that the executor might, for example, misinterpret a clause in the will in a way that benefits one beneficiary at the expense of another. The most serious estate administration risks for executors are not mistakes in the probate courtroom but mistakes with beneficiaries, creditors, and third parties.

1. Fiduciary Duties and Infallible Hindsight

An executor is charged with duties of good faith, fidelity, loyalty, fairness, and prudence. Presumably a pro se executor can act in good faith and with fidelity, loyalty, and fairness towards the beneficiaries. The key question is whether or not an executor would ever be acting prudently by proceeding pro se. If the executor cannot establish that his or her decision to proceed pro se evidenced the prudence an ordinarily capable and careful person would have used in making the decision, he or she can be sued for breaching a duty to the beneficiaries. Such a suit would only be brought if there had been damage to the beneficiaries’ interest, so it follows that the executor would only be called to prove the prudence of proceeding

278 See supra Part III.D.6.
279 See supra Part III.C.6 (discussing Judd v. City Trust Sav. Bank, 12 N.E.2d 288 (1937)).
280 Humane Soc’y of Austin & Travis County v. Austin Nat’l Bank, 531 S.W.2d 574, 577, 580 (Tex. 1975), (noting the executor’s duty to preserve the assets of the estate and not to engage in conflicts of interest); McLendon v. McLendon, 862 S.W.2d 662, 670 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1993, writ denied); Ertel v. O’Brien, 852 S.W.2d 17, 20 (Tex. App.—Waco 1993, writ denied).
281 TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 230 (Vernon 2003); 18 WOODWARD & SMITH, supra note 35, § 693.
282 See TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 230 (defining an executor’s duty of care regarding estate property).
pro se in the event of some significant problem with the estate’s property or beneficiaries.\textsuperscript{283} Inevitably, as fiduciaries often discover only after such a claim is brought, the plaintiffs have the benefit of hindsight in second-guessing the executor’s decisions. If the executor proceeds pro se without a hitch, no one will care. But if any problems arise during the estate administration, the executor has taken the risk that the beneficiaries will sue claiming he or she is responsible on the theory that the problem would have been avoided had the executor been sufficiently prudent to hire legal counsel. Hiring counsel insures against this claim.

2. The Real Work of Estate Lawyers and the Real Risk of Pro Se Executors

 Appearing in court to probate a will is a necessary but obviously insufficient part of estate administration.\textsuperscript{284} The most substantial work of estate administration and the most substantial role of estate lawyers occur outside of the brief probate hearing. Estate lawyers use their practical experience in helping the executor locate and value assets, which may involve choosing between competing appraisals or determining if the executor has an ownership interest in assets the testator may not even realize were owned, such as legal claims.\textsuperscript{285} Estate lawyers guide executors through income tax, estate tax, gift tax, generation-skipping transfer tax, and property tax issues. Estate lawyers prepare deeds or other assignments to the beneficiaries, as well as settlement agreements that memorialize the distributions from the estate and the beneficiaries’ acquiescence in their propriety. Estate lawyers advise the executor in dealing with creditors’ claims. Perhaps most importantly, estate lawyers provide both legal and practical guidance when one or more beneficiaries appear likely to become cross-wise with one another or the executor. The five or so minutes of the routine probate hearing very quickly become a distant memory in the estate’s administration.

There is a continuum of technical and practical difficulty between the uncontested probate of a will destined for independent administration and a

\textsuperscript{283} See id. § 233A (allowing suit by the personal representative to recover the estate’s personal property, debts or damages).

\textsuperscript{284} See id. § 94 (stating that no will is effective until probated).

\textsuperscript{285} For example, the testator may have a malpractice claim against his or her estate planning attorney. See, e.g., Belt v. Oppenheimer, Blend, Harrison & Tate, Inc., 192 S.W.3d 780, 786 (Tex. 2006) (noting that legal malpractice claims may survive in favor of the decedent’s estate, and only a personal representative, including an executor, may bring suit).
multi-year contested estate litigation. Whether or not a prudent person would proceed pro se in estate administration depends upon the person’s estimation of where on that continuum the estate’s administration will be. While even the most experienced lawyers may misjudge the complications of a particular estate’s administration, the pro se executor’s judgment is presumably going to be made without the benefit of much experience. This lack of experience is likely to miss any number of potential complications a competent lawyer would spot.

\[a.\] \textit{Complications with Uncontested Probate}

The application for the uncontested probate of a will is a simple and relatively informal court proceeding only so long as the original will is offered and was duly executed. A pro se executor might not make much of the fact that there is only a photocopy of the will\textsuperscript{286} or that one of the witnesses signed the self-proving affidavit attached to the will but not the will itself.\textsuperscript{287} The executor may also miss that there is no self-proving affidavit attached to the will.\textsuperscript{288} Any of these deviations might require significant additional work to have the will probated; though, to the untrained eye, none of them are likely to seem significant at all. And these are all complications that can arise in uncontested hearings with all of the beneficiaries’ supporting both the executor and the will. Yet, their consent and support is legally insufficient to overcome the deficiencies.

\[b.\] \textit{The Unavoidable Risk of Contest}

The contest of a will is very unlike the simple uncontested proceeding requiring knowledge of procedure and strategy in addition to substantive legal information.\textsuperscript{289} The risk of the pro se executor being defeated on

\textsuperscript{286} See 17 WOODWARD & SMITH, supra note 12, § 284.

\textsuperscript{287} See 17 WOODWARD & SMITH, supra note 12, § 311; see, e.g., Boren v. Boren, 402 S.W.2d 728, 729 (Tex. 1996) (holding that a will is a nullity where the self-proving provision is signed but the will itself is not).

\textsuperscript{288} See 17 WOODWARD & SMITH, supra note 12, § 311; see, e.g., In re Estate of Plohberger, 761 S.W.2d 448, 450 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied).

\textsuperscript{289} TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 10 (Vernon 2003) (requiring the contest of a will to be in writing); 1 DESHAZO ET AL., supra note 32, § 6:189 (noting that placement of the burden of proof regarding the requirements of a will depends upon whether the will has been admitted to probate). The testator’s capacity, compliance with statutory formalities, proper execution of the will and absence of revocation are among the issues that would be litigated at a proceeding to contest a will. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 59 (stating the requisites of a will); Carr v. Radkey, 393 S.W.2d
procedural rather than substantive grounds is substantial. However, unlike most pro se litigants whose defeat is consequential only to them, the estate’s beneficiaries stand to lose. This is a loss the beneficiaries may seek to recover from the executor. Unfortunately for the pro se executor, there is never certainty that a probate hearing initially scheduled for the uncontested docket will remain so.

c. **Interpreting the Will**

One of the most common legal services lawyers provide during an estate administration is explaining the will’s meaning to the executor so that the executor can follow its terms. Although a pro se executor might mistake clear wording for clear meaning in a will, an estate lawyer knows better. Is a distribution to be per stirpes or per capita? Is an individual adopted as an adult a “child”? Is a step-child? What if the testator was divorced from his wife but never changed his will—does she still benefit? How are taxes and expenses to be charged among the beneficiaries’ shares? Do non-probate assets bear any of these? The answer to each of these questions will shift benefits and burdens among the beneficiaries, and the answer may not be as clear to the executor as the words of the will. The duty to be fair to the beneficiaries is one the pro se executor risks.

806, 807–16 (Tex. 1965) (resolving the issue of a testator’s capacity and what testimony is to be considered on the issue); 1 DeSHAZO ET. AL., *supra* note 32, § 6:189 (listing areas of litigation in a contested will proceeding).

290 See, e.g., Bloom & Hershkoff, *supra* note 264, at 513 (discussing a study which found pro se litigants often commit procedural errors); Bradlow, *supra* note 99, at 664 (noting a litigant’s request for counsel may be denied forcing them to appear pro se and exposing them to the risk of losing the case on “mundane procedural rules”); Holt, *supra* note 99, at 169–70 (noting that lack of knowledge of procedural requirements can effectively deny a pro se litigant of their opportunity to adjudicate their case on the merits).

291 See Lehman v. Corpus Christi Nat’l Bank, 668 S.W.2d 687, 688–89 (Tex. 1984) (discussing application of the presumption that use of the terms “child” or “children” refers to sons or daughters of whatever age to an adopted adult).

292 See Floyd v. Floyd, 813 S.W.2d 758, 759 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1991, writ denied) (holding that a step child was under the terms of the will).

293 See 17 WOODWARD & SMITH, *supra* note 12, § 69.


295 TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 322A; Patrick v. Patrick, 182 S.W.3d 433, 437–38 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, no pet.) (discussing the general rule of apportioning taxes among probate and non-probate assets and the exceptions to the general rule).
transgressing when he interprets the will without a lawyer even if the interpretation is in good faith and reasonable.

d. Estate Assets

The job of the executor is to collect the testator’s assets and to distribute the assets to the beneficiaries. Like most jobs, it is easier said than done. The ease of this task depends in part on how well organized the testator was, but even the most organized testator’s assets might not be so easily collected and distributed. The testator may have legal claims he never considered pursuing, such as claims against beneficiaries for unpaid debts owed. May, must, or should the executor pursue such a claim? The testator’s assets are likely to have changed between the date of the will and the date of death. What if assets specifically bequeathed to a beneficiary cannot be found or were sold and replaced with other assets? None of these issues are likely to become evident until after the probating of the will, yet these types of issues are common complications to an executor’s attempt to locate and distribute the testator’s assets.

e. Summary

It is impossible to catalog the potential complications of an estate administration, even one that seems simple on first review. Even experienced estate lawyers never know what all they do not know when considering whether or not to take on advising an executor with respect to an estate administration. As a practical matter, pro se executors bear the risk personally when they estimate where upon the continuum of ease and trouble the estate’s administration will be; disgruntled beneficiaries will be armed with both the rights of those owed the highest duties and the certainty of hindsight as to how problematic the administration became.

296 See 1 DESHAZO ET AL., supra note 32, §§ 5:32, 5:34 (discussing the executor’s duty to marshal the assets).

297 See, e.g., Russell v. Adams, 299 S.W. 889, 894 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1927, judgm’t adopted); Oxsheer v. Nave, 90 Tex. 568, 40 S.W. 7, 10–11 (Tex. 1897) (holding a debtor beneficiary must either pay a debt owed to the estate or have the debt offset his share in the estate and, if the debt is greater, receive no interest).

298 See, e.g., Shriner’s Hosp. for Crippled Children of Tex. v. Stahl, 610 S.W.2d 147, 148, 150 (Tex. 1980).
V. CONCLUSION

Executors have the right to proceed pro se to probate a will and otherwise administer the estate.299 However, given the inherent uncertainties of estate administration and the executor’s fiduciary duties to the beneficiaries, it is likely unwise for most executors to do so. Nevertheless, the probate courts should consider how best to accommodate pro se executors in a way that maximizes judicial access without decreasing judicial efficiency. Since, by definition, Texas attorneys will not be advising pro se executors, we should consider advising our testator clients as to the risks and potential benefits of pro se probate and ensuring that the testator’s balancing of those risks and benefits is reflected in the will governing the executor.

299 See supra Part III.D.6.A.