A General Theory of Eminent Domain

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Where to begin? That is the question whenever one traces the origin and development of any particular set of ideas. There is, of course, some famous, if very light, judicial precedent that one should, "Begin at the beginning, and go on till you come to the end: then stop."¹ "The beginning," alas, is a point unattainable by those of us who are neither speculative philosophers nor inspired prophets. Nor, perhaps, do ancient beginnings matter much in our present inquiry, except as a matter of curiosity.

Some claim the first recorded exercise of eminent domain power was King Ahab's seizure of Naboth's vineyard.² The internal facts, however, indicate the king had no such legal power, for he had to have Naboth stoned to death before he could make the vineyard his. In any event, there is no evidence that this Biblical incident contributed in the slightest to the American law of eminent domain, not even in Massachusetts Bay Colony in its most God fearing days.

One is curious, next, about Roman expropriation practice. We know about as much of this as we do of Naboth's vineyard. The principle of expropriation was never formulated by legislator or jurist. It is not even clear Rome exercised a power of compulsory taking, though some scattered bits of evidence suggest she did. The straight roads and aque-

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¹ The King of Hearts to the White Rabbit during the trial of the Knave of Hearts for stealing the queen's tarts. L. Carroll, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland, Ch. 12 (1901).
² 1 P. Nichols, Eminent Domain 44 (rev. 3d ed. 1964); 1 Kings 21.
ducts suggest this, and there was on occasion appropriation of materials for aqueduct repair upon compensation.\(^3\) Whether compensation was a regular practice is unknown. The one thing that is clear enough about Roman expropriation law is that its mysteries cannot have had discernible effect on our own practice.

Expropriation and compensation were both practiced in England during the entire American colonial period. However, as far as is known, no Englishman or American prior to the Revolution worked out a systematic speculative theory of eminent domain. John Locke gave a philosophical disquisition upon one aspect of the subject,\(^4\) which was somewhat embellished by Blackstone.\(^5\) The English to this day have not raised the subject of eminent domain to the imperative level at which it now exists in America. They do not even use the phrase "eminent domain," but instead, "compulsory acquisition," "compulsory powers," or "expropriation." Compensation may be said to be a constitutional principle, to the extent such can exist without a constitution. Modern English treatises on expropriation scarcely go back of the Lands Clauses Act of 1845, which was the first permanent, general statute on the subject.\(^6\) Before that, the power to take and the duty to pay compensation were spelled out in each act that directed the particular project for which the taking would occur. The Lands Clauses Act has been largely replaced through the years by other acts of more or less general applicability.\(^7\) In England the whole subject of what we call eminent domain is still a highly practical affair, attended by few of the abstractions with which we surround it.

We have come to regard eminent domain as a branch of constitutional law. The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution and the constitution of every state except North Carolina contain so-called eminent domain clauses. The now classic language of the fifth amend-

\(^3\) Jones, Expropriation in Roman Law, 45 L.Q. Rev. 512 (1929).


\(^5\) 1 Blackstone, Commentaries *139.

\(^6\) See C. Cripps, Compulsory Acquisition of Land 9-27 (11th ed. 1962); T. Ingram, Compensation to Land and House Owners 1-3 (1864); D. Lawrence, Compulsory Purchase and Compensation 75-84 (4th ed. 1967); W. Leach, Disturbance and Compulsory Purchase 1-9 (2d ed. 1965); R. Stewart-Brown, Guide to Compulsory Purchase and Compensation 1-5 (5th ed. 1962). None of these treatises attempts to build up a history or general theory of taking or compensation, quite in contrast to many American works. The English authors treat the subject in an intensely practical way; they are concerned mostly with procedures.

\(^7\) The best concise discussion is in D. Lawrence, supra note 6, at 75-112.
Eminent Domain

ment reads: "nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation." Twenty-six state constitutions allow compensation for property "damaged" as well as that "taken."8 The "damaging" language has the effect of more or less facilitating compensation for certain non-trespassory takings, though every act for which compensation has been allowed as a damaging has, in some jurisdictions, also been compensated as a taking.

Because eminent domain has become a constitutional subject, it may not be generally realized that its principles also exist in judge-made law. The early constitutional eminent domain clauses themselves were made pursuant to an existing ethos shared by judges along with constitution makers. In other words, the principles we have come to think of as constitutional existed and exist also independently of written constitutions. There are some examples of this. Gardner v. Trustees of Village of Newburgh,9 probably the leading early decision, written by Chancellor Kent, required compensation on natural principles at a time when there was no eminent domain clause in the New York constitution. Indeed, many American decisions, mostly up to about the Civil War era, explained eminent domain principles in natural law terms.10 Even today the state of North Carolina has no eminent domain clause, but the state's supreme court has enunciated the principles and has been most liberal in applying them.11 The United States Supreme Court has made compensation a requirement

8. "Damaged" or an equivalent word appears in the following state constitutions: Ala. Const. art. XII, § 235 (applies only to damagings by municipal and private corporations and individuals); Alaska Const. art. I, § 18; Ariz. Const. art. II, § 17; Ark. Const. art. 2, § 22; Calif. Const. art. I, § 14; Colo. Const. art. II, § 15; Ga. Const. art. I, § III, para. I; Ill. Const. art. I, § 15; Ky. Const. § 242 (applies only to damagings by municipal and private corporations and individuals); La. Const. art. I, § 2; Minn. Const. art. I, § 13; Miss. Const. art. I, § 17; Mo. Const. art. I, § 26; Mont. Const. art. III, § 14; Neb. Const. art. 3, § 21; N.M. Const. art. II, § 20; N.D. Const. art. I, § 14; Okla. Const. art. II, § 24; Pa. Const. art. XVI, § 8 (applies only to damagings by municipal and private corporations and individuals); S.D. Const. art. VI, § 13; Texas Const. art. I, § 17; Utah Const. art. I, § 22; Va. Const. § 58 (applies only to damagings by municipal and private corporations and individuals); Wash. Const. art. I, § 16; W. Va. Const. art. III, § 9; and Wyo. Const. art. I, § 33. The model for these provisions is the amendment to the Illinois constitution, adopted in 1870, intended to liberalize the allowance of compensation for loss of certain kinds of property rights, particularly street access. See Chicago v. Taylor, 125 U.S. 161 (1888), which reviews the history and purpose of the Illinois amendment.

9. 2 Johns. Ch. 162 (N.Y. 1816).


11. See especially Gray v. City of High Point, 203 N.C. 756, 166 S.E. 911 (1932); Hines v. City of Rocky Mount, 162 N.C. 409, 78 S.E. 510 (1913).
of due process, binding upon the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment.\textsuperscript{12}

In perspective, then, the constitutional eminent domain clauses are 
not ends in themselves, nor are they beginnings. They are formal, 
concise statements of principles recognized and enshrined, but not 
invented, by the constitution maker. The real significance and 
meaning of these principles, therefore, depends on the discovery of 
their historical and theoretical development, rather than solely on the 
interpretations of the constitutions. The purpose of this article is to 
develop a framework, based on that discovery, for analyzing the prin-
ciples of eminent domain. It will impose order upon our inquiry if we 
organize it under the following heads: the act of taking, the compensa-
tion requirement, the public-purpose limitation, and the concept of 
property.

I. THE ACT OF TAKING

In its first aspect, what we call eminent domain involves the trans-
fer, in a prescribed mode, of property interests from one to another. 
Implicit in this is the notion of private property, which is necessary to 
make any transfer possible.

It is difficult to conceive of any society, even one composed of only 
two interacting persons, that does not recognize private property. If \( A \) 
has any claim to the clothes on his back that \( B \) does not, then \( A \) has 
private property. This and many similar rights must exist even in 
so-called communistic societies, such as the Shakers or the Utopians. 
Private property in land exists today in abundance in Russia. Every-
one there has a special claim to his house or apartment, which, while 
it may not correspond to our concept of fee ownership, is quite close 
to the property interest we call leasehold. Private property exists in 
any society we can imagine, the only differences being in its nature 
and extent from one society to another. So, transfers are everywhere 
possible.

There are, of course, various modes for transferring property rights, 
differing somewhat from one legal system to another. The transfer

\textsuperscript{12} Griggs \textit{v.} Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); Pennsylvania Coal Co. \textit{v.} 
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). The holdings in these cases were foreshadowed by a 
deliberate, though unnecessary, statement to the same effect in Chicago B. & O.R.R. 
\textit{v.} Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 233 (1897), and by weaker dictum in Holden \textit{v.} Hardy, 
169 U.S. 366, 389 (1898).
involved in eminent domain has certain characteristics that distinguish it from other forms of transfer. First, it occurs between an individual and the state, or some alter ego of the state such as a public utility, with the state or the alter ego always being the transferee. As a consequence, it is accurate to think of the transferee-state as having enough of the nature of an individual to receive the same property right the transferor had. This is the basis for the statement that the state is viewed as an individual treating with another individual for an exchange.  

A second, and the most distinguishing, characteristic of the eminent domain transfer is that it may be compelled over the transferor's immediate, personal protest. The qualifying words "immediate" and "personal" are not usually found in discussions of eminent domain, but have been added here for a reason that will be spelled out in the ensuing exploration of the power to take. In some sense a power is involved, and it is a power belonging to the state. It is an act of the state in its capacity as sovereign. This implies, first, that eminent domain exists only in societies having sovereign governments, not, for instance, in the hypothetical microscosmic society of A and B. Of more practical importance, it implies that eminent domain transfers may occur only when the body politic is involved and chooses to exercise its power.

For a more detailed examination of the power involved in eminent domain, it will be convenient to consider the subject under two subheads. The first will deal with the origin and nature of the power to take, and the second will distinguish this from other powers of government.

A. Origin and Nature of The Power to Take

One thin line of authority would have it that the power to retake land is impliedly reserved when land is patented out by the state. A "necessary exception in the title to all property," would be a typical formulation.  A more extreme statement would be that "the right of eminent domain is a remnant of the ancient law of feudal tenure."
The consequences of any such reserved-power theory would be most unsettling, even to courts that have referred to it. Presumably, no compensation would be required, nor would it be necessary to go through the elaborate judicial condemnation procedure. And government’s power, being reserved in the original grant, seemingly would be prior to all encumbrances, such as easements or liens, the holders of which would not be entitled to compensation. None of these consequences occur in the decisions that dabble—for this is all they are doing—with the reserved-power theory.

A most obvious rebuttal to this theory is that it simply is not in accord with actual practice. With one exception, to be recorded below, there is no indication that any English or American government has in fact reserved any such power. For a court to create a fictional power would be to announce a rule of law, but that rule does not exist because it would produce consequences that, as just mentioned, do not occur. Moreover, it would not be possible for one government, such as an American state, to take land that had originally been granted by another government, such as the United States government or the British government. Nor would it be possible to condemn personalty, the ownership of which does not trace back to a governmental grant. The reserved-power theory, while it might be the basis for some imagined system of expropriation, does not explain our system.

There is one historical exception, in which a kind of reserved power did exist. When William Penn received his royal grant to Pennsylvania, he sold land subscriptions to “adventurers and purchasers” in England. His agreement with them was that, for lands they purchased in the countryside, they were to receive proportional lands in “the” city. In order that they could travel from country to city, Penn agreed to lay out roads from other towns to the city and from town to town. But when the settlers reached Pennsylvania, “the” city, Philadelphia, was the only established town, so that the location of roads could not then be determined. So, in the original grants Penn granted six per cent additional land as his contribution for roads. The understanding was that the colonial government could thereafter take back without compensation such land as proved necessary for roads when their lo-

16. The agreement between Penn and the subscribers is contained in Acts of Assembly of the Province of Pennsylvania viii (Hall & Sellers printers 1775).
cation was known. It was anticipated that some owners might subsequently lose more or less than six percent for roads, but this was agreed to as an inevitable consequence of the scheme. During the entire colonial period, therefore, and even into the federal period, Pennsylvania took land for roads without paying compensation. However, under a colonial act of 1700, compensation was given for the improvements on land. Colonial Pennsylvania, then, provides the only known legitimate example of the reserved-power theory.

Our received wisdom on the subject of eminent domain is that it is an inherent and necessary power of all governments. A classic exposition is by the Supreme Court in *Kohl v. United States*, in which the federal government was held to have eminent domain power because "such an authority is essential to its independent existence and perpetuity." This rationale certainly has the sanction of many judicial utterances. It is the standard explanation adopted by the leading American commentators on eminent domain.

This inherent-power concept traces back to the early speculative writers on eminent domain, the civil law jurisprudents Pufendorf, Bynkershoek, and Vattel. Grotius, who is generally considered the father of modern eminent domain law and the originator of the term "eminent domain," speaks of the principle that "public advantage"

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17. These matters are all reviewed in M'Clenachan v. Curwin, 3 Yeates (Pa.) 362 (1802), and Feree v. Meily, 3 Yeates (Pa.) 153 (1801). *M'Clenachan* held that, even in 1802, compensation was not required for unimproved land.

18. 91 U.S. 367, 371-72 (1875). Strangely, it was not until this decision that the federal government was clearly determined to have eminent domain power. Until they used the federal power to obtain land for the post office involved in *Kohl*, federal officials had apparently had state governments condemn land for federal purposes.


20. 2 J. Kent, Commentaries on American Law *339; 1 P. Nichols, Eminent Domain 18-23 (rev. 3d ed. 1962); Kratovil & Harrison, Eminent Domain—Policy and Concept, 42 Calif. L. Rev. 596 (1954).

21. S. Pufendorf, De Jure Natuaræ et Gentium 1285 (C. and W. Oldfather transl. 1934). This work was originally published in 1672.

22. C. Van Bynkershoek, Quaestionum Juris Publici 218 (T. Frank transl. 1930). This work was originally published in 1737.

23. E. de Vattel, The Law of Nations 96 (C. Fenwick transl. 1916). This work was originally published in 1758. On the cited page Vattel also says: "It is even to be presumed that when a Nation takes possession of a country it only allows private property rights over certain things subject to this reserve." Taken alone, this language might seem to be the origin of the reserved-power theory discussed earlier. Perhaps it is the origin; however, Vattel's main thrust is that eminent domain is a governmental, not a proprietary, power.
should prevail over "private advantage." 24 Byngershoek, the most incisive and complete of these early writers, stated their concept thus: 25

Now this eminent authority extends to the person and the goods of the subjects, and all would readily acknowledge that if it were destroyed, no state could survive . . . . That the sovereign has this authority no man of sense questions. . . .

In one sense, it might be said that a particular government has such authority if an agency with power to make a binding rule on the subject has so determined. The United States Government has the authority in that sense because the Supreme Court thus held in Kohl v. United States. The American states have the authority for the same reason. Neither the United States Constitution nor, as far as is known, any state constitution contains an express grant of this authority. That explains why the courts have spoken of an "inherent power." However, this language must be understood to have force no further than the necessity of the case requires, that is to say, only to the particular government of the court and not to governments in general.

As to governments in general, it is apparent that the inherent-power concept rests on the assumed assertion that they absolutely must have the power to appropriate. It is far from certain that eminent domain power is "inherent" in the sense governments would perish if they did not have it. Natural persons and corporate bodies conduct all sorts of activities with great success without any such power. Take even so imperative a government activity as waging war. Suppose land could not be condemned for fortifications. This would make the conduct of war more difficult than it now is, but the nation would not be defenseless. Land for fortifications could usually be acquired, though perhaps not always exactly where desired and, no doubt, at a higher average cost than if it could be expropriated. Perhaps we could even agree with Pufendorf that eminent domain is "one of the lesser functions of supreme sovereignty." 26

It is probably true now that American governments have the power to condemn any property rights to aid in accomplishing any permis-

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24. H. Grotius, De Jure Belli Ac Pacis 807 (F. Kelsey transl. 1925). This work was originally published in 1625.
25. C. Van Byngershoek, supra note 22, at 218.
26. S. Pufendorf, supra note 21, at 1285.
sible governmental enterprise. This, of course, is by force of judicial decisions declaring them to have the power to that extent. It is further true that English, as well as American colonial, state, and federal, governments have followed the practice of expropriating land for certain purposes for several centuries. Going back to about the beginning of the sixteenth century, many, many English and colonial statutes authorized condemnation of land and building materials, either for specific projects or generally, for: roads, bridges, fortifications.

28. Connecticut general highway act, undated, but enacted before 1715, contained in Acts and Laws of Connecticut 50-51 (T. Green printer 1715), and in Acts and Laws of His Majesty's English Colony of Connecticut 85 (T. Green printer 1750); Delaware general highway act of 1752, contained in Laws of the Government of New-Castle, Kent and Sussex Upon Delaware 334 (B. Franklin & D. Hall printers 1752); Georgia general highway act of 6 March 1766, contained in Georgia Colonial Laws, 17th February 1755—10th May 1770 (I. McCloud ed. 1932); Massachusetts general highway act, Ch. 10, L. 1693, contained in Acts and Laws of His Majesty's Province of the Massachusetts—Bay 47 (B. Green printer 1726); Massachusetts general highway act, Ch. 7, L. 1712, id. at 227; Massachusetts act regulating buildings and roads in Boston, Ch. 1, L. 1692, id. at 1; New Hampshire general highway act of 1719, contained in Acts and Laws Passed by the General Court or Assembly of His Majesties Province of New-Hampshire 149 (B. Green printer 1726); North Carolina general highway act, Ch. 3, L. 1764, contained in Acts of Assembly of the Province of North-Carolina 310 (J. Davis printer 1773); Virginia general highway act, Act 50, of 1732, contained in 1 Hening, Virginia Statutes at Large 199 (1823); Stat. 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 6 (1662) (general statute for enlarging and repairing highways); Stat. 8 & 9 Wm. 3, c. 16 (1697) (general statute for widening highways); Stat. 6 Ann., c. 42, §§ 6, 7 (1707) (act for enlarging and repairing highways around the city of Bath); Stat. 10 Ann., c. 16, §§ 4, 5, 6 (1711) (act for enlarging and repairing a road in county of Kent). The above is not an exhaustive list of English statutes, but it is a complete listing of all colonial statutes available to the writer in which expropriation was clearly authorized.

It is virtually certain that land was condemned for roads in the American colonies not mentioned above and that it was condemned before the dates of the statutes cited. A 1639 Massachusetts Bay act, the original of which is not available to the writer, authorized the taking of land for highways, apparently by a procedure similar to that of later Massachusetts statutes. See Backus v. Lebanon, 11 N.H. 19 (1840), and W. Loyd, Early Courts of Pennsylvania 246-47 (1910). In Maine, there are several interesting records of early condemnation procedures in local trial courts, reported in Province and Court Records of Maine (C. Libby ed. 1931). The record is given of such a case between Godfry Shelden and the Towne of Scarborough in the County Court at York on 6 July 1669, and of an order by the same court, appointing a committee to lay out a road, in which it appears land could be condemned upon compensation. 2 id. at 177, 220. See also 4 id. at 95, 318 & 376-77.

In Maryland 1704 and 1724 statutes established procedures for laying out roads and repairing bridges. Compleat Collection of the Laws of Maryland 26, 264 (W. Parks printer 1727). The only specific mention of condemnation was for bridge timbers, but it seems likely that land must have been taken also. New Jersey had skimpy road statutes that simply required towns and counties to appoint surveyors to lay out highways. Ch. 20, Acts of 1675, and ch. 1, Acts of 1682, contained in Grants, Concessions and Original Constitutions of the Province of New-Jersey [and] the Acts Passed During the Proprietary Governments 102, 257-58 (A. Leaming and J. Spicer eds.) (pub. shortly after 1750). This volume covers New Jersey.
river improvements, and for the great fen drainage projects that were carried out in seventeenth and eighteenth century England.

When we say, as we just have, that English and American "governments" have expropriated land for this purpose and that, we have not been precise enough. We must make a distinction between the legislative and executive branches—between king and Parliament. This leads first to an examination of that English historical institution, the king's prerogatives, which were powers the crown exercised in its own right, without the need of parliamentary authority.

Among the King's prerogative powers were dominion of the sea, control over navigation, foreign affairs, defense of the realm, enforcing acts of Parliament, dispensing justice, coining money, providing for his own household, granting offices and titles of nobility, and collecting taxes. These ancient powers appear to have come down from a time before parliamentary supremacy was established; indeed,
they seem hardly capable of growth by, say, the sixteenth or seventeenth century.\textsuperscript{34} Implied in the powers enumerated were further powers "necessary and proper" (as American constitutional lawyers would say) to accomplish the principal objects. Under some of these further powers, the king or his ministers might make use of private land and to some extent even destroy the substance of it, all without compensation. For instance, the king might, it was finally decided in 1606, dig in private land for saltpeter to make gunpowder for defense of the realm.\textsuperscript{35} Or he might, through his commissioners of sewers, rebuild and repair ancient drains, ditches, and streams for draining the land to the sea.\textsuperscript{36} This came from his power to guard against the sea and to regulate navigation. From the same power, he might build and repair lighthouses, build dikes, and grant port franchises.\textsuperscript{37} To carry out his prerogative to coin money, he had power to work all gold and silver mines.\textsuperscript{38} Fortifications could be built without compensation on private land, these being, of course, for defense of the realm.\textsuperscript{39} Also without compensating, the king's officers could raze private buildings to protect his subjects against a conflagration.\textsuperscript{40} While the other prerogatives have been merged into our modern doctrine of eminent domain, this power to raze remains yet, not precisely as an exception to eminent domain theory, but as survivor of an older institution.

Most of the prerogative acts were done without compensation. However, with purveyances of supplies for the royal household, when they could be made without the owner's consent, the ancient and universal practice seems to have been to require payment of full value. Magna Charta allowed the king to take corn and other provisions without consent for immediate cash payment.\textsuperscript{41} When, in 1661, a statute allowed the king to have compulsory use of horses, oxen, and carriages for his travels, it was at a rate per mile set out in the statute.\textsuperscript{42} Similarly, the

\textsuperscript{34} See Case of the King's Prerogative in Saltpetre, 12 Coke. 12, 77 Eng. Rep. 1294 (1606).
\textsuperscript{35} Id.
\textsuperscript{36} Case of the Isle of Ely, 10 Coke. 141, 77 Eng. Rep. 1139 (1610).
\textsuperscript{37} 5 Bacon's Abridgment Prerogative, 498, 503-04, 510 (5th ed. 1798).
\textsuperscript{38} Id. at 516.
\textsuperscript{39} See Case of the King's Prerogative in Saltpetre, 12 Coke. 12, 77 Eng. Rep. 1294 (1606).
\textsuperscript{40} Id.
\textsuperscript{41} Magna Charta, Ch. 28 (1215).
\textsuperscript{42} Stat. 13 Car. 2, c. 8 (1661).
1662 statute that authorized compulsory land or water transportation for the army and navy required payment, either at rates fixed in the statute or by arbitration.\textsuperscript{43} Other purveyance acts, which allowed acquisition of supplies only with the owner's consent, probably meant in practice that the owner would often sell at a bargained-for price. Some of the purveyance acts, then, did recognize the compensation principle that we associate with eminent domain. To this extent there may be some borrowing historically between prerogative and eminent domain theory.

One thing the king could never do under his prerogative powers was to take a possessory estate in land. We know he might have interests like profits and easements, but a distinction was apparently always made between these interests and estates. Possibly a theoretical explanation would be that the king, as chief lord and grantor, could not derogate from his own grant. By Magna Charta, Chapter 31, the king and his officers are forbidden to take timber without consent. Commenting on this, Lord Coke makes the revealing observation that it was thus because timber was "parcell of the inheritance," which the king could take "no more then the inheritance it selfe."\textsuperscript{44} In Case of the Isle of Ely,\textsuperscript{45} Coke and the other justices held that sewer commissioners could not be given power by the king to take land for new drainage works, though Parliament might have conferred such power. Consistent with this is Blackstone's assertion that only the legislature may condemn land.\textsuperscript{46}

Prerogative power and eminent domain, though similar in some ways, were essentially different. Prerogative belonged to the king, eminent domain, to the legislative branch. Prerogative could not be used to acquire estates in land and only under heavy restrictions to acquire personalty, while eminent domain power exists for those purposes. Compensation is always associated with eminent domain, but with prerogative, only for certain kinds of purveyances and then by force of statute. It seems true that some of the prerogative powers have now been comprehended within eminent domain, to the extent prerogative was used to acquire personalty or to diminish property

\begin{footnotes}
\item[43] Stat. 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 20 (1662).
\item[44] E. COKE, SECOND INSTITUTE *34-35.
\item[46] 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *139.
\end{footnotes}
interests in land. A remnant from prerogative is the power to destroy buildings without compensation to stop the spread of a conflagration. Only in a limited sense, then, is it proper to think of eminent domain and prerogative as being the same institution even today. It is not at all correct to say eminent domain grew out of prerogative.

Therefore, we cannot pinpoint the origins of eminent domain in English law until we find two things: (1) an act of Parliament that (2) authorized a compulsory taking of an estate in land. The first definite evidence of expropriation of land and, therefore, of eminent domain, is found in the earliest of the several statutes of sewers, enacted in 1427. Reciting that ancient ditches, gutters, walls, bridges, and causeways for draining lowlands in Lincoln County had fallen into disrepair, the statute appointed commissioners of sewers to maintain them, with power to assess benefitted landowners. Evidence of power to take land is fleeting: “where shall need of new to make.” There is no indication of condemnation procedure, nor of a compensation requirement. Coke, however, says the taking of land for new works was authorized under this act and under the several renewals of it. A most interesting statute of 1512 definitely allowed land on the Cornish coast to be taken, or at least occupied, for fortifications and, in express language, without compensation. Why without compensation? Obviously because the act was in aid of the king's prerogative to build

47. Stat. 6 Hen. 6, c. 5 (1427). The earliest statute found that even remotely contains elements of eminent domain was the Statute of Winchester of 1285, which required landowners to cut down underbrush along roads so that robbers might not hide. Stat. Winchester, 13 Edw. 1, Stat. 2, c. 5 (1285). Obviously this was not an exercise of eminent domain but of what we would call the police power, as were some other statutes of the Middle Ages that required riparian owners to remove such obstructions as "gorces, mills, wears, stanks, stakes and kiddies" from navigable streams. Stat. of Cloths, 25 Edw. 3, Stat. 4, c. 4 (1350). See also Stat. 1 Hen. 5, c. 2 (1413); Stat. 4 Hen. 6, c. 5 (1425); Stat. 9 Hen. 6, c. 9 (1430). To their contemporaries, the Statute of Winchester and the navigable-stream acts would likely have been understood as passed in aid of the king's prerogative powers.

Another practice that falls short of eminent domain is the old English system, also very much a part of American history, of requiring landowners to contribute labor and materials to the repair of roads. See, e.g., Stat. for Mending of Highways, 2 & 3 Phil. & M., c. 8 (1555); Stat. 5 Eliz., c. 13 (1562); Stat. 18 Eliz., c. 10 (1576); Stat. 29 Eliz., c. 5, § 2 (1587); Stat. 3 & 4 W. & M., c. 12, §§ 5, 6, 7 (1691); Stat. 1 Geo. 1, Stat. 2, c. 52 (1715); Stat. 7 Geo. 2, c. 9 (1734). For American colonial statutes, see those cited in note 28, supra.

48. Case of the Isle of Ely, 10 Coke. 141, 77 Eng. Rep. 1139 (1610). The original statute was for ten years. It was continued from time to time by Stat. 18 Hen. 6, c. 10 (1439); Stat. 23 Hen. 6, c. 8 (1444-45); Stat. 12 Edw. 4, c. 6 (1472); Stat. 4 Hen. 7, c. 1 (1489-90); and Stat. 6 Hen. 8, c. 10 (1514-15).

49. Stat. 4 Hen. 8, c. 1 (1512).
fortifications, as the statutes of sewers were in aid of his prerogative to drain land into the sea. Perhaps it is significant also that it was thought necessary explicitly to deny compensation, hinting that someone in 1512 might otherwise have expected it. At all events, by 1514 and again in 1539 we have clear examples of eminent domain with compensation in a form we would recognize today. The 1514 statute authorized the city of Canterbury to improve a river, but provided that anyone whose mill, bridge, or dam was removed should be "resonably satisfyed."50 In 1539 the statute granted power to the mayor and bailiffs of Exeter to clear the River Exe, providing that "they shall pay to the owners and farmers of so much ground as they shall dig, the rate of twenty years purchase, or so much as shall be adjudged by the justices of assize in the county of Devon." 51 It is interesting to note that the cities of Canterbury and Exeter were authorized by Parliament to perform works the king might have done under his prerogative powers. Not only does this indicate the king's power was not exclusive, but it suggests that, while the king might have acted without paying compensation, Parliament would not. After this period of time, Parliament exercised its power of eminent domain regularly and often, as we have already observed.52

We have made progress. We have established that eminent domain arose in Anglo-American jurisprudence as a function of Parliament. The legislative function has been distinguished from the kingly prerogative power. And finally we have demonstrated how and when eminent domain arose as a parliamentary institution. It is time to return to the basic problem of this section, which is to examine the nature of the power involved in the act of taking by eminent domain. This we do by posing the question, why is eminent domain an exclusive function of the legislative branch?

The answer is tied in with the Anglo-American concept of representative government. John Locke gets to the heart of the matter in his Essay on Civil Government:53

Thirdly, The Supream Power cannot take from any Man any part of his Property without his own consent. For the preservation of Prop-

50. Stat. 6 Hen. 8, c. 17 (1514-1515).
51. Stat. 31 Hen. 8, c. 4 (1539).
52. See notes 28-32, supra.
Eminent Domain

mony being the end of Government, and that for which Men enter into Society, it necessarily supposes and requires, that the People should have Property. . . . 'Tis true, Governments cannot be supported without great Charge, and 'tis fit every one who enjoys his share of the Protection, should pay out of his Estate his proportion for the maintenance of it. But still it must be with his own Consent, i.e. the Consent of the Majority, giving it either by themselves, or their Representatives chosen by them.

Of course Locke was speaking of taxation as well as of expropriation. He is uttering the classic cry, “no taxation without representation.” But his statement was understood by the American colonists to apply as well to eminent domain. Article 10 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, adopted in 1780 and the prototype for several other original state constitutions, manifestly shows its Lockeian source:

Each individual of the society has a right to be protected by it in the enjoyment of his life, liberty and property, according to standing laws. He is obliged, consequently, to contribute his share of the expense of this protection; to give his personal service, or an equivalent, when necessary: but no part of the property of any individual can, with justice, be taken from him, or applied to public uses, without his own consent, or that of the representative body of the people . . . and whenever the public exigencies require that the property of any individual should be appropriated to public uses, he shall receive reasonable compensation therefor.

The final sentence, requiring compensation, will be dealt with in the next section; it did not come from Locke and is quoted here only for completeness. Interestingly, this final sentence was not in the drafting committee’s draft, but was added on the floor of the Massachusetts constitutional convention. So, the principle that first came to mind, even before the compensation requirement, was that property could be taken only by consent—of the individual in person or by his representatives consenting for him. Several other of the early state constitutions, adopted during or shortly after the Revolutionary War, con-

54. 3 F. THORPE, FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS 1891 (1909).
tained equivalent language about consent. In point of time, the constitutions of the thirteen original states as a rule contained the consent language earlier than, in later constitutions, they did provisions for compensation.

Now we may answer the question previously posed: why is eminent domain an exclusive function of the legislative branch? The answer contains the following elements: (1) The sovereign has no power to expropriate property, including tax money, from an individual; (2) Of course the individual may always consent to give away his property or money to the sovereign or, for that matter, to anyone having capacity to receive it; (3) The essence of representative government is that the citizen delegates to his legislative representatives a power to speak and act for him; and (4) By force of this delegated power, the body of legislators may consent in the citizen's behalf that his property or money shall be given up. To be sure, some limitations have been engrafted onto the exercise of this power; these will be discussed presently. But the pure power is a power to consent, not to take against the will.

How realistic is this? It must be granted that the consent theory is not the traditional inherent-power doctrine. And of course it can exist only in a political society, such as ours, that has evolved a mature concept of representative government. How far it is thought to exist in


57. The following original state constitutions contained nothing on the taking of property: Del. Const. (1776); Ga. Const. (1777); N.H. Const. (1776); N.J. Const. (1776); S.C. Const. (1776). The following original constitutions contained language, said to be a principle of Magna Charta, to the effect that men should not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without the consent of their peers or the law of the land: Md. Const., Declaration of Rights, art. XXI (1776); N.Y. Const. art. XIII (1777); N.C. Const., Declaration of Rights, art. XII (1776). New Hampshire's second constitution contained both the consent and judgment-of-peers formulas, but no compensation requirement. N.H. Const. part I, art. XII and part I, art. XV (1784). South Carolina's second constitution contained only the judgment-of-peers statement. S.C. Const. art. XLI (1778). Connecticut had no constitution until 1818; Maine, none until 1819; and Rhode Island, none until 1842. See, respectively, 1 F. Thorpe, supra note 54, at 536 (1909); 3 id. at 1646; 6 id. at 3222.

A compensation requirement first appeared in Vermont's abortive constitution of 1777, which, after being framed by a convention and affirmed by the legislature, was never ratified by the people. Vt. Const. ch. I, art. II (1777). This requirement was included in the next Vermont constitution, which was ratified. Vt. Const. ch. I, art. II (1786). Meantime, the original Massachusetts constitution was ratified with a compensation requirement. Mass. Const. part I, art. X (1780). Next, Pennsylvania's second constitution, of 1790, and Delaware's second constitution, of 1792, picked up this requirement. Pa. Const. art. IX, § 10 (1790); Del. Const. art. I, § 7 (1792). Other states gradually added compensation language, generally during the 19th century.
Eminent Domain

practice in such a society depends upon how much one believes in the reality of legislative representation. An exception must exist for persons who have property subject to eminent domain and who for some reason have no electoral voice in choosing representatives. Another exception might at first blush seem necessary for a citizen of state A who owns land in state B, but this is not really an exception, for, by coming into state B he subjects himself to its laws as an alien.

If one accepts the principle of representative government, there is no compulsory taking, but rather a voluntary relinquishment by delegated consent. A corollary is that there must be legislative authority for every exercise of eminent domain. It will now be understood why, in the beginning of this section, it was said that property could be taken, not against the owner's absolute will, but only over his "immediate, personal protest."

B. Eminent Domain Distinguished from other Powers of Government

There is a great deal of artificiality in attempting to pigeonhole the types of sovereign power into police power, war power, navigation power, taxing power, eminent domain power, and the like. For one thing, one never knows what to do with such activities as schools, roads, post offices, and water departments. These are swept into the amorphous category of general welfare power, which sounds like a filing system in which everything goes into the "miscellaneous" file. Then there is the interfacial problem of, for example, where does taxation end and eminent domain begin? Furthermore, since the purpose here is to distinguish the eminent domain power, if we were to do that by reference to other powers, we should have to define at least some of them also. This suggests it would be better simply to identify those phenomena which must coincide before we can say government has engaged in an act of eminent domain.

First, eminent domain must be pursuant to parliamentary authority. Second, Parliament's power was to acquire for the use of government private property, originally an estate in land. The private owner gives up, and government acquires, a property interest. A more detailed examination of "property" as it exists in eminent domain will be made later. For the moment the term may be taken to mean a private property interest that can be identified as such within the private owner's
totality of interests and capable of being transferred by him. Eminent domain involves a transfer, or its equivalent, of such an interest to the government.

In the usual case, in which the government acquires the fee in land there is no difficulty in seeing the transfer at work. This is more difficult in some unusual situations, but will still be found to occur upon precise analysis. For example, in United States v. Welch\textsuperscript{58} the Government took $A$'s land, across which neighbor $B$ had an easement appurtenant. The Government's use of $A$'s land prevented $B$ from using his easement. In effect, the easement had been extinguished; that is, the easement rights were transferred from the dominant tenement and merged back into the servient tenement from which they had originally come, just as $B$ might have released his easement to $A$. Similarly, in Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co.,\textsuperscript{59} where a corporation having eminent domain power flooded land, in effect they acquired a well known interest in land, a flowage easement. Again, where a governmental entity blocks the street access enjoyed by an abutting owner, in substance government has received the release of the interest known as an easement of access that formerly burdened the street. In all these examples government's quantum of property rights have been augmented and the condemnee's rights diminished.

This description of the act of taking forces some line drawing between eminent domain and two other categories of government powers. First is the so-called police or regulatory power. The distinction here ought to be whether government has acquired unto itself a property right—an interest that is literally or effectively transferred and increases government's store of proprietary interests. The police or regulatory power passes no such interest to the government. It may (and here is where confusion begins) decrease some private owners' property interests and may, in equal measure, increase other private owners' interests. For instance, a zoning regulation that prevents you from building over thirty-five feet high may impose upon you something very like an easement of light, air, and view, burdening your land and benefitting your neighbor's.\textsuperscript{60} It is not done, however, under

\textsuperscript{58} 217 U.S. 333 (1910).
\textsuperscript{59} 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871).
\textsuperscript{60} Incidentally, however much we protest that government may not compel one private owner to transfer property interests to another private person, by this and many similar regulatory measures we really do so. We say that we are "adjusting
Eminent Domain

the eminent domain power, because, assuming a transfer of some sort does occur, it is not to the government in its ownership capacity.

None of this precludes the possibility that a governmental act in the superficial form of police power might actually be an exercise of eminent domain instead of, or in addition to, police power. For instance, an ordinance forbidding landowners to enter an abutting street would, presumably, be both a regulatory traffic measure and an extinguishment (forced release) of the owners’ easements of access upon the city’s street. Clearly also, nothing said above implies that all police power measures are constitutional, but only that they are not objectionable as uncompensated exercises of eminent domain. A zoning ordinance, while it should not be struck down as a taking, certainly may be invalid on other grounds, such as that it denies due process or is a denial of equal protection of law.

The second category of similar government power is that of taxation. It is not merely similar to eminent domain; it is the same, as far as the power itself goes. Locke treated eminent domain and taxation interchangeably, as we have seen, requiring a legislative act to exercise either power.61 Why not say that a taking of money is the same as a taking of property? Indeed, is not money property, as the United States Supreme Court held in 1969?62

Traditionally, writers on eminent domain have been scrupulous to find distinctions between that power and taxation. Possibly they have been overmuch concerned with preserving neat and logical distinctions between the labels. More likely the concern has been that labeling taxation as eminent domain would inevitably require compensation exactly equal to the amount of tax. That supposed impasse, however, flows from an imperfect understanding of the compensation requirement, to be discussed as the next item in this article. Anticipating that discussion, it can be said that a tax exaction would have to be returned under eminent domain theory only to the extent it exceeded the taxpayer’s fair share of the cost of his government. The corollary also is true, that the government would not have to compensate for the taking of property interests in land or chattels if

conflicts among citizens, and we hope we are, but we are in many exercises of the police power also compelling a certain amount of transfer or redistribution of property rights.

61. See note 53 and accompanying text, supra.

the levy fell fairly on a particular owner along with the general citizenry. What would be the difference between, say, a money tax at the rate of $1,000 per section of land and an in-kind exaction at the rate of one acre per section? The distinction between what we call taxation and what is called eminent domain lies, not in any differences between money and things, but between even and uneven exaction. With both taxation and eminent domain, the same basic power is being exercised; it is merely exercised in different ways.

II. THE COMPENSATION REQUIREMENT

Any sampling of eminent domain cases would certainly show that "compensation" is the issue in the vast majority, either the question whether it should be given or how much. From this point of view, the compensation requirement must be said to be central. But from what has previously been said here about the nature of the legislative power to expropriate, compensation would appear less fundamental. If the power to take is, in our representative system of government, really a power delegated to one's representatives to consent to a transfer of property rights, it could be argued that the legislature could consent on whatever terms it chose. Since the owner might make a gift, the legislature might also transfer gratis or for any price. Though this seems correct in theory, we must hasten to acknowledge that any such possibility is foreclosed in America by constitutional requirements for just compensation. What we see operating here is, therefore, a limitation or additional requirement superimposed upon the pure concept of eminent domain.

We have previously seen that American courts have come to regard compensation as a fundamental principle even in the absence of an express constitutional requirement. This is the situation in North Carolina today, and the United States Supreme Court has read a compensation requirement into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. As American courts were forging their eminent domain doctrine in the early to middle, and even into the latter, part of the nineteenth century, they commonly ascribed the requirement to the following sources: Natural law; Grotius and several other

63. See notes 11 and 12, supra.
civil law jurisprudents; and English precedent, including Magna
Charta and the common law. In some instances, as in the renowned
1816 case of Gardner v. Trustees of Village of Newburgh, compensation had to be founded in general principles, there being no
constitutional requirement. Judges sometimes also spoke of more
exotic sources, such as the Bible, Roman law, and the universal
practice of all civilized peoples, which we cannot examine for lack
of data. However, the three sources first listed can be examined.

J. A. C. Grant has shown convincingly that between, roughly, 1800
and the Civil War, American courts supported the compensation re-
quirement on natural law grounds many times. He is supported by
ample numbers of decisions. Chancellor Kent, who also wrote the
Gardner opinion, insured currency to the natural law rationale by
explaining in his Commentaries that compensation "is founded in
natural equity, and is laid down by jurists as an acknowledged prin-
ciple of universal law." Though it is interesting to know the courts
found a natural law basis for compensation, that fact is more the be-
inning than the end of our present concern.

In the first place, it is no surprise to find early nineteenth century
American courts explaining eminent domain compensation in natural
law terms. What legal doctrine did they not thus explain? Natural law
was the prevailing judicial philosophy. Moreover, the term in itself is
almost meaningless; it is an empty vessel into which one can pour

64. 2 Johns. Ch. 162 (N.Y. 1816).
65. Grant, The "Higher Law" Background of the Law of Eminent Domain, 6
Wis. L. REV. 67, 71-81 (1931).
66. In the following cases the state constitutions did not expressly require com-
penstation at the time, so that the courts can be said to have required it upon natural
principles: Vanhorne v. Dorrance, 28 F. Cas. 1012 (No. 16,857) (D. Pa. 1795); Young
v. McKenzie, 3 Ga. 31, 44 (1847); Proprietors of Piscataqua Bridge v. New-Hampshire
Bridge, 7 N.H. 35 (1834); Sinnickson v. Johnson, 17 N.J.L. 129 (1839); Bradshaw v.
Rodgers, 20 Johns. 103 (N.Y. 1822); Gardner v. Trustees of Village of Newburgh, 2
Johns. Ch. 162 (N.Y. 1816). Vanhorne v. Dorrance is a real tour de force, containing,
not only the most extended and fundamental discussion of eminent domain principles
the writer has seen in any American decision, but also a clear statement of the
docline of judicial review that foreshadowed Marbury v. Madison. The following
cases contain less important statements of natural-law theory, sometimes in dictum:
Bonaparte v. Camden & A.R.R., 3 F. Cas. 821 (No. 1617) (D. NJ. 1830); Cairo &
F.R.R. v. Turner, 31 Ark. 494, 499 (1876); Loughbridge v. Harris, 42 Ga. 500, 503
(1871); Henry v. Dubuque & P. R.R., 10 Iowa 540, 543 (1860); Harness v. Chesapeake
& O. Canal Co., 1 Md. Ch. 248, 251 (1848); Ash v. Cummings, 50 N.H. 591, 613
(1872); Bristol v. New-Chester, 3 N.H. 524, 534-35 (1826); People v. Platt, 17 Johns.
67. 2 J. Kent, Commentaries on American Law *339.
almost anything. By "natural law," a judge may only be saying "I will it so." To St. Thomas Aquinas, it meant "derived from God," a divine law underlying all human law. To some it means immutable ethical or philosophical principles. To others—and this seems to be what it meant to nineteenth century judges—it means principles that perhaps all civilized peoples, or perhaps the progenitors of Anglo-American law, subscribed to in common. In this sense the theory of natural law rests on nothing more than actual or ascribed notions shared by some sort of consensus of the universe of people referred to; it does not examine any question of rightness or wrongness more ultimate. It assumes that the collective will of this universe is sufficient foundation for law. Blackstone, certainly a natural lawyer, said something very similar when he said the common law is "general customs," of which the judges are "the living oracles." Today we might render it, "The judges are the spokesmen of community consensus."

We are all natural lawyers in the broad sense of the term and always shall be as long as we acknowledge any source of law outside the law. Roscoe Pound's sociological jurisprudence is not so different from Blackstone's jurisprudence of custom. Nor is any of this opposed to the jurisprudence of realism. One can agree fully with Blackstone, or even with St. Thomas, and still subscribe to Holmes' stark, "The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law." Holmes is talking about municipal law, the law in force, while Blackstone and St. Thomas are talking about the source of that law. Whether that source is God, custom, or what the judge had for breakfast, when we consider whatever it is, we are natural lawyers. And when we consider the judicial product of the process, we all are positivists. We are simply considering two different stages of the judicial process.

So, it is no great revelation to say early American courts ascribed the compensation requirement to natural law. The more significant question is to examine what "natural law"—what particular source—they had in mind. Other than vague references to the Bible, Rome, and all civilized people, we can identify two sources, the civil law writers and English common law, including Magna Charta. In other words, the term "natural law" was used as shorthand for these two and was not in itself a separate source.

68. 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, *68. 69.
Eminent Domain

The usual source of legal doctrine for an early state court having no indigenous controlling rule was an English decision. Not only by force of the reception act we would expect to find in most states, but by the simple necessity of the case, an American court claiming the common law as its birthright had to turn to the English reports. And so, what English cases were cited as authority for the compensation requirement? None. An oversight? No; there were none. As far as exhaustive research shows, there was not a single English, nor, for that matter, any reported American colonial, decision rendered prior to the formation of the Union in which it was held or said that compensation was required for a taking. If, then, our state courts were correct in their oft-repeated assertion that compensation was an English constitutional or common law right, that claim must be supported by historical matter other than reported decisions.

We have already seen that eminent domain is a legislative power, exercised by Parliament and not by the king. The earliest clear instance of this power is found in the various statutes of sewers, the first of which was enacted in 1427. In a strict sense, one could say that eminent domain compensation could not have arisen until that time. However, the compensation principle can be traced further back in connection with what we today would see as an analogous institution, the king’s prerogative to make purveyances. Chapter 28 of the 1215 Magna Charta reads, “No constable or other bailiff of ours shall take corn or other provisions from anyone without immediately tendering money therefor, unless he can have postponement thereof by permission of the seller.” If, as commonly supposed, Magna Charta was a reassurance of established principles, we might speculate that compensation for purveyances was then already an expected thing. Be that as it may, it is no speculation that compensation became a feature of a number of purveyance statutes through the American colonial period. In many instances the prerogative was destroyed entirely by the statutory requirement that the owner freely consent to the transfer. Other statutes, following the Magna Charta formula, allowed compulsory transfer but required compensation, either at a customary (market value) rate or at a rate fixed by the statute. One suspects that

70. See note 47 and accompanying text, supra.
73. See, e.g., Stat. 13 Car. 2, c. 8 (1661).
even the statutes that outright forbade purveyances contemplated that
the king would ordinarily obtain supplies at a price freely bargained
for.74

Purveyance statutes are in themselves examples of the principle that
government must pay for what it takes. It is tempting to infer that
medieval Englishmen conceived of this as a general politico-legal
principle. That may, however, not be permissible in the absence of
other direct evidence. We saw previously that the king's powers were
regarded more warily than parliamentary ones, which was why only
Parliament had eminent domain power. At a certain stage of history it
is not unusual to find what are later systematized as general principles
applied only to isolated cases. It may be a truism that, viewed chron-
ologically, what begins as the exception ends up as the rule. Still, de-
spite a lack of direct evidence, one may speculate upon some connec-
tion between the compensation requirement in eminent domain and a
similar earlier principle for purveyances. Possibly compensation was a
general principle or perhaps it was only a principle for purveyances
that was applied specially by analogy to eminent domain.

Just when compensation became an accepted principle of English
law is difficult to pinpoint. We can say, though, that it existed from
the beginning of the American colonial period, which is a significant
point for our purposes. The main problem is that, so far as research
shows, there was virtually no discussion of the question by English
writers. It is a subject about which they appear to have had remark-
ably little intellectual curiosity. There is Blackstone's remark that the
legislature, in taking a man's land, always gives him "a full indemni-
fication and equivalent for the injury thereby sustained."75 Of course
this dates from the end of the colonial period.

A more important discussion, dating happily from the beginning of
the period, is found in Robert Callis' Reading Upon the Statute of
Sewers,76 which was delivered in Gray's Inn in 1622. We may have
some faith in what he says, since only a learned barrister of that
inn would have been invited to give readings. In the part in question,
Callis was discussing whether the Statute of Sewers then in force em-
powered sewer commissioners to build new ditches and drains or

74. This suspicion is heightened by those statutes that said a purveyance could be
made only by consent and at an agreed price. See, e.g., Stat. 36 Edw. 3, St. 1, c. 6
(1362); Stat. 2 & 3 Edw. 6, c. 3 (1548).
75. 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *139.
76.  R. CALLIS, READING UPON THE STATUTE OF SEWERS (1685).
only to repair existing ones. The original statute, enacted in 1427 as 6 Henry 6, chapter 5, had given them this power, but it had been replaced by a later act in the reign of Henry VIII that was not clear on the point.\textsuperscript{77} In fact, shortly before Callis gave his reading, Lord Coke's court had held in the \textit{Case of the Isle of Ely}\textsuperscript{78} that the later statute conferred no such power. The Privy Council had then nullified that decision by an opinion that new works were authorized. Callis concurred with the Privy Council and then added:\textsuperscript{79}

That where any man's particular interest and inheritance is prejudiced for the Commonwealths cause, by any such new erected works, That that part of the Countrey be ordered to recompence the same which have good thereby, according as is wisely and discreetly ordered by two several Statutes, ... \textit{27 Eliz. Chap. 22} [1585] ... And the other \textit{3 Jac. Reg. c. 14} [1605] ... [which] may serve as good Rules to direct our Commissioners [of sewers] to imitate upon like occasion happening.

Callis implies that compensation was a general principle, though his proofs are neither ancient nor strong. The statute of 27 Elizabeth is in point, since it authorized the city of Chichester to dig a canal and required compensation. But the statute of 3 James was miscited; it gave the commissioners of sewers control over certain tributaries of the Thames and said nothing of takings or compensation. He might have cited other better and slightly older statutes, as we will see. The real significance of his statement is that he, as a fair representative of his contemporaries, thought compensation required in principle in 1622.

Just how long before that time the principle was recognized is not so sure. Since the 1427 original Statute of Sewers, mentioned above, was the first clear exercise of eminent domain we have been able to document,\textsuperscript{80} we cannot expect to find compensation earlier. The 1427 act, while it authorized the sewer commissioners to build new works, said nothing about compensation or about procedures to acquire land. It is not until the early sixteenth century that we find examples of a statutory compensation provision.

\textsuperscript{77} Stat. 23 Hen. 8, c. 5 (1531).
\textsuperscript{78} 10 Coke. 141, 77 Eng. Rep. 1139 (1610).
\textsuperscript{79} R. \textit{Callis}, \textit{supra} note 76, at 104.
\textsuperscript{80} \textit{See} note 47 and accompanying text, \textit{supra}. 

577
One enticing theory, which might be made out, is that the requirement came to be accepted sometime around the turn of the century after a period of doubt. We have previously mentioned the 1512 act that ordered fortifications on the Cornish coast, land therefor to be used expressly without compensation.\textsuperscript{81} Then, two or three years after, we find a statute authorizing the city of Canterbury to improve a river channel, requiring compensation for destruction of mills and dams.\textsuperscript{82} Later sixteenth century statutes similarly required cities or counties to pay for land invaded in making river improvements Parliament authorized.\textsuperscript{83} From these bits of evidence it might be supposed that the compensation requirement emerged as an accepted principle around the time of the 1512 statute. However, the matter is clouded by the fact that that statute was for constructing fortifications. The king had a prerogative power to erect fortifications on private land without compensation, on the theory he had a kind of servitude for the purpose.\textsuperscript{84} Our statute may well have been viewed by its enactors as being in aid of the king's power. So, for that matter, might the Statute of Sewers have been viewed, in a somewhat different way, for the king had prerogative power to, and did, appoint sewer commissioners. In fact, Coke believed the purpose of the 1427 Statute of Sewers was to enlarge the powers of commissioners previously appointed by the king, to allow them to take the freehold for new works, which, Coke said, only Parliament could authorize.\textsuperscript{85}

Thus viewed, an essential difference appears between the Cornwall fortification statute and the later acts conferring power on cities and counties. These political bodies were not exercising the king's power but Parliament's power of eminent domain. Compensation, though required in the latter case, might not be in the former, and the two cases not be contrary. The Statute of Sewers was different yet, because, while it may have been intended to aid the king's commissioners, it gave them powers the king had not, powers of eminent domain. If the compensation principle was recognized in 1427 as it was in the next century, the commissioners would have had to pay for lands for

\textsuperscript{81} Stat. 4 Hen. 8, c. 1 (1512).
\textsuperscript{82} Stat. 6 Hen. 8, c. 17 (1514-1515).
\textsuperscript{83} See Stat. 31 Hen. 8, c. 4 (1539); Stat. 27 Eliz., c. 20 (1585); Stat. 27 Eliz., c. 22 (1585). \textit{See also} Stat. 7 Jac. I, c. 19 (1609).
new works. What the historical facts were, we do not know. We can safely conclude only that eminent domain compensation was required by Parliament as early as 1514-1515, that it may have been required earlier, but that there is not sufficient evidence on the latter point.

Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries compensation became a regular feature of English parliamentary acts. We have already cited at length many, many such statutes concerning roads, bridges, fortifications, river improvements, and the draining of the fens.86 No statute of that era has been found denying compensation for a taking. Until the Lands Clauses Act of 1845, each statute provided for its own compensation scheme, if any; so, one would have to examine every act of Parliament to make an absolutely definitive statement. However, so many statutes dealing with public works have been sampled, a large percentage of those indexed in the Statutes of the Realm and the Statutes at Large, that it is conservative to say Parliament extended compensation as the usual practice during the American colonial era.

In the colonies themselves the granting of compensation was well established and extensively practiced at and before the time of the Revolution. This history has been largely lost to current scholars, who apparently have not looked for it in the right place.87 The virtual lack of printed colonial appellate decisions denies that usual source for practical purposes. A few post-colonial opinions, sketch in their states' colonial eminent domain practices, and these will be mentioned. But the richest source is the highway statutes adopted by colonial legislatures. These, together with a few other records, give a rather definite picture of compensation practices for roads, no doubt the main cause for the taking of land.

Compensation for road lands reportedly was given in Massachusetts Bay under a 1639 law and in New Amsterdam as early as the 1650's, though little detail is available on these practices.88 We do, however, get an intimate glimpse of compensation at work on the local level from the record of an order entered by the Suffolk County

86. See notes 28-32, supra.
Some landowners in Milton were awarded sums for land taken for a new road, “because [the Law] doth allow Satisfaction [sic] for Land in Such Cases if the parties Requier it.” Even more revealing are several entries from the same era for the County Court at York, Maine, which was, of course, then a part of Massachusetts politically. The earliest, for 6 July 1669, shows that commissioners were appointed to lay out a road across Godfrey Shelden’s land and to fix the compensation to be paid him by the town of Scarborough. As to others whose lands were occupied, the court added, “those whose grounds are Trespassed upon are to be satisfyed according to Law.” Another order, in 1671, appointing a committee to lay out a road directed that “where any person suffers Inconvenience relateing to his propriety by the Convenience of the Road, It is to bee valewd & fully made good by the Townes within whose limitts it falls, to all reasonable satisfaction.” Later, briefer minute entries of 1697/1698, 1705, and 1710 are consistent with the two earlier ones. The suggestion is of a well-defined principle, understood at the working level and going back to the mid-seventeenth century or earlier in Massachusetts.

Then we have highway acts for most of the colonies and can fill in the gaps for some others with cases from statehood days. In the colonies, somewhat differently than in England at the time, the custom was to adopt a general act for the building and repair of highways. The Massachusetts statute of 1693, itself seemingly derived from the 1639 act, followed a scheme that later appeared in several other colonies. Anyone, such as a town, that wanted a new road applied to the county court, which appointed a commission to report on the need. Upon the commissioners’ report, if the court found the road needed, a local “jury” was appointed to lay out the route. Compensation was provided for as follows: “Provided, That if any Person be thereby damaged in his Propriety or Improved Grounds, the Town shall make him reasonable Satisfaction, by the Estimation of those that Laid out

89. 31 Colonial Society of Massachusetts, Publications (Records of the Suffolk County Court 1671-1680) 400-01 (1933).
90. 2 Province and Court Records of Maine 177 (C. Libby ed. 1931).
91. 2 id. at 220.
92. 4 id. at 95; 4 id. at 318; 4 id. at 376-77.
Eminent Domain

the same. . . ." An owner aggrieved by the "jury's" estimate could appeal to the county court. Once a road was built, it was maintained by the citizens of the towns through which it ran, who, under the direction of town "surveyors," had to donate labor and materials. This basic scheme of highway establishment and maintenance, with some variation in details, was eventually followed by statute in Connecticut, Delaware, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and partially in Pennsylvania.94

Data for the other colonies is more checkered, but everything there is evidences compensation for road lands. The Georgia Supreme Court in 1851 reviewed the matter and said compensation had been awarded for enclosed, though not for unenclosed, land in colonial times.95 Maryland's statutes seem not to have touched upon the subject, but a 1724 act permitted the cutting of timber for bridges as long as it was not suitable for "Clapboards or Coopers Timber."96 In New Jersey apparently land for local roads was taken without compensation, on the theory the owners' benefits exceeded losses, while main

94. Conn. act, undated but before 1715, found in Acts and Laws of His Majesty's English Colony of Connecticut in New England in America 85-88 (T. Green printer 1750), and in substantially same language in Acts and Laws of His Majesty's Colony of Connecticut in New England 51 (T. Green printer 1715); Dela. act of 1752, found in Laws of the Government of New-Castle, Kent and Sussex Upon Delaware 334-41 (B. Franklin & D. Hall printers 1752); N.H. act of 1719, found in Acts and Laws Passed by the General Court or Assembly of His Majesties Province of New-Hampshire in New-England 149-51 (B. Green printer 1726); N.C. L. of 1764, ch. 3, found in Acts of Assembly of the Province of North-Carolina 310-15 (J. Davis printer 1773); Pa. L. of 1700, ch. 55, found in Acts of Assembly of the Province of Pennsylvania 9 (Hall & Sellers printers 1775). As to Pennsylvania, the word "partially" in text refers to the fact that road lands could be taken without compensation because, in its original grants, the proprietary government added an extra six percent of land for future road use. See notes 16-17 and accompanying text, supra. Therefore, the 1700 statute allowed compensation only for improvements on the land but not for land itself. See M'Clenachan v. Curwin, 3 Yeates 362 (Pa. 1802), and Feree v. Melly, 3 Yeates 153 (Pa. 1801). As a matter of general interest, the Pennsylvania statute book cited above, belonging to the law library at the University of Washington, bears on the title page the handwritten name of its original owner, John Dickinson. Another example of his signature will be found subscribed to the United States Constitution.

95. Parham v. Justices, 9 Ga. 341 (1851). The holding is that, while compensation had not previously been required for unenclosed land, it henceforth would be, owing to the increase in its value. Apparently there was no colonial statute on the question, though the writer is unwilling to state this categorically. The only collection of Georgia colonial statutes available, Georgia Colonial Laws 1755-1770, 324-34 (I. McCloud ed. 1932), contained a general road act of 1766 that did not deal with compensation.

96. T. Bacon, Laws of Maryland at Large c. 14 § 3 (1765); Compleat Collection of the Laws of Maryland (W. Parks printer 1727). The 1724 bridge act is on page 264 of the latter collection.
highways were paid for, at least after 1765.97 The compensation situation in Virginia is not very clear, despite the preservation in Hening's Statutes at Large of a number of road acts from 1632 on.98 There was no general compensation scheme by statute, though bridge timbers and earth fill had to be paid for from around mid-eighteenth century.99 Apparently the practice was to take unimproved land for roads without compensation.100 South Carolina's practices, though not statutory, were well known, even notorious. Compensation was given in the few instances in which improved lands were taken, but not for unimproved land.101 The South Carolina Supreme Court sanctioned this system until about 1836,102 raising both the eyebrows of judges in other states,103 and the hackles of South Carolina's own dissenting judges.104

One feature of colonial compensation wants explaining. Apparently the normal, if not universal, pattern was to pay only for improved or enclosed land.105 Even in Massachusetts and colonies that had her comparatively thorough statutory scheme, that seems to have been the case. It will be recalled that the Massachusetts statute spoke of satis-

97. Scudder v. Trenton Delaware Falls Co., 1 N.J. Eq. 694, 756 (1832). The court refers to a 1765 statute that allowed compensation for land for main highways, which were thought to benefit all the public and not only adjacent owners. Since the only statutory collection available to the writer was published in 1750, this could not be confirmed. A 1682 road act required counties to build and maintain roads, but gave no details on procedures to be used. N.J. L. of 1682, c. 1, found in GRANTS, CONCESSIONS AND ORIGINAL CONSTITUTIONS OF THE PROVINCE OF NEW-JERSEY [AND] THE ACTS PASSED DURING THE PROPRIETORY GOVERNMENTS 257-58 (A. Leaming & J. Spicer eds., pub. shortly after 1750).

98. Some of the road statutes dealt with specific roads only or had to do with repairs. Repairs were made on the usual Anglo-American plan for the day, i.e., work by citizens under the direction of local surveyors. Va. L. 1657-1658, Act 9, in 1 Hening's Stats. 436 (1823); Va. L. 1705, Ch. 39, in 3 Hening's Stats. 392 (1812); Va. L. 1748, Ch. 28, in 6 Hening's Stats. 64-69 (1819). The most interesting statutes having to do with establishing roads were: Va. L. 1632, Act 50, in 1 Hening's Stats. 199 (1823); Va. L. 1705, Ch. 39, supra; and Va. L. 1748, Ch. 28, supra.

99. Va. L. 1738, Ch. 7, in 5 Hening's Stats. 31-35 (1819); Va. L. 1748, Ch. 28, in 6 Hening's Stats. 64-69 (1819); Va. L. 1762, Ch. 12, in 7 Hening's Stats. 579 (1820).


101. Lindsay v. Commissioners, 2 Bay 38 (S.C. 1796). See also State v. Dawson, 3 Hill 100 (S.C. 1836); Shooburd v. Corporation of City of Charleston, 2 Bay 63 (S.C. 1796).

102. State v. Dawson, 3 Hill 100 (S.C. 1836); Shooburd v. Corporation of City of Charleston, 2 Bay 63 (S.C. 1796); Lindsay v. Commissioners, 2 Bay 38 (S.C. 1796).


104. See especially State v. Dawson, 3 Hill 100 (S.C. 1836) (Richardson, J., dissenting).

105. Except in Pennsylvania, where, owing to the unusual nature of the proprietary grants, payment was made only for the improvements situated on improved land, but not for the soil itself. See note 94, supra.
faction for “Propriety or Improved Grounds.” This is not a denial of the compensation principle, or was not so regarded at the time, however we might view it in our day. In a time when unimproved land was generally of little worth, a new road would give more value than it took. The principle is the still-familiar one of offsetting benefits and was so recognized by judges who commented upon it in early state decisions.106 In effect, the colonials made an “irrebutable presumption”; that is, a rule of law by the fictionalizing process, that a new road would always give more value than the unenclosed land it occupied had. One may feel this a violent assumption, even for land on a wild frontier. Such an objection, however, goes, not to the principle, but only to the facts on which it should be applied. The colonial practice of paying only for unenclosed land did not deny the general right of compensation.

We have now seen that compensation was the regular practice in England and America, as far as we can tell, during the whole colonial period. One must stop short of saying it was invariably practiced, because data to support that kind of statement will never be assembled. However, Blackstone, writing near the end of the colonial experience, and Callis, commenting at the beginning, both regard compensation as an accepted principle. Had there been more contemporary commentators, we might know more surely how they regarded the institution. The indications, though they lack that final degree of conclusiveness, all point to one conclusion: early state courts were justified in their claim that compensation was a principle of the common law—of immemorable usage in our land and in the land of our land.

The English and colonial usage, while it was precedent for the compensation principle, did not touch upon one important dimension of the subject. What is the theoretical justification for compensation? What, in the relationship between citizen and state, requires payment for property interests taken? For the answers to these questions, we have to look initially to the third source of the compensation requirement cited by early American decisions, a group of continental writers on jurisprudence.

The first of these writers in point of time, Hugo Grotius, was little interested in the compensation issue. About all he said was that com-

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106. See especially Parham v. Justices, 9 Ga. 341 (1851); Scudder v. Trenton Delaware Falls Co., 1 N.J. Eq. 694 (1832); Lindsay v. Commissioners, 2 Bay 38 (S.C. 1796) (arguments of counsel against motion).
pensation was required.\textsuperscript{107} Samuel Pufendorf, writing a bit later in 1672, does briefly offer a rationale:\textsuperscript{108}

Natural equity is observed, if, when some contribution must be made to preserve a common thing by such as participate in its benefits, each of them contributes only his own share, and no one bears a greater burden than another. . . . [T]he supreme sovereignty will be able to seize that thing for the necessities of the state, on condition, however, that whatever exceeds the just share of its owners must be refunded them by other citizens.

Emerich de Vattel agrees that "the burdens of the State should be borne equally by all, or in just proportion."\textsuperscript{109} The fourth scholar usually associated with the group, Cornelius Van Bynkershoek, seems to be in general agreement.\textsuperscript{110}

The theory here is that of just share—that a citizen should be expected to bear no greater cost of government than other citizens. Why is that so? Pufendorf bases the theory on "natural equity," which is shorthand for, "I refuse to seek a more fundamental reason, but rest my case in the belief I have reached a proposition you will accept without demonstration." May we not still ask what would be so bad about government exacting property of greater value from one citizen than from his fellows? This question is really two. The first part asks whether there is a general principle that government should treat subjects equally, as enshrined in the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. Assuming there ought to be a general principle of equal treatment, the second question arises: Should this assumed principle be extended to property interests?

The answer begins with John Locke, despite the fact that he did not directly discuss the compensation question. At an earlier point in this article Locke was quoted supporting the proposition that a taking had to be consented to by the owner's legislative representatives.\textsuperscript{111} Only reluctantly did Locke concede that government should have the power to compel the surrender of tax money or property. However, he recog-

\textsuperscript{107} H. Grotius, \textit{De Jure Belli ac Pacis} 385, 807 (F. Kelsey transl. 1925).
\textsuperscript{109} E. de Vattel, \textit{The Law of Nations} 96 (C. Fenwick transl. 1916).
\textsuperscript{110} C. Van Bynkershoek, \textit{Quaestiones Juris Publici} 218-23 (T. Frank transl. 1930).
\textsuperscript{111} See note 53 and accompanying text, supra.
nized there was no other way for government to be supported, and so he acknowledged "'tis fit every one who enjoys his share of the Protection, should pay out of his Estate his proportion for the maintenance of it." The word "proportion" is a reference to Pufendorf's principle of just share. Locke, however, carries the matter back to a more fundamental proposition. He says the "preservation of Property" is "the end of Government, and that for which Men enter into Society." It would, of course, be absurd to form a government having "the" end of preserving property, and then to use that government to take away property.

In essence, Lockeian social contract theory says this: When men were in a simple state of nature, before government was formed, they enjoyed private property and personal liberty unhindered. As natural society became more complex, its members impinged upon each other, so that it became necessary to form governments, the purpose of which were to preserve the private rights enjoyed in the state of nature. Government is a servant, necessary but evil, to which its subjects have surrendered only what they must, and that grudgingly. They recognize that government needs their money and other property to operate, but it would defeat the very purpose if government could extract a larger share from a subject than it needs to serve its purposes to him. Applied to taxation, this means no man should be asked to give more than pays for his share of protection. Eminent domain presents a special problem, for by its nature it falls unevenly upon first this man then that. Compensation evens the score.

Lockeianism certainly is not the only theory of government, not even among philosophers who in general subscribe to the social contract. Hobbes and Rousseau, both subscribers, describe the contract in a way that would obviate the necessity, if not the possibility, of compensation. Hobbes states flatly that, while subjects have property rights against each other, they have none "such, as excludeth the Right of the Soveraign."¹ In Rousseau's paternalistic state, everything belongs to the sovereign, which parcels property rights out to its subjects as it judges their needs.²

No claim is here made that Locke is right or wrong in any ultimate

sense—only that he was the accepted theory of government in America when the American doctrine of eminent domain was being hammered out. The earliest eminent domain clauses, such as Massachusetts', were mostly paraphrased from chapter XI of his *Essay on Civil Government*.\(^{114}\) Indeed, the very idea of a written, ratified constitution is an embodiment of the social contract.

Professor Joseph L. Sax denies that the purpose of the compensation requirement was protection of private property or, as he puts it, "value maintenance."\(^{115}\) Speaking especially of Grotius, Vattel, and Pufendorf, he says their concern was not the fact of loss, but the danger that subjects might be tyrannized by ill-considered, hasty, or discriminatory takings. Political freedom, not proprietary protection, is the interest at stake.

There are several problems with this theory. Most obvious, Professor Sax has stated a basis for the so-called public-use limitation instead of for the compensation requirement. Grotius, Vattel, and Pufendorf, as well as Bynkershoek, were very interested in the question of the purposes for which eminent domain could be used. They agreed the power could not be used arbitrarily but carried on a lively discussion about whether it had to be for "public advantage" (Grotius),\(^{116}\) "public welfare" (Vattel),\(^{117}\) "necessity of the state" (Pufendorf),\(^{118}\) or "public utility" (Bynkershoeck).\(^{119}\) The passages upon which Professor Sax relies relate to that discussion. His explanation also ignores the influence of John Locke, nor does he acknowledge the extensive Anglo-American experience with compensation during the colonial period. The ultimate problem with his theory, however, is self-implied. If fear of political oppression is the reason for compensa-

\(^{114}\) Compare J. Locke, *An Essay Concerning Civil Government* 376-80 (P. Laslett ed. 1960), *with the following*: Mass. Const., Declaration of Rights, art. X (1780) found in 3 F. Thorpe, *Federal and State Constitutions* 1891 (1909); Del. Const. art. I, Sec. 8 (1792) found in 1 Id. at 569; N.H. Const., Part I, art. XII (1784), found in 4 Id. at 2455; Pa. Const., Declaration of Rights, art. VIII (1776) found in 5 Id. at 3083; Va. Const., Bill of Rights, Sec. 6 (1776), found in 7 Id. at 3813.


\(^{116}\) H. Grotius, *supra* note 107, at 385.

\(^{117}\) E. De Vattel, *supra* note 109, at 96.

\(^{118}\) S. Pufendorf, *supra* note 108, at 1285. Pufendorf explains he does not mean absolute necessity but necessity as a matter of degree, as long as the requirement was not too much relaxed.

\(^{119}\) C. Van Bynkershoek, *supra* note 110, at 218. Bynkershoek equates his standard of "public utility" with Grotius's standard, which was given in text of the present chapter as "public advantage." The difference may be only in translation.
tion, by what means might that oppression be accomplished? By the
taking of property interests. "Oppression," "tyranny," and like words
simply describe a process or phenomenon by which objects the subject
dreads are visited upon him by his rulers. He dreads, and would avert,
the objects, not the empty process. In this case the dreaded object is
loss of property, so that we see Professor Sax is concerned with pro-
tection of private property after all.

We return, then, to the principle that compensation is designed to
even the score when a given person has been required to give up prop-
erty rights beyond his just share of the cost of government. This pre-
sumably always happens when interests in realty or personalty are
transferred to the government for some specific project. What about
taxation? At an earlier point the position was taken that the power
involved in taxation is the same power as that involved in eminent
domain. Locke required a legislative act for both and applied the
principle of "just share" to both.120 What are the implications for, say,
a graduated income tax? The first observation one might make is that
John Locke must not be resting so easily these days. Beyond that, if
the theory of "just share" is to be observed, one would have to justify
uneven tax rates by demonstrating that taxpayers paying higher rates
receive correspondingly higher levels of benefits from government.
This is the argument when it is said the high-bracket taxpayer is pro-
tected and benefitted more than the low-bracket citizen by such serv-
ices as national defense, police forces, schools, roads, and so forth.
The extent to which this is objectively so, or, conversely, is mere ra-
tionalization is, of course, one of the great public debates of our day.
Nevertheless, the argument is still carried on in the form of the
Lockeian principle of just share.

When, however, unequal tax rates are justified, as they often are,
on the theory that government ought to act as redistributor among dif-
ferent persons or groups in society, this is non-Lockeian. It is
Rousseauist. In Rousseau's view, a member of society is entitled to no
more than he needs for subsistence. He is trustee of his property for
the public, and the state's proper function is to redistribute, to the end
that "all have something and none of them has too much."121 Were
this theory to be applied to eminent domain it would produce a system of taking much different from what we actually follow. For instance, one could justify taking land from an individual for less than full value or even for no compensation if that person were found to possess an unequal amount of material things. So far as is known, the redistributive principle has not been urged for eminent domain takings as it sometimes is for taxation.

If we view eminent domain and taxation as two forms of the same power, a certain inconsistency will be seen to exist at the theoretical level. We still insist upon exact value replacement for property condemned but not always for taxes assessed. It may be that the future will see the redistribution principle applied to eminent domain, though there is no indication this actually is occurring. Until it should occur, we must say that compensation exists to insure that no more of an individual's property rights will be taken from him than represents his just share of the cost of government. That is the purpose and the function of the compensation requirement.

III. THE PUBLIC-PURPOSE LIMITATION

A private person has the inherent privilege of doing anything he has the natural capacity for, limited by regulations imposed for the protection of others. An artificial person, such as a corporation or government, may do only those acts given it by its human creators. We are fond of saying our state governments are governments of "limited powers," meaning that they may do anything not expressly denied them. This somewhat misplaces the emphasis. In the first place, the state constitution has, subject to the amendment process, permanently withheld certain acts from the government. Then there are an infinite number of acts that might be constitutionally permissible but which the state government, meaning in this instance the legislature, has never chosen to do. Should some state officer attempt to carry out some ultra vires act, we would stay him, branding his attempt as either unconstitutional or unauthorized.

If we view eminent domain as one power among many powers of government, it is clear that it might not be used to further some ultra vires end. So, if the state constitution prohibits the legislature from authorizing a lottery, eminent domain could not be used to acquire land for a state gambling casino. Or, if no legislative body having the

588
Eminent Domain

power to do so has authorized a road from point A to point B, land for such a road may not be condemned. In such cases as these, then, it seems inevitable, even truistic, to say there is a public-purpose limitation on the exercise of the eminent power.

The more difficult question is whether there is, or ought to be, some more stringent limitation on the use of the power. We saw a few pages ago that the original jurisprudential writers on eminent domain were very interested in that question, perhaps more so than in any other eminent domain aspect.122

These writers, however they might disagree on the proper amount of it, did seem to agree that eminent domain should to some extent be more restricted than other governmental powers. For instance, Pufendorf and Bynkershoek, while they used different terminology, seem to agree that land should not be condemned for a park for the public's pleasure, though the state might in general have the power to operate parks. The civil law jurisprudents' views, being quoted in judicial decisions, apparently influenced nineteenth century courts that devised the so-called public-use doctrine. At least the courts found theoretical justification for a result they wanted to reach.

In its purest, and mostly fabled, form, the public-use doctrine would allow property interests to be taken only if the subject matter in which they exist, land or things, will be used by the public. Reputedly the doctrine traces back to some language by Senator Tracy in New York's 1837 case of Bloodgood v. Mohawk & Hudson R.R.123 At issue in Bloodgood was, first, whether the legislature could delegate eminent domain power to a railroad and, second, if so, whether the railroad had to pay for condemned lands before entry or could pay later as the state did. The court answered the first question "yes," for everyone knows the public uses railroads; so, the public-use doctrine did not bar the delegation. On the second issue, the court held that the "just compensation" requirement was for advance payment, since it would be unjust to permit a possibly insolvent railroad to occupy

122. See notes 116-119 and accompanying text, supra.
123. 28 N.Y. Comm. L. (18 Wend.) 9, 56-62 (1837); Comment, The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem, 58 Yale L.J. 599, 600 (1949). The Yale comment is a principal source of the comments made in the text about the public-use doctrine. One fault with the comment, which does not affect its usefulness for present purposes, is that it assumes the courts took the pure form of the public-use doctrine more seriously than they probably did. It is thus easy to establish the "demise" of a thing that hardly ever existed.
land before paying. Senator Tracy disagreed with the majority on the first point, feeling that "public use" ought rightly to mean possession by a government agency. He even grumbled about the established practice of condemning land for highways, for he could not see, if "public use" meant "public benefit," where the power could be limited. Where, indeed?

Whatever the rhetoric, the practical limitations imposed by the public-use doctrine have been slight. It was most often unlimbered in railroad or mill act cases. A few mill acts were struck down in the nineteenth century as involving non-public uses of eminent domain, but they were generally upheld.124 After all, mill acts had existed in some of the colonies without much question being raised about them.125 Perhaps the public-use doctrine still has enough vitality that someone might argue it as an objection to an excess condemnation, but with hardly an expectation of success. Certainly no one would be so gauche as to argue that a public park did not serve a public purpose, at least not since urban renewal has generally been held to be a "public use."126

It is the urban renewal cases and especially Berman v. Parker127 that have made clear that "public use" cannot be argued in any literal sense. Not only does Berman sanction the taking of land for renewal and resale, but it speaks, not of public use, but public purpose and of that most broadly. One wishes the Court had spelled out its views more fully. However, the concept seems to be built up out of these ideas: eminent domain is no more sacred or profane than other powers of government, it may be used in combination with other powers when this would serve a public purpose, and what is a public purpose is up to the legislature and hardly ever up to the courts. The Supreme Court's decision, while it does not constitutionally prevent state courts from taking a more restricted view of "public use," is normative for the federal courts and, no doubt, highly persuasive on the others. Berman's concept of public purpose seems very close to the minimum limitation on eminent domain that our system will allow in strict theory.128

124. Loughbridge v. Harris, 42 Ga. 500 (1871) (mill act held invalid); Comment, supra note 123, at 600-08.
125. 1 P. Nichols, EMINENT DOMAIN 58-60 (rev. 3d ed. 1964).
128. See text accompanying note 122, supra.
One question nobody has much worried about is what the constitutional draftsmen intended concerning public purpose. This is a bit remarkable, considering that the public-use doctrine supposedly came from the phrase “private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.” Grammatically, of course, “public use” is descriptive and not limiting. The phrase does not read “shall not be taken except for public use and not without just compensation.” Nobody seems to have worried about that either, strangely. Nor does there now seem to be much readily available evidence about what, if anything, the draftsmen thought about “public use.”

The words “public use” first appeared constitutionally in 1776 in Pennsylvania and Virginia. Pennsylvania’s 1776 Declaration of Rights said: “But no part of a man’s property can be justly taken from him, or applied to public uses, without his own consent, or that of his legal representatives. . . .” No public-use limitation would, of course, be implied with “taken from him” included in the disjunctive. Virginia’s 1776 constitution, however, gives the same difficulty as the fifth amendment’s present language: “That . . . all men . . . cannot be taxed or deprived of their property for public uses, without their own consent, or that of their representatives so elected. . . .” Two other early constitutions agreed essentially with Pennsylvania’s phraseology, one with Virginia’s. The commonest language respecting property rights was what may be called the Magna Charta or due process formula, which typically said no freeman ought to be “deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land.” For present purposes, we mercifully may steer clear of the difficult question whether this was intend-
ed to cover eminent domain.\textsuperscript{134} If it was, the words "deprived of" do not suggest a public-use or public-purpose limitation. Without some extensive, and unavailable, legislative histories, the internal evidence is not sufficient to establish that the drafters consciously intended such limitation.

In a couple of instances, however, there is slight evidence of some imperfectly defined desire to limit the taking power. The eminent domain clause of Vermont's 1777 constitution, which was never ratified by the people, and of the 1786 constitution, which was ratified, contains this phrase: "That private property ought to be subservient to public uses, when necessity requires it..."\textsuperscript{135} The problem, naturally, is what "necessity" means. The word may have been borrowed from the civil law writers, with some thought of limiting the power.

Then there is the Massachusetts 1780 constitution, the adoption of which has been documented. Article X of the Declaration of Rights mentions "public uses" twice.\textsuperscript{136} The second sentence reads: "But no part of the property of any individual can, with justice, be \textit{taken from him, or applied to public uses}, without his own consent, or that of the representative body of the people." So far, this is like the Pennsylvania wording. Then the final sentence adds: "And whenever the \textit{public exigencies require} that the property of any individual should be appropriated to \textit{public uses}, he shall receive a reasonable compensation therefor." Now, the entire compensation clause, indeed the entire bill of rights, was added after a proposed 1778 constitution was soundly rejected by the towns when it was submitted to them for ratification. In a number of instances towns gave the lack of a bill of rights as a reason for rejection, though we cannot cite anyone who complained specifically about lack of an eminent domain clause.\textsuperscript{137} So, when the

\textsuperscript{134} Of course the Supreme Court now has adopted the principle that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment guarantees compensation. Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962). However, several of the early state constitutions contained both the Magna Charta formula and specific eminent domain clauses, suggesting the former were not thought to cover the latter. Compare the Delaware and New Hampshire citations in notes 131 and 133, supra.

\textsuperscript{135} \textit{VT. Const., Ch. I, art. II (1777), found in 6 F. Thorpe, Federal and State Constitutions 3740 (1909); VT. Const., Ch. I, art. II (1786), found in 6 id. at 3752.}

\textsuperscript{136} The 1780 Massachusetts constitution is most readily available in 3 F. Thorpe, Federal and State Constitutions 1891 (1909). It also is in \textit{Journal of the Convention for Framing a Constitution of Government for the State of Massachusetts Bay 225 (1832).}

\textsuperscript{137} \textit{The Popular Sources of Political Authority 176-365 (O. Handlin & M. Handlin eds. 1966). All the towns of Essex County joined in a lengthy, learned.}
Eminent Domain
drafting committee reported the 1780 constitution to the convention, it contained Article X—minus the last sentence. That sentence was added by amendment from the floor and the amended article approved by the convention. Who offered the amendment, what arguments he made, or whom he represented, the convention journal does not say. If the language "whenever the public exigencies require" is more than merely descriptive, or to the extent it betrays its author's state of mind, it shows a distrust of the legislative process that was no part of Lockeian theory. John Locke, of course, was responsible for the principle of legislative consent contained in the third sentence. He reposed great confidence in the legislature, and many American rebels, whom we take to be good enough libertarians, were content with that. But out there somewhere in the hustings, in Lenox or Plymouth or Beverly or Lexington or Pittsfield, people sent a delegate who did not trust even representative government all that much. He wanted, first, to see the people's liberties perpetuated in a written bill of rights, and then he did not have enough faith in his legislative representatives to give them their head completely with his property.

A somewhat similar situation likely led to the adoption of the United States' fifth amendment with its eminent domain clause. Everyone knows, of course, that the original Constitution contained no bill of rights. The subject did come up. On 12 September 1787, five days before adjournment, Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts moved, and George Mason of Virginia seconded, that a committee be appointed to draft a bill of rights, but the motion lost unanimously. Three days later Mason objected to the Constitution because it had no bill of rights.141

139. The choice of these towns is not wholly fanciful. When the convention met in 1779 to draft what became the 1780 constitution, Pittsfield directed her delegate to work for the language of the third sentence, though there is no evidence he was instructed on the last sentence. THE POPULAR SOURCES OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY, supra note 137, at 411. The other towns were ones that, in rejecting the 1778 constitution, complained that it lacked a bill of rights. See note 137, supra.
140. 2 M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 582 (1911); J. MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 630 (A. Koch ed. 1969). Some editions of Madison, and apparently a direct transcript of his notes, say the vote was 5-5, with Massachusetts absent. But Madison's handwritten notes agree with the official journal that the motion "passed in the negative" 0-10.
141. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 140, at 637. In the end, Gerry and Mason, with Edmund Randolph of Virginia, were the delegates who refused to sign the Constitu-
That the Constitution would have failed ratification without an understanding that a bill of rights would be submitted may be putting the matter a bit strongly, but there were serious demands for one. Many amendments were proposed in the ratifying conventions of Maryland, New York and Pennsylvania. However, while there was a popular groundswell for a bill of rights, we must frankly conclude that there is no evidence that eminent domain limitations were given much attention. Moreover, there seems no indication that the Revolutionary experience itself had created any particular alarm about the expropriation power. Examination of the Declaration of Independence and of ten other important Revolutionary documents revealed that, while the British were scoundrels in a thousand ways, they never abused eminent domain. They surely would have been accused of it if they had. Add to this the fact, which we well know,
Eminent Domain

that eminent domain had been hardly written on, and one wonders how it got into our constitutions at all. Yet, on 8 June 1789 James Madison presented his draft of twelve proposed amendments to the first session of Congress. His seventh, which became the fifth in the ratification process, contained double jeopardy, compulsory testimony, and due process clauses, followed by this eminent domain clause: "No person shall be ... obliged to relinquish his property, where it may be necessary for public use, without a just compensation." The suggestion of a public-use limitation is stronger than with the present language, but is it anywhere near conclusive? In any event, Madison's original draft was amended, which, if it signifies anything, may imply his language was too strong.

Here is a birdseye view of what seems to have happened with the public-use or public-purpose doctrine. The civil law writers Grotius, Pufendorf, and Bynkershoek, using varying semantic formulas, developed the notion that the exercise of eminent domain power should be restricted to somewhat more necessitous situations than should other governmental powers. American constitutional draftsmen, likely from familiarity with the civil law writers, assumed a similar notion, which they referred to obliquely but did not state explicitly. Considering especially that mill acts already existed in some colonies, it is doubtful that the draftsmen thought condemnation could be only for the literal use of the public. However, this was the meaning purportedly given in some nineteenth century decisions, though no such general rule ever really existed. Of recent years, while public-use language is still employed and may occasionally prevent a taking here and there, the courts are realistically following a public-purpose test.

Whether the test is stated as public-use or public-purpose, there is one thing about which American courts have always said they were adamant. Eminent domain cannot be used to transfer property from one private person to another. That would violate the most fundamental Lockeian principle that governments were instituted to protect every man's property against his neighbor's depredations. But even this principle has proven flexible, for mill acts are generally valid, and some states confer private eminent domain power upon a landlocked owner who needs a road. Of course the opponents of urban renewal

147. See, e.g., Vanhorne v. Dorrance, 28 F. Cas. 1012 (No. 16,857), (D. Pa. 1795); Coster v. Tide Water Co., 18 N.J. Eq. 54 (1866).
argued that it was bad because it authorized A's land to be condemned for sale to B. Berman v. Parker and cases like it finesse the argument, and the doctrine, by shifting the public purpose from use of land to improving cities and removing slums. At this point the question Senator Tracy asked in Bloodgood v. Mohawk & Hudson R.R. becomes very hard. Where can the eminent domain power be limited?

Perhaps we should rephrase the question by asking: where should the power be limited? Bynkershoek seemed to agree with Pufendorf that, for instance, land should not be taken for a park, though the government might have unquestioned power to tax for and operate the park. If there is a justification for so limiting the power to take land, it must lie in some special evil that is associated with taking specific property interests but is not associated with other government acts.

What is so evil about expropriating specific property that is not evil about a general tax levy? One difference we have already seen: the specific taking makes the loser bear an unfairly large share of the cost of government. But we have also seen the law's response to this, which is the compensation requirement. What further evil lies in the specific taking that compensation will not cure? It would have to be some preferred status for the integrity of specific property in specific land or things. In other words, it would be a less serious act, an act that could be justified by lesser public need, for government, for example, to regulate proprietary uses or to levy a general tax, than to exact a specific interest. Certainly our private law of property has running through it a strong notion that a man is entitled to integrity of property. One cannot be forced to accept a substitute, even if he and everyone else agree it is better than what he has. Eminent domain, in essence, compels a substitution. On the other hand, there is, if anything, a stronger notion that his neighbor cannot take something for nothing. Taxation, in essence, forces this, or even viewed most benignly, forces a substitution of assets for government's protection and services. Viewed either way, taxation appears to violate the property principles at least as much as does eminent domain.

Still, perhaps there is some lurking reason to feel specially uneasy about exactions of specific property interests. Professor Sax articulates this in a way when he suggests that specific takings, which spend their

force on a single owner, have a certain capacity to tyrannize.\textsuperscript{149} He made the suggestion as part of a theory in support of the compensation requirement, though its implications would, if anything, actually support a public-use or public-purpose limitation. The thought would be that the taking of property from a singled-out owner could be used by crafty rulers to penalize that owner. Taxation would do the same thing if it were individually selective. This illustrates that it is not only the loss of property interests that does the harm, for that occurs with the general tax levy, but the selectivity of the loss. However, for this harm to occur, we must assume the owner suffers, or perceives he suffers, some kind of loss that compensation, which we must assume will equal the objective value of the interest, does not assuage. In other words, we must assume owners attach a unique, non-monetary satisfaction to the holding of specific property interests. It is only through the non-compensable denial of this form of satisfaction that the disfavored citizen could be punished and tyrannized.

Do owners in fact attach this satisfaction to property that money cannot quench? Presumably there are no statistics on this, but it seems a reasonable answer would be, "sometimes yes, sometimes no." One may think about it for himself and will probably conclude he would be happy to be relieved of some items and not of others. All this would seem to make eminent domain a fairly unpredictable, and so, dull, tool for evil rulers to use to tyrannize selected subjects. No evidence has been found suggesting it has been so used. And, at any rate, if it were attempted, it would, in our legal system, be an arbitrary act that could be enjoined as a denial of due process. Any potential for harm is more theoretical than real.

The conclusion is that there is no sufficient reason to limit the exercise of eminent domain any more than of other powers of government. All exercises, including regulations and taxations, are intrusions upon individual liberty, but they are necessary to prevent greater human losses in an interdependent society. Eminent domain poses no special threat to the individual that would require special limitations on the occasions of its exercise. It is not black magic, but merely one of the powers of government, to be used along with the other powers as long as some ordinary purpose of government is served.

None of this, however, speaks to the special problem of eminent

\textsuperscript{149} See note 115 and accompanying text, supra.
domain’s being used to transfer A’s property to B. Take that simple case: government pays for and condemns A’s land and immediately gives it to B. No one will seriously contend that the transfer was not from A to B, just because the land paused momentarily in the government. If the act was done because B was the governor’s brother or political supporter or some such, it is void as offending due process and probably equal protection. It also fails to meet the test of public purpose set out above. Suppose, however, it is the declared and accepted public purpose of the state to assist needy persons, among whom B is the neediest. At this point the Lockeian political theorist will be greatly upset: governments were instituted to protect and preserve property rights that members of society brought into or acquired within society. If, in the name of serving society and protecting us all from the depredations of ragged beggars, government directly takes our land and gives it to them, surely the process has come round full circle and has defeated itself. Given his predilections, the Lockeian is right.

Suppose, however, one accepts a more Rousseauist philosophy of government. Certainly if he shares the collectivist ethic that we are all trustees of property for the state, then the state may do as it wishes with its land. Or even if he accepts Rousseau’s idea that it is the function of the state to see that all have enough and none have too much, the transfer from A to B is a proper act, at least if A has too much as well as B’s having too little. In other words, even if we assiduously apply the public purpose test, it does not tell us whether A’s land can go to B unless we have determined our governmental purposes. Thus, when a court says A’s land cannot go to B because there is no public purpose, it is assuming a particular role of government without saying so.

The fact is that our society has never been wholly Lockeian or wholly Rousseauist. Maybe it is truer to say people often do what is expedient and do not always check with their theoreticians before they act. The mill acts, which we have seen existed in colonial times, allowed the transfer of water and flowage easements from A to B. Railroads, turnpikes, and various public utilities have, nearly since the beginning of the Union, enjoyed the power to condemn A’s land unto themselves. Certainly the public benefitted by being able to use the facilities (for a price), but that does not change whose land went to whom. Urban renewal, whether it occurred in the 1950’s, as in
Eminent Domain

_Berman v. Parker,^{150}_ or a hundred years ago, as in _Dingley v. City of Boston,^{151}_ allows A's land to be condemned for B when this would serve some purpose legislatively designated and judicially accepted as public.

If there is a doctrine that property cannot be condemned from one person to be transferred to another, it has some large exceptions. Any such doctrine would flow from a public-purpose limitation only if, in a pure Lockeian theory, it were always against public policy to allow such transfers. What the courts mean to say, and what might be defensible statistically, is that such transfers tend more than transfers to the government to be for non-public purposes and so more or less tend to be suspect. We must still inquire in each case what are the public purposes, according to the theory already worked out.

IV. THE PROPERTY CONCEPT

If there is one categorical thing we can say about eminent domain, it is that it always concerns property. This statement rests on nothing more nor less than a convention, almost a definition, just as the meaning of all language must rest on convention or communication is impossible. Of course one might speak of the condemnation of life, liberty, or the pursuit of happiness, but one does not because Grotius, Pufendorf, Bynkershoek, Vattel, Locke, the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, the fifth amendment, Chancellor Kent, and _Nichols on Eminent Domain_ do not.

We now can add to a definition of eminent domain that was begun at an earlier point in this article: it is a power of government by which property of private persons may be transferred to the government, or to an alter ego such as a public utility, over the transferor's immediate, personal protest. It is encouraging to progress to this point, but once again it is all too evident we have bitten into another large question. What is "property"? Two lines of inquiry provide a foundation for answering this question: First, the historical development of the property concept in eminent domain, and second, the correct theoretical model of that concept.

Down to the time when the United States and early state constitu-

\[151\] 100 Mass. 544 (1868).
tions were adopted, the few writings there were on eminent domain spoke of the taking of "property." 152 Never, in these sources, nor, so far as has been found, in any source, was there any attempt to describe or define what was meant by "property." That basically was the situation when the fifth amendment, like the other early constitutions, referred to the taking of "property." Superficially we have a definitional problem, but so are questions about what is "God," "law," and "justice"—superficially. In the pre-Revolutionary era land had been taken by being physically invaded by public projects like roads, bridges, and drainage works. These kinds of appropriations do not force difficult decisions on the taking of property. The difficult decisions are forced by cases that involve no physical touching of the alleged condemnee's land.

To identify the problem more narrowly, it arises out of the ambiguous character of the word "property." Hohfeld observed this, the word's capacity for denoting the physical thing or, alternatively, legal interests pertaining to the thing.153 In the words of Morris R. Cohen, "Anyone who frees himself from the crudest materialism readily recognizes that as a legal term property denotes not material things but certain rights."154 Property, like beauty, exists in the eye of the beholder—provided he is legally educated. But ask your local real estate man what he thinks "property" is or—let us quit pretending—listen sometime to lawyers carrying on a casual conversation about "that property down on the corner."

Suppose that some governmental entity, such as the Village of Newburgh, New York, takes its water supply out of a stream that

152. H. Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis 807 (F. Kelsey transl. 1925); S. Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium 1285 (C.H. & W.A. Oldfather transl. 1934); C. Van Bynkershoek, Questionum Juris Publici 218-23 (T. Frank transl. 1930); E. de Vattel, The Law of Nations 96 (C. Fenwick transl. 1916). This was also true of Locke and Blackstone when they wrote that an owner might be divested of his "property" only by his own consent or the consent of his legislative representatives. J. Locke, An Essay Concerning Civil Government, Ch. XI, at 378-80 (P. Laslett ed. 1960); 1 Blackstone, Commentaries *138-39. Likewise, colonial highway acts, such as Massachusetts', generally required compensation for one's "Proprietary or Improved Grounds" or some equivalent words. Mass. L. 1693, Ch. 10, contained in Acts and Laws of His Majesty's Province of the Massachusetts-Bay 47-49 (B. Green printer 1726). The constitutions adopted during the Revolution, when they had eminent domain clauses, spoke of the taking or appropriation of "property," as did the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights of 1780. Mass. Const., Declaration of Rights, art. X (1780), found in 3 F. Thorpe, Federal and State Constitutions 1891 (1909).


flows through the plaintiff's land. His water level is appreciably lowered, so that he now fails to receive enough water for his domestic and commercial uses. Has he lost "property" in the form of riparian rights? Not if we say his protected "property" is the land, for there has been no physical invasion. Chancellor Kent did allow compensation in 1816 in *Gardner v. Trustees of Village of Newburgh*, recognizing a non-physical concept of property. A few years later New Hampshire reached a consistent result in a case in which the holder of a bridge franchise was held to have a compensable interest in the franchise.

Quite to the contrary was the Massachusetts decision in 1823 in *Callender v. Marsh*, the best known and most influential of the early cases. This was the original change-of-grade case, in which the cutting down of a street blocked an abutting owner's access onto it. Though an abutter is now and was then supposed to have an easement of access, the court refused compensation, one reason being that no land had been touched. Why should "property" be conceived of in its physical sense? The famous Chief Justice Gibson of Pennsylvania explained in another influential decision, *Monongahela Navigation Co. v. Coons*, that this was so because "Words which do not of themselves denote that they are used in a technical sense, are to have their plain, popular, obvious, and natural meaning." Gibson, in other words, preferred the real estate man's meaning of "property." Additionally, the courts advanced the practical reason that it would be a severe burden if condemnors had to pay for "consequential" damage; that is, harm to intangible interests.

The popular notion became, "no taking without a touching." It would be something of an oversimplification unreservedly to label the physical concept of property the "older" view. For one thing, it has

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155. 2 Johns. Ch. 162 (N.Y. 1816). The "property" question was not, however, the most hotly contested issue. Chancellor Kent was faced with a situation in which New York, at the time the injury occurred, had no eminent domain clause in its constitution. He had to, and did, work out a theory of compensation on natural law grounds.

156. Proprietors of Piscataqua Bridge v. New-Hampshire Bridge, 7 N.H. 35 (1834). The plaintiff held a franchise from the state to maintain a bridge on a certain stretch of river. Later, when the state granted another franchise to the defendant within the same stretch, this was held a taking of the plaintiff's franchise.

157. 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 418 (1823).

158. 6 Watts & S. 101, 114 (Pa. 1843).

159. Commissioners of Homochitto River v. Withers, 29 Miss. (7 Cush.) 21 (1855); O'Connor v. Pittsburgh, 18 Pa. (6 Harris) 187 (1851).
had its opponents, not only Chancellor Kent, but others, mostly legal writers, for over a hundred years.\(^{160}\) At the other end of the equation, the physical concept still exerts a heavy influence in some opinions.\(^{161}\) Nevertheless, the trend has been away from a touching requirement, with increasing acceptance of takings without any physical invasion. Some examples of this trend follow.

Where access is not limited or denied in the original opening of the way, an abutting owner is judicially recognized to have an easement of reasonable access upon a public street or road and thence to the general system of public ways. If some entity having eminent domain power blocks or denies this reasonable access, there should in theory be a taking, wholly or partially, of this easement. *Callender v. Marsh,* of course, denied compensation where the blockage was by a change of street grade. Except for a few jurisdictions, *Callender*’s influence was so great that compensation is still denied on those facts unless a constitutional clause allows compensation for a “damaging” or unless a statute allows it. However, over half the states have such clauses or statutes. In fact patterns other than change of grade, which have tended to develop after the middle of the nineteenth century, the courts have been influenced little by *Callender*’s hard and fast rule. We have in mind phenomena such as street closures, declarations of no access or of limited access, blockage of the abutting street at some point before the next intersecting street, and the closure of the original abutting street accompanied by the opening of a new one that gives poorer access. Of recent years freeways and limited-access highways, which cut across established road networks, have produced many of these fact patterns. Certainly there has been a great deal of judicial inconsistency in these situations, with some strange twists and turns of doctrine. Still and all, the long-range tendency has been toward giving compensation on account of unreasonable loss of access.

Another kind of property right that may be lost or diminished without a trespassory invasion is included under the label “riparian rights.” A riparian owner is recognized to have property rights in the

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161. See, e.g., Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962) (no property taken by noise, vibration and smoke from airplane flights); Nunnally v. United States, 239 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1956) (no property taken by noise and shock from cannon); Randall v. City of Milwaukee, 212 Wis. 374, 249 N.W. 73 (1933) (no compensation for “consequential” harm from partial blocking of street access).
adjacent water, chiefly continuation of the body of water substantially in its natural state, limited uses of it, and access to it. These rights may more or less vary locally, depending upon the existence of doctrines such as an appropriation system for allotting use of water. Whatever his rights are under local law, the owner may suffer loss or diminution of them due to the acts of a body having eminent domain power. Some of the common acts are blockage of access, water pollution, changes of flow or level, and restrictions of his use of the surface. In these fact patterns many decisions do recognize that a taking may occur. However, the status of the taking theory is complicated by what might be called the intrusion of other theories. In some cases, particularly those involving water pollution or restrictions on surface use, courts prefer to analyze the problem by use of nuisance theory or by considering the acts of the public body as an exercise of police power. A larger intrusion is the navigation-servitude doctrine, under which private riparian rights are subservient to the power of government, usually the federal government, to regulate navigation. So, for instance, a governmental blocking of access or surface use that otherwise would be a wrong and a taking will not be such if the court finds the government acted under its power to regulate navigation. The upshot of all this is that, while riparian rights are recognized as property subject to being expropriated, recognition of the right is masked in many cases by the application of several theories.

One who owns a parcel of land will or may have certain property rights that extend to lands the general possession of which is in others. He may have the benefit of an appurtenant easement; a restrictive covenant; or rights of light, air and view; and will be entitled to lateral support from his neighbor. If these rights be viewed as species of property, they should be capable of being taken by an eminent domain act. In the nature of things, this act will always occur outside the benefitted lands, as where some government project on the servient or burdened land blocks the easement or is contrary to the restriction of the covenant. Since the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Welch, the courts have not hesitated to grant compensation for easements. With restrictive covenants many courts, though probably now a minority, have refused compensation, finding no "property" affected and fearing to open the floodgates to claims they feel would

162. 217 U.S. 333 (1910).
be nebulous and burdensome. There is a small amount of authority on the taking of lateral support that indicates it normally will be recognized as compensable property.163 Regarding loss of light, air, and view, the decisions are so few that it is hard to say what has been the course of development.

There is a final kind of interest that only a handful of courts have recognized as condemnable property, and then often hazily. An owner of land has a right to be free of certain kinds of annoying activity from occupiers of other land. This is the law of nuisance, which lies at the intersection of our categories of tort and property law. If a governmental agency conducts such an activity nearby, of course the injured owner may not enjoin the activity, but might he not claim the government had extinguished and taken his landowner's property right to be free from such nuisances? The main cause of claims today is the noise, dust, and fumes from jet aircraft landing and taking off from publicly owned airports. A half-dozen or so jurisdictions have allowed compensation in cases involving airports, garbage dumps, and disposal plants. Many more decisions, of which the Supreme Court's Richards v. Washington Terminal Company164 is the leading example, will allow compensation if the harm is especially serious and peculiar to this plaintiff. Of course, when compensation is allowed in any of these cases, it implies a property interest was affected, though the courts typically do not openly identify or describe the interest. The area is an eminent domain frontier where the courts still need to formulate an adequate framework of analysis.

We see, then, that American courts were, in effect, originally told to award the expropriation of "property" without being told what it was. Most early nineteenth century courts began by assuming the word could be applied in its popular physical sense. That concept proved inadequate and unacceptable in many situations that began to arise where an owner had obviously lost a valuable right, yet there had been no touching of his land. Increasingly, therefore, courts have been willing to say "property" has been taken without a physical invasion. While the trend is in that direction, the change is by no means com-

163. In some cases the loss of lateral support was caused by excavation for a change of street grade. If the court, under the influence of Callender v. Marsh, refuses compensation for loss of access from this cause, it may also refuse compensation for the loss of support. See note 157 and accompanying text, supra.

164. 233 U.S. 546 (1914).
Eminent Domain

plete. For one thing, the shadows of the nineteenth century linger. For another, courts often show their fear to lift the lid off a Pandora’s box of eminent domain claims.

Let us now inquire into the theoretical model for “property” as the concept ought to be used in eminent domain. The starting point is our earlier discussion of the act of taking. We there said that a taking involves the transfer of property from an owner to the condemnor. The transfer, indeed, is one that might have been, and of course frequently is, made as the result of a negotiated bargain. “Eminent domain” is a power of the sovereign to require, in theory to give legislative consent for, the transfer—and that is all it is, a power. Eminent domain does not make the transfer; it is not the transfer. It only requires that the transfer be made. The transfer itself is no different from a freely negotiated one between the owner and the government.

What sorts of things might an owner transfer? The answer reads like the introductory chapter of a treatise on property law, where we learn about “interests in land”: fees simple, future estates, leaseholds, easements, riparian rights, restrictive covenants, et cetera. These are what the owner owns, and there is a way he can create or transfer each one of them. Eminent domain transfers are no different; they are of the same kinds of interests as the owner might grant, convey, assign, release, sell, or lease to anyone. To anyone: what this says is that the interests transferred to the sovereign are the same interests as those recognized in the law of property among private persons.

Putting this together with something developed at an earlier stage, no act of eminent domain occurs unless there is a transfer to the government and unless the transfer is of an interest such as an owner might transfer to a private person. And, of course we add, parenthetically, that the transfer has occurred over the owner’s immediate, personal protest. Will this work in practice? This question, too, was discussed at an earlier point, where the suggested test was found to produce rational results even in difficult fact patterns. Perhaps the most difficult case to analyze is the loss of street access caused by, say, a whole or partial driveway closure. What property interest such as

165. See part I, supra.

166. A possible exception, of no consequence here, is that the attempted alienation of a right of entry, arguably also of a possibility of reverter, might terminate it.

167. See notes 58-59 and accompanying text, supra.

168. Id.
the owner might transfer to a private person has he transferred to the city? The interest involved is an elusive one, for it is the easement of access the owner had onto the city's own street. It was not precisely an easement against another private person, though it was the kind of right one might hold against a private person. The city's act of blocking access wholly or partially extinguished the easement or, in other words, worked a whole or partial release of it to the city.

The definition of "property" also fits some larger purposes that eminent domain should serve—that its very existence seems to imply. Underneath the idea that a citizen should be compensated at all by his government, there runs the current that, insofar as possible, the state should be no better off with him than if the state had been another private person. The necessities of maintaining a government require that it have the power to extract property, including tax money, from its subjects. The Lockeian principle of just share requires that, in specific extractions, such as eminent domain brings, citizens be evened up among themselves with compensation.169 In harmony with this principle, if not actually symmetrical, is the principle suggested, that government should stand on the same footing as a private person as respects the kinds of property interests that are subjects of eminent domain. For the condemnee this does obvious justice by insuring him payment for whatever a private person would pay for. It also does justice to the condemnor by insuring that compensation will not be due for unknown and exotic interests. We might mention also that the invariable measure of the amount of compensation, market value, can work only when the interest being valued is one recognized on the private market.

The conclusion is that "property" in eminent domain means every species of interest in land and things of a kind that an owner might transfer to another private person. With this our exploration of the elements of eminent domain is finished.

A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

This short final section will not be a summary or conclusion in the usual sense. It will instead attempt to lift out the basic elements of eminent domain that have been developed in theory and to arrange

169. See notes 53 and 111 and accompanying text, supra.
them into an order that will allow them to be applied. The intended product is a framework of analysis that can be used to solve taking problems, both those where there is and those where there is not a touching of the would-be condemnee’s land.

We have three separate questions we must answer before we can determine whether a claimant is entitled to eminent domain compensation. First, we must determine if a property interest of the kind that could pass between private owners is involved or has been affected. As a practical matter, this question of “property” is often so bound in with the “taking” question that the two are difficult to think of separately. But it aids analysis to do so, even if this forces a certain amount of artificial conceptualizing. We must be able to identify a known species of private property interest or, whatever has happened and regardless of whether causes of action may exist on other theories, there will be no exercise of eminent domain.

Assuming “property” is involved, the second question is whether that interest has been “taken.” The critical inquiry in this step is whether the property interest has been transferred from an owner to the condemning entity. This can be very difficult. Suppose a city should impose building height limits as part of a zoning scheme. Normally this will not constitute a taking because, admitting arguendo that there has been a kind of redistribution of property interests similar to covenantal height restrictions among private owners in the zone, there has been no transfer to the city. But if we may imagine a fantastic situation in which the city owned a great deal of land in the zone and passed the ordinance for the benefit of that land, then a taking may arguably have occurred. Or suppose the city passes a traffic safety ordinance prohibiting abutters on a certain street from driving onto it. A taking has occurred, because the city has in effect compelled a release by the owners of the access easement they formerly had against the city’s street. Certainly the ordinance also is a police-power regulation, but one should not fall into the trap of thinking it cannot therefore be a taking; it is both. A great deal of precise thinking is needed to determine if a transfer to the state has occurred. It must then be asked whether this transfer was without the immediate, personal consent of the owner, but the answer is generally apparent.

If “property” has been “taken,” one may say there has been an attempted exercise of the eminent domain power. The final question is
whether the governmental entity, assuming it is an agency generally vested with eminent domain power, may invoke the power in this instance. At stake is whether the government's acts in taking the property interest are in furtherance of some object that is within the power of that particular governmental body. In the (increasingly rare) cases in which this question is answered in the negative, the attempted taking should of course be judicially enjoined. If the question is answered affirmatively, compensation will be due.

This framework of analysis may be deceptively simple. The steps may seem too mechanical. But behind each step is a theory that has its foundation in our historical conception of a people and their government. Most courts would do well to follow the framework if they never got beyond the mechanics of it. They would do better if they were led to look beyond the framework to its foundations.