The Philippines and the United States: Problems of Partnership, by George E. Taylor (1964)

Ben Cashman
BOOKS REVIEWED


Professor George E. Taylor clearly has written the best study on the Philippines since the end of World War II. His work, The Philippines and the United States: Problems of Partnership, fills not only an academic void but, more important, also one for United States decision-makers, diplomats, and ordinary readers. In the introduction he states that his book "is a study of the relations between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines from the point of view of the United States." This is not to say, however, that the volume presents only a pro-American point of view. Quite the contrary is true; this undoubtedly accounts for its very favorable reception in the Philippines. It is an impartial study and the author does not hesitate to criticize both the United States and the Philippine governments.

One of the key points made concerns current difficulties in Southeast Asia. This point—presented in the introduction and amplified later in the volume—should be better known to Americans: "It is not generally understood that U.S. policies in Southeast Asia today depend in great measure on a political and military partnership with the Republic of the Philippines...." (p. 3) In the event that the United States-Philippine alliance (which includes the right of the United States to have bases there) should be ruptured, the United States would then have to fall back to the Marianas as its first security line in the South Pacific. Professor Taylor quite correctly points out that the partnership—and thus the alliance—cannot be taken for granted. Few informed readers would argue with the assertion that the United States has taken an independent Philippines for granted

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For an account of this incident see Asahi Shimbun, June 16, 1930. Unfortunately, the Minobe article on this development to which Professor Miller refers is unavailable to me.

* Professor of Japanese Government and Politics, Far Eastern and Russian Institute, University of Washington.

1 George E. Taylor is Chairman, Department of Far Eastern and Slavic Languages and Literature; and is Director, Far Eastern and Russian Institute, University of Washington, Seattle.

since 1946. Much of Filipino criticism of U.S. policies since independence centers on the fact that the United States still takes the Philippines for granted and is insensitive to Philippine national aspirations and capacities. This attitude became more of an irritant to the Filipinos as nationalism grew and as the growth of this nationalism was largely ignored in the United States.

There are two conditions, in the author’s view, for a U.S. policy for the Philippines which must be “directed in fact and in theory to the task of imaginative participation in the political and economic development of the Philippines.” These are (1) “a purposive evaluation of Philippine affairs based, as much as possible, on a scientific analysis of the problem of economic growth and the nature of the political process” and (2) “to focus the purposes and practices of those instruments that implement U.S. policy—the separate diplomatic, military and economic aid missions—on the main objective of realizing the full potentialities of the partnership between the United States and the Philippines” (p. 4). These two conditions set the theme of this book which analyzes clearly and concisely those factors involved in developing an integrated United States foreign policy for the Philippine Republic.

Professor Taylor’s work is divided into two parts: (1) the emergence of the issues, which is an excellent history of pre-independence United States relations with the Philippines and (2) independence and partnership, which analyzes in depth the post-independence problems and issues. Throughout the volume the author not only discusses the political factors involved, but he is one of the few writers on the Philippines who correlates the all-important social and economic factors with the political issues. In these areas he is sensitive to Filipino desires and aspirations. It is the impact of nationalism on Filipino attitudes and aspirations which has been largely ignored in the United States, and as Professor Taylor suggests, if the United States is “to formulate an effective policy for the Philippines we shall certainly have to understand the character and ideological content of Filipino nationalism” (p. 15). Or as he more strongly puts it, “the search for national identity is the basic problem of the Filipino, and therefore of United States relations with the Philippines” (p. 15). This reviewer has had the opportunity recently to read many current Filipino publications and Professor Taylor’s point is well taken. The Filipinos are clearly trying—and sometimes desperately—to build a political,
economic and social structure which is Filipino and not merely a poor copy of the United States. There is nothing incompatible with this desire, as the author points out in his conclusions, and United States interests in the Philippines.

The first section of this volume contains an excellent, concise and sometimes controversial view of Filipino history. As a prelude to his historical summary, Professor Taylor puts the human and natural resources of the Philippines in perspective when he states:

It may be no exaggeration to say that unless the Filipinos can immediately reduce their birthrate, any hopes they may have of improving their material conditions will be vain. Even if they can slow down the increase in population, which is doubtful, they must, as they themselves recognize, carry out an ambitious social and economic program over a long period of time with skill and resolution. To do this requires a high level of leadership and a dedicated group of men who can stay in power, which means that they must get themselves elected. There must also be other men outside government, other leaders, who promote the objectives of the program in their own way and in their own sectors of society. This combination of men and circumstances came one step closer to realization in 1961 with the election of Macapagal to the presidency. If history is any guide, the Philippines will not fail because of any lack of leaders of the quality that the situation demands. Not all Americans are aware that the Filipinos have produced leaders who compare with those of any other country in talent, vision, and courage (p. 29).

It is how broadly these resources are utilized which will determine the quality of Philippine nationalism and the author concludes that “Nationalism can remain narrowly based, or it can broaden its base to include the tao [the common man]. If the leaders of the Philippines should decide to include him in the nationalist movement, there are no difficulties that cannot be overcome” (p. 29). This may be somewhat of an overstatement, but it clearly indicates the role of nationalism in present and future Philippine policies. To help the reader understand this emerging nationalism, the author traces the story of the Philippines in its three main periods: the pre-Spanish, the Spanish, and the American. Most readers would probably agree with his conclusion that “the Spaniards left behind them habits of submission and obedience and an inability to take political initiative and responsibility—habits which are deadly enemies of democracy and which are very slow to change even when democratic institutions have been substituted for centralized autocracy” (p. 33). He sum-
marizes the political legacy of the United States to the Philippines as: "A half century of American rule in the Philippines was devoted to the self-imposed task of mothering the national revolution of another people. When the United States granted the Filipinos their independence in 1946, it turned over to them a revolution which they themselves had started and no one else could finish" (p. 57). Some Filipinos disagree with the author's view that "it was a foreign power that carried out their revolution for them..." (p. 59). Perhaps the disagreement in points of view can best be illustrated by recalling that the Philippines now celebrate June 12th as its independence day and not the 4th of July. The former is the date on which General Aguinaldo proclaimed the independence of the Philippines from Spain.

Two of the most important policies of American colonialism which left a profound impact on an independent Philippines were public education and political tutelage. The accomplishments and shortcomings of these policies the author summarized as follows:

The end result of American political direction was an American-type of constitution but not an American form of government; the Philippine Republic is a centralized, not a federal government. The unusual concentration of authority in the person and office of the chief executive certainly did not come about by American intention, but resulted from historical factors and the structure of Philippine society. The Filipino looks for the charismatic element in leadership and is accustomed, through personal experience of the patricentric family, to accept authority. The relation between landlord and tenant, the most common of all relationships outside the family, was much more than a contractual affair. It had many of the elements of deference and responsibility that were common within the family. In the Philippines, traditions of individual initiative and responsibility in the political process had to be created as far as the masses were concerned. While it is not true to say that the ideological bases of the Western type of democracy have found no acceptance in the Philippines, they still compete with powerful forces (p. 79).

United States policies did not create a broadly based democratic society (the typical American, of course, believes we did) but as Professor Taylor so correctly states: "The Americans have mainly themselves to blame for the failure to build democracy at the grass roots when they had the opportunity to do so" (p. 80). Ignoring the common man in Philippine political life was largely continued until Ramon Magsaysay became president. The job is not finished; Filipinos are apparently as apathetic about politics as many Amer-
icans if the pleas for voter registration appearing in Filipino periodicals are any indication.

Professor Taylor pulls no punches in his summation of the economic record of the United States in the Philippines. While the United States was training the Filipinos in the art of self-government, "it was making the colonial economy progressively dependent on its own" (p. 81). This has continued into the post-independence period and raises the question of "whether a country [can] ... be politically free and economically dependent" (p. 81). This point is not as vital to Philippine economic well-being as some (particularly in the Philippines) make it out to be. There is no reason to disagree with Professor Taylor's view that the economic relationships between the United States and the Philippines can and should be improved, but the more important defect of the Filipino economy, and a legacy of the United States, is "its neglect of the agrarian situation" (p. 82). Specifically the United States did not improve the lot of the Philippine peasantry. "[F]ailure to make any significant improvement in the agricultural sector was a serious shortcoming in the U.S. record" (pp. 83-84). Even during the one year between the end of World War II and independence, the United States continued to do nothing about correcting some of the major economic and social defects, but concerned itself with enacting legislation to protect United States business interests in the islands. As Professor Taylor states: "The key problem, however, was that of the long-term economic development of the Philippines, and to this no branch of the government gave effective consideration. The United States lost the opportunity for leadership while it still held the reins, using its great power instead to bully and blackmail the Filipinos into concessions to special interests" (p. 115). It is this sort of statement which makes this volume provocative and indeed requires the United States to do some reassessment of its role in the Philippines in the past sixty-five years.

The author adopts a sympathetic view—certainly not held by the Truman administration—concerning the wartime roles of Filipino leaders in the occupied Philippines. He does not condemn them as collaborators, but he shows how their presence may have been advantageous to the Filipino people because it prevented direct Japanese rule. He states "these leaders [who served in the Philippine Executive Council under the Japanese] had a far more difficult role than did the guerrillas" (p. 104). He concludes that:
Most of the leaders who stayed behind were acting for the interests of a future Philippine Republic in a spirit of fierce national pride and independence. The record shows that some, like Recto, had been critical of America, but very few indeed had been openly favorable to Japan. President Osmeña's analysis, that some were acting for the future good of the Philippines and others from fear of reprisals, suggests two categories that were not mutually exclusive. If everyone in authority had followed the example of Chief Justice José Abad Santos [who was executed for failure to cooperate], there would have been no buffer between the Japanese and the Filipino people. In a very real sense the Commonwealth leaders could claim that to be faithful to the United States was to be true to the Philippines (p. 107).

It is possible to argue that Professor Taylor may oversimplify the collaboration issue. This reviewer believes he does not. The United States wanted these individuals investigated and tried, but this attitude ignored the simple fact that the best people to judge their actions were those who lived with them under the Japanese and who alone could determine whether their lives were better or worse for a show of cooperation.

The author without equivocation asserts that the "Filipinos got off to a very bad start on the road to independence" (p. 133). This bad start reflects poor planning on the part of the United States for Philippine independence. In a very meaningful paragraph, the author sums up why the start was so bad:

After liberating the Philippines the United States made a settlement that was marked by lavish expressions of mutual good will, by partly fulfilled promises, and by a restoration of the old relationship in almost everything except in name. Many of the issues that both countries face today arose from the policies of the United States at this time, such as the treatment meted out to collaborators, the insistence on special privileges for American businessmen, the handling of the back pay for guerrillas, determination of war damage claims, the pegging of the peso to the dollar, the status of American bases, the tariff, and regional security. Today many of these decisions take on a different cast in the light of new attitudes and new purposes. But nothing can conceal the fact that instead of a bold and imaginative program based on careful planning during the war years, such as was devised for a defeated Japan, the U.S. Congress served up a sterile compromise based on the restoration of prewar economic dependence. The Filipino representatives on the Rehabilitation Commission, able members of the political elite, were in no position to insist on changes radical enough to ensure an independent and democratic Philippine republic. Until July 4, 1946, the main responsibility for the future of the republic fell on American
soldiers, yet not one recommendation seems to have been made resembling those that came so freely a few years later. This was a restoration, not a revolution (p. 114).

This is a strong indictment of the policy of the United States towards the Philippines, and it is an especially clear example of how the United States took the Philippines for granted. Any honest appraisal of United States policies must attest to its accuracy. For better or for worse the Filipinos must live with their history and "no matter which way the Filipino turns for inspiration, for examples, or for concepts about himself, his country, and his future, he has to come to terms with the record of the United States of America in the Philippines" (p. 59).

The author does not devote much space to the immediate postwar problem of the Philippine Republic with the then Communist-directed Hukbalahap movement. This reviewer would have preferred to see the Hiks treated in one place in the book rather than briefly in various sections. The main points on the seriousness of the threat, however, are in this study, including the fact that the United States did not then understand the Huk menace any clearer than it did the Communist threat elsewhere in Asia.

The second part of the book deals with the more immediate relations between the United States and the Philippines. It is in this section that the problems of partnership emerge. In almost every case, the current problems are old issues amplified by a growing nationalism and a changing Filipino social structure. In his typically clear style, the author summarizes the new Philippine nation: "The turning point came, perhaps, with the Magsaysay election in 1953, which brought to power a man who was the first Philippine president to attempt to persuade the common people that the government should be responsive and responsible to them, who began to tackle the mighty problem of agrarian reform, and who firmly but tactfully impressed on the United States the fact that the Filipinos intended to be treated as an independent people" (p. 153). It is in the author's discussion of this new nation where he makes his most significant contribution. Anyone who wants to understand the Philippines of today should read chapters 8 and 9, for it is here where the human element in the Philippines emerges so clearly. While the old family system still largely prevails, there are new social forces appearing, particularly the middle class. He handles the intellectuals separately (because of the key role
assigned to them) but acknowledges that they are part of the middle class. There are limitations on Filipino intellectuals and as the author puts it: “it cannot be said that there is yet an independent, self-regenerative intellectual life in the Philippines” (p. 160). The author, however, assigns to the intellectuals the role of deciding the ultimate character and content of Filipino nationalism. There is a major effort by the intellectuals to search the pre-Spanish past for the foundations of a Filipino identity. He concludes that:

There is little agreement on the way in which the Philippine nation will grow, on the social content of nationalism, the relation between government and the governed, between the rich and the poor. This vagueness about the national image would be of no great consequence if there were no competing philosophies, no Communist program. But there are sufficient divisions within the composite ruling class to make it possible for the Communists, with their competing appeal to nationalism, to make serious headway. In the political power struggle the very concept of a Philippine national image will be used for purposes of manipulation because it is the most powerful political symbol in the country. He who captures Filipino nationalism captures the Philippines (pp. 169-70).

While the intellectuals may decide the content of Philippine nationalism, the whole middle class is assigned a meaningful role. It is “one of the few potential sources of constructive political dynamism in the Philippines” (p. 175). It is a small group at present, but it can grow if there are changes in the Filipino social relations, the class structure, and agricultural reform. The main obstacle to expansion of the middle class in the author’s view lies in the “attitude of the oligarchy toward the investment of capital, toward politics and government and the worth of their own people” (p. 175). The author points out the paths the middle class may take:

The middle class in the Philippines can move in two directions. It can share, as it is doing today, in the rewards of the technologically advanced sector of the economy and ignore the technologically backward agricultural sector. In following this course it may be tempted to use political connections in order to acquire capital and to neutralize competitors, particularly aliens. Under these conditions a few individuals will accumulate vast fortunes, but the middle class, as a class, will not grow a great deal in wealth or in power. The other direction in which the middle class can move is to take the lead in arousing the latent energies of the people to harness these energies to the economic revolution. This would call for a conscious and deliberate effort to form an alliance with
the peasants and workers and with the army. Only in this way can the agrarian changes be brought about that will make further industrialization possible (p. 177).

The problem here, of course, is to get the peasant to accept political leadership from the middle class. This is a complicated matter and the manner in which it is resolved will determine the political and economic future of the Philippines.

Another element in the social dynamics of the Philippines is the political role of the Filipino military forces. The author makes it very clear that he is concerned with the future role, not the past role, which has largely been apolitical. As the author states: "in the early days of American rule William Howard Taft had demonstrated that the military is subordinate to the civil authority. This lesson was inculcated in the Philippine army so successfully that after independence the Philippine Republic stood in less danger of a military coup d'état than any other country in Southeast Asia. Of all the American contributions to the Philippine value system, that of the military establishment was perhaps decisive" (p. 181). There is not a deep division between the politicians and the military men but some professional soldiers resent the interference of politicians in the internal affairs of the armed forces. Professor Taylor acknowledges that the future role of the army depends on what happens to the rest of the country.

If Communist subversion again becomes an immediate problem, the armed forces will consider it their mission to do again what was done before. And if the higher officers do not accept the challenge, then idealistic young officers could easily persuade themselves that the patriots should remove those who stand in the way, whether they be civilian or military officials. They now have what they did not have before: the example of the armed forces in other Asian countries, such as Korea, Burma, Pakistan—the solution of the radical right. But the myth could just as easily be appropriated by the radical left if the left could put its program in such a way as to gain ground in the armed forces (p. 193).

The wiser course "is for the middle class to make an active ally of the army, supporting and extending its present activities in civil affairs, such as engineering projects, land clearing, communications, and enforcement of election laws" (p. 195).

The author traces the steps which have brought about a changed partnership in the economic growth of the Philippines. While the changes have been gradual—and partly as a result of friction between
the two countries—the net effect has been a lessening of U.S. influence and an increase in direction of its own economic life. As the author says: "during this period [mid-fifties on], the Philippines forced the United States to modify the economic assistance program, secured a revision of the trade agreement of 1946, and began to take hold of the control and direction of its own economic life" (p. 197). The story of U.S. economic assistance to the Philippines, according to the author, has three important aspects:

First, there are the philosophy, scope, and method of granting aid, all of which have been matters of considerable dispute and now are up for rigorous review. Second, there are the efforts to encourage a radical land reform, which met with minimal success and maximum acrimony but are still of high priority. Third, there are the deliberate efforts to promote free labor unions, which are continuing and have a long way to go before they can be considered really successful. In addition, there is the contribution that economic assistance has made to the emergence of a Philippine economic policy and the problems of adjustment that this implies for the United States (p. 197).

The philosophy of United States economic policy in the Philippines "has been directed toward persuading, leading, and on occasion compelling the Philippine government to exercise the sort of leadership that would result in a free economy, a more equitable distribution of wealth, and democratic political institutions. What was new was the assumption, written into the Mutual Security Act, that these three go together. Political democracy without social and economic revolution does not provide the dynamism for a working democracy. Hence the unfinished revolution in the Philippines" (p. 199). It is in these areas where friction has developed. The United States has urged the Philippine government to take steps to bring about this revolution—some aid was conditioned upon the Philippines proceeding along specified lines—and the U.S. program clashed with the vested interests of the land owners who have the wealth and the political power. Once again Professor Taylor in presenting an answer to the problem of Philippine economic development returns to the responsibilities of the middle class:

The problem in the Philippines is that we have succeeded in securing the formal acceptance of the purest form of free market capitalism, but we have not succeeded in establishing a state strong enough to tax, coerce, and provide the social services that make capitalism possible. In order to create state power of this sort the majority of the Filipinos must accept the view that the state is there to serve, not private purposes,
but the public interest. The middle class is the only one whose immediate economic interests may coincide to some degree with the national interest. There is, therefore, a tendency among American businessmen and officials to hope that the political dynamism necessary to build the institutions of the modern liberal-democratic state will come from the middle class, and that the middle class will determine the character of the Philippine nationalism (p. 214).

The building of a strong Filipino economy has tested and strained the partnership. The ultimate economic course must be decided by the Filipinos and this will determine what the United States should do. The incumbent Philippine administration has defined its objectives and has "taken several steps toward implementing the program. The vigor of the Philippine effort should be matched by an equally brisk American approach. The fact that the Filipinos are determined to act independently and will not stand for old colonial attitudes does not mean that the United States must stand aside and speak only when spoken to. On the contrary, this is a time for participation in their economic and social program and for shrewd assistance in those places where it will do the most good for the U.S. national interest. These are years in which the creative potential of the Filipino people may well be released, for good or for ill, and our relations with the Philippines are likely to be difficult and tempestuous whether or not they are productive" (p. 229). This reviewer hopes that those Americans who will be involved in deciding United States economic policy for the Philippines will read and heed Professor Taylor's analysis of the situation.

As indicated earlier in this review, Professor Taylor in his introduction establishes the role that the Philippine Republic plays in the national security interests of the United States in Southeast Asia. It is a vital role. As Rear Admiral Francis J. Blouin, Director, Far East Region, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, testified in 1965 before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs: "Our first line of defense lies in those countries which border on Communist China, the U.S.S.R. and their Asian satellites. Any threat to the political or physical security of those countries constitutes a threat to the security of the United States. The peoples of those countries are the key to the defense of this forward line of the free world." The same spokesman put it more

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directly when he stated: "It is of paramount strategic importance to us that our frontier with communism in the Pacific be kept where it is, thousands of miles west of the Continental United States." This official view binds the United States to the Philippines in a partnership unlike that which existed prior to World War II. As Professor Taylor indicates, the Philippines were considered expendable by the United States. "As General George C. Marshall later declared, the Philippines, a small military outpost of the United States, would always have to be sacrificed in a fight with a first-class power; nor could it be assumed that the United States would enter the war if Japan were to attack the Philippines but not the territory of the continental United States. There was certainly no obligation to do so" (p. 102).

Today, however, the United States security interests make it incumbent that the U.S. maintain its position in the Philippines. The United States has publicly committed itself to regard any attack on the Philippines as an attack on itself and President Johnson in October 1964 promised President Macapagal that the United States would honor this pledge.

This reciprocal defense need for each other has not meant, however, that there have not been disputes between the two countries on military matters. The most long-standing issue concerns the status of U.S. bases in the Philippines—Clark Field, Subic Bay, and Sangley Point. The military bases agreement negotiated in 1947 was the first concluded after World War II and gave the United States jurisdiction over service personnel for all on-base offenses and for most off-base offenses. There has been a series of incidents wherein Filipino nationals were killed near or on these bases and the Filipino press increasingly plays up these "murders" in a concerted campaign to force a renegotiation of the bases agreement. Professor Taylor presents a very clear summary of the issues involved and concludes:

Most of the Americans on the bases have little contact with Filipinos other than those in the lower social strata, including those with whom many American servicemen collaborate in smuggling and illegal traffic in dollars. Small wonder, then, that many of them take such a jaundiced view of the Filipino, or that the Filipinos often think of the American as arrogant. In any other country the situation would have come to a head long before it did in the Philippines. Sooner or later the United States will have to accept in the Philippines the same sort of status-of-forces agreement that it has elsewhere, and it will be in the American

4 Ibid.
interest to do so. There is no logical ground on which to stand in refusing to grant to the Philippines what we give to other allies. It is extremely poor policy to extract every ounce of resentment, tension, and misunderstanding from protracted negotiations over an issue to which there can be only one conclusion (pp. 245-46).

Since publication of this volume, two additional incidents in late 1964 further intensified Filipino feelings and the press again pushed for revision of the bases treaty. Since January 1965, the United States and the Philippines have been negotiating on this highly inflammatory issue. While the more extreme Filipino view has been to demand total withdrawal of United States forces, it is certain that a more moderate view will prevail and the bases will remain, but under altered conditions.

Professor Taylor in his review of an emerging Philippine foreign policy points out that this Asian partner of the United States has two aims in foreign affairs: "to clarify its relations with the United States, and to establish a new relationship with other countries, particularly its neighbors in Asia" (p. 250). As indicated earlier in this review, the Filipinos insist that the United States no longer take them for granted. "From the United States the Filipinos want respect and equality of status much more than money or favors. They want the American government to accept their nationalism, whatever its strengths and weaknesses, as naturally as they accept that of other countries. That is why they have felt it necessary to demonstrate, in negotiations with the United States as well as through their role in the United Nations, that the Philippines arrives at its policies independently, even when they coincide with those of its partner" (p. 255). There is no reason why the United States cannot work effectively with the Philippines within this frame of reference. It is essential that the United States does if the Philippines is to fulfill the role Professor Taylor suggests for it: "The Philippines must act as a loyal ally of the United States and other members of SEATO when dealing with the Asian members of that organization. But the Republic's standing with the uncommitted countries, it feels, can be established only by disproving the charges that the Philippines is a puppet of the United States. It is easy to fail in both. The Filipinos have ambitions to be bridge builders between the United States and the peoples of Asia and possibly Africa, yet they have not been able to bring the uncommitted countries, such as Indonesia and Burma,
into the free world alliances. Nor was the first Malay republic included in the plans for a state of Malaysia" (p. 270).

The official United States Department of State view on Philippine foreign policy is: "The Philippines seeks to preserve the balance of power in the Far East and to strengthen efforts aimed at containing an expansionist Communist China. Further, it wishes to broaden its role in Asian affairs and to draw together with its non-Communist neighbors. For this reason President Macapagal has proposed the formation of 'Maphilindo,' a confederation of the three Malay nations, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia. The success of this proposal is dependent on a resolution of the differences Indonesia and the Philippines have with Malaysia." Mr. William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee that "both our prestige and security are attached to the record the Philippines is making in Asia." This country is vitally concerned with the direction Philippine foreign policy takes and we must be prepared to accept the simple fact that the Philippines will not necessarily always hold the same view on international matters as the United States. This is neither disloyalty to the United States nor is it a desire to break the partnership; it merely is a normal expression of nationalism which should be expected from any sovereign and independent nation.

In his chapter on the Communist bloc and the Philippines Professor Taylor clearly outlines the long-range objective of the Communist bloc to take over the Philippines. As he suggests, these islands would be a particularly rich prize because of the damage their loss would do to American prestige in Asia. Fortunately the Communist threat to the Philippines, at the moment, is minor but it cannot be denied that the Communists "are preparing for another serious bid for power when the occasion permits" (p. 272). The Philippines is probably the most anti-Communist country in Asia. It does not maintain trade or diplomatic relations with any member of the Communist bloc. It has controlled the efforts of the Huks to seize power, but current press reports in the Philippines indicate that there is still Communist activity present and that it takes the form of assassination of low level political leaders and terrorizing—on a limited scale—of the peasants.

The author quite correctly discusses the role of the "Overseas Chi-

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6 Dep't of State, Background Notes, Dep't of State Pub. No. 7750, March 1964, p. 5.
6 Supra note 3, at 367.
nese" in his discussion of the Communist menace. The Chinese residents in the Philippines must not be used as pawns of Peiping or Taiwan. If the Communist Chinese should gain control of the Chinese in the Philippines, the results might be disastrous. Until now, however, the Chinese Nationalist government has been able to maintain a greater control over the loyalties of the Chinese in the Philippines but this does not provide a permanent answer to the problem. Professor Taylor indicates that "the Filipinos know that the Chinese problem can be solved only by a combination of two processes—the absorption of the Chinese into Philippine society both culturally and racially, and the assumption by the Filipinos of economic leadership and control. If the Chinese are absorbed, if there are no questions as to their loyalty and identification, then as Filipinos they can add their wealth and talent to the development of the country" (pp. 275-76). In short, they must be made an integral part of Filipino society in all respects.

In the larger view, the Communist ideology is the greater threat to the Philippines. It is Professor Taylor's theme throughout the book that the Filipinos are searching for a national identity. He puts the matter in clear perspective when he states: "The adjustment of the new Asian nations to each other, after the long isolation under imperial controls, is one of the revolutionary political facts of our time.... There has also come a watchful competition between the new nations to find a workable solution to the problems of national development. The result is ideological confusion. Countries that are politically committed to the free world may be ideologically uncommitted, and vice versa. It is difficult to find our bearings; but it is quite clear that the Communists have engaged us on the most crucial issue of all, that of the Filipino view of the world, the place of the Filipino in it, and the shape of the future for the Filipino nationalist. Whoever captures Philippine nationalism, captures the Philippines" (p. 286). There is no need to argue with this view or to doubt the wisdom of the author's recommendation that the United States must come face to face with it by paying "as much interest in the intellectual and cultural life of its ally as it does in its strategic economic and political significance" (p. 290).

Professor Taylor concludes his study with a look into the future for the Philippines:

First, we can expect that the period of development on which the Filipinos have now embarked will be turbulent, for there is bound to be
class struggle, social dislocation, and economic imbalance whether the Philippines is achieving economic growth or retreating in the face of insoluble problems. Second, we can expect these problems to be compounded by the efforts of the Communists to create conditions for the seizure of power not only in the Philippines, but also in other parts of Southeast Asia. Third, we can foresee that the world tendency toward the creation of supranational organizations for economic and political purposes will have far-reaching effects. The Philippines will have to make some difficult choices with respect to its Asian neighbors. Fourth, there is only one class in the Philippines that has the motivation, the knowledge, and the opportunity to force the pace of economic growth and take the leadership in social change. This is the middle class, broadly defined to include politicians and entrepreneurs, the professions, government servants, the managers, and the intellectuals” (p. 194).

The author balances this outlook for the Philippines by indicating that the United States must examine its “special” relationship with the Philippines and concentrate on “supporting, guiding and cooperating with those Filipinos who are capable of satisfying the aspirations of their people within the framework of democratic values and institutions” (p. 295). Such attention should be focused on the middle class. “The policy of giving moral, political, and material support to the middle class involves more than the complex coordination of U.S. political and economic measures. It must also be integrated with United States policy toward the Philippine military establishment. There are two reasons for this: one is that the Philippine military can do a great deal to help in the development of the country; and the other is that if the middle class fails, the military will take over either with or in opposition to the Communists. It is very important, therefore, that the Philippine military should continue to be democratic in outlook, support the constitution, and back the right kind of nationalism” (p. 307). All of this demands a partnership wherein the United States respects the pride, independence and nationalist spirit of the Filipino people.

Professor Taylor has performed a distinguished service to both the United States and the Philippines for putting the partnership in perspective. His is a scholarly work and a clear guide for the future relations of the two countries. His book has been described as a “new, a mature American approach to the Philippines. From the American point of view, at least, the important thing should not be merely to read and agree with Professor Taylor; it should be to understand and to heed. For the Philippines, the book may be considered a non-sentimental and an intelligent effort to show the Philippines and Filipinos
as they really are...." It has also been referred to as "the definitive study about Philippine-American relations...." And finally, "the writer of this review takes some pride in pointing out that the policy of this Journal... has during all the past years been in line with the very sound advice now so eloquently advanced by Professor Taylor." This reviewer can only echo these sentiments about this highly worthwhile volume. It is a must for anyone who pretends to understand the complicated and dangerous situation today in Southeast Asia. It is hoped that it will be as closely and widely read in the United States as it has in the Philippines.

Ben Cashman*


Because Minobe Tatsukichi became a symbol of the small, courageous and ultimately impotent band of liberals in pre-1945 Japan, his name is familiar to even the more casual readers of modern Japanese history. This systematic study makes known to those outside Japan for the first time the precise nature of Minobe's constitutionalism and provides a far more accurate measure of his place in Japan's academic and political worlds than has hitherto been available. In this intellectually elegant biography Professor Miller has served not only his subject but the scholarly community very well indeed.

What Professor Miller has brilliantly produced can be summarized briefly: a clear intellectual portrait of an individual scholar whose thought and career were inextricably woven into the development of both an old-style and a new-style Japanese constitutionalism in the first half of the twentieth century. The Minobe we observe in this book is an individual both swimming with and fighting against the intellectual and political currents of his time. He emerges as a distinctive personality through the author's detailed description of his thoughts as ex-

7 Kennewick, A Philippine Image, Philippine Free Press (Manila), Sept. 26, 1964, p. 95.
9 J. of the American Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines, Aug. 1964, p. 358.
* Member of the faculty, Shoreline Community College, Seattle; part-time member of the Political Science Faculty, Seattle University, Seattle.
1 Professor of Political Science, College of Wooster, Wooster, Ohio.