Panopticism for Police: Structural Reform Bargaining and Police Regulation by Data-Driven Surveillance

Mary D. Fan
University of Washington School of Law

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PANOPTICISM FOR POLICE: STRUCTURAL REFORM BARGAINING AND POLICE REGULATION BY DATA-DRIVEN SURVEILLANCE

Mary D. Fan*

Abstract: Spurred by civil rights investigations, police departments across the nation, including in Washington State, are engaging in structural reform bargaining and collaborative design of institutional reforms. Often before any complaint is filed in court or a judge makes any findings of unconstitutionality, police—and the groups threatening to sue the police—are cooperating to fashion remedies for the biggest concerns that have shadowed the law of criminal procedure, such as excessive force and the disproportionate targeting of people of color. Prominent scholars have expressed concern over settlement of civil rights suits outside the arena of the courtroom and without legal clarification. This Article argues, however, that bargaining in the shadow of law and outside the courthouse may yield smarter and farther-reaching reforms and remedies based on data-driven surveillance than could be achieved through litigation and judicial decision.

This Article argues that the remedies being fashioned “off the books”—that is, outside the doctrine in the case law reporters—offer important insights for the future of police governance and reform. The primary engine of police regulation—the exclusionary rule, which deters rights violations through the remedy of exclusion of improperly obtained evidence—is increasingly eroding and becoming the last resort rather than first instinct. The question becomes: what regulatory and remedial model should arise to fill the vacuum? The Article contends that a promising paradigm being refined by structural reform bargaining is regulation by data-driven surveillance—what this Article dubs “panopticism for police.” Panopticism is efficient internalized regulation by surveillance. The term comes from the metaphor of Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon, in which prisoners in a state of perfect visibility positioned around an opaque watch tower self-regulate because at any time the guard may be watching. The goal of police panopticism is leveraging data-driven surveillance from multiple institutional vantages. The state of “conscious and permanent visibility” reduces monitoring and remedial costs and triggers self-regulation and institutional culture change.

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* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law. I am grateful to Garrett Heilman for superb research assistance and to Tom Wyrwich, Rebecca Levine, Jeremy Gelms, and Andrew Zellers for excellent editing. Many thanks also to Sherry L. Leysen and the other extraordinary librarians of the University of Washington library. The author retains the copyright in this article and authorizes royalty-free reproduction for non-profit purposes, provided any such reproduction contains a customary legal citation to the Washington Law Review.
INTRODUCTION

New Jersey police supervisors review on a random-selection basis videos of traffic stops and require officers to report the race of people stopped and searched pursuant to a consent decree.\(^1\) Los Angeles police are required by consent decree to complete a written or electronic report for each incident where force was used and for each investigative stop documenting the subject’s “apparent race, ethnicity, or national origin,” the reason for the stop, and whether a search was conducted.\(^2\) Stratified random samples of the reports are regularly audited through a procedure that includes “an examination for ‘canned’ language, inconsistent information, lack of articulation of the legal basis for the applicable action” or other reporting problems.\(^3\) Wallkill, New York, police are now obliged by consent decree to “document their activities while on duty and in a form that will allow monitoring of such activities to take place” through methods such as a daily log and documentation of stops.\(^4\) Detroit police are overseen by a monitor to ensure implementation of a consent judgment that, among other things, establishes a risk management database to track officer conduct and requires setting thresholds for red flags that trigger supervisory review to detect


\(^{3}\) Id. at para. 128.

potentially problematic officers.5

These are just a few examples of institutional reform of police practices in recent decades.6 Before instituting reforms, these jurisdictions and others in similar straits struggled with allegations such as excessive force, harassment, and disproportionate targeting of minorities by the police.7 Civil rights investigations and, in some cases, lawsuits followed.8 Changes ultimately were not wrought by judicial mandate.9 Constitutional criminal procedure doctrine—customarily

6. There are many other similar examples. For example, New York City police report the race of people targeted for investigative stops and promulgate written policies forbidding profiling pursuant to a stipulation to settle a civil rights suit. Stipulation of Settlement at 5, 8–9, ex. B, Daniels v. City of New York, No. 99 Civ. 1695 (SAS) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2003). Montgomery County, Maryland, police have agreed to implement a computer system recording traffic stop data, including race of people stopped and searched, to conduct regular data analyses, and to release the results in semi-annual public reports. Memorandum of Agreement Between the U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Montgomery County, Md., the Montgomery Cnty. Dep’t of Police and the Fraternal Order of Police, Montgomery Cnty. Lodge, Montgomery County Lodge 35, Inc., 11–12 (Jan. 14, 2000). Pittsburgh police must file a written report after each traffic stop that records the race of people stopped, whether the stop escalated to a search, and whether searches yielded any contraband or other evidence pursuant to a consent decree. Consent Decree at para. 16, United States v. Pittsburgh, No. Civil 97-0354 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2002). Virgin Islands police must document all uses of force in writing and develop a computerized risk management system that enables audits of such factors as each officer’s uses of force and decisions to charge subjects with “resisting arrest,” “assault on a police officer,” “disorderly conduct,” or “obstruction of official business” in use-of-force cases. Consent Decree at paras. 52, 59–60, United States v. Territory of the Virgin Islands, No. 03-23-09 (D.V.I. Mar. 23, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/VIPD_CD_03-23-09.pdf.
perceived as the main code of conduct regulating police—did not grow new branches to prescribe reform. Claims concerning the need to check the police were not filtered through the distorting lens of a criminal case with a defendant seeking to exclude evidence from the jury. Rather, the reforms stemmed from structural reform bargaining between litigants outside the courthouse that produced consent decrees—negotiated agreements between parties in the form of a court order stipulated between the parties—or memoranda of agreement—less formal agreements that typically provide for judicial enforcement in the event of a breach.

These negotiated reforms typically came in advance of any judicial involvement or finding of unconstitutionality. This distinction is important because some of the most famous and controversial forms of negotiated reforms—consent decrees—have frequently come after judicial findings of constitutional violations or probable violations, forcing the adoption of reforms. Such controversial consent decrees, familiar from contexts such as school desegregation, social services provision, and prison reform litigation, are sometimes decried as undemocratic because they embroil courts in dictating change and setting policies in areas that courts are ill-equipped to investigate and supervise. In contrast, this Article is focused on cooperative bargaining that leads to reform forged by police departments and civil rights


11. A consent decree is akin to a contract in that it binds the parties, but it is “more than a mere contract” because it is in form an order of the court and requires court action for consummation. Recent Cases, 41 HARV. L. REV. 538, 539 (1928).

12. See, e.g., Memorandum of Agreement Between the United States & the City of Villa Rica, Ga. 7 para. 4 (Dec. 23, 2003) (“This Agreement is enforceable through specific performance in Federal Court.”); Memorandum of Agreement Between the United States & the Village of Mt. Prospect, Ill. para. 43 (Jan. 22, 2003) (“This Agreement is enforceable through an action for specific performance in federal court.”).

13. See, e.g., Consent Decree paras. 1, 4–8, United States v. New Jersey, Civil No. 99-5970 (MLC) (D.N.J. Dec. 30, 1999) (stating that the City denies the Justice Department’s allegations of unconstitutional practices but has agreed to the reforms specified in the consent decree to avoid “the risks and burdens of litigation”); Consent Decree paras. 1, 4, United States v. Pittsburgh, Civil No. 97-0354 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 1997) (similar).

14. See, e.g., ROSS SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREES: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN COURTS RUN GOVERNMENT 9–12, 153–61 (2003) (accusing courts of becoming embroiled in problems they are ill-equipped to solve, offering examples where courts found violations or issued preliminary injunctions based on probable violations, leading to judicially enforceable consent decrees to remedy the violations).

15. See id.
organizations in advance of any judicial findings of unconstitutionality, without the prodding and intervention of judicial legal interpretation. Such structural reform bargaining typically results in memoranda of agreement prefaced with the sweetener of praise for the police department’s cooperation in seeking solutions to alleged problems, though more formal consent decrees also occur.¹⁶

This Article begins with the insight that the real engine of police reform increasingly is not found in the formal criminal procedure doctrine. The exclusionary rule—oft-described as the principal remedy and basis for deterring police misconduct¹⁷—is slipping as the main lever of police deterrence despite its starring role in criminal procedure jurisprudence.¹⁸ Civil rights suits against the police are no longer the chimera alternative for redressing undesirable police practices.¹⁹ The most important actor for prescribing rules regulating police practices is shifting from the judiciary, clumsily wielding constitutional doctrine to manage the police, to politically attuned agencies and civil society.²⁰

¹⁶ See, e.g., Agreement Between the United States & Jerry L. Demings, Orange County Sheriff paras. 5, 9 (Sept. 16, 2010) (praising Sheriff for his cooperation); Memorandum of Agreement Between the U.S. Dep’t of Justice & the City of Buffalo, N.Y. & the Buffalo Police Dep’t, the Police Benevolent Ass’n, Inc., & the Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., and Mun. Empls. Local 264, at paras. 2, 4 (Sept. 19, 2002) (thanking the city and police department for cooperation with the aim of providing the “best police service” and providing a “model for the best police practices” in the use of chemical spray); cf. Consent Decree Between the U.S. Dep’t of Justice and Prince George’s County, Md. & the Prince George’s Cnty. Police Dep’t paras. 3, 6 (Jan. 24, 2004) (stating that the department denied allegations of unconstitutionality but entered into the agreement to avoid the burdens of litigation and “to partner in support of vigorous and constitutional law enforcement” using “the best available policing practices and procedures”).

¹⁷ See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S.__, 129 S. Ct. 695, 707 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (describing the exclusionary rule as “often the only remedy effective to redress a Fourth Amendment violation”); Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 360 (1974) (explaining that the exclusionary rule is the “primary instrument for enforcing the fourth amendment”); Susan A. Bandes, And All the Pieces Matter: Thoughts on The Wire and the Criminal Justice System, 8 O HIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 435, 441 (2011) (describing the exclusionary rule as the “main remedy for police illegality”).

¹⁸ See, e.g., Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 698, 704 (holding that costs of exclusion are too high to remedy negligent police error causing erroneous arrest and search); David B. Owens, Comment, Fourth Amendment Remedial Equilibrium: A Comment on Herring v. United States and Pearson v. Callahan, 62 STAN. L. REV. 563, 565–70 (2010) (discussing cutbacks on exclusionary remedy).

¹⁹ See, e.g., Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1388 (1983) (explaining “the most ‘powerful’ remedies, criminal prosecutions for willful violation of the fourth amendment and actions for injunctions against large-scale violations, are rarely brought and rarely succeed” and “damage actions are also expensive, time-consuming, not readily available, and rarely successful”).

²⁰ See David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699, 1737–41 (2005) (analyzing the turn to judicial regulation to check police discretion); cf. Eric Miller, Putting the Practice into Theory, OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 31, 31 (2009) (arguing that criminal justice “law and
Nonjudicial actors, including prominently the United States Department of Justice and civil rights organizations, are collaboratively crafting remedial and governance regimes in the shadow of law and police department investigations.  

Police departments across the nation are coming under scrutiny and participating in collaboratively calibrated and institutionally tailored reform. Close to home in Washington State, for example, the Justice Department recently launched an investigation to determine whether the Seattle Police Department has engaged in a pattern or practice of excessive force and racially biased policing after controversial incidents surfaced involving uses of force against people of color. The revelation of a Justice Department investigation spurred the Seattle Police Department to announce “a complete revamp of how the department develops professional standards and expectations” before any findings from the investigation and in advance of any litigation. Scrutiny was sufficient to spur self-regulation and reform without resort to cumbersome litigation and judicial micro-management. These shifts are instructive for the future of how American police will be regulated and the nature of remedies available for civil rights concerns.

Formal criminal procedure jurisprudence has well-known roadblocks to scrutiny of the most controversial collateral consequences of policing such as disproportionate targeting of minorities and the use of police power to intimidate or harass. Landmarks of non-inquiry include Whren v. United States, which refused to invalidate pretextual stops of young minority men, and Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, which refused to intervene in a case of “merely gratuitous humiliations imposed by a police officer who was (at best) exercising extremely poor judgment” in

legal scholarship have failed to keep up with real-world transformations that have seen law-based (and, in particular, court-centered) regulation become an increasingly marginal aspect of police regulation”).

21. See discussion infra Part II.
26. See id. at 813.
arresting a mother he had erroneously stopped before for a minor traffic violation in front of her frightened crying children. These cases are firmly entrenched in constitutional criminal procedure’s shifting and sometimes unstable terrain of rules, though vigorously decried in the literature. Courts decline to peer into the Pandora’s box of motives for police stratagems and exercises of power so long as an objective basis can be conceived for a particular police action.

The doctrine informs defendants who argue racial targeting or other problematic exercises of discretion that criminal cases are not the proper context to press such claims. Rather, the claimants must clear the hurdles of bringing an equal protection claim. The barriers to bringing a successful equal protection claim are prohibitively high, however.

28. Id. at 323–24, 346–47, 355.
31. See, e.g., Whren, 517 U.S. at 813 (“[T]he constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment. Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”).
32. Id.
The U.S. Supreme Court has clamped down on the availability of discovery for selective prosecution cases, requiring the claimant to “produce some evidence that similarly situated defendants of other races could have been prosecuted, but were not.” Plaintiffs thus must produce evidence of discrimination to have access to discovery, the main mechanism for finding evidence of discrimination. Moreover, courts are not hospitable to claimants making a case through statistical analysis, requiring proof of purposeful discrimination in the defendant’s case. The phalanx of rules together produces a non-inquiry stance of courts in claims of misuse or harmful use of police discretion.

This eschewal of inquiry is part of a larger judicial reluctance to second-guess police. Judges, particularly appellate judges reviewing constitutional claims, are far-removed from the streets where police must patrol. Courts are profoundly wary of hamstringing police in dealing with the stresses and dangers of criminal law enforcement. More fundamentally, courts are cautious because persistent problems, such as disproportionate minority impact, are in part a result of structural societal inequities and legislative choices regarding what to penalize, which are daunting to redress at the case and court level.


35. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292–96, 293 n.12 (1987) (requiring proof of purposeful discrimination in the claimant’s case and explaining that statistics failed to establish such proof in the defendant’s particular case); United States v. Avery, 137 F.3d 343, 356 (6th Cir. 1997) (construing McCleskey to signify that “[o]nly in rare cases will a statistical pattern of discriminatory impact conclusively demonstrate a constitutional violation”).

36. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (reasoning that officers’ “quick ad hoc judgments” on matters such as arrests should not be impeded by requirements of step-by-step justification to be second-guessed by courts); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 n.15 (1968) (reasoning that officers “in the heat of an unfolding encounter on the street” and its dangers need intelligible and not overly constraining rules).

37. As the Atwater Court put it:

Often enough, the Fourth Amendment has to be applied on the spur (and in the heat) of the moment, and the object in implementing its command of reasonableness is to draw standards sufficiently clear and simple to be applied with a fair prospect of surviving judicial second-guessing months and years after an arrest or search is made. Courts attempting to strike a reasonable Fourth Amendment balance thus credit the government’s side with an essential interest in readily administrable rules.


38. See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656 (1984) (“In a kaleidoscopic situation such as the one confronting these officers . . . spontaneity rather than adherence to a police manual is necessarily the order of the day” and in such situation officers may “act out of a host of different, instinctive, and largely unverifiable motives . . . .”).

differences in the experience of justice would risk—as Justice Powell put it for the U.S. Supreme Court—“throw[ing] into serious question the principles that underlie our entire criminal justice system.”

There is formal law and then there is practice, forged by experts, advocates, and officials charged with vindicating the promise of law. A more hopeful portrait of the prospects for improvement of the quality and equality of justice emerges when one examines practice. Successes and progress by Department of Justice investigators and by civil society actors such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) illuminate promising modes of redress and reform.

Courts are clumsy police overseers, and constitutional criminal procedure is awkwardly suited for the task of police regulation. This is not a reason, however, to abdicate the important task of providing a check and ameliorating deleterious consequences. Because of the nature of the constituencies most at odds with police power—marginalized communities—the political process often does not provide an effective check—at least not without a jump-start. What kind of remedies would experts fashion in cooperation with police? Recent decades have begun to offer an answer to this question that can inform the deliberation of courts, litigators, and policy makers.

This Article analyzes the virtues of collaborative reform and remedial design and argues that a promising product of such collaboration is data-
driven surveillance of police to better steer discretion. This Article dubs such data-driven surveillance “panopticism for police.” The Panopticon was envisioned by Jeremy Bentham, oft-described as one of the founding fathers of utilitarianism and modern deterrence theory. Bentham’s original conception envisioned facilitating more efficient and effective governance of prison inmates by creating a structure that permitted the perfect visibility of prisoners arrayed around an opaque watchtower. The genius of the idea has transcended the original context of prison management to become a metaphor for the management of modern society. Creating a sense of “conscious and permanent visibility” leads to self-regulation by the populace in conformance with expectations because at any time one may be surveilled.

This Article explores the promising potential of panopticism for governing the governors—policing the police and other actors vested with power. While the focus of this Article is on police, the insights may have resonance for other criminal justice actors vested with strong discretion that may yield disparate distributions and experiences of justice. “Criminal law for cops”—criminal procedure’s body of conduct rules for police—can benefit from panoptic insights to ensure less costly, more internalized enforcement of civil liberties. This Article explores the promising potential of police panopticism as a remedy and governance strategy. The goal of police panopticism is to minimize the severe costs of managing the police by leveraging data-driven surveillance from multiple institutional points and actors. The state of


47. See, e.g., FOUCAULT, supra note 46, at 200–09 (analyzing influence of idea on governance of modern society in diverse contexts).

48. See Steiker, supra note 10, at 2470 (calling criminal procedure “a species of substantive criminal law for cops”).
“conscious and permanent visibility” should reduce monitoring and remedial costs by triggering self-regulation.

This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses the dilemma surrounding how much police opacity to permit in light of countervailing crime control and power misuse concerns and statutory routes opened to penetrate that opacity. This Part discusses three of the most important statutory routes for penetrating police opacity today: (1) 42 U.S.C. § 14141, which authorizes the U.S. Department of Justice to launch investigations and sue police departments that have a pattern or practice of violating civil rights; (2) the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 and Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which deploy the power of the purse to require police departments receiving federal funds to refrain from discriminating on the basis of race, color, sex, or national origin; and (3) 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which through doctrinal twists and turns, today better enables private parties to bring suit for violations of civil rights.

Part II explores how these three key litigation routes ultimately constitute avenues toward collaboration and bargaining rather than court-ordered reform and distinguishes between institutional and law reform. Part II argues that the virtues of cooperation in law’s shadow outweigh the cost of legal stasis. This Part argues that a primary virtue is expert input in fashioning practicable and institutionally tailored reform rather than a clumsy one-size-fits-all judicial rule. Moreover, cooperation rather than judicial interpretation and decision-making may yield greater reform because courts forced to decide the merits of litigation and whether to impose the high costs of clumsy judicial remedies may end up narrowing the scope of the right rather than recognizing a violation.

Part III explores the future of police regulation and reform in light of the insights emerging from collaborative reform and governance. This Article argues that police panopticism can supplement the much-eroded exclusionary rule by better detecting and preventing undesirable practices through data-driven surveillance. This Part examines emerging strategies for regulation by surveillance of police, including warning-flag databases, recording of day-to-day police–citizen encounters, and other modes of monitoring that have emerged in consent decrees and memoranda of agreement.
I. MAIN ROUTES FOR PENETRATING POLICE OPACITY

The question of whether and how to limit law enforcement discretion and penetrate the opacity of police practices has long vexed criminal justice experts.\(^{49}\) Opacity and the dangers of discretion are related because problematic exercises of discretion, such as the use of excessive force or targeting racial minorities, flourish more widely in the dark, when shielded from scrutiny.\(^{50}\) In the interest of effective crime prevention, the U.S. Supreme Court has been very sympathetic to the need to give police room to maneuver and act on educated intuition.\(^{51}\) The Court tries to avoid mandating a step-by-step breakdown and reporting of reasons out of concern that such a requirement would overly hamstring effective law enforcement.\(^{52}\) The Court also has repeatedly underscored the need to avoid impairing law enforcement effectiveness through vigor-chilling scrutiny, which also may disclose enforcement policy to would-be criminals.\(^{53}\)

Countervailing concerns regarding the need to prevent misuses of power, however, have led to the development of statutory routes for penetrating police opacity. Congress over the years, and the courts

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52. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (“A police officer’s determination as to how and where to search the person of a suspect whom he has arrested is necessarily a quick ad hoc judgment which the Fourth Amendment does not require to be broken down in each instance into an analysis of each step in the search.”).

through statutory rather than constitutional interpretation, have forged three main bases for penetrating police opacity and curbing discretion, including discretionary decisions with racial impact. One of the most promising developments is the enactment of 42 U.S.C. § 14141(b), which authorizes the U.S. Attorney General to sue for equitable and declaratory relief when there is a reasonable basis to believe that law enforcement officials have engaged in a pattern or practice of deprivation of constitutional or federal statutory rights.

Section 14141 complements earlier restrictions against law enforcement agencies receiving federal funds for discriminating on the basis of race, color, sex, or national origin under the 1968 Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3789d, and Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Section 14141 provides a procedural vehicle by which the Justice Department can sue agencies receiving federal funds for violations of constitutional or federal statutory rights, including the right against discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, or national origin conferred by § 3789d and Title VI. The primary cause of action for private citizens and civil rights entities suing law enforcement, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, also has proved to have some teeth, despite the teething difficulties posed by doctrinal twists and turns. As demonstrated by important reforms won by private organizations suing under the provision, § 1983 is an important and complementary vehicle for extending the reach of structural reform.

Innovative institutional reforms secured by structural reform litigation include the data reporting and monitoring mandates detailed at the outset of this Article and further explored in Part III. Some scholars, however,
have expressed dissatisfaction with the quantity of cases brought and dismay over the persistence of police misconduct in many jurisdictions.\(^{62}\) The focus of this piece is not on the quantity debate, but rather on lessons for how to design regulatory strategies and remedies that emerge from the expert collaboration incentivized by these causes of action. Determining *how to design* more effective, finer-grained mechanisms of police regulation and reform is an important issue distinct from the general question of *how to reach more departments*. Regulatory and remedial design can inform the practices not just of structural reforms stemming from litigation under provisions such as § 14141, § 3789d, Title VI, or § 1983, but also other avenues of police regulation. This Part offers an overview of the three main legal avenues for contemporary police department reform. The next Parts explore the insights that emerge from cooperative reform and offer a theory and practical illustrations of police panopticism as regulatory strategy and remedy.

**A. Path-Opening: 42 U.S.C. § 14141**

Congress launched a paradigm shift in police regulation when it authorized the Justice Department to investigate and sue police departments rather than relying just on the hope that the exclusionary rule and damages actions would deter rights violations.\(^{63}\) The legislation that would become 42 U.S.C. § 14141 was forged in the embers of fury over the videotaped beating of Black motorist Rodney King by Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) officers.\(^{64}\) The provision authorizing Justice Department suits was originally proposed in the 1991 Police Accountability Act, but did not muster enough votes to pass.\(^{65}\) The potent remedy regulating the police was repackaged in the police-palatable wrapper of a bill that gave money to the police, the Violent

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65. Id. at 138.
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.\(^\text{66}\) The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act was mainly pitched as a bill to fight “ever-increasing violence” by giving police departments federal money to “hire new officers for community policing and to implement community policing programs.”\(^\text{67}\) Congress pitched the bill to the powerful law and order lobby as legislation aimed at giving police money to support their “pioneer[ing] . . . return to preventative community policing techniques” aimed at “working with the community” to “tailor[] solutions . . . to unique neighborhood crime and disorder problems.”\(^\text{68}\)

But buried deep in Title 21, § 210401 of the bill was the law that would be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14141.\(^\text{69}\) To understand the history of the provision, one must examine its origins in the earlier criminal justice reform bill: the Police Accountability Act of 1991.\(^\text{70}\) The highly publicized Rodney King beating prompted the legislation conferring “standing to the United States Attorney General” to seek civil injunctive relief against police departments exhibiting a pattern or practice of violating federal civil rights.\(^\text{71}\) The House Report describing the impetus for the legislation recounted the controversial beating replayed on television screens across the nation:

> While twenty-one other officers stood by, three LAPD officers and a sergeant administered 56 baton blows, six kicks to the head and body, and two shocks from a Taser electric stun gun. The incident was captured on videotape by a citizen. . . .

> Unfortunately, the Rodney King incident is not an aberration. The Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department, created to examine the incident . . . concluded in its July 1991 report that “there is a significant number of officers in the LAPD who repetitively use excessive force against the public.” . . .

> . . . It is apparent, moreover, that the problem is not limited to Los Angeles. Police chiefs from 10 major cities convened soon after the King incident and emphasized that “the problem of


\(^{68}\) Id. at 7.

\(^{69}\) § 210401, 108 Stat. at 2071.


\(^{71}\) Id. at 135.
excessive force in American policing is real.\textsuperscript{72} The Report proffered accounts from police officials and cases from across the country, in places such as New Jersey, Ohio, Boston, Michigan, and D.C.—several of which would later be locales for structural reform litigation\textsuperscript{73}—regarding excessive force and abuse, particularly of minorities.\textsuperscript{74}

The conferral of investigative authority was important because prior to the legislation, the Justice Department lacked authority to address “systemic patterns or practices of police misconduct.”\textsuperscript{75} While the Justice Department could prosecute individual police officers, juries often were reluctant to convict.\textsuperscript{76} If the officer was acting pursuant to an official policy or was poorly trained, the Justice Department could not sue the police department to correct the larger problem.\textsuperscript{77} The report explaining the 1991 precursor legislation proffered two examples, including one from Washington State.\textsuperscript{78} In a nine-month period, four people in separate incidents were badly beaten by Mason County, Washington, officers in vulnerable, pain-susceptible spots such as the head, testicles, and kidneys after investigative stops.\textsuperscript{79} Some of the beaten individuals were falsely charged to induce them into signing a release of liability form.\textsuperscript{80} The legislative report observed that though the Ninth Circuit had found the training for the officers to be “woefully inadequate, if it can be said to have existed at all” courts were “powerless to correct” the larger institutional inadequacy.\textsuperscript{81}

\textsuperscript{72} Id.


\textsuperscript{75} Id. at 137.

\textsuperscript{76} Id.

\textsuperscript{77} Id.

\textsuperscript{78} Id. at 138–39.

\textsuperscript{79} See Davis v. Mason County, 927 F.2d 1473, 1478–79 (9th Cir. 1991) (describing incidents).

\textsuperscript{80} Id. at 1478.

\textsuperscript{81} H.R. REP. NO. 102-242, pt. 1, at 138–39 (quoting Davis, 927 F.2d at 1482); see also supra
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in *Los Angeles v. Lyons*[^82] constricted the ability of private individuals to sue for injunctive relief by imposing a high hurdle for establishing standing to sue for violations of civil rights[^83]. The plaintiff Adolph Lyons, a Black man, had been choked unconscious by the Los Angeles police during a routine traffic stop though he offered no resistance[^84]. Between 1975 and 1983, at least sixteen people had died during chokehold use by the Los Angeles police—twelve of them Black men like Lyons[^85]. The Court nonetheless held that Lyons lacked standing to sue because he could not show sufficient likelihood that he would again experience a chokehold by the Los Angeles police[^86].

While the 1991 legislation’s provisions attempting to afford greater access to private individuals to sue for injunctive relief did not make it into the 1994 law, the authorization for the Department of Justice to sue for institutional reform did[^87]. The investigations or announced investigations across diverse jurisdictions have had “influence [that] greatly exceeds their number.”[^88] The Justice Department has authorized more than forty-one investigations, with additional investigations inaugurated this year, including an investigation into the Seattle Police Department[^89]. In fidelity with the concerns that impelled passage of § 14141, the vast majority of the investigations are into allegations of use of excessive force[^90].

[^83]: Id. at 105–06.
[^84]: Id. at 97–98.
[^85]: Id. at 115–16 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
[^86]: Id. at 111 (majority opinion). For an analysis of the virtual certitude standard imposed by the Lyons Court, see Mary D. Fan, Comment, *Risk Magnified: Standing Under the Statist Lens*, 112 YALE L.J. 1633, 1635–36 (2003).
[^90]: REAMS JR. & FORREST, supra note 89, Doc. 58, at 145.
B. Purse Power: Crime Control and Safe Streets Act and Title VI

The Justice Department’s authority to pursue structural reform litigation reinforces the rights and causes of action arising from statutory restrictions on agencies receiving federal funds from discriminating based on race, color, sex or national origin. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits “any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance”—including federal law enforcement and the numerous state and local agencies receiving federal grants—from such discrimination. Adopted four years later, the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 reiterates the prohibition and also provides a process of warnings, funds suspension, and suit for enforcement. These two prohibitions, tied to the federal power of the purse, offer substantive rights and procedural avenues that are bases for limiting what is colloquially called racial profiling.

Under both statutes, the most obvious remedy for violations is suspension or termination of federal funding. The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, for example, provides for a civil suit for injunctive relief, including suspension, termination, or repayment of funds based on a pattern or practice of violations of the antidiscrimination provisions. A very fractured U.S. Supreme Court in Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Service Commission of New York also implied a private right of action to sue for injunctive relief to enforce the antidiscrimination protections of Title VI.

The fractures in Guardians Ass’n have resulted in the dichotomy that proof of discriminatory intent is required to make out a damages claim for violation of Title VI, but discriminatory impact suffices if plaintiffs are seeking equitable relief to enforce Title VI’s implementing

91. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006) (”No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”); id. § 3789d(c)(1) (similar).
92. Id. § 2000d.
93. See, e.g., id. § 3789d(c)(2)(A), (C) (providing for warning process and suspension of funds on further noncompliance).
95. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3789d(c)(2)(A), (C) (providing mechanism for suspension of funds).
96. Id. § 3789d(c)(3).
98. See id. at 608 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring) (counting votes).
regulations. Similar to Title VI, the implementing regulation provides that no program receiving federal funds may:

[U]tilize criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, or national origin, or have the effect of defeating or substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the program as respects individuals of a particular race, color, or national origin.

The distinction matters greatly. The “smoking gun” proof of discriminatory intent is hard to obtain. The most practicable way to make a case is through statistical evidence regarding the department’s practices. Structural reform litigants seeking to enjoin discriminatory practices thus have a lower hurdle of proof if they couch their suit as seeking to enforce the regulations implementing Title VI’s antidiscrimination protections.

Private litigants have made some headway in anti-racial-profiling structural reform litigation brought under Title VI’s regulations. For instance, in Rodriguez v. California Department of Highway Patrol, the NAACP, the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), and the ACLU joined forces to sue for alleged racial profiling under a federally funded drug interdiction program called “Operation Pipeline.” In support of their Title VI claim, the plaintiffs presented...

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99. Id.; see also Larry P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d 969, 981–82 (9th Cir. 1984) (explaining dichotomy); David Rudovsky, Law Enforcement by Stereotypes and Serendipity: Racial Profiling and Stops and Searches Without Cause, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 296, 330 (2001) (“Since Guardians and Choate, federal courts of appeals have consistently found that Title VI implementing regulations prohibiting practices that cause an unjustified disparate impact provide a basis for private plaintiffs to sue recipients of federal funds on a discriminatory effects theory, without a showing of discriminatory intent.”).

100. 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2) (2010).


102. Id.

103. See, e.g., Wilson v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 66 Fed. App’x 791, 796 (10th Cir. 2003) (reversing motion to dismiss on defendant’s racial profiling claim involving traffic stop and reinstating suit, including Title VI claim); Rodriguez v. Cal. Dep’t of Highway Patrol, 89 F. Supp. 2d 1131, 1139 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (rejecting defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint and allowing suit, including Title VI claim, to proceed).

104. 89 F. Supp. 2d 1131.

data that Black motorists were 1.5 times as likely and Latino motorists were three times as likely to be stopped by California Highway Patrol officers than White motorists.\textsuperscript{106} District Judge Fogel ruled this disparity was sufficient to make a claim and survive a motion to dismiss.\textsuperscript{107} After clearing the procedural hurdle, the ACLU and LULAC successfully settled the case and levied data-generating reforms, including collection of data on race and traffic stops and limits on searches, as well as more than $800,000 in legal fees and damages.\textsuperscript{108}

Section 14141 is complementary to these prior provisions and clears up some of the murk in the scope of relief and reform that the Justice Department may seek to enforce the substantive antidiscrimination prohibitions of the 1964 and 1968 laws. Section 14141 authorizes the Justice Department to sue for a pattern or practice of violating the federal rights created by federal laws forbidding discrimination by a recipient of federal funding.\textsuperscript{109} The scope of injunctive relief authorized under § 14141 is more broadly worded as “appropriate equitable and declaratory relief to eliminate the pattern or practice.”\textsuperscript{110} Justice Department investigations into allegations of racially discriminatory impact have thus leveraged § 14141 as well as Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.\textsuperscript{111}

\section*{C. A Winding and Widening Path: 42 U.S.C. § 1983}

For private citizens and entities, the main vehicle for damages and injunctive-relief suits remains 42 U.S.C. § 1983, enacted as part of the...

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{107} \textit{Rodriguez}, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 1137; ACLU, California Press Release, supra note 105.
\item \textsuperscript{108} Weatherspoon, \textit{supra} note 94, at 737 n.91; Dolan & Giionna, \textit{supra} note 106, at A1.
\item \textsuperscript{109} 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2006).
\item \textsuperscript{110} Id.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Civil Rights Act of 1871 to vindicate the promise of the Fourteenth Amendment. Reconstructionist Republican legislators passed the legislation because of outrage and alarm over violence against Blacks in the South, including lynching, whippings, and other atrocities. While the legislation is also called the Ku Klux Klan Act because of its genesis amid rampant Klan violence, the provision was shaped by deep concern over the inaction and potential complicity of local law enforcement officials. The remedy of § 1983 thus was not against the Ku Klux Klan but rather state actors who refused to enforce state laws or enforced them in a discriminatory manner. Section 1983 provides:

> Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .

Despite its genesis in a sense of urgent need for reform, the provision was interpretively disarmed by the U.S. Supreme Court and remained dormant for nearly a century after its passage. In *Barney v. City of New York*, Chief Justice Fuller of the U.S. Supreme Court held that official actions contrary to state law or policy are not under color of state law. "Lawless police brutality" thus was outside the scope of the statute’s tort remedy against government officials. Official actions in derogation of state law were left to the vagaries (and potential

114. Id. at 7–10.
119. 193 U.S. 430 (1904).
120. Id. at 437–39 (citing Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 13 (1879)).
121. See *Monroe*, 365 U.S. at 213–14 (Frankfurter, J. dissenting) (so arguing based on past precedent).
recalcitrance) of state courts for redress.\textsuperscript{122}

The subsequent jurisprudence interpreting § 1983 has churned on whether to offer an avenue for suit and how narrow a route to provide.\textsuperscript{123} The Court also has wavered and shifted on the liability of political subunits. In \textit{Monroe v. Pape},\textsuperscript{124} the Court ruled that municipalities such as the City of Chicago are not a “person” under § 1983 and thus are not subject to suit.\textsuperscript{125} In \textit{Moor v. Alameda County},\textsuperscript{126} the Court extended the exclusion from the interpretation of “person” to other political subdivisions of states, including counties.\textsuperscript{127}

The constriction by this interpretation of § 1983 meant that the potential remedy was ineffectual when the Warren Court began searching for a way to check state police misconduct. The U.S. Supreme Court had initially eschewed extending the controversial exclusionary rule to the states even though it incorporated the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures to regulate state and local actors.\textsuperscript{128} Without a remedy, however, it became egregiously apparent that state and local police were not observing the Fourth Amendment’s protections despite incorporation.\textsuperscript{129} State officers blatantly illegally seized evidence in contravention of the Fourth Amendment and then handed it over to federal authorities on a silver platter for prosecution.\textsuperscript{130} In 1961, the Court ultimately closed the gaping enforcement hole by extending the exclusionary remedy to the states in \textit{Mapp v. Ohio}\textsuperscript{131} to deter state police misconduct.\textsuperscript{132} Showing how dormant § 1983 had become, the \textit{Mapp} opinion did not even explicitly

\textsuperscript{122} Barney, 193 U.S. at 438 (“[I]t is for the state courts to remedy acts of state officers done without the authority of, or contrary to, state law.”).

\textsuperscript{123} See, e.g., Monroe, 365 U.S. at 188–91.

\textsuperscript{124} Monroe, 365 U.S. 167.

\textsuperscript{125} Id.

\textsuperscript{126} Alameda County, 411 U.S. 693 (1973).

\textsuperscript{127} Id. at 709–10.


\textsuperscript{129} See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 652–53 (describing “the obvious futility of relegating the Fourth Amendment” to toothless remedies in the states absent incorporation of the exclusionary rule).


\textsuperscript{131} Mapp, 367 U.S. 643.

\textsuperscript{132} Mapp, 367 U.S. at 659–60.
analyze § 1983 as a remedy and mode of police regulation and deterrence. Writing for the Court, Justice Clark cursorily adverted to “the obvious futility of relegating the Fourth Amendment [to] the protection of other remedies . . . .”

The jurisprudence interpreting § 1983 would soon shift, however, to give force and effect to the vehicle for seeking civil remedies for official misconduct. The same term as Mapp, the Warren Court began breathing life into § 1983 in Monroe v. Pape, which held that state police officers acting in contravention of state law by illegally entering and ransacking the plaintiff’s home while he and his family were made to stand naked were nonetheless acting under color of state law. By 1971, the Court construed a right to sue federal law enforcement officers in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents. To make bringing civil suits more feasible, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act of 1976, which confers on courts the discretion to award attorney’s fees to prevailing parties in civil rights litigation. In 1978, the U.S. Supreme Court reconstrued the term “persons” subject to suit to include municipalities.

Today, § 1983 is an important avenue for private impact litigators to seek reform of police practices. For example, the Center for Constitutional Rights sued the New York City police under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title VI, and was able to extract a settlement stipulation that required police to, among other things, record data regarding the races of people stopped. In Maryland, the NAACP and ACLU extracted a settlement that mandated, among other reforms, collection and dissemination of traffic stop and race data after suing under Title VI and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The NAACP also successfully sued New Jersey

133. Id. at 652.
police for racial profiling of Black motorists on the New Jersey Turnpike under § 1983, among other causes of action.141

Emboldened by past successes in racial profiling litigation, the ACLU and the Mexican American Legal Defense Fund (MALDEF) have filed suit against Sheriff Joe Arpaio of Arizona for alleged discriminatory profiling of Latinos in attempts to interject the state in the enforcement of federal immigration law.142 Private litigation under § 1983 thus can extend the reach and spread of structural reform. Justice Department suits under § 14141 and private-entity suits under § 1983 are complementary. As discussed in Parts II and III, these statutes have spurred structural reform bargaining, yielding reforms that demonstrate the power and potential of data-driven surveillance.143

II. COOPERATIVE REFORM IN LAW’S SHADOW

While § 14141, § 3789d, Title VI, and § 1983 are formal avenues of litigation, in practice their greatest utility is bringing expert parties together to bargain for reform. The causes of action induce cooperation through the prospect of litigation. The real action and progress, however, is achieved outside the courthouse. Indeed, most of the resolutions that have emerged from Justice Department investigations under § 14141, for example, were reached by negotiation before launch of a lawsuit.144

In reality, structural reform litigation is a bit of a misnomer. In practice, what is occurring is structural reform bargaining that leads to institutional change through settlement while the law and judiciary remain in stasis. A distinguished cadre of writers has argued against settlement, particularly of civil rights litigation.145 Some of the most oft-

143. See infra Parts II–III.
144. Harmon, supra note 62, at 3–4, n.7.
145. See, e.g., Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1076, 1083 (1984) (arguing settlement is distorted by imbalances in power and coerced consent akin to plea bargaining and short-circuits the articulation of law and public values); Samuel Issacharoff, When Substance Mandates Procedure: Martin v. Wilks and the Rights of Vested Incumbents in Civil Rights Consent Decrees, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 189, 238–39 (1992) (arguing that consent decrees in public litigation “are inherently troublesome” because they come at the expense of legal clarification, “permit private parties to invoke the judiciary’s enforcement authority to define rights that are consistent with what the parties believe would be the litigated outcome,” and “avoid the mediating lens of the court and the accompanying public scrutiny”); Marshall Miller, Police Brutality, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 176–80 (1998) (expressing concern that “repeated consent decrees will subvert
expressed concerns include short-circuiting the process of articulating 
law and public values,146 lack of transparency and process in decision-
making,147 and power imbalances between parties that infect the 
bargaining process and outcomes.148 These concerns are important and 
should be taken into account in crafting settlement procedures and 
protections.149 This Part contends, however, that in the contemporary 
context of institutional and governmental litigants for reform, and in the 
shadow of increasingly police-solicitous and scrutiny-averting legal 
standards, the virtues of settlement exceed the concerns in a manner 
distinct from the past.

A. An Invitation to Bargain

Owen Fiss began his classic article in the anti-settlement canon 
Against Settlement with concern over how imbalance of power will 
infest the bargaining process.150 He offered as an example “a struggle 
between a member of a racial minority and a municipal police 
department over alleged brutality.”151 An assumption in the argument, 
shaped by the lingering romance of the Warren Court era, is that in the 
judicially moderated and law-governed arena of litigation, power 
distortions are ameliorated. Fiss acknowledged that power imbalances 
between party representatives persist in litigation but argued that the 
distortions are lessened “because the judge tests those statements and 
judicial opportunities to interpret § 14141 and preempt the potential benefits of 
publicizing . . . unconstitutional police patterns and practices” and that “a high settlement 
rate . . . will largely shift the role of structuring remedial change from federal judges to the Attorney 
General and the lawyers for the defendant police departments and municipalities”); Randolph D. 
Moss, Participation and Department of Justice School Desegregation Consent Decrees, 95 YALE 
L.J. 1811, 1811–12 (1986) (expressing concern over “negotiated compromises” effacing “legal 
ideals and procedural protections”); Jeremy A. Rabkin & Neal E. Devins, Averting Government by 
Consent Decree: Constitutional Limits on the Enforcement of Settlements with the Federal 
Government, 40 STAN. L. REV. 203, 203–04 (1987) (expressing concern over “the risk that major 
policy decisions will be fixed in secret negotiations with small groups of private plaintiffs rather 
than through the more open and accountable procedures of ordinary executive decisionmaking”).

146. E.g., Fiss, supra note 145, at 1076, 1083; Issacharoff, supra note 145, at 238–39; Miller, 
supra note 145, at 178; Moss, supra note 145, at 1811–12.

147. E.g., Issacharoff, supra note 145, at 238–39; Miller, supra note 145, at 178; Rabkin & 
Devins, supra note 145, at 204.

148. E.g., Fiss, supra note 145, at 1076.

149. See, e.g., David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 
2620–21 (1995) (analyzing how the settlement process can be improved to better serve and address 
concerns regarding openness, legal justice, and the creation of public good).

150. Fiss, supra note 145, at 1076.

151. Id.
actions against independent procedural and substantive standards.”

The stance of courts, particularly in the criminal procedure context, has dramatically changed from the days when Fiss envisioned judicial decision-making and legal standards as protecting the less powerful minority litigant. The legal doctrine and the posture of courts has been of mounting deference to the police and reluctance to peer into police stratagems that may cause disproportionate harm to the less powerful who are policed. The strong judicial reluctance to intervene is reflected in the crystallization of non-inquiry rules of various types over the decades. For example, when claimants argue police have played foul rather than fair in various stratagems, the U.S. Supreme Court has taken a strong stance of non-inquiry into the subjective motivations of officers.

A landmark—and unanimously decided—example is Whren v. United States. The case arose from police spotting two young Black men driving in a disadvantaged community, or “high drug area” in police parlance. The officers executed a U-turn to tail the young Black motorists. Followed in such a pronounced manner by police, Whren and his companion turned right without signaling at what the officers deemed an “unreasonable speed.” Stopping the car, the officers walked up, and contended they saw two large plastic bags of crack cocaine in plain view in defendant Whren’s hands.

Whren argued that because driving is so extensively regulated by myriad open-textured provisions, such as the requirement that driving must be at a speed “reasonable and prudent under the conditions” or that the driver must give “full time and attention” to vehicle operation, police have wide cover to pursue a pretextual stop. In effect, police are able to target individuals for little more than being young, Black, and male.

152. Id. at 1080.
153. See discussion and sources cited supra notes 36–40 and infra notes 162–165.
154. Id.
156. Whren, 517 U.S. at 808.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 808–09.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 809–10.
161. See id.
The Whren Court refused to intervene to mitigate the risk of racial targeting. The Court first reiterated that constitutional criminal procedure—particularly Fourth Amendment jurisprudence—generally eschews case-specific inquiry into the subjective motivations of officers.\textsuperscript{162} One of the main reasons for this non-inquiry stance is deference to police needs and the notion that the quick ad hoc judgment calls officers make on the street are not susceptible to a step-by-step analysis.\textsuperscript{163} Whren tried to get around the rule of non-inquiry into subjective intent by arguing that a reasonable officer would not have made the stop in light of customary police practices.\textsuperscript{164} Justice Scalia, writing for the unanimous Court, dismissed the approach based on what a reasonable officer in the jurisdiction would do as even more unworkable than inquiry into subjective intent.\textsuperscript{165} The Whren Court concluded that in “the run-of-the-mine case,” there was “no realistic alternative” to the customary rule of deeming a search justified without further inquiry if officers could point to probable cause.\textsuperscript{166} Thus claimants who believe they were racially targeted have scant recourse because of the non-inquiry stance of courts in the criminal procedure context. Because courts are reluctant to second-guess the police, as Whren illustrates, it is far from clear that litigation in the judicial arena will ameliorate rather than aggravate imbalances in power.\textsuperscript{167}

Not only can out-of-court settlements secure potentially greater reform than the doctrine interpreted by courts provides, but the balance of power has also shifted in contemporary settlement bargaining. The advent of § 14141 means that the government brings its power, prestige, resources, and publicity to bear in representing the less powerful. The balance of power also has shifted, albeit in a less dramatic way, in the private impact litigation context, where the interests of the less powerful

\textsuperscript{162} Id. at 813 (“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”); see also Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 260 (2007) (explaining that the Court repeatedly rejected attempts to introduce subjectivity into Fourth Amendment analysis); Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153–54 (2004) (holding that objective circumstances, rather than subjective police motives or knowledge, control analysis of reasonableness of arrest); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 136 (1978) (“Subjective intent alone . . . does not make otherwise lawful conduct illegal or unconstitutional.”); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221 n.1, 235 (1973) (holding that a traffic-violation arrest is not invalid even if it was “a mere pretext for a narcotics search”).

\textsuperscript{163} E.g., Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235.

\textsuperscript{164} Whren, 517 U.S. at 813–14.

\textsuperscript{165} Id. at 814–15.

\textsuperscript{166} Id. at 819.

\textsuperscript{167} See Fiss, supra note 145, at 1076 (giving example of a racial minority’s struggle against a police department’s use of excessive force).
are represented by prestigious, press-savvy impact litigation groups such as the ACLU, NAACP, and MALDEF. Leveraging the threat of negative spotlight, government investigators or impact litigating institutions may be able to extract more concessions in settlement than police-solicitous law would provide.

B. On Institutional Reform Rather than Law Reform

What about the oft-expressed concern that settlement subverts the clarification of law through litigation and judicial decision? Here again, the realities of contemporary constitutional criminal procedure doctrine complicate the case. When it comes to suits against the police, the Court’s highly deferential qualified immunity standard may lead to dismissal of a case without even clarifying the law—or securing any institutional reform.

The Court’s recent decision in Pearson v. Callahan168 amplifies the risk of dismissal without legal clarity. Pearson is a sharp shift from the Court’s concern for legal clarification demonstrated in Saucier v. Katz.169 Saucier required courts to decide if the facts alleged amount to a constitutional violation, even if not of “clearly established law,” because law would otherwise stagnate without clarification.170 Pearson suspended the requirement of Saucier that courts first determine whether the facts as pled make out a constitutional violation.171 Under Pearson, courts may dismiss suits on the grounds that the challenged police conduct did not violate clearly established pre-existing law without ever explaining whether the conduct was permissible.172 The elimination of the Saucier requirement that courts must first explain what the Constitution requires thus leaves both police and the public in the dark and prevents the crystallization of clearly established law for future suits.

Moreover, when defendants try to push the law of police regulation these days, the law may push back. The law of criminal justice is retrenching sharply from its Warren Court-era hospitableness to criminal defendants.173 Obvious signs include the erosion and cutbacks to

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170. Id.
172. Id. at 816–20.
173. For accounts of cutbacks, see, for example, Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1519, 1525–93 (2008); Owens, supra note 18, at 565–71 (2010).
landmarks of the earlier era, such as the exclusionary rule or *Miranda* protections. From a pragmatic perspective, clear-eyed about doctrinal realities and the need to achieve on-the-ground progress, pursuing institutional reform outside the risky judicial and doctrinal arena may net greater progress than aiming for legal reform.

**C. The Virtues of Collaborative Reform (Despite Legal Stasis)**

The virtue of structural reform bargaining, from a reform perspective, is that the resulting remedies are tailored by experts with input from insider police and impacted civil rights claimants. Both sides have incentives to bargain toward reform rather than risk judicial decision. The risks for civil rights claimants of generating even less hospitable law and the risks for police subjected to bad publicity and potentially clumsy judicial oversight create mutual incentive to collaborate in designing reforms. Judicial intervention acts as a penalty default that both parties have interest in avoiding. This undesirable default applies if the parties do not cooperate. The penalty default thus incentivizes cooperation.

In the structural reform bargaining context, the undesirable aspect of the penalty default from the police perspective is the risk of clumsy and costly court-ordered remedies in the absence of cooperation and settlement. The undesirable aspect of the penalty default from the civil-rights claimant’s perspective is the danger of judicial dismissal or refusal to decide if a settlement is not attained.

Transforming civil rights litigation into opening bids to bargain towards party-designed reforms shifts the actors designing reforms from the judiciary to the litigants. Rather than cause for concern, this change in approach may be salutary. As discussed, supra, in Part II.A, the litigants in police department structural reform suits are increasingly sophisticated actors with complementary expertise in community concerns and police needs. In contrast, courts are ill-suited and lack expertise to micro-manage police departments, particularly on the granular, department-tailored level needed to enhance the prospects of real and sustainable change.

Federal judges are generalists. Some may have criminal law experience. Many, however, do not have the level of insider knowledge.

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176. *See id.* at 97–98 (explaining how penalty defaults give incentive to at least one party to contract around the default).
that investigators, police, and advocacy organizations on the ground possess. Not only can parties afford to be more creative than courts in crafting reforms, they also have the know-how to develop more effective modes of regulation and remedial regimes. Indeed, the incentive to avoid inexpert and crude judicially imposed reforms is a reason for police to collaborate in designing reforms by agreement, stipulation, or consent decree.

Moreover, federal court decisions based on federal or constitutional law bind across diverse jurisdictions. In contrast, department-specific negotiations concerning reform can help push reforms toward best practices while still recognizing the need for local variation suited to context.\(^\text{177}\) Non-judicial actors outside the arena of one-size-fits-all federal and constitutional law can engage in better-adapted reforms without costly overbreadth or ill-fit to local context.

Party-negotiated reforms also offer the virtues of greater flexibility and adaptability and room for experimentation and change if early solutions prove insufficient. Negotiating parties can apply the lessons of past agreements to explore new innovations and adaptations. Parties crafting agreements that need not bind other entities can afford to be creative in a way that courts cannot. Contrast, for example, settlement agreements that require implementation of an automated early-warning system and a statistical model to identify potentially problematic officers with the typical stakes of criminal procedure cases—exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of constitutional rights if the prosecutor seeks to introduce the evidence in a criminal case.\(^\text{178}\) Such settlement agreements often have a detailed code of reforms tailored to problems identified after an investigation of departmental practices. This is quite a contrast to the simple stakes in a criminal procedure case of whether evidence is excluded or not.\(^\text{179}\) Courts interpreting constitutional criminal procedure’s minimum floor for police conduct necessarily must be minimalist because constitutional protections apply across cases and


\(^{178}\) Compare, e.g., Consent Decree at para. 12, United States v. Pittsburgh, Civ. No. 97-0354 (W.D. Pa. April 16, 1997) (requiring implementation of an early-warning system and statistical model for identifying problematic officers), and Consent Decree at paras. 71-77, United States v. Steubenville, Civ. No. 97-0966 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 28, 1997) (requiring implementation of an information system that allows for regular audits with the goal of supervising officer behavior and preventing constitutional violations), with sources cited, supra note 17 (explaining the exclusionary rule is the principal remedy of constitutional criminal procedure doctrine).

\(^{179}\) See supra note 178 (contrasting detailed agreements with constitutional criminal procedure’s remedies).
jurisdictions. Moreover, in a system that strongly values precedent, the rigid artillery of law that courts must wield to impose reform is hard to tweak and tailor when experience counsels change.\(^\text{180}\)

Incentivized police cooperation in designing institutional reforms and data production measures is desirable, in turn, because it is cheaper to change a cooperating entity than it is to impose clumsy top-down measures from a distance on a recalcitrant organization. The lessons of judicial intervention in famous historical contexts such as school and residential desegregation and prison reforms demonstrate the difficulty of forcing change upon recalcitrant institutions.\(^\text{181}\) Ultimately, sustainable change requires buy-in and transformation in the police organizational culture.\(^\text{182}\) As Debra Livingston, Kami Chavis Simmons, and others have argued, “[p]olice reform efforts are doomed to fail without significant cooperation of the police officers themselves.”\(^\text{183}\) This insight has led Simmons to argue that “rank-and-file officers should be allowed a place at the negotiating table and should be afforded an opportunity to have their perspective considered during the reform process” because “[a]s active participants in the negotiation process . . . rank-and-file police officers could add value by asserting their interests and participating in a dialogue about creating a solution.”\(^\text{184}\)

Moreover, police are best-situated to access information and well-positioned to know what reforms are needed and which strategies might produce the most change because of insider information gained from

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183. Kami Chavis Simmons, The Politics of Policing: Ensuring Stakeholder Collaboration in the Federal Reform of Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 98 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 489, 524 (2008); see also Livingston, supra note 177, at 848–52 (noting “a conclusion drawn by many police scholars—namely, that efforts at police reform will be most effective when the police organization itself is involved in the process and, ultimately, when reform involves not simply adherence to rules in the face of punitive sanctions, but a change in the organizational values and systems to which both managers and line officers adhere”).

184. Simmons, supra note 183, at 524.
day-to-day experience. For example, officers are better situated to know what goes on behind the scenes, such as whether public complaints get buried or are investigated and how the departmental culture might aggravate aggressive uses of force. In contrast, judges are not insiders within police departments and typically lack experience with the daily workings and culture within a department.

Though best situated to produce and share information, law enforcement officials have strategic incentives to withhold information that would better inform doctrine and judicial and public deliberation. The perverse incentive arises because law enforcement officials have a strong self-interest in withholding information regarding potentially problematic practices to avoid scrutiny and retain the power to engage in such practices even though release of the information would better serve collective interests in redressing problems. Incentivizing collaborative reform to avoid the penalty default of clumsy court-ordered solutions has the benefit of giving the police a push to cooperate in self-reform and deploy insider knowledge to better design regulatory and remedial regimes. Of course, police have self-interest—and potential law enforcement interests—in avoiding changes to the status quo and the release of internal information. Bargaining with parties representing civil rights concerns to avoid the costs and embarrassment of litigation, however, gives police better incentives to collaborate in reform and produce information.

III. LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE OF POLICE GOVERNANCE AND REFORM

In a time when the exclusionary rule as the primary mode of police regulation is increasingly embattled, and the prospect of its demise debated, we particularly need expertise in fashioning alternative

185. See, e.g., NEW ORLEANS INVESTIGATION, supra note 22 (detailing, based on interviews with officers, how excessive use of force is aggravated by a departmental culture that condones and even encourages retaliation and internal practices that avoid investigating officer uses of force).

186. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 175, at 97–100 (arguing that penalty defaults should be set against parties who strategically withhold information that, if shared, would increase the size of pie because they want bigger slice of pie).

187. See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 695, 700–02 (2009) (holding that costs of exclusion are too high to offer remedy for negligent police error leading to wrongful arrest and search); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591–94 (2006) (refusing to apply exclusionary remedy for knock-and-announce violation prior to entry into home). For recent commentary on the cutback, see, for example, Owens, supra note 18, at 565–69.

188. See generally, e.g., Thomas K. Clancy, The Irrelevancy of the Fourth Amendment in the Roberts Court, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 191 (2010) (predicting demise of, or at least substantial limits
models of police regulation and remedial regimes. Concern that the exclusionary rule makes society pay by distorting the truth-finding process when the constable blunders has led to cutbacks on the remedy. A majority of the contemporary U.S. Supreme Court has held that because of the “substantial social costs” exacted by exclusion, it should be the “last resort” rather than the “first impulse.” As the primary engine of police regulation and remedies for violations is relegated to the “last resort,” the question becomes—what should be the new model for police regulation and remedies for violations?

A. The Search for Alternatives and the Potential of Regulation by Information

In recent jurisprudence, the growing distaste for exclusion as a remedy has resulted in decisions to offer no remedy at all. In Herring v. United States, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the costs of exclusion were too high to offer the remedy for negligent police error that lead to an unlawful arrest and search incident to the arrest. Currently the Court is split as to whether the exclusionary rule remains necessary to effectuate the protections of the Fourth Amendment in light of the wider availability of § 1983 relief. In Herring v. United States, Justice Ginsburg in dissent, joined by Justices Breyer, Stevens, and Souter, underscored that she adhered to the view in Mapp v. Ohio that the exclusionary rule “is often the only remedy effective to redress a Fourth Amendment violation.” The makeup of

190. Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591.
191. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 702 (no remedy for wrongful arrest and search incident to arrest); Hudson, 547 U.S. at 594 (no remedy for knock-and-announce violation prior to entry into home).
192. 129 S. Ct. 695.
193. Id. at 702.
194. Compare Hudson, 547 U.S. at 597–98 (writing that § 1983 suits are now a more potent remedy than in the days when the Court extended the exclusionary rule to the states for lack of a viable alternative remedy to effectuate Fourth Amendment protections), with id. at 609 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that § 1983 suits remain inadequate as an alternative remedy to deter rights violations).
the Court has changed since the days of Mapp, however, so that the more “majestic conception” of the purpose of the exclusionary rule,\(^\text{196}\) which launched turning-point cases for police regulation such as Mapp, is now relegated to dissents protesting erosion of past commitments.\(^\text{197}\)

As the exclusionary rule falls out of favor with the contemporary Court, criminal procedure doctrine and practice has been in search of an alternate remedial and regulatory approach.\(^\text{198}\) The main alternatives are damages schemes of varying degrees of refinement.\(^\text{199}\) Constitutional criminal procedure doctrine, however, has shown great concern over the potential for damages to overdeter and chill vigorous policing because officers will ease up on the job rather than face individual liability.\(^\text{200}\) Indeed, compared to the numerous criminal cases where law has been clarified by defendants seeking exclusion of evidence, civil cases presenting criminal procedure questions remain rare. Professor Donald Dripps has observed that only four damage actions against police have led to substantive Fourth Amendment decisions by the Court, laying aside a small cluster of cases on the execution of search warrants.\(^\text{201}\)

Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Pearson v. Callahan does not suggest a Court hospitable to rendering damages more readily available any time soon. As discussed, Pearson makes it easier to dismiss civil rights suits against officers and harder for clearly established law to crystallize because courts no longer have to first indicate whether there has been a constitutional violation.\(^\text{202}\) In practice, therefore, damages will probably remain a rarely viable remedy for

\(^{196}\) Id. (quoting Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 18 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).

\(^{197}\) See, e.g., id. (recalling “a more majestic conception” of the Fourth Amendment and its adjunct, the exclusionary rule) and expressing concern about its erosion (quoting Evans, 514 U.S. at 18 (Stevens, J., dissenting)); United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 763, 769–70 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (lamenting the majority’s decision declining to apply the exclusionary rule and neglect of the larger values served by the rule); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 356 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (deploring “downgrading” of the exclusionary rule).

\(^{198}\) See, e.g., Ronald J. Rychlak, Replacing the Exclusionary Rule: Fourth Amendment Violations As Direct Criminal Contempt, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 241, 241–42 (2010) (observing that now that a majority of justices have expressed dissatisfaction with the exclusionary rule and interest in alternative means of deterrence of violations, the question is what remedial regime should be adopted).


\(^{200}\) See, e.g., Jeffries, Jr. & Rutherglen, supra note 88, at 1408 (discussing judicial reluctance to award money damages, particularly for borderline errors, because of fears of “overdeterrence—more precisely, unintended deterrence of legitimate acts”).

\(^{201}\) Dripps, supra note 188, at 209, 235.

\(^{202}\) See supra notes 168–172 and accompanying text.
defendants, and thus insufficient as a supplement to the eroded exclusionary rule.

The search for alternatives can draw fresh insights from innovations outside the judicial arena. Opening up our gaze to examine approaches taken by experts engaging in collaborative institutional reform bargaining expands the model from the usual forced choice of exclusion or damages. This choice is forced by the constriction in the scope of vision of the standard palette of remedies. Analyzing the denouement following consent decrees can expand the field of vision to include panoptic data-driven surveillance approaches, such as automated early-warning systems and audits, to prevent constitutional violations.203

What is striking is that many of the key reforms forged by settlement stipulations, agreements, and consent decrees generate data to penetrate the opacity of police discretion through information-reporting, collection, and dissemination.204 Many of the reforms in cases involving recurrent problems such as excessive force or racial targeting call for police to report uses of force, demographic information, and bases for investigative stops and searches.205 The methods of regulation and remedies are shifting to information and data-driven surveillance of police practices.

The benefits of data collection and dissemination for public deliberation and oversight concerning police tactics are demonstrated by the New York City Police Department’s collection of data on Terry stops and frisks. After mass protests erupted in New York over the fatal shooting of Amadou Diallou, an unarmed West African immigrant in the Bronx, by four police officers in 1999,206 the Center for Constitutional Rights sued the city for data.207 The resulting data-gathering measures have documented the disparate impact of Terry stops, showing, for example, that Black and Latino people were nine times more likely to be stopped than Whites in 2009.208

Another success story crystallized in the years following the 2001 consent decree entered into between the Justice Department and the LAPD.209 The reforms included such data-driven requirements as (1) the

203. See supra notes 1–5; infra notes 206–242.
204. See supra notes 1–9 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 1–9 and accompanying text.
207. Baker, supra note 60.
208. Id.
209. Consent Decree, United States v. City of Los Angeles, No. Civil 00-11769 (C.D. Cal. June
completion of a written or electronic report for each incident where officers use force; (2) performance tracking with automated alerts for every officer; and (3) data-collection regarding investigative stops, including a suspect’s “apparent race, ethnicity, or national origin,” the reason for the stop, and whether a search was conducted. To avoid circumvention of data-collection efforts using “canned” or vague language, the reports are regularly audited. The LAPD case tackling a controversial and deeply troubled department involved heavier judicial intervention, including appointment of a federal monitor to ensure implementation. The reforms have paid off. A recent study found that since 2004 nearly every category of use of force by the LAPD dropped, collectively falling nearly thirty percent. Uses of force against Black and Hispanic suspects declined the most. The decrease in uses of force such as chokeholds and shootings by police is all the more striking because the annual number of arrests and percentage of stops resulting in arrest rose vigorously, suggesting that the vitality of law enforcement did not drain because of the reforms. Moreover, focus groups and surveys indicate increased public confidence in the police and cautious optimism for improved community relations that extended across racial and ethnic groups.

Settlement agreements have pried information from police to penetrate the opacity that shields potential abuse, which has begun an information cascade when it comes to persistent flashpoints such as racial profiling. Successfully securing reform through investigation in one jurisdiction may lead to reforms in other jurisdictions without even need for suit—leading by example and general deterrence. Many states have introduced racial profiling legislation, often requiring data

15, 2001).

210. Id. at paras. 55–69, 104–05.
211. Id. at para. 128.
213. Id. at 33.
214. Id. at 34.
215. Id. at 25, 33, 35; id. at 19 (Officers interviewed expressed worries about de-policing and policing being less proactive in tasks like investigation and arrests because of paperwork burdens and fear of disciplinary action). While subjective accounts are worth considering, the objective measurement of arrests and percentage of stops resulting in arrests suggests caution may not be a bad thing for accuracy.
216. Id. at 2, 44–53.
Some police departments even have begun voluntarily collecting data on the issue after successful suits in other jurisdictions—showing the power of cascades of reform. Data-generation remedies also can help illuminate the impact of implicit biases that can lead to persistent problems such as disproportionate impact in criminal justice policies and racial targeting because of subconscious perceptual distortions, which would otherwise be obscured by opacity.

Monitoring through data generation exerts its own control function. The greater transparency produced by data generation is a technique of police panopticism. When police are subject to the watchful gaze of courts, the public, and self-surveillance, they behave in better conformity with expectations. Data-driven surveillance also can spur self-examination and change. Minneapolis–St. Paul police, for example, adopted a policy of advising motorists of their right to decline consent to a search and set up complaint collection centers after data gathering revealed the disparate impact of stops and searches on minority motorists. In the St. Paul case, the legislature was the entity creatively providing incentive to undertake data-driven surveillance by offering

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218. Id. at 273.


220. See FOUCAULT, supra note 46, at 201–02 (developing, as a metaphor for control, the notion of panoptic prison in which prisoners arrayed in transparent cells self-police).

221. See supra notes 44–48 and accompanying text for applying panoptic insights to policing.

222. Heron Marquez Estrada, Focus of Profiling Shifts from St. Paul: Minneapolis Officials Say They’ll Soon Reveal New Plans for Traffic Stops and Searches, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., June 22, 2001, at A1; David Shaffer & Heron Marquez Estrada, St. Paul Police Search Black, Hispanic Drivers at Higher Rate, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Jan. 10, 2001, at A1.
money for video cameras in police cars if agencies agreed to gather data. Thus, legislatures as well as civil rights litigators can be catalysts for creatively and cooperatively triggering data-driven methods to prevent undesirable conduct.

**B. Optimizing Police Panopticism**

The lessons of experience from implementing consent decrees can inform better design to optimize the strategy of police panopticism. An important lesson of experience is that generalized data-gathering regarding problems such as racial disparities is not enough to steer behavior without finer-grained surveillance. There is a difference between data-driven surveillance of police conduct and amassing more data of disparities. We have ample data and recurrent reports of disparities in criminal justice at the national, state, and local levels. What we need is smarter surveillance of the conduct that can lead to problems such as disparities in who is targeted for investigative stops and seizures or the use of excessive force.

Effective data-driven surveillance calls for finer-grained information regarding specific actor conduct. Finer-grained data-generation surveillance better responds to the frequent lament that the “low visibility” of line-level law enforcement officers renders effective oversight difficult. Indeed, the lessons of implementing effective reform following earlier consent decrees show the need for such finer-grained data. An example is the NAACP and ACLU’s pioneering litigation over racial profiling in Maryland in the 1990s, which resulted in an earlier form of consent decree. The consent decree involved an agreement that police collect data on the race of people stopped and

223. Shaffer & Estrada, supra note 222, at A1.


searched in traffic incidents, make the process of filing complaints more user-friendly, and implement better measures to investigate complaints.\textsuperscript{227} The measures were adopted to redress “an alleged pattern of racially discriminatory stops, detentions and searches of minority motorists traveling on I-95 in the state of Maryland.”\textsuperscript{228}

Five years after these reforms, data in 2008 showed similar disparities in searches of minority motorists compared to White motorists as in 2002, the year immediately preceding entry into the consent decree and implementation of its reforms.\textsuperscript{229} By 2008, litigators had the insights of experience to draw upon in seeking more effective information-based regulation and remedies. NAACP and ACLU litigators went back to court and sued for finer-grained information to effectuate enforcement of the agreement.\textsuperscript{230} In 2010, the organizations successfully secured a court order requiring release of approximately ten thousand documents pertaining to racial profiling complaints against officers that the Maryland Department of Police had tried to shield against release as personnel records.\textsuperscript{231}

Of course, in the information age, we have smarter ways of data-based surveillance than sorting through boxes of ten thousand documents. The evolution in the nature of collaboratively designed reform over the years of experience with structural reform bargaining have yielded examples of how to better regulate police through smarter data-driven surveillance. Examples of reform by surveillance range from important low-technology changes, such as collecting information on people stopped, to sophisticated computerized systems for analyzing complaints data and potential red-flag patterns.\textsuperscript{232}

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the greatest advances in the nature of reforms designed have occurred in settlements extracted by leveraging the power, authority, and prestige of the Justice Department under § 14141.\textsuperscript{233} John C. Jeffries, Jr., and Scott Rutherglen have aptly argued

\textsuperscript{227} See id.


\textsuperscript{229} ACLU, Maryland Press Release, supra note 226.


\textsuperscript{231} Id.

\textsuperscript{232} See infra notes 238–242 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{233} For example, Pittsburgh police must file a written report after each traffic stop that records the race of people stopped, whether the stop escalated to a search, and whether searches yielded any contraband or other evidence pursuant to a consent decree. Consent Decree at paras. 16-17, United States v. Pittsburgh, Case No. Civil 97-0354 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2002).
that one of the great virtues of Justice Department-initiated structural reform is the “political endorsement of the need for structural relief” and the accountability of government officials.\textsuperscript{234}

Another important virtue of Justice Department structural reform bargaining is the greater equalization in bargaining power when the Justice Department represents the community. Smarter and farther-reaching reforms are more readily exacted by the Justice Department than by private litigants, including even well-organized groups such as the ACLU and NAACP. Contrast, for example, the lengths of litigation the NAACP and ACLU had to pursue to obtain racial profiling complaints from the Maryland State Police with the readiness and ease with which the Justice Department recently extracted sensitive records from the Maricopa County, Arizona, Sheriff’s Department.\textsuperscript{235}

In September 2010, the Justice Department filed a complaint against the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office concerning allegations of a pattern or practice of national origin discrimination and unconstitutional searches and seizures.\textsuperscript{236} Maricopa County opted to settle soon after the filing of the complaint to remove the case to the inactive docket and to stay the proceedings.\textsuperscript{237} As the price for staying the civil rights lawsuit pursuant to the 2011 consent decree, the Justice Department exacted from Maricopa County agreements to:

\begin{itemize}
  \item Release all use of force forms completed and submitted by sheriff’s deputies between September 2008 and March 2009;
  \item Release all documents related to internal affairs investigations concerning allegations of excessive use of force and/or discriminatory policing from 2008 onwards; and
  \item Disclose all current or former personnel recommended for
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{234} Jeffries, Jr. & Rutherglen, supra note 88, at 1421. They argue:

An action brought by federal officials represents a political endorsement of the need for structural relief, usually to remedy pervasive constitutional violations. Furthermore, when the litigation is settled, it serves as an acceptable form of bargaining between governments, outside the ordinary political processes of revenue sharing and legislation but still under political control. . . . Unlike court orders obtained by private plaintiffs, those obtained by federal officials involve some degree of political accountability in the decision to sue and to seek structural relief. The democratic deficit is rapidly resolved when the real attorney general, not a private attorney general, decides to sue.

\textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{235} See supra notes 227–231.

\textsuperscript{236} Complaint at 6, 9, United States v. Maricopa County, Ariz., No. 2:10-cv-01878-GMS (D. Ariz. Sept. 2, 2010); see also Letter from Loretta King to Sheriff Joseph Arpaio, supra note 7 (conveying allegations).

correction, discipline, suspension, or termination because of excessive use of force and/or discriminatory policing from January 1, 2007 onwards. 238

Examining Justice Department consent decrees yields other examples of innovations in refined data-driven surveillance that afford finer-grained and more effective monitoring than mere data collection. For example, the Justice Department’s 2009 consent decree with the U.S. Virgin Islands Police Department (VIPD) requires the development and implementation of a risk management system to collect and record:

a. all uses of force;
b. canine bite ratios;
c. the number of canisters of chemical spray used by officers;
d. all injuries to prisoners;
e. all instances in which force is used and a subject is charged with “resisting arrest,” “assault on a police officer,” “disorderly conduct,” or “obstruction of official business;”
f. all critical firearm discharges, both on-duty and off-duty;
g. all complaints (and their dispositions);
h. all criminal proceedings initiated, as well as all civil or administrative claims filed with, and all civil lawsuits served upon, the Territory and its officers, or agents, resulting from VIPD operations or the actions of VIPD personnel;
i. all vehicle pursuits;

j. all incidents involving the pointing of a firearm (if any such reporting is required); and

k. all disciplinary actions taken against officers. 239

The database permits individualized surveillance, requiring the name, badge number, shift, and supervisor of each involved officer. 240 The VIPD is required to design a protocol for the automated system permitting data analysis according to the:

i) number of incidents for each data category by individual officer and by all officers in a unit; ii) average level of activity for each data category by individual officer and by all officers in a unit; and iii) identification of patterns of activity for each data category by individual officer and by all officers in a unit. 241


240. Id. at para. 61.

241. Id. at para. 64.
The consent decree also requires quarterly review of information generated by the automated risk management system.242

Developments in data-driven surveillance thus have moved us beyond the aphorism that mere information is power. Today, the automation of information and data-driven surveillance is power. Some of the most promising reforms to emerge from collaborative structural reform bargaining harness this insight. The examples detailed above demonstrate how reforms from structural reform bargaining do not only generate information, but also use the information to steer behavior and change organizational culture through, for example, early warning systems and intervention protocols.

The reforms framed in consent decrees and memoranda of agreement are not just empty promises—they are leading to changes in practices and spurring cascades of reform.243 Consent decrees are not merely promissory—they are entered as court orders and provide for judicial enforcement in the event of nonperformance by the police department.244 While memoranda of agreement are less formal than consent decrees and do not take the form of a court order, these agreements typically also provide for enforcement in federal court.245 Moreover, a Justice Department announcement regarding the commencement of investigation against a police department can spur voluntary reform even in advance of any findings, as recently demonstrated in Seattle.246

Eight months after the Justice Department announced an investigation into allegations of excessive force and racially biased policing by the Seattle Police Department, Seattle Mayor Mike McGinn announced “a complete revamp of how the department develops professional standards and expectations.”247 Contemplated reforms include such measures as in-

242. Id. at para. 64.
245. See, e.g., Memorandum of Agreement Between the United States & the City of Villa Rica, Ga. 7 para. 4 (Dec. 23, 2003) (“This Agreement is enforceable through specific performance in Federal Court.”); Memorandum of Agreement Between the United States & the Village of Mt. Prospect, Ill. 9 para. 43 (Jan. 22, 2003) (“This Agreement is enforceable through an action for specific performance in federal court.”).
247. Id.; Letter from Mike McGinn, Mayor of Seattle, to Jonathan M. Smith, Chief, Special Litig. Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, and Jenny Durkan, U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Wash.,
car video review in use-of-force investigations; creation of a Force Review Board and Force Investigative Team; a “top-to-bottom review and rewrite” of the Department’s policies and procedures; and creation of a new Professional Standards Section responsible for internal audits, inspections, and researching best practices. Reform spurred by structural reform bargaining in one jurisdiction also can lead other police departments to voluntarily undertake improvements to avert the scrutiny and expense of litigation—extending the power and sweep of self-regulation. Thus, the panoptic power is so efficient that even the threat of scrutiny can spur police department self-regulation.

There are different ways to define and measure impact and success when it comes to institutional reform of police practices. One way to measure impact is progress in the perception, documentation, and revelation of problems previously misunderstood or discounted. For example, reforms requiring reporting of the race of people stopped and searched have revealed that not only are minorities disproportionately stopped and searched, but also that stops and searches of minorities yield lower “hit rates” of evidence or arrests. Because of this data, disproportionate targeting can no longer be dismissed as vague unsubstantiated allegations or justified because of supposed greater probability of criminality. Data collection has revealed that searches of minorities are less efficient and yet police suspicion leads to grossly disproportionate targeting of minorities for stops and searches. Thus, data-driven surveillance may detect patterns revealing potential implicit bias because of subconscious inaccurate stereotyping.

Of course, the ultimate goal and standard of success is reduction of practices of persistent concern, such as reduction of the disproportionate targeting of minorities yielding lower hit rates or excessive force. More studies must be done about the impact of data-driven surveillance on reducing such problems. The focus should be on the newer generation of

Re: United States’ Investigation of the Seattle Police Department – Garrity Protections (Dec. 6, 2011) [hereinafter Letter from Mayor McGinn].

248. Id. at 1–2.
251. Id; see also Baker, supra note 60 (reporting findings revealed from the data collection and release that Blacks and Latinos are nine times more likely than Whites to be stopped by police in 2009).
252. See supra note 219 for some of the abundant and rich literature on implicit bias in policing and other legal contexts involving judgment and decision making.
smarter reforms that involve not just collection of data in the aggregate, but also methods of monitoring and red-flag systems that create greater incentive for individual officers to self-regulate and internalize the external gaze facilitated by data-driven transparency.

CONCLUSION

Structural reform bargaining arising from police practice reform suits is offering a micro-laboratory for experimentation with smarter methods of police regulation and remedial regimes. The insights that are emerging from collaborative agreements demonstrate the power of a third alternative to the traditional exclusionary rule–damages dichotomy for deterring police misconduct. The potential third approach to preventing undesirable police conduct is information-based regulation that leverages data-driven surveillance of police practices. Such data-driven surveillance increasingly entails more than mere data collection and reporting. Rather, the most powerful reforms harness data to detect potentially problematic actors who harm the reputation of the whole department and to prevent future abuses.

A minority of officers can account for a substantial amount of problematic conduct, tarring trust in a majority of hard-working officers. For example, one of the most recently released investigative findings, focusing on excessive force by the Seattle Police Department, noted that:

In any given year, a minority of officers account for a disproportionate amount of use of force incidences. Over the more than two-year period reviewed, 11 officers used force 15 or more times, and 31 officers used force 10 or more times. In 2010, just 20 officers accounted for 18% of all force incidents. Yet, [the Seattle Police Department] has no effective supervisory techniques to better analyze why these officers use force more than other officers, whether their uses of force are necessary, or whether any of these officers would benefit from additional use of force training.253

If not caught and corrected, problematic practices may become structurally entrenched, infecting a department’s institutional culture and undermining community trust.254


254. See, e.g., NEW ORLEANS INVESTIGATION, supra note 22, at V (finding that “too many officers of every rank either do not understand or choose to ignore the boundaries of constitutional
The finding that the Seattle Police Department has engaged in excessive force is a sobering reminder that even police agencies such as the Seattle police, hailed as innovative and responsive to community concerns, must wrestle with problematic conduct. Moreover, the Seattle Police Department’s case illustrates the import of collaborative design and definition of desirable conduct with input from a powerful, expert entity representing countervailing civil rights concerns, such as the Justice Department. Indeed, even before the Justice Department investigation, the Seattle Police Department already had an Early Intervention System—admirable self-monitoring in principle. As the Justice Department found, however, the Seattle police thresholds for triggering red flags are far too high, interventions come far too late, and supervisory review “is superficial at best.” Effective reform and design of data-driven police surveillance is better produced in the crucible of adversarial collaboration—that is, bargaining between entities representing countervailing interests.

Data-driven surveillance measures such as implementing automated early detection systems and requiring audits and supervisory review also changes the structural context of neglect that often is identified as a contributing factor to abuses. Sophisticated systems for preventing abuses by discerning red-flag patterns of behavior have the potential for greater impact in penetrating the opacity of police practices where potential abuses may flourish. The monitoring for problematic patterns of behavior also incentivizes internalization of expectations of proper behavior because deviation is subject to detection through data-driven surveillance. Such surveillance is more effective if designed and conducted from multiple vantages with input from groups representing policing and structurally and culturally entrenched problems with the department that “undermine trust within the very communities whose cooperation the Department most needs”).


256. INVESTIGATION OF THE SEATTLE POLICE, supra note 253, at 22.

257. Id. at 23. For example, a red flag is not triggered and departmental intervention does not occur unless there are seven uses of force in a period of six months or fourteen uses of force in a year. Id. at 22.

258. See, e.g., id. at 5, 15, 18 (finding that lack of supervisory analysis of uses of force, “appalling[ly]” low-quality investigations of citizen complaints, and nonreporting of uses of force by officers contributes to the problem of excessive force); PUERTO RICO INVESTIGATION, supra note 22, at 32 (finding that “[lack of reporting requirements and objective supervisory review]” and “[i]nadequate systems to review critical incidents” as well as “[c]ondoned fear and violence by tactical units” contribute to longstanding problems with excessive force).
countervailing civil liberties concerns as well as expert insider police. Statutory avenues such as § 14141, Title VI, § 3789d, and § 1983 have become more viable avenues to penetrate police opacity and introduce data-driven surveillance. Designing a panopticon for police is an ambitious project with important implications that call for collaboration across institutions—including formal adversaries. Nonjudicial institutions outside the constraints of formal constitutional criminal procedure doctrine have important expertise to offer in the design of the future of police regulation and remedies for social harms.