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FOREVER EVERGREEN: AMENDING THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION FOR A HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT

Devra R. Cohen

Abstract: Pollution poses an ongoing threat to the health and welfare of the citizens of Washington State. Air pollution costs Washington approximately $190 million per year, ocean acidification is contributing to oyster die-offs, and approximately 677,000 acres of land are affected by area-wide soil contamination. Although Washington has aspirational environmental legislation and a narrowly defined duty under article XVII of the Washington State Constitution to protect navigable waters, their shores and tidelands, the State needs to do more if its citizens—present and future—are going to enjoy a healthy environment. Amending the Washington State Constitution to include an extended public trust doctrine that provides broad environmental protection and incorporates an affirmative right to a healthy environment will add a layer of environmental protection and provide the impetus for politically difficult environmental action. Amending the State Constitution to include a positive right to a healthy environment would not be a radical departure from current policy, and is necessary to safeguard the environment for present and future generations.

INTRODUCTION

Washington State, along with the rest of the world, is facing and will continue to face significant environmental challenges. Air pollution, soil pollution, and climate change all pose serious threats to the state’s natural environment, economy, and citizens’ health. To tackle these threats, this Comment argues for an amendment to the Washington State Constitution that enshrines a broad public trust duty and provides a positive right1 to a healthy environment. To protect Washingtonians’ health and welfare, and to ensure a healthy environment for generations to come, the Washington State Constitution should be amended to include the following provision:

(a) The state of Washington is the trustee of Washington’s natural environment, including the air, water, soil, and ocean shores. It is one of the principal duties of the state to protect,

preserve, and restore the state’s natural environment for the current generation and for generations to come. Those residing within Washington’s borders, now and in the future, have a positive right to live in and enjoy a healthy environment.

(b) This amendment shall take full effect immediately upon the approval and ratification by the qualified voters. The legislature may take action to carry out the purposes of this section, but no such action shall be required for this section to become effective.2

This language provides a positive right to a healthy environment. Like the right to education,3 this proposed language would allow citizens to sue the government4 to declare and enforce their rights,5 and would encourage both the legislature and the courts to prioritize environmental protection.6 The provision is meant to encompass all aspects of the natural environment—including those, like air and water, that are affected by climate change—and enshrine a broad public trust duty in the State Constitution.7 Although adding such an amendment may seem

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2. A proposed joint resolution to introduce this amendment is attached as Appendix A.

3. WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (“It is the paramount duty of the state to make ample provision for the education of all children residing within its borders, without distinction or preference on account of race, color, caste, or sex.”).

4. Individuals can bring constitutional challenges. See, e.g., McCleary v. State, 173 Wash. 2d 447, 269 P.3d 227 (2012) (enforcing the right to amply funded education found in article IX, section 1 of the Washington State Constitution). Even if sovereign immunity were to be an issue, the legislature could waive that immunity, as it has in the tort context. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.92.090 (2014) (“The state of Washington, whether acting in its governmental or proprietary capacity, shall be liable for damages arising out of its tortious conduct to the same extent as if it were a private person or corporation.”). For an in-depth examination of Washington’s waiver of sovereign immunity for tortious conduct, see generally Michael Tardif & Rob McKenna, Washington State’s 45-Year Experiment in Governmental Liability, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1 (2005); Debra L. Stephens & Bryan P. Harnetiaux, The Value of Government Tort Liability: Washington State’s Journey from Immunity to Accountability, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 35 (2006).

5. When a plaintiff alleges that the state has violated a constitutional provision, Washington courts have authority to declare the state action unconstitutional. See Svitak ex rel. Svitak v. State, No. 69710-2-I, 2013 WL 6632124, at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 16, 2013) (implying that had the plaintiff “identif[ied] a constitutional basis from which [the court] could find the State’s inaction to be unconstitutional” the court could have addressed the issue pursuant to its authority under RCW 7.24.010). Revised Code of Washington 7.24.010 provides the court with the “power to declare rights, status and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.” WASH. REV. CODE § 7.24.010 (2014). See generally McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d at 477, 269 P.3d at 227 (illustrating that there is a constitutional basis for enforcement of the right to amply funded education).

6. See infra Part II.B.

7. The concept of amending state constitutions to include a public trust duty is not new. See, e.g., Mary Christina Wood, Advancing the Sovereign Trust of Government to Safeguard the Environment for Present and Future Generations (Part I): Ecological Realism and the Need for a Paradigm Shift, 39 ENVTL. L. 43, 74 (2009) (recognizing that some state constitutions contain public trust provisions and recommending that states “could amend their constitutions to make the trust duty
radical at first glance, this Comment will demonstrate that it is not radical and that it is necessary.

This Comment proceeds in two parts. Part I shows that adding this amendment to the Washington State Constitution would not be a radical departure from Washington’s history, current policy, existing constitutional structure, and national and international trends. First, this Part provides an overview of the public trust doctrine—both generally and in Washington specifically. As this Comment illustrates, Washington’s public trust doctrine is well established, in line with the doctrine’s ancient origins and its modern interpretation in other states, and that the traditional, narrow public trust doctrine is already enshrined in article XVII, section 1 of the Washington State Constitution. This Comment then explains how there is room for expansion of Washington’s common law public trust doctrine. As Part I demonstrates, codifying a broad public trust duty in a constitutional amendment would not be a radical leap from existing Washington common law.

Part I continues with a discussion of current Washington laws that exemplify an existing commitment to the environment. It then discusses other constitutionally protected positive rights, demonstrating that including one for the environment would not be unprecedented, and would allow the State Constitution to reflect Washingtonians’ values. This Part concludes with an overview of the national and international scene. In addition to providing a broad overview of the frequency of constitutional environmental protection provisions, this Part provides six concrete examples—three national and three international—of how this right has been utilized elsewhere to protect the environment and tackle major environmental challenges.

8. See infra Part I.
9. See infra Part II.
10. See infra Part I.A.
11. See infra Part I.B.
13. Id.
15. See infra Part I.C. This Part highlights some of the aspirational language the Washington State Legislature has adopted in its environmental legislation. Part II.A, infra, will show that these aspirations have not been met.
16. See infra Part I.D.
17. See infra Part I.E.
18. See infra Parts I.E.1.a–c.
19. See infra Parts I.E.2.a–c.
While Part I lays the groundwork for why the proposed amendment would not be a radical step, Part II explains why such an amendment is necessary to protect the health and welfare of Washingtonians. This Part first explores some of Washington’s existing environmental problems, including air, water, and land/soil pollution. It then details why a constitutional amendment—not stronger legislation or the common law—is necessary to address these, and other, environmental challenges.

The Author freely admits that amending the State Constitution will not immediately solve all environmental problems. However, as this Comment demonstrates, including the right to a healthy environment in the State Constitution is not radical. It is, however, a necessary first step to ensure that the people, the courts, and the legislature have the tools to tackle today’s worst environmental problems.

I. AMENDING THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION WOULD NOT BE A RADICAL STEP

Amending the Washington State Constitution to include a positive right to a healthy environment that is a codification of a broad public trust duty is not a radical departure from existing Washington law and policy. Washington’s long history with the public trust doctrine, its inclusion of the traditional doctrine in its Constitution, and the possibility of common law expansion of the doctrine indicate that the state is ready to accept a broader public trust doctrine. Current Washington law, which demonstrates an ethos of environmental protectionism, and a state constitution, which traditionally reflects the people’s mores, both indicate that including a strong environmental provision in the Constitution would be in line with Washingtonians’ convictions. Finally, amending the State Constitution would be consistent with both national and international trends of including strong, positive environmental protections directly in states’

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22. See infra Part II.A.3.
23. See infra Part II.B.
25. Id.
27. See infra Part I.C.
28. See infra Part I.D.
29. See infra Parts I.C & D.
constitutions.  

A. The Deep Roots of the Public Trust Doctrine

It has long been recognized that the government has a duty to keep and protect certain resources for the public at large. This duty, known as the public trust doctrine, has its roots in Roman law. The Institutes of Justinian declared that certain resources, namely the air, sea, seashore, and running water, were “by natural law common to all.” This declaration is recognized as Ancient Rome’s public trust doctrine. This expansive public trust doctrine was also present in medieval European law. Eleventh-century French law stated that certain resources, including “the public highways and byways, running water and springs, meadows, pastures, forests, heaths and rocks” were open to use by all people, and were not owned or exclusively used by lords. Professor Sax, the founding father of the modern public trust doctrine, explained that in medieval Europe it was logical for the common places—like the forests and pastures—to be held for the public, since their public use was the basis of the feudal economy. This medieval customary law incorporated the developed expectations of the community into the ultimate determination of rights and uses. Determinations based on the public trust doctrine were allowed to consider the stability of society along with formalities like title ownership.

The doctrine has persevered through time and place, and was recognized in England and the United States after independence. In

30. See infra Part I.E.
33. Rettkowski, 122 Wash. 2d at 239, 858 P.2d at 243 (Guy, J., dissenting) (quoting J. INST. 2.1.1 (J. Moyle trans., 1896)).
34. Id.
36. Id. (quoting M. BLOCH, FRENCH RURAL HISTORY 183 (1966)).
38. Sax, supra note 35, at 189.
39. Id. at 192.
40. Id. “The central idea of the public trust is preventing the destabilizing disappointment of expectations held in common but without formal recognition such as title.” Id. at 188.
England, the doctrine established that the Crown held the beds of navigable waters in an unbreakable trust for the people so that they might enjoy commerce, navigation, and the fisheries. 41 The United States 42 inherited the public trust doctrine from the English Crown upon independence. 43 Under the doctrine, states hold the title to navigable waters, to the lands under navigable waters, and to land under tideways, in trust for the people of the state. 43 The trust ensures that the people “may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein freed from the obstruction or interference of private parties.” 45 States may grant parcels of this submerged protected land for building structures like docks and wharves, which aid commerce, so long as those parcels, once built upon, “do not substantially impair the public interest in the lands and waters remaining.” 46 The states have the power to define the boundaries of public trust protection within their borders. 47 However, at no point may a state generally abdicate its control over water or land held in trust such that it is completely outside of state control and no longer beneficial for the general public. 48

The modern incarnation of the public trust doctrine in the United


42. An in-depth and detailed view of the public trust doctrine within the United States more broadly is beyond the scope of this Comment. For a more detailed look at the public trust doctrine in the United States, see generally, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig, Adapting to Climate Change: The Potential Role of State Common-Law Public Trust Doctrines, 34 VT. L. REV. 781 (2010) (describing the contours of the public trust doctrine in the United States).

43. Johnson, supra note 41, at 674.

44. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892); see also Craig, supra note 42, at 801–02 (“The original 13 states acquired title to beds and banks underlying tidal and, as would later be confirmed, navigable-in-fact, nontidal waters as a matter of their conquest of England. All other states acquired such ownership by operation of the Equal Footing Doctrine, under which all subsequent states were admitted with the same rights as the original 13.” (footnotes omitted)).


46. Id.

47. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 475 (1988) (stating that “it has been long established that the individual States have the authority to define the limits of the lands held in public trust”); see also, e.g., Patrick Redmond, The Public Trust in Wildlife: Two Steps Forward, Two Steps Back, 49 NAT. RESOURCES J. 249, 258 (2009) (noting that the Supreme Court in Phillips Petroleum Co. “acknowledged that the states are free to narrow or expand the zone of public trust protection”).

48. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 452–53 (“The State can no more abdicate its trust over property in which the whole people are interested, like navigable waters and soils under them, so as to leave them entirely under the use and control of private parties, except in the instance of parcels mentioned for the improvement of the navigation and use of the waters, or when parcels can be disposed of without impairment of the public interest in what remains, than it can abdicate its police powers in the administration of government and the preservation of the peace.”).
States collects various common law rules to protect certain natural resources for the people. The core of the doctrine is that the state cannot sell or give up its control of navigable waters, their beds and tidelands ("public trust resources"). The state controls these resources for the benefit of the people, and, "in its strongest formulations, has an affirmative duty to exercise 'continuing supervision' over their management to preserve them as fully as possible."  

In the United States, the federal government does not determine the bounds of the public trust doctrine. However, some elements are common amongst the states. Throughout the United States, the public trust doctrine protects salt and fresh waters that are navigable-in-fact, the beds of those waters, and the shoreland up to the high tide/water mark. Outside of this traditional scope of the public trust doctrine, each state has the power to expand or contract the protection of the public trust doctrine within its own borders. This power is limited, however, by the states’ inability to fully abrogate state control over public trust land.

Although the public trust doctrine traditionally protects three rights (navigation, commerce, and fisheries), some states have expanded their public trust doctrine beyond these traditional geographic and/or purpose-based boundaries. At a basic level, many western states’ public trust doctrines encompass waters that are not navigable-in-fact for commercial vessels, but are navigable-in-fact for small personal pleasure crafts. Some states have gone even further, giving greater strength and breadth to the public trust doctrine. For example, when dealing with water extraction in California, the public trust doctrine applies to non-


50. Redmond, supra note 47, at 250; Wood, supra note 7, at 80 (2009) (noting that the traditional public trust resources are "navigable waters and soils under them" but arguing that these resources "were part of a broader category of property imbued with the public trust").

51. Redmond, supra note 47, at 250 (footnote omitted).

52. For a more complete explanation of navigable-in-fact see Johnson, supra note 41, at 677–78.

53. Id. at 678.

54. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 475 (1988); see also Redmond, supra note 47, at 258.


57. For a more detailed overview of the contours of the public trust doctrine throughout different states in the United States, see generally Craig, supra note 42; Klass, supra note 31.

58. Johnson, supra note 41, at 681.

59. For additional examples other than those provided in this section, see id. at 681–83.
navigable tributaries of navigable waters. Massachusetts’ public trust doctrine covers state parks and swamps, regardless of whether they are connected to navigable waters. Similarly, in New York, the public trust extends to parkland, and prohibits the use of parkland for even environmentally friendly activities like recycling and composting.

In Pennsylvania, the public trust doctrine is enshrined in the Commonwealth’s Constitution and is one of the strongest and broadest public trust doctrines in the country. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has stated that the public trust doctrine “establishes the Commonwealth’s duties with respect to Pennsylvania’s commonly-owned public natural resources, which are both negative (i.e., prohibitory) and affirmative (i.e., implicating enactment of legislation and regulations).” These so-called negative rights impose upon Pennsylvania “a duty to refrain from permitting or encouraging the degradation, diminution, or depletion of public natural resources, whether . . . through direct state action . . . [or] because of the state’s failure to restrain the actions of private parties.” In addition to the prohibition on state conduct, Pennsylvania’s public trust doctrine also imposes a positive duty on the Commonwealth “to act affirmatively to protect the environment, via legislative action.” Combined, the public trust doctrine imposes upon Pennsylvania “a duty to prevent and remedy the degradation, diminution, or depletion of [Pennsylvania’s] public

60. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court of Alpine Cnty., 658 P.2d 709, 721 (Cal. 1983) (Mono Lake case holding that the public trust doctrine applies to “diversion of nonnavigable tributaries” to protect navigable waters); see also Johnson, supra note 41, at 681 (“The California court made it clear that ‘if the public trust doctrine applies to constrain fills which destroy navigation and other public trust uses in navigable waters, it should equally apply to constrain the extraction of water that destroys navigation and other public interests. Both actions result in the same damage to the public interest.’” (emphasis in original) (quoting Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P. 2d at 720)); Redmond, supra note 47, at 258–59.


62. Id. (citing Robbins v. Dep’t of Pub. Works, 244 N.E.2d 577 (Mass. 1969)).

63. Id.


65. The third clause of section 27 of the Declaration of Rights in the Pennsylvania Constitution states, “As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.” Pa. Const. art. 1, § 27. This provision “establishes the public trust doctrine with respect to these natural resources (the corpus of the trust), and designates ‘the Commonwealth’ as trustee and the people as the named beneficiaries.” Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 956 (Pa. 2013). Pennsylvania’s constitutional provision will be discussed at greater length infra Part I.E.1.c.


67. Id. at 957.

68. Id. at 958.
natural resources. As a fiduciary, the Commonwealth has a duty to act toward the corpus of the trust—the public natural resources—with prudence, loyalty, and impartiality.” Pennsylvania must uphold its fiduciary duty to protect and safeguard the Commonwealth’s natural resources for both the present and future generations. It must consider both short- and long-term environmental impacts of proposed action—or inaction—and ensure that future generations have “equal access” to the Commonwealth’s natural resources. Pennsylvania’s clear articulation of its expansive and duty-imposing public trust doctrine is a prime example of how states may extend their public trust doctrine beyond the traditional protection of navigable waters, their beds, and their shorelands.

The public trust doctrine has a long and well-accepted history. It has been part of American law since independence. Although it is traditionally applicable only to navigable waters, their beds and tidelands, each state can determine the bounds of its public trust doctrine. Indeed, many states have expanded the doctrine to include additional lands and waters, giving state protection to great swaths of the environment.

B. The Public Trust Doctrine: Washington’s Duty to Its Current and Future Citizens

Washington’s adoption, interpretation, and application of the public trust doctrine are in line with the doctrine’s ancient origins and modern interpretation elsewhere in the United States. The public trust doctrine has been recognized in Washington since at least 1901. The doctrine has, from its inception, been used to protect the water resources for public purposes. Safeguarding natural resources for citizens is a concept that is not new—not for Washington, and not in the law more broadly.

This Section describes the history and evolution of the public trust doctrine in Washington. It then shows how Washington’s acceptance of

69. Id. at 957.
70. Id. at 959.
71. Id.
72. See Johnson, supra note 41, at 676–78.
74. Caminiti v. Boyle, 107 Wash. 2d 662, 667 & n.7, 732 P.2d 989, 993 & n.7 (1987); Bodi, supra note 73, at 646.
75. See Klass, supra note 31, at 702.
the public trust doctrine is consistent with the doctrine’s historic roots and with its acceptance elsewhere in the United States. This section wraps up with a discussion of the traditional public trust doctrine that is codified in article XVII, section 1 of the Washington State Constitution, and a discussion of how Washington’s common law public trust doctrine has room for expansion.

1. Washington’s Public Trust Doctrine

Washington has a long history of accepting the public trust doctrine: it has been recognized in the state for over a century. In 1901, in *City of New Whatcom v. Fairhaven Land Co.*, the Washington State Supreme Court explained the essential characteristics of the State’s ownership of navigable waters, their beds, and the tidelands, which passed to the states from the English Crown after the American Revolution:

The title to lands under tide waters in the sea, arms, and inlets thereof, and in tidal rivers . . . was, by the common law, deemed to be vested in the king, as a public trust, to subserve and protect the public right to use them as a common highway for commerce, trade, and intercourse. The king, by virtue of his proprietary interest, could grant the soil so that it should become private property; but his grant was subject to the paramount right of the public use of navigable waters, which he could neither destroy nor abridge. In every such grant there was an implied reservation of the public right.

The traditional, limited doctrine was codified in 1889 in article XVII, section 1 of the State Constitution. That section provides:

The [S]tate of Washington asserts its ownership to the beds and shores of all navigable waters in the state up to and including the line of ordinary high tide, in waters where the tide ebbs and flows, and up to and including the line of ordinary high water within the banks of all navigable rivers and lakes: Provided, that this section shall not be construed so as to debar any person from asserting his claim to vested rights in the courts of the state.

The Washington State Supreme Court has held repeatedly that under article XVII, section 1, Washington may sell or otherwise dispose of the

76. 24 Wash. 493, 64 P. 735 (1901).
77. Id. at 499, 64 P. at 737.
tidelands and shorelands to private individuals. However, even private ownership of tidelands and shorelands is subject to “the paramount public right of navigation and the fishery.” The Court has defined navigable waters to include those that can be used for boats, modes of water transportation, and floating logs.

The Washington State Supreme Court revisited the public trust doctrine in 1969 in Wilbour v. Gallagher. In Wilbour, a class action was brought against landowners who had filled in a portion of their land that had previously been artificially submerged for a portion of the year by closing a dam, which raised the level of navigable Lake Chelan. The Court found that for the thirty-five years prior to the defendants filling in their land, that land—when submerged—was openly used by the public “for fishing, boating, swimming and for general recreational use.” The Court held that the submerged land was subject to the public right of navigation and the incidental public rights of fishing and recreation. The defendants could not infringe on the public’s use of the navigable water, and thus the Court ordered that the fill be removed. However, when the land was not submerged, the Court held that the landowners could “keep trespassers off their land, and may do with the land as they wish[ed] consistent with the right of navigation when it is submerged.” The Court treated the artificially fluctuating waters the same as it would have treated naturally fluctuating waters: when the land is submerged, the public can exercise its right to utilize the waters; when the land is not submerged, the private owners’ rights prevail and the public does not have the right to access that land.

Wilbour expanded the public trust doctrine in Washington in two

81. Id. at 667, 732 P.2d at 993.
82. See Dawson v. McMillan, 34 Wash. 269, 274, 75 P. 807, 809 (1904); Craig, supra note 42, at 817.
84. Id. at 309, 462 P.2d at 234–35.
85. Id. at 312, 462 P.2d at 236.
86. Id. at 316, 462 P.2d at 239.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 315, 462 P.2d at 238 (“[I]n the situation of a naturally varying water level, the respective rights of the public and of the owners of the periodically submerged lands are dependent upon the level of the water. As the level rises, the rights of the public to use the water increase since the area of water increases; correspondingly, the rights of the landowners decrease since they cannot use their property in such a manner as to interfere with the expanded public rights. As the level and the area of the water decreases, the rights of the public decrease and the rights of the landowners increase as the waters drain off their land, again giving them the right to exclusive possession until their lands are again submerged.”).
First, it established that even if water level fluctuates, and even if that fluctuation is artificial, the public right to use navigable waters was paramount. Second, the Court defined the “incidental rights of fishing, boating, swimming, water skiing, and other related recreational purposes” as “corollary to the right of navigation and the use of public waters.” The public can exercise these corollary rights in the same way it may exercise its right of navigation. For determining the scope of public use for purposes of the public trust doctrine, there is no distinction between the right of navigation and the incidental rights of recreation and fishing.

In 1987, the Washington State Supreme Court provided the “classic exposition” of the state’s modern public trust doctrine in Caminiti v. Boyle. In Caminiti, the Court explained that “the state’s ownership of tidelands and shorelands is . . . comprised of two distinct aspects.” The first—jus privatum (private property interest)—provides that, “[a]s owner, the state holds full proprietary rights in tidelands and shorelands and has fee simple title to such lands. Thus, the state may convey title to tidelands and shorelands.” The second—jus publicum (public authority interest)—is the “principle that the public has an overriding interest in navigable waterways and [t]he lands under them.” Jus publicum is the public trust doctrine, and it constrains the state in what it may and may not do. The Court explained: “[t]he state can no more convey or give away this jus publicum interest than it can ‘abdicate its police powers in the administration of government and the preservation of the peace.’

In Washington, the jus publicum right includes navigation and fishery, as well as the right to other incidental recreational purposes. Under its jus publicum obligations, the state holds these lands “in trust for the public,” and “[i]t is this principle which is referred to as the ‘public trust

90. Bodi, supra note 73, at 647.
91. Wilbour, 77 Wash. 2d at 315–16, 462 P.2d at 238 (“[T]he public has the right to go where the navigable waters go, even though the navigable waters lie over privately owned lands.”); see also Bodi, supra note 73, at 647.
92. Wilbour, 77 Wash. 2d at 316, 462 P.2d at 239; see also Bodi, supra note 73, at 647.
93. Wilbour, 77 Wash. 2d at 316, 462 P.2d at 239.
94. Redmond, supra note 47, at 296.
96. Id. at 668, 732 P.2d at 993.
97. Id. The emphasis of this Comment is on the second aspect of ownership, jus publicum, and thus will not further discuss jus privatum.
98. Id. at 668, 732 P.2d at 994.
99. Id. at 669, 732 P.2d at 994.
100. Id. (quoting Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892)).
doctrine,’’ which “has always existed in the State of Washington.” 102

The same year that the Washington State Supreme Court decided *Caminiti*, it also ruled on *Orion Corp. v. State*. 103 In *Orion Corp.*, the Court reaffirmed that the public trust doctrine does, and has always, existed in Washington, and that the doctrine “requires the state to maintain its dominion in trust for the people.” 104 In addition, the Court reiterated that where there is a public trust issue—for example, the sale of tidelands, which affects the people’s need to access navigable waters—the right of fishery and navigation is the “paramount public right” that the State must protect. 105 The Court also added a new layer to the public trust doctrine, describing it as a doctrine that “resembles ‘a covenant running with the land (or lake or marsh or shore) for the benefit of the public and the land’s dependent wildlife.’” 106 Importantly, the Court explicitly refused to “decide the total scope of the doctrine,” 107 indicating that the doctrine in Washington is still developing and growing. 108

Eleven years after *Caminiti* and *Orion Corp.*, the Court took another step toward expanding the public trust doctrine in *Weden v. San Juan County*. 109 After finding that noise and traffic from personal watercrafts threatened birds and mammals throughout San Juan County, and conflicted with other traditional uses of the shoreline, the county banned the use of personal watercrafts (PWCs). 110 The Court upheld this ordinance. 111 In response to a public trust challenge to the ordinance, the Court held that, although the ordinance did prohibit a specific form of recreation, the waters were still open to the public, including PWC owners who used a different form of recreation. 112 The Court defined the public trust doctrine as protecting “public ownership interests in certain uses of navigable waters and underlying lands, including navigation, commerce, fisheries, recreation, and environmental quality.” 113 The

102. Id. at 669–70, 732 P.2d at 994.
104. Id. at 639, 747 P.2d at 1072.
105. Id. at 640, 747 P.2d at 1072.
106. Id. at 640, 747 P.2d at 1072–73 (quoting Reed, *The Public Trust Doctrine: Is It Amphibious?*, 1 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 107, 118 (1986)).
107. Id. at 641, 747 P.2d at 1073.
108. See Bodi, supra note 73, at 650.
110. Id. at 685–88, 958 P.2d at 276–78.
111. Id. at 709, 958 P.2d at 288.
112. Id. at 699, 958 P.2d at 283–84.
Court concluded, “it would be an odd use of the public trust doctrine to sanction an activity that actually harms and damages the waters and wildlife of this State.” ¹¹⁴ The court seemingly assumed that the protection of wildlife fell within the scope of Washington’s public trust doctrine¹¹⁵ and stated that the public trust doctrine includes protection of environmental quality.¹¹⁶ This common law extension of the doctrine has had practical effects. After Weden, the Shoreline Hearings Board,¹¹⁷ which reviews permits under the Shoreline Management Act,¹¹⁸ indicated that “the public interest in access to and enjoyment of the shoreline ‘necessarily includes a component of environmental and habitat protection.’”¹¹⁹

Of course, the Court has recognized limitations on the public trust doctrine. In Rettkowski v. Department of Ecology,¹²⁰ the Washington State Supreme Court declined to invoke the public trust doctrine in deciding whether the Department of Ecology had authority to issue cease-and-desist orders to prohibit irrigation farmers from making groundwater withdrawals.¹²¹ Although the Court admitted that the public trust doctrine is “partially encapsulated” in article XVII, section 1 of the State Constitution, it declined to apply the doctrine to the issues in Rettkowski for two reasons.¹²² First, because the court had never extended the public trust doctrine to apply to ground water or non-navigable waters.¹²³ Second, because the state—not any particular state (1992)).

¹¹⁴. Id. at 700, 958 P.2d at 284 (emphasis added).
¹¹⁵. Redmond, supra note 47, at 298.
¹¹⁶. Weden, 135 Wash. 2d at 698, 958 P.2d at 283 (quoting Johnson et al., supra note 113, at 524).
¹¹⁷. The Shoreline Hearings Board is “invested by the [Shoreline Management Act (SMA)] with authority over permitting reviews under section 90.58.180, [and] has viewed the SMA’s primary mandate as maintaining ‘public use and enjoyment of the shorelines,’ which covers the right to navigation but includes other forms of public access and even visual impacts.” Redmond, supra note 47, at 299 (quoting Ass’n of Wash. Bus. v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, SHB No. 00-037, 2001 WL 1022097, at *9 (Wash. Shorelines Hearings Bd. 2001)). The SMA will be discussed at greater length infra Parts I.C & II.A.2.
¹¹⁸. The Shoreline Management Act was passed in 1971 and was prompted, at least in part, by Wilbour v. Gallagher, 77 Wash. 2d 306, 462 P.2d 232 (1969), and the Court’s “question[ing] the appropriateness of filling and other tideland development absent a state regulatory process.” Bod, supra note 73, at 647.
¹²¹. Id.
¹²². Id. at 232, 858 P.2d at 239.
¹²³. Id. It is important to note that the Court said that it had “never previously interpreted” the doctrine to cover these waters; it did not say that it could never interpret the public trust doctrine to apply to groundwater and non-navigable water. Id. (emphasis added). Indeed, the Court included a
agency—carries the duty established by the public trust doctrine. Later, in *State v. Longshore*, the Washington State Supreme Court held that the public trust doctrine does not protect the public’s right to gather all water-dependent creatures. The doctrine “does not encompass the right to gather naturally occurring clams on private property.” The Court reasoned that, “because of the characteristics of clams, clamming activity is more closely related to ownership of underlying land than to utilization of public waters.” However, even in *Longshore*, the Court reiterated one of the central holdings in *Caminiti*: Although the state can “invest individuals with ownership of tidelands and shorelands,” it can do so only as long as that investment does not interfere with “the paramount public right of navigation and fishery.” Most recently, in *Biggers v. City of Bainbridge Island*, the Court reiterated that the duties imposed by the public trust doctrine as codified in article XVII of the State Constitution are imposed only on the state, and therefore can be utilized only by the state and not by a municipality.

In sum, Washington has a clearly established public trust duty, dating back to at least 1901. This doctrine—at least in its traditional, narrow form—is partially codified in article XVII, section 1 of the State Constitution. The fact that the public trust doctrine is enshrined in the State Constitution has not only allowed the Court to expand the state’s obligations under the public trust doctrine through case law, but also indicates that codifying this broader public trust duty in the Constitution would be consistent with the existing Constitution. Although the Washington State Supreme Court has not defined the outer limits of the doctrine, the Court seems to be expanding public trust protection to the natural resources associated with the state’s navigable waters. The Court’s semi-frequent and relatively contemporary application of the doctrine indicates that it is alive and well, and remains a vibrant, if vulnerable, tool that could be used to further environmental protection.

footnote directly after this statement expressing this sentiment. *Id.* at 232 n.5, 858 P.2d at 239 n.5 ("We similarly do not need to address the scope of the doctrine today."). This point will be addressed in greater detail infra Part I.B.2.

124. *Rettowski*, 122 Wash. 2d at 232, 858 P. 2d at 239.
125. 141 Wash. 2d 414, 5 P.3d 1256 (2000).
126. *Id.* at 429, 5 P.3d at 1263.
127. *Id.* at 428, 5 P.3d at 1263.
128. *Id.* at 427, 5 P.3d at 1263.
129. *Id.* (citing *Caminiti* v. *Boyle*, 107 Wash. 2d 662, 667, 732 P.2d 989, 993 (1987)).
131. *Id.* at 695–96, 169 P.3d at 21–22; see also *Redmond*, *supra* note 47, at 302–03.
132. Aside from the navigable waters and their beds, shorelands, and tidelands protected by
in Washington.

2. **There Is Room for Expansion of Washington’s Common Law Public Trust Doctrine**

The public trust doctrine provides the state with a mechanism to reduce pollution in the state’s waters, and protect the public’s interest “in clean water, environmental quality, fish and wildlife, and recreation.”

Although the traditional doctrine—protecting navigable waters and their attendant lands—is enshrined in the State Constitution, it seems unlikely that the Court would find constitutional public trust protection for resources that are not directly tied to navigable waters and their lands.

That being said, while the Washington State Supreme Court has provided some guidance on the bounds of the public trust doctrine, it has article XVII, any application of the public trust doctrine is based solely on common law. This leaves the doctrine vulnerable to encroachment and erosion by the legislature and the courts. See infra Parts II.B.1–2.


134. Article XVII, section 1 specifically refers to the State’s ownership of “the beds and shores of all navigable waters in the state up to and including the line of ordinary high tide . . . and up to and including the line of ordinary high water within the banks of all navigable rivers and lakes.” WASH. CONST. art XVII, § 1. *Caminiti v. Boyle* specifically referred to this constitutional provision, and cases dealing only with navigable waters and other lands covered by this provision, when that case held that the public trust doctrine had always existed in Washington. 107 Wash. 2d 662, 666–70, 732 P.2d 989, 992–94 (1987). After discussing *Caminiti’s* holding, the Court in *Orion Corp. v. State* also expressly referred to the State’s ownership of tidelands and shorelands as the basis for the application of the public trust doctrine to the tidelands at issue in the case. 109 Wash. 2d 621, 639, 747 P.2d 1062, 1072 (1987) (“Because title in and sovereignty over Washington’s tidelands and shorelands vested in the state upon admission into the Union, the public trust doctrine applies to Orion’s Padilla Bay tidelands.”). The Court also recognized that the State’s public trust duty in tidelands and shorelands was based on the public’s need to access navigable waters. Id. at 640, 747 P.2d at 1073; see also Steven W. Turnbull, Note, *The Public Trust Doctrine: Accommodating the Public Need Within Constitutional Boundaries—Orion Corp. v. State*, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 747 P.2d 1062 (1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1996 (1988), 63 WASH. L. REV. 1087, 1096, 1107 (1988).

In the foundational cases regarding the constitutionally enshrined public trust doctrine, the Court has dealt only with those waters and lands that are protected under article XVII, section 1. It seems unlikely that the Court would hold that the constitutionally enshrined public trust expands beyond those waters and lands specified in article XVII, section 1. See *Svitak ex rel. Svitak v. State*, No. 69710-2-1, 2013 WL 6632124, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 16, 2013). In *Svitak ex rel. Svitak v. State*, the court of appeals dismissed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief that alleged the public trust doctrine created an affirmative duty on the state to protect the atmosphere because, at least in part, “the issue is not justiciable as there is no allegation of violation of a specific statute or constitution.” Id. By finding that there was no allegation of a constitutional violation, the court necessarily did not extend the constitutionally enshrined public trust doctrine to include the atmosphere. Had the court concluded that the constitutional public trust doctrine—outlined in article XVII, section 1—including natural resources like the atmosphere, there would have been a violation of a constitutional provision. Thus it seems likely that any expansion of the public trust doctrine beyond those waters and lands would not be grounded in the Constitution, and would instead necessarily have to be based in common law.
repeatedly refused to explicitly define the limits of its scope. The Court has thus left at least the common law aspect of Washington’s public trust doctrine open to expansion.

Washington courts have utilized the public trust doctrine as the basis for regulations that restrict an individual’s right of fishery by applying it in situations where the state was protecting its natural shellfish resources. In Washington Geoduck Harvest Association v. Washington State Department of Natural Resources, Division 2 of the Washington State Court of Appeals upheld the Department of Natural Resources’ (DNR) geoduck management system. First, the court held that because the geoducks were being harvested from the beds of navigable waters on state-owned land, the public trust doctrine applied. The court then stated that the DNR’s harvesting regulations—which regulated when individuals could harvest geoducks from particular tracts of state land—promoted the public interest, and thus were not improper. The court found that “[t]he public trust doctrine, as applied to DNR’s regulation of commercial geoduck harvesting, protects the public right to recreation, commerce, and commercial fishing, all of which are bolstered by the state’s system of facilitating sustainable geoduck harvesting and natural regeneration of the resource.” The court thus utilized the public trust doctrine to support the DNR’s regulation of geoduck harvesting, recognizing that although the regulation did constrict individuals’ rights of fishery, it was for the overall benefit of the natural resource and therefore the public. The court upheld the DNR’s regulations and procedures as constitutional,


136. The Court has stated in dicta that “we have never previously interpreted the doctrine to extend to non-navigable waters or groundwater,” but it did not indicate that that would not be possible in the future. Rettkowski, 122 Wash. 2d at 232, 858 P.2d at 239. As previously indicated, states are free to expand the public trust doctrine beyond the traditional bounds of navigable waters, and their beds and tidelands. See supra Part I.A. However, any expansion of the common law public trust doctrine would be vulnerable to legislative encroachment and could not act as the basis for litigation. See infra Part II.B.

137. See Craig, supra note 42, at 828.


139. Id. at 452, 101 P.3d at 897.

140. Id. at 451, 101 P.3d at 896.

141. Id. at 452, 101 P.3d at 897 (“[T]he state’s action is improper only where it does not promote, or where it substantially impairs, the public interest. Here, the opposite is true.” Please note that the language in the Pacific report varies slightly in that it says “the state’s action is only improper where . . . .”).

142. Id.

143. See id.
finding that they “serve[d] the public, satisfie[d] the public trust doctrine’s requirements, and [were] not an unconstitutional infringement on the public’s rights.” The court has shaped the public trust doctrine in Washington by using it as a restriction on individuals’ personal rights for the benefit and preservation of the public resources.

State supreme court justices and court of appeals judges have expressed a need to expand the public trust doctrine. The Weden court defined the public trust doctrine as protecting environmental quality and wildlife. The general protection of environmental quality and wildlife (other than fisheries) is beyond the traditional scope of the public trust doctrine, which only protected navigable waters and their attendant lands, for navigation, fisheries, and commerce. In his Rettkowski dissent, Justice Guy argued that the navigability requirement of the public trust doctrine should be abandoned. Following Professor Sax’s assertion that “[t]he function of the public trust as a legal doctrine is to protect such public expectations against destabilizing changes,” the scope of the doctrine “is defined by the public’s need in those natural resources necessary for social stability.” Justice Guy argued that it was time for the state to “recognize . . . the public’s interest . . . in water as an essential natural, finite resource, not in water just as a public highway or playground.” To protect water as “an essential natural, finite resource,” it is necessary to protect the environment overall. In addition, Justice Guy’s conceptualization of the public trust doctrine, its scope, and its purpose, could reasonably be expanded to protect other non-water natural resources that are needed for social stability because they are “an essential natural, finite resource.”

144. Id.
146. See Johnson, supra note 41, at 677–78.
148. Sax, supra note 35, at 188.
149. Rettkowski, 122 Wash. 2d at 242, 858 P.2d at 244 (Guy, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 242, 858 P.2d at 245.
151. See, e.g., Wood, supra note 7, at 83–84 (recognizing that all natural resources—both those traditionally protected by the public trust doctrine and those, like groundwater and forests, that are outside the scope of the traditional doctrine—are interconnected and arguing that to comport with “ecological reality” the public trust doctrine must protect all natural resources); Air Pollution and Water Quality, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://water.epa.gov/lawsregs/lawsguidance/cwa/tmdl/airdeposition_index.cfm (last visited Dec. 28, 2014) (illustrating the link between air pollution and water quality); infra Part II.A.2.
152. Indeed, at least one scholar has suggested that Washington’s forests—which are an important source of income for the state—could be found to be public trust resources. See Daniel Jack Chasan, A Trust for All the People: Rethinking the Management of Washington’s State Forests, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 44–47 (2000).
Lower court judges have also indicated that the public trust doctrine should or does encompass more than traditional navigable waters, navigation, fisheries, and recreation. Court of Appeals, Division 2, Chief Judge Quinn-Brintnall defined the state’s public trust duty as encompassing the state’s “natural resources.”153 The public trust doctrine encompasses animals *ferae naturae* (wild animals), and “under Washington’s inherent public trust doctrine the State and its people hold this title [to animals *ferae naturae*] in trust for the use and the benefit of all the people of this state, including those yet unborn.”154 Chief Judge Quinn-Brintnall cited *Graves v. Dunlap*155 for this proposition. In *Graves*, the Washington State Supreme Court stated that “the recognized doctrine is that the title to game belongs to the state in its sovereign capacity, and that the state holds this title in trust for the use and benefit of the people of the state.”156 This language, recognizing the traditional common law doctrine relating to wild animals,157 echoes public trust language used in *Caminiti*158 and indicates that the public trust doctrine could be applied to non-water resources.

Finally, the public trust rights established in *Caminiti* require protection of the environment that goes beyond just navigable waters. *Caminiti* established that the right of navigation—and the incidental right of fishing—is a protected interest of the public trust doctrine, as codified in the State Constitution.159 In addition, *Caminiti* explicitly stated that the right to recreation in navigable waters is protected by the public trust.160 To protect the recreational values of water, the state must protect the environment at large.161 Similarly, protection of the fishery “implicitly includes protection of water quality,”162 and thus the overall

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154. Id. (citing *Graves v. Dunlap*, 87 Wash. 648, 651, 152 P. 532, 533 (1915)).
155. 87 Wash. 648, 152 P. 532 (1915).
156. Id. at 651, 152 P. at 533 (emphasis added).
157. Id.
158. *Caminiti* v. Boyle, 107 Wash. 2d 662, 669, 732 P.2d 989, 994 (1987) (“[T]he state holds such dominion [over this state’s tidelands and shore lands] in trust for the public. It is this principle which is referred to as the ‘public trust doctrine.'”).
159. Id. at 669, 732 P.2d at 994.
160. Id. (citing Wilbour v. Gallagher, 77 Wash. 2d 306, 462 P.2d 232 (1969)).
161. In addition to negatively affecting fisheries, water pollution can have a negative effect on recreation. For example, swimming in water that has toxic algal blooms (caused by nutrient pollution) can result in liver or stomach illness, rashes, respiratory problems, and neurological affects. See *Nutrient Pollution: The Effects: Human Health*, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www2.epa.gov/nutrientpollution/effects-human-health (last visited Dec. 24, 2014).
If codified, the public trust doctrine could be used as a check on both state action and inaction. Caminiti adopted the United States Supreme Court’s understanding of the duty of the state with regard to trust lands. Quoting Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, the Washington State Supreme Court wrote, “[t]he control of the State for the purposes of the trust can never be lost, except as to such parcels as are used in promoting the interest of the public therein, or can be disposed of without any substantial impairment of the public interest in the lands and waters remaining.” Under the Court’s precedent, the state must retain control over its public trust resources so that it can protect them. Although the Court adopted this language to determine if legislation violated the public trust doctrine, it could readily be used to determine if state inaction violates the public trust doctrine. If the state, by its inaction, failed at any time to manage and protect its natural resources for the benefit of the people, it would be breaching its public trust duty because it would no longer be maintaining control sufficient to execute its duty to protect the resources for the people.

Protecting the overall environment is necessary for the State to fulfill its mandate to protect public trust resources, lands, and waterways for present and future generations. Expanding the public trust doctrine to include broader environmental protections would be in line with the existing constitutional provision, and follow the direction the Court has been going. Enshrining the right to a healthy environment in a

163. Water pollution can have devastating effects on fish populations. For example, excessive amounts of phosphorous and nitrogen (nutrient pollution) from sources like agriculture, stormwater, wastewater, and fossil fuels, can wash into water bodies, causing algal blooms which can create toxins killing fish, reduce fish’s abilities to find food, and “cause entire populations to leave an area or even die.” Nutrient Pollution: The Effects: Environment, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www2.epa.gov/nutrientpollution/effects-environment (last visited Dec. 24, 2014); Nutrient Pollution: Sources and Solutions, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://www2.epa.gov/nutrientpollution/sources-and-solutions (last visited Dec. 24, 2014).


167. See Citizens for Responsible Wildlife Mgmt. v. State, 124 Wash. App. 566, 577, 103 P.3d 203, 208 (2004) (“[T]he sovereign’s duty to manage its natural resources recognized in the public trust doctrine is not time limited, and the primary beneficiaries of the sovereign’s exercise of its public trust are those who have not yet been born or who are too young to vote. Thus, the sovereign authority to regulate natural resources is circumscribed by its duty to manage natural resources well for the benefit of future generations.” (emphasis in original)).

168. This Comment is meant to introduce the general proposition that amending the State Constitution to include a right to a healthy environment is not radical and is necessary. However,
2015] FOREVER EVERGREEN

constitutional amendment would be a natural extension of the state’s existing public trust doctrine, which protects navigable waters and their beds and tidelands, and is already enshrined in the Constitution.

c. Current Washington Laws Demonstrate an Existing Commitment to Environmental Protection

The Washington Legislature, as the voice of the people, has demonstrated an existing commitment to environmental protection by passing a variety of laws that seek to protect every aspect of the natural environment. A comprehensive examination or even an overview of all existing environmental laws in Washington is beyond the scope of this Comment. What this Comment seeks to do is highlight a few examples of such laws to demonstrate that there is an existing commitment to environmental protection.

A primary example of the State’s commitment to environmental protection is found in the Shoreline Management Act. The Act recognizes the value and fragility of the shoreland, and the concern throughout Washington relating to these fragile lands’ use, preservation, and restoration. The Act declares that:

It is the policy of the state to provide for the management of the shorelines of the state by planning for and fostering all reasonable and appropriate uses. This policy is designed to insure the development of these shorelines in a manner which . . . will promote and enhance the public interest. This policy contemplates protecting against adverse effects to the public health, the land and its vegetation and wildlife, and the waters of the state and their aquatic life, while protecting generally public rights of navigation and corollary rights incidental thereto.

The Shoreline Management Act reflects the State’s commitment to maintain the ecological health and natural character of shoreline areas.

Similarly, the Water Pollution Control Act calls for pure waters throughout the state, and the protection and proliferation of wildlife. The Act declares that it is Washington’s policy “to maintain the highest possible standards to insure the purity of all waters of the state consistent with public health and public enjoyment thereof, the propagation and

precisely defining a “healthy environment” would require political debates and an analysis of scientific data that are beyond the expertise of the Author and outside the scope of this Comment.

170. Id.
171. Id. §§ 90.48.010–90.48.906.
protection of wild life, birds, game, fish, and other aquatic life, and the industrial development of the state.”172 The Water Pollution Control Act recognizes the necessity of industrial development, but includes the protection of wildlife as part of the official policy of the state, even before it recognizes development.

Washington’s existing laws do not just protect water and shorelands. The State’s commitment to environmental protection goes beyond those narrow bounds to include the preservation of aquatic resources in their natural form.173 The Natural Area Preserves legislation174 calls for the protection of natural lands, along with their eco-systems.175 Natural lands are protected for current and future generations as areas “of scientific research, teaching, as habitats of rare and vanishing species, as places of natural historic and natural interest and scenic beauty, and as living museums of the original heritage of the state.”176

These laws are just a few of the many examples of Washington’s existing legislative commitment to protecting and preserving the environment for current and future generations. However, as will be illustrated in Part II,177 despite this commitment, Washington has not lived up to these aspirational goals. As these laws demonstrate, a constitutional amendment enshrining the right to a healthy environment would be in line with Washington’s existing ethos. An amendment would not only create a constitutional mandate that would force the state to do better, but it would also provide the legislature with a clear signal indicating the importance of protecting the environment in fact, not just in aspirational statements.

D. The Washington State Constitution Already Includes Positive Rights and Reflects Washingtonians’ Values

Amending the Washington State Constitution to include a right to a healthy environment would not be a radical step because the State Constitution already includes positive rights, and the Constitution has traditionally reflected Washingtonians’ values. First, the Washington State Constitution already has enshrined positive rights. A “positive

172. Id. § 90.48.010.
173. Id. § 79.70.010 (2014) (“It is, therefore, the public policy of the state of Washington to secure for the people of present and future generations the benefit of an enduring resource of natural areas by establishing a system of natural area preserves, and to provide for the protection of these natural areas.”).
174. Id. §§ 79.70.010–79.70.900.
175. Id. § 79.70.010.
176. Id.
177. See supra Part II.A.
right” is one that requires government action, rather than restricts it.\textsuperscript{178} There are at least four constitutional provisions that enshrine positive rights. Article II, section 35 requires the legislature to “pass necessary laws for the protection of persons working in mines, factories and other employments dangerous to life or deleterious to health; and fix pains and penalties for the enforcement of the same.”\textsuperscript{179} Article XIII, section 1 requires that the state provide “[e]ducational, reformatory, and penal institutions.”\textsuperscript{180} Article X, section 3 requires that the legislature “provide by law for the maintenance of a soldiers’ home for honorably discharged” members of the Union’s armed forces and “members of the state militia disabled while in the line of duty and who are \textit{bona fide} citizens of the state.”\textsuperscript{181} It should be noted that although article II, section 35, article XIII, section 1, and article X, section 3, are positive rights (meaning that they require government action), none of those provisions are fully self-executing.\textsuperscript{182} The plain language of article II, section 35 requires the legislature to pass laws to protect workers.\textsuperscript{183} Article XIII, section 1 “is not fully self-executing but requires supplementation by ‘such regulations as may be provided by law.’”\textsuperscript{184} Similarly, the plain language of article X, section 3 requires that the legislature “provide by law” for veterans’ care.\textsuperscript{185}

Article IX, section 1 provides a positive right that is self-executing. It provides for the positive right to education: “[i]t is the paramount duty of the state to make ample provision for the education of all children residing within its borders.”\textsuperscript{186} In \textit{McCleary v. State}\textsuperscript{187} the Washington State Supreme Court held that this constitutional provision “confers on children in Washington a \textit{positive constitutional right} to an amply funded education.”\textsuperscript{188} Although the legislature must implement

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{Clayton} Clayton, \textit{supra} note 1, at 75.
\bibitem{WASH CONST. art. II, § 35.} WASH CONST. art. II, § 35.
\bibitem{WASH CONST. art. XIII, § 1.} WASH CONST. art. XIII, § 1.
\bibitem{WASH CONST. art. X, § 3.} WASH CONST. art. X, § 3.
\bibitem{182} A self-executing constitutional provision is one that takes effect without any sort of legislative action. \textit{See} 16 \textit{CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM CONSTITUTIONAL LAW} § 89, \textit{available at WestLaw}.
\bibitem{WASH CONST. art. II, § 35.} WASH CONST. art. II, § 35.
\bibitem{UTTER & SPITZER, supra note 79, at 214.} \textit{See UTTER & SPITZER, supra note 79, at 214.}
\bibitem{WASH CONST. art. X, § 3; see also UTTER & SPITZER, supra note 79, at 181} WASH CONST. art. X, § 3; \textit{see also} UTTER & SPITZER, \textit{supra} note 79, at 181 (noting that the legislature provided for the Washington Soldiers’ Home in chapter 72.36 of the Revised Code of Washington).
\bibitem{WASH CONST. art. IX § 1.} WASH CONST. art. IX § 1.
\bibitem{Id. at 483, 269 P.3d at 231} \textit{Id.} at 483, 269 P.3d at 231 (emphasis added).
\end{thebibliography}
guidelines to fulfill its mandate under the Constitution, the provision does not require any legislative action to become effective. Children have a right to education directly under the Constitution—no legislative action is required. Including a positive right to a healthy environment would not be a significant departure from existing Washington constitutional law because the Constitution already provides for positive rights.

Second, the Constitution has always reflected Washingtonians’ values. The Washington State Constitution was drafted during the populist movement, and the document reflects the values of that time. In response to people’s concerns about special interests, distrust of railroads and corporations, and a “general objection to the concentration of power in elites,” the Constitution “imposed numerous restrictions on the legislature, scattered executive authority among independently elected officials, intentionally hamstring corporations, and provided strong protections of individual liberties.” These restrictions reflected the populist beliefs of the majority farming community: “protection of a self-sufficient way of life in the face of powerful commercial forces that threatened to manipulate or control the common people.”

The Constitution accurately reflected the people’s ideals then, and for many Washingtonians, it still does today. However, “a component of the state’s modern self-image that is absent from the document is a provision entrenching the state’s strong outdoor recreation and environmentalist spirit.” In 2008, Washington joined the Pacific Coast Collaborative, which prioritizes making the Pacific coast region a world-leader in reducing greenhouse gas emissions to fight climate change,

189. See Utter & Spitzer, supra note 79, at 170.
190. See McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d 477, 483, 269 P.3d 227, 231 (“The judiciary has the primary responsibility for interpreting article IX, section 1 to give it meaning and legal effect.”).
191. Wash. Const. art. VIII, § 10; see also Jeffrey Omar Usman, Good Enough for Government Work: The Interpretation of Positive Constitutional Rights in State Constitutions, 73 ALB. L. REV. 1459, 1464, 1474 (2010) (listing this amendment as a positive environmental right provided for in the Washington State Constitution). These loans are used “for the conservation or more efficient use of water, energy, or stormwater or sewer services.” Wash. Const. art. VIII, § 10. This provision was passed to encourage conservation efforts, as “[c]onservation was seen as a good alternative to new power plants.” Utter & Spitzer, supra note 79, at 167.
192. Utter & Spitzer, supra note 79, at 4–5.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 7.
195. Id. at 5, 11 (“[T]he self-sufficiency and suspicion of big business (as well as big government) remain strong in Washington State, and in that respect its constitution continues to reflect populist attitudes.”).
196. Id. at 11.
and “leading the world in sustainable environmental management” to protect the ocean and coastlines. In 2013, Washington elected current governor, Jay Inslee, “an environmental champion,” who is making environmentalism and clean energy a priority. Washingtonians are committed to protecting the environment, and it is time to amend the Constitution to reflect these mores. The flexibility inherent in state constitutions allows them to better reflect the aspirations of the current generation. Amending the Constitution to include a right to a healthy environment would accurately reflect the values of the people, something that the Constitution has done since it was first drafted.

E. Amending the Washington State Constitution Would Be in Line with National and International Trends

In recognition of the importance of strong environmental protections, states nationally and internationally have incorporated broad environmental protection principles into their constitutions. This section demonstrates that there is a national and international trend toward incorporating broad environmental protections into state constitutions. Although not all states with these provisions utilize them, some states and countries have successfully relied on them to tackle serious environmental problems. This Comment highlights six such cases—three national, three international—to showcase the potential power of these provisions and to demonstrate that courts have invoked


201. State constitutions can be amended more easily than the federal Constitution. See Mila Versteeg & Emily Zackin, American Constitutional Exceptionalism Revisited, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 129), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2416300. Amendments to the Washington State Constitution must be proposed by one of the branches of the legislature, approved by two-thirds of both branches of the legislature, and then approved by a majority vote of the people. WASH. CONST. art. XXIII. This process is arguably easier than amending the federal Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. V. (requiring two-thirds of both the House of Representatives and the Senate—or two-thirds of state legislatures—to propose an amendment; the proposed amendment must then be approved by three-fourths of state legislatures).

202. See Versteeg & Zackin, supra note 201, at manuscript at 129, 135.

203. Indeed, it has been argued that, “these constitutional provisions have [in general] had very little observable impact on the environmental laws and policy of the states that adopted such provisions.” James M. McElfish, Jr., State Environmental Law and Programs, 1 L. ENVTL. PROTECTION § 7:3 (2014).
constitutional provisions to strengthen environmental protection.\textsuperscript{204} An amendment to the Washington State Constitution that provides for broad environmental protections would be in line with this national and international trend,\textsuperscript{205} and would be a powerful tool for tackling some of the State’s most pressing environmental challenges.

1. \textit{Nationally, States Are Incorporating a Right to a Healthy Environment into Their Constitutions}

Throughout the United States of America, states have incorporated the right to a healthy environment in their own state constitutions. Every state constitution drafted since 1959 addresses natural resources preservation and environmental issues.\textsuperscript{206} Six states with constitutions enacted before 1959 address environmental issues through constitutional amendments.\textsuperscript{207} Forty-two state constitutions\textsuperscript{208} “at least mention environmental protection or natural resources.”\textsuperscript{209} As of November 2014, sixteen states have a constitutional provision that explicitly protects the environment.\textsuperscript{210} Some states, like Alaska,\textsuperscript{211} Montana,\textsuperscript{212} and

\textsuperscript{204} A comprehensive overview of every example of courts invoking or not invoking these constitutional provisions is beyond the scope of this Comment.

\textsuperscript{205} Parts I.E.1.a–c & I.E.2.a–c, infra, provide specific examples of where states and countries have utilized these constitutional environmental protections to address environmental needs and problems.

\textsuperscript{206} Klass, supra note 31, at 714. For additional information and examples of these varying provisions, see Barton H. Thompson, Jr., \textit{Constitutionalizing the Environment: The History and Future of Montana’s Environmental Provisions}, 64 MONT. L. REV. 157, 160–63 (2003).


\textsuperscript{208} For additional information on how other states have incorporated the public trust doctrine into their constitutions, see Klass, supra note 31, at 714–19.

\textsuperscript{209} Id. at 714. Of these forty-two state constitutions, “eight states have clear language granting citizens environmental rights, eleven states include public policy statements on environmental protection, and the remaining twenty-three states at least refer to natural resources or environmental protection.” Id. at 714 n.85 (citing Robert J. Klee, \textit{What’s Good for School Finance Should Be Good For Environmental Justice: Addressing Disparate Environmental Impacts Using State Courts and Constitutions}, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 135, 167 (2005)).

\textsuperscript{210} McElfish, supra note 203.

\textsuperscript{211} ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 2 (“The legislature shall provide for the utilization, development, and conservation, of all natural resources belonging to the State, including land and waters, for the maximum benefit of its people.” (emphasis added)); ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 3 (“Wherever occurring in their natural state, fish, wildlife, and waters are reserved to the people for common use.”); ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 4 (“Fish, forests, wildlife, grasslands, and all other replenishable resources belonging to the State shall be utilized, developed, and maintained on the sustained yield principle, subject to preferences among beneficial uses.”); \textit{Constitutional Amendment Summary: 1966-2004 Proposed Amendment Titles & Vote Counts}, OFF. OF THE LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR BYRON MALLOTT, http://ltgov.alaska.gov/treadwell/services/alaska-constitution/amendment-summary.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2015). Taken together, the Alaska Supreme Court has interpreted the aforementioned provisions of the Alaska Constitution to
Louisiana,\textsuperscript{213} included provisions protecting the environment and natural resources directly in their constitutions, without utilizing amendments.

Other states began adopting constitutional amendments in the late 1960s and early 1970s which “were generally put in terms of declaring the policy of the state, of establishing a ‘public trust’ over the environment, or creating environmental ‘rights’ for the citizens of the states.”\textsuperscript{214} New York, for example, amended its Constitution in 1969 to declare that “[t]he policy of the state shall be to conserve and protect its natural resources and scenic beauty.”\textsuperscript{215} Similarly, Pennsylvania amended its Constitution in 1971 to include a right to “clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment.”\textsuperscript{216}

Although it has been argued that these constitutional provisions protecting the right to a healthy environment have generally “had very

\textsuperscript{212} MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“All persons are born free and have certain inalienable rights. They include the right to a clean and healthful environment . . . .”); MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (“(1) The state and each person shall maintain and improve a clean and healthful environment in Montana for present and future generations. (2) The legislature shall provide for the administration and enforcement of this duty. (3) The legislature shall provide adequate remedies for the protection of the environmental life support system from degradation and provide adequate remedies to prevent unreasonable depletion and degradation of natural resources.”); see also Thompson, supra note 206, at 158 (highlighting the important position environmental protection provisions were given in Montana’s 1972 Constitution).

\textsuperscript{213} This article refers to the 1974 Louisiana Constitution. LA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (“The natural resources of the state, including air and water, and the healthful, scenic, historic, and esthetic quality of the environment shall be protected, conserved, and replenished insofar as possible and consistent with the health, safety, and welfare of the people. The legislature shall enact laws to implement this policy.”).

\textsuperscript{214} McElfish, supra note 203.

\textsuperscript{215} N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, § 4 (adopted Nov. 4, 1969) (“The policy of the state shall be to conserve and protect its natural resources and scenic beauty . . . . The legislature, in implementing this policy, shall include adequate provision for the abatement of air and water pollution . . . .[,] the protection of agricultural lands, wetlands and shorelines, and the development and regulation of water resources. The legislature shall further provide for the acquisition of lands and waters . . . . which because of their natural beauty, wilderness character, or geological, ecological or historical significance, shall be preserved and administered for the use and enjoyment of the people.”).

\textsuperscript{216} PA. CONST. art. 1, § 27 (adopted May 18, 1971) (“The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and aesthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the common property of all the people, including generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.”); Article 1, Section 27. Added by Amendment of May 18, 1971, DUQUESNE U., http://www.duq.edu/academics/gumberg-library/pa-constitution/historical-research/legislative-histories/a1-s27-1971 (last visited Feb. 17, 2015).
little observable impact on the environmental laws and policy of the states that adopted them, some states have certainly put their provisions to use. The following are three specific examples where a state’s constitutional right to a healthy environment has been used to strengthen environmental protection for the people’s benefit.

a. Montana

Environmental protection was one of the major themes delegates considered when drafting the 1972 Montana Constitution. This theme is reflected throughout the text of the Montana Constitution. Its preamble begins with the statement: “We the people of Montana grateful to God for the quiet beauty of our state, the grandeur of our mountains, the vastness of our rolling plains . . . establish this constitution.” Article II of the 1972 Montana Constitution provides that, “[a]ll persons are born free and have certain inalienable rights. They include the right to a clean and healthful environment.” Article IX reiterates this sentiment and creates an obligation to safeguard the environment for the state and the people of Montana:

(1) The state and each person shall maintain and improve a clean and healthful environment in Montana for present and future generations. (2) The legislature shall provide for the administration and enforcement of this duty. (3) The legislature shall provide adequate remedies for the protection of the environmental life support system from degradation and provide adequate remedies to prevent unreasonable depletion and degradation of natural resources.

The right guaranteed in article II and the rights provided for in article IX are “interrelated and interdependent.” Although it is clear that environmental protection was a priority for the drafters of the new Constitution, what precisely this provision required of the State was left open for the courts to decide. As one Missoula delegate to the

217. McElfish, supra note 203; see also Thompson, supra note 206, at 158–59, 163–65 (noting that constitutional provisions protecting the environment have had little impact).
220. Mont. Const. art. II, § 3.
221. Mont. Const. art. IX, § 1.
223. Holmes, supra note 218, at 429.
Constitutional Convention indicated, the drafters intended to leave the extent of environmental protection open for litigation.224

The Montana Supreme Court first addressed the level of scrutiny the court must utilize “when the right to a clean and healthful environment guaranteed by [article II, section 3 or those rights referred to in [article IX, section 1 are implicated” in Montana Environmental Information Center v. Department of Environmental Quality.225 In that case, the court examined whether a statute226 that allowed water test discharges that degraded high quality waters without review violated articles II and IX of the Montana Constitution, and if plaintiff environmental groups had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the act.227 After an extensive review of the history of the 1972 Constitution looking at the drafters’ intent, the Court interpreted article II, section 3 and article IX, section 1 to give substantial protection to the environment.228 The Court held that a concrete showing of harm was not required for plaintiffs to have standing.229 The court further held that, “the right to a clean and healthful environment is a fundamental right because it is guaranteed by the Declaration of Rights found at [article II, section 3 of Montana’s Constitution]230 and therefore that strict scrutiny must be applied to all rules and statutes that implicate those rights.231 By reading the constitutional provisions with the drafters’

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224. Missoula delegate Mae Nan Ellingson said, “What did it mean to have a right to a clean and healthful environment? To me, it meant that the citizen had the right to go to court to protect that environment.” HOLMES, supra note 218, at 430 (quoting delegate Mae Nan Ellingson).

225. 988 P.2d 1236, 1244 (Mont. 1999).

226. Plaintiffs specifically contended that section 75-5-317(2)(j), MCA (1995) “to the extent that [it] allow[ed] discharges of water from watering well or monitoring well tests, which degrade[d] high quality waters without review pursuant to Montana’s nondegradation policy” was void for violating the constitutional provisions protecting the environment. Id. at 1237.

227. Id. at 1242.

228. Id. at 1249 (“To give effect to the rights guaranteed by [article II, section 3 and [article IX, section 1 of the Montana Constitution they must be read together and consideration given to all of the provisions of [article IX, section 1 as well as the preamble to the Montana Constitution. In doing so, we conclude that the delegates’ intention was to provide language and protections which are both anticipatory and preventative. The delegates did not intend to merely prohibit that degree of environmental degradation which can be conclusively linked to ill health or physical endangerment. Our constitution does not require that dead fish float on the surface of our state’s rivers and streams before its farsighted environmental protections can be invoked. The delegates repeatedly emphasized that the rights provided for in subparagraph (1) of [article IX, section 1 was linked to the legislature’s obligation in subparagraph (3) to provide adequate remedies for degradation of environmental life support system and to prevent unreasonable degradation of natural resources.”).

229. Id.

230. Id. at 1246.

231. Id. The Court further held that to survive strict scrutiny, the State must “establish[] a compelling state interest and that its action is closely tailored to effectuate that interest and is the
intent in mind, the Court interpreted the Montana Constitution to include expansive environmental protections meant to guarantee not only a healthful environment, but one that was free from degradation—the strongest possible protections that the drafters could provide for the environment.  

b. Louisiana

Like Montana, Louisiana included environmental protections directly into its Constitution when it adopted the current Constitution in 1974. Article IX provides that:

The natural resources of the state, including air and water, and the healthful, scenic, historic, and esthetic quality of the environment shall be protected, conserved, and replenished insofar as possible and consistent with the health, safety, and welfare of the people. The legislature shall enact laws to implement this policy.

In Louisiana, the environmental protections enshrined in article IX of the Constitution are a codification of a broad public trust doctrine. The Louisiana Supreme Court explained that in Louisiana, “[a] public trust for the protection, conservation and replenishment of all natural resources of the state was recognized by art. VI § 1 of the 1921 Louisiana Constitution.” The court further explained that “middle-tier” scrutiny is appropriate for a statute that impacts constitutional rights provided in article IX.

In Northern Plains Resource Council, the Court upheld mineral development leases issued by the State to a mining company that were entered into without an environmental review. The Court held that “[b]ecause the leases themselves do not allow for any degradation of the environment, conferring only the exclusive right to apply for State permits, and because they specifically require full environmental review and full compliance with applicable State environmental laws, the act of issuing the leases did not impact or implicate the right to a clean and healthful environment in [a]rticle II, [s]ection 3 of the Montana Constitution.” Similarly, because the leases did require an environmental review before any mining could take place, the leases did not impact rights conferred by article IX. The Court thus upheld the leases.  

233. LA. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
234. In re Am. Waste & Pollution Control Co., 642 So. 2d 1258, 1262 (La. 1994) (noting that article IX, section 1 “continues the Public Trust Doctrine in environmental matters”).
Constitution expanded the public trust doctrine by explicitly categorizing water and air as natural resources, and commanding the legislature to implement policies to conserve, protect, and replenish those natural resources “insofar as possible and consistent with health, safety and welfare of the people.”236 Although these protections are broad and go beyond the scope of the traditional public trust doctrine, environmental protection is not “an exclusive goal.”237 Rather, there is a balancing test weighing environmental benefits and costs against other economic and social factors.238

Although environmental protection is not an exclusive goal, agencies cannot escape the constitutional mandate to try to protect the environment as much as possible. In *Save Ourselves, Inc. v. Louisiana Environmental Control Commission*,239 the Louisiana Supreme Court held that agencies that “act as the primary public trustee of natural resources and the environment” must provide “active and affirmative protection” of the public’s right to a safe and healthy environment.240 In order to ensure that this duty is met, an agency must provide a record of decision that clearly articulates the basis for its decision.241 The agency must thus demonstrate that it has acted in the public’s best interest, balancing environmental factors against the general welfare of the people.242

Louisiana courts have recognized that while environmental protection is mandated by the State Constitution, it must also be balanced against sometimes competing economic and social factors.243 However, this balancing test does not negate the State’s duty to provide “active and affirmative protection” of the environment.244 Instead, the state must clearly, and on the record, articulate the basis for its decisions when they affect environmental quality.245 This requirement ensures that decision-makers execute their “duty to see that the environment would be

(emphasis added) (footnote omitted).

236. *Id.*
237. *Id.* at 1157.
238. *Id.*
239. *Id.* at 1152.
240. *Id.* at 1157.
241. *Id.* at 1159–60.
242. See *id.* at 1157.
243. *Id.*
244. *Id.*
245. *Id.* Agency officials must follow the “rule of reasonableness,” which “requires an agency or official, before granting approval of proposed action affecting the environment, to determine that adverse environmental impacts have been minimized or avoided as much as possible consistently with the public welfare.” *Id.*
protected to the fullest extent possible consistent with the health, safety and welfare of the people" and are more deliberate with their decisions that affect the environment.

c. Pennsylvania

Pennsylvania amended its Constitution in 1971 to include broad environmental protections. Article I, section 27 provides:

The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the common property of all the people, including generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all people.

As discussed above, Pennsylvania’s interpretation of article I, section 27 provides some of the strongest public trust constitutional protections of natural resources in the United States. The provision is self-executing, and “create[s] a right in the people to seek to enforce the obligations” that the Commonwealth incurs as the trustee responsible for the maintenance and conservation of the “public natural resources.”

The Commonwealth’s obligations related to this constitutional provision were recently addressed in Robinson Township v. Commonwealth. In that case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court invalidated various provisions of Act 13, which aimed “to provide a maximally favorable environment for [oil and gas] industry operators to exploit Pennsylvania’s oil and natural gas resources, including those in the Marcellus Shale Formation.” Among other things, Act 13 required local government “to authorize oil and gas operations, impoundment areas, and local assessment operations . . . as permitted uses in all zoning districts throughout a locality,” to authorize both natural gas compressor stations and natural gas processing plants, and prohibited local governments from imposing more stringent conditions on oil and gas

246. Id. at 1160.
249. See supra notes 65–72 and accompanying text.
250. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 974.
252. Id. at 975.
operations.253 The Act also entitled oil and gas operators “to automatic waivers of setbacks”—meant to protect sensitive water resources—upon submission of a plan that identified additional measures, as prescribed by the Department of Environmental Protection, that would be utilized during construction, drilling, and well operations.254

The Court found that Act 13 implicated the public’s natural resources “essential to life, health, and liberty: surface and ground water, ambient air, and aspects of the natural environment in which the public has an interest,” all of which are part of the public trust.255 The Court found that three provisions of the Act were “incompatible with the Commonwealth’s duty as trustee of Pennsylvania’s public natural resources,” in violation of article I, section 27.256 One provision unlawfully required local governments “to ignore their obligations under [a]rticle I, [s]ection 27” and instead required them “to take affirmative actions to undo existing [environmental] protections.”257 Another provision fell short of the legislature’s constitutional duty to enact legislation that restrains private parties from causing environmental degradation.258 Finally, the Court found that the third challenged provision “fail[ed] both to ensure conservation of the quality and quantity of the Commonwealth’s waters and to treat all beneficiaries equitably in light of the purpose of the trust,” in violation of the Commonwealth’s trustee duties.259 Despite recognizing that the oil and gas industry “offer[ed] the very real prospect of jobs and other important economic benefits,”260 the Court invalidated provisions of an Act that provided more favorable conditions for the oil and gas industry because they violated the people’s right to a clean and healthy environment.

253. Id. at 971–72. For more detail on Act 13, see id. at 969–74.
254. Id. at 973.
255. Id. at 975.
256. Id. at 985.
257. Id. at 978.
258. Id. at 979. The Court noted there were two reasons the Act violated the legislature’s duty to restrain private parties. “First, a new regulatory regime permitting industrial uses as a matter of right in every type of pre-existing zoning district is incapable of conserving or maintaining the constitutionally-protected aspects of the public environment and of a certain quality of life.” Id. Second, the “requirement that local government permit industrial uses in all zoning districts [results in] some properties and communities . . . carry[ing] much heavier environmental and habitability burdens than others. This disparate effect is irreconcilable with the express command that the trustee will manage the corpus of the trust for the benefit of ‘all the people.’” Id. at 980 (citations omitted). It is important to note, however, that the Court did recognize that there were competing constitutional requirements and “that sustainable development may require some degradation of the corpus of the trust,” thus implying that a balance must sometimes be struck between environmental protection and development. Id. at 980.
259. Id. at 984.
260. Id. at 976.
2. Internationally, Countries Are Incorporating a Right to a Healthy Environment into Their Constitutions

States in the United States are not alone in incorporating constitutional provisions that protect the environment. Internationally, countries have included environmental provisions in their constitutions since 1948.261 The 1970s marked the start of a worldwide trend in which countries began amending their constitutions to include stronger environmental protections.262 As of 2012, 147 out of 193 of the world’s constitutions—approximately three-quarters—“include explicit references to environmental rights and/or environmental responsibilities.”263 Countries from all regions (except North America) and from all levels of development have these provisions.264

Although not all countries utilize their constitutional environmental protection provisions,265 some countries do. This section provides just a few examples of countries utilizing those provisions to tackle major environmental challenges and increase government accountability.266

a. Argentina

Argentina revised its Constitution in 1994, and in doing so incorporated strong environmental protections.267 Section 41 provides that:

All inhabitants are entitled to a healthful and balanced environment fit for human development in order that productive activities shall meet present needs without endangering those of future generations; and shall have the duty to preserve it. As a first priority, environmental damage shall bring about the obligation to repair it according to law.

The authorities shall provide for the protection of this right, the

261. Italy was the first country to have such a provision. DAVID R. BOYD, THE ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS REVOLUTION: A GLOBAL STUDY OF CONSTITUTIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 50 (2012). A full examination of the international trend of incorporating environmental provisions into constitutions is beyond the scope of this Comment. For a detailed analysis of this topic, see generally BOYD, supra.

262. Id. at 3.

263. Id. at 47.

264. Id.

265. For example, although throughout Africa the right to a healthy environment is recognized, economic, political, and social, challenges have generally prevented its effective implementation and enforcement. Id. at 283.

266. For additional examples and a more comprehensive look at international constitutional environmental provisions, see generally id.

267. Id. at 50.
rational use of natural resources, the preservation of the natural and cultural heritage and of the biological diversity, and shall also provide for environmental information and education."  

The Constitution further states that the national government must set the "minimum protection standards," and that the provinces also may pass complementary laws to further protect the environment. This constitutional provision is the foundation of environmental law in Argentina, and the basis of much of the environmental litigation in that country. This provision, combined with an increasingly active judiciary (in 2007 there were 151 cases dealing with the right to a healthy environment), has resulted in Argentina being the regional leader "in judicial recognition and enforcement of the constitutional right to live in a healthy environment."  

Argentineans have utilized their constitutional right to live in a healthy environment to tackle major pollution in their country’s capital city. In Beatriz Silvia Mendoza v. National Government, the leading case based on Section 41, a group of concerned citizens sued the national and local government, the City of Buenos Aires, and forty-four industrial facilities for polluting the Matanza-Riachuelo River. The Matanza-Riachuelo River is one of the most polluted rivers on the continent with millions of people—many of whom are poor—living near its banks. The National Supreme Court of Justice responded to the suit in a series of decisions. In 2006, the Court ordered the government to conduct an environmental assessment of the river and begin an environmental education program. In 2007, the Court ordered the government “to establish a comprehensive cleanup and restoration plan for the river” with input and evaluation from independent experts, the plaintiffs, non-governmental organizations, and the public. The Court issued its final comprehensive ruling in 2008 with three objectives: “improved quality of life for the inhabitants of the basin,” “reconstruction of the environment in the basin in all of its components,”

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268. Art. 41, CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL [CONST. NAC.] (Arg.).
269. Id.
270. See BOYD, supra note 261, at 129.
271. Id.
272. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice], 8/7/2008, “Mendoza, Beatriz Silvia y otros c. Estado Nacional y otros s/ daños y prejuicios (daños derivados de la contaminación ambiental del Río Matanza – Riachuelo),” M. 1569. XL (Arg.).
273. BOYD, supra note 261, at 129.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 130.
276. Id.
and “prevention of injury with sufficient degree of predictability.”

To attain these objectives, the Court ordered that the government and other defendants undertake a variety of actions, including “the creation and implementation of plans for wastewater treatment,” “development of a regional environmental health plan” with “ongoing judicial oversight of the implementation plan,” “improvement of drinking-water, sewage treatment, and stormwater discharge systems,” and “closure of all illegal dumps, redevelopment of legal landfills, and cleanup of the riverbanks.” The Court based its decision on Section 41 and Section 43 (which allows citizens to “defend their rights through recourse to the judicial system”). The Court’s decision triggered the World Bank to approve two billion U.S. dollars for the Matanza-Riachuelo Basin Sustainable Development Project. As of mid-2011, major progress had been made toward cleaning up the river, including providing one million people with clean drinking water and half a million people with a new sewage system; the closure of 167 polluting companies and 134 garbage dumps; and “the creation of 139 sampling points for monitoring water, air, and soil quality.” As of 2014, more than 1500 polluting enterprises are being continuously monitored “to track progress in reducing industrial pollution.” In addition, the contracts for civil works related to the project have been signed, and construction is expected to begin in 2015.

Argentina is the Latin American leader in relying on its constitutional amendment to ensure that individuals live in a healthy environment. Utilizing their constitutional rights, community members from one of the poorest and most polluted areas of Buenos Aires were able to sue the government and begin tackling one of the country’s worst environmental problems.

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277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 131; see also Art. 43, CONST. NAC. (Arg.).
280. BOYD, supra note 261, at 131.
281. Id.
283. Id.
284. See BOYD, supra note 261, at 129.
b. South Africa

South Africa included a right to a healthy environment in its 1996 Constitution. Article XXIV declares that:

Everyone has the right—
(a) to an environment that is not harmful to their health or wellbeing; and
(b) to have the environment protected, for the benefit of present and future generations, through reasonable legislative and other measures that—
(i) prevent pollution and ecological degradation;
(ii) promote conservation; and
(iii) secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources while promoting justifiable economic and social development.

The Constitutional Court has interpreted this provision as imposing a trusteeship position on the current generation. This position requires the current generation to protect the Earth for future generations. The court is responsible for making sure that the current generation fulfills its obligation to future generations.

In addition to recognizing its own role in protecting the environment, the Court “observed that the protection of the right to a healthy environment will depend not only on the diligence of public officials but also on the active participation of civil society and, in some cases, on public interest litigation.” To foster public interest litigation—like that protecting the environment—the Constitutional Court held that unsuccessful plaintiffs are exempt from reimbursing their opponents’ legal costs.

Perhaps most striking, the constitutional right to a healthy environment has had a major impact on legislation in South Africa. The 1996 Constitution resulted in a “complete overhaul” of South Africa’s environmental law, resulting in the National Environmental

285. Id. at 50, 151.


287. BOYD, supra note 261, at 153 (“T]he present generation holds the Earth in trust for the next generation. This trusteeship position carries with it the responsibility to look after the environment. It is the duty of the court to ensure that this responsibility is carried out.” (quoting Fuel Retailers Ass’n of S. Afr. v. Director-General: Envtl. Mgmt., Dep’t of Agric., Conservation and Env’t, Mpumalanga Province 2007 (10) BCLR 1059 (CC) at para. 102 (S. Afr.))).

288. Id.

289. Id.

290. Id. (citing Biowatch Trust v. Registrar, Genetic Resources 2009 (6) SA 232 (CC) (S. Afr.)).

291. Id.
Management Act. The preamble of the Act states that the Act’s purpose is “to provide for co-operative, environmental governance by establishing principles for decision-making on matters affecting the environment, institutions that will promote co-operative governance and procedures for co-ordinating environmental functions exercised by organs of state; and to provide for matters connected therewith.” The first and second paragraph of the preamble recognize that many people living in South Africa live in an unhealthy environment, but that “everyone has the right to an environment that is not harmful to his or her health or well-being.” The preamble continues, explaining that both present and future generations have the right to have the environment protected via legislation and other means. To reach this end, the Act establishes—among other provisions—management principles, which reiterate the importance and centrality of environmental protection and management to protect people; and enforcement/compliance mechanisms which include the right to information, protection for whistleblowers, and standing for individuals suing to enforce environmental laws.

In addition to the National Environmental Management Act, other legislation addressing air quality, water, biodiversity, and local governments also include a right to a healthy environment. South Africa’s strong environmental laws and constitutional protection of the environment “represents a beacon of hope” in the movement toward greater environmental protection in Africa.

c. Philippines

Article II, Section 16 of the Constitution of the Philippines provides that “[t]he State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a

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293. National Environmental Management Act 19519. Professor Boyd explains that the Act “repeatedly refers to the right to a healthy environment.” BOYD, supra note 261, at 149.
294. National Environmental Management Act 19519 (recognizing “many inhabitants of South Africa live in an environment that is harmful to their health and well-being”).
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id. § 2.
298. Id. § 31(1).
299. Id. § 31(4), (8).
300. Id. §§ 32–33.
301. BOYD, supra note 261, at 149–50.
302. Id. at 160.
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.”303 This provision was enacted as part of the present 1987 Constitution.304 In 1993, the Supreme Court of the Philippines decided the first precedent-setting case implicating this provision. In Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., a lawsuit was “filed on behalf of children and future generations” with the goal of cancelling all timber-harvesting licenses in the country.305 The Supreme Court of the Philippines held that the right to a healthful ecology was self-executing, and pressed the “urgent need to protect the environment on behalf of both present and future generations.”307

In 2008, the Supreme Court of the Philippines issued the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay308 decision, which was aimed at cleaning up Manila Bay.309 The Court held that “different government agencies and instrumentalities cannot shirk from their mandates; they must perform their basic functions in cleaning up and rehabilitating the Manila Bay.”310 To effectuate this order, the Court required that within six months a dozen government agencies had “to develop a comprehensive plan . . . to rehabilitate and restore Manila Bay.”311 Specifically, the Court ordered the agencies to perform specific actions including the clean-up of toxic and hazardous waste, the development of facilities and programs for disposal of solid waste, the reintroduction of indigenous aquatic species, and the development of an environmental education program.312 Responsible agencies were required to “allocate a budget sufficient to

303. CONST. (1987), art. II, sec. 16 (Phil.).
305. Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., G.R. No. 101083, 224 S.C.R.A. 792 (July 30, 1993) (Phil.).
306. BOYD, supra note 261, at 167. Although Minors Oposa did not result in the cancellation of all timber-harvesting licenses, when the case was filed there were ninety-two licenses in the Philippines, but “by 2006, there were only three, and the rate of deforestation had fallen.” Id. Furthermore, in a case brought by a timber company, “the Supreme Court upheld the government’s ability to cancel licenses, based in part on the Minors Oposa precedent.” Id.
307. Id.
309. BOYD, supra note 261, at 168.
310. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, G.R. Nos. 171947-48, at 23; see also BOYD, supra note 261, at 168.
311. BOYD, supra note 261, at 168.
carry out the restoration plan.” To ensure that its order was actually carried out, the Court has continuing mandamus, “the power to supervise implementation of the restoration plan,” and government agencies must submit quarterly reports that are reviewed by a court-established expert committee. This case demonstrates that the right to a healthy environment is used as a powerful tool, and creates real responsibilities for the state. The Court held that “the responsible government agencies cannot escape their obligation to future generations of Filipinos to keep the waters of the Manila Bay as clean and clear as humanly possible. Anything less would be a betrayal of the trust reposed in them.” The government has allocated approximately one hundred million U.S. dollars to begin clean-up of the Bay.

In addition to these groundbreaking cases, the Supreme Court of the Philippines designated 117 courts as “green courts,” which would be headed by judges that are specially trained to deal with violations of environmental law. In 2010 the Supreme Court of the Philippines issued specific procedural rules applicable to environmental cases. The rules had four objectives: “protecting and advancing the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology; providing a simplified, speedy, and inexpensive procedure for enforcing environmental rights; adopting innovations and best practices for enforcing environmental laws; and enabling courts to monitor and ensure compliance with orders in environmental cases.” In addition, the Supreme Court created the writ of kalikasan (nature)—a type of civil action that allowed any natural or legal person to bring a case that would result in the court ordering a respondent “to cease an environmentally harmful activity; protect the environment; or carry out restoration or rehabilitation activities.” The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the environmental protections enshrined in the Constitution has led to strong environmental decisions and procedural maneuvers to help ensure that

313. Boyd, supra note 261, at 169.
314. Id.; see also Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, G.R. Nos. 171947-48, at 27.
316. Id.
319. Id. (citing Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (2010)).
320. Id.
the constitutional mandate is satisfied.

Countries around the world have included provisions enshrining a right to a healthy environment in their constitutions. As the examples in this section show, these amendments are not just rhetoric—they can and have been used to tackle serious environmental challenges and foster real environmental change. Although the United States has not included this right in the Constitution, numerous states have. This right has, at least in some states, also been used to foster environmental change and address serious environmental problems. Washington should follow the national and international trend and amend its Constitution to include an explicit, positive right to a healthy environment.

II. AMENDING THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION IS NECESSARY TO ADDRESS WASHINGTON’S ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS AND TO PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT FOR THIS AND FUTURE GENERATIONS

Not only would a constitutional amendment be in line with existing Washington mores, and national and international trends, it is necessary to secure a healthy environment in Washington. This Part, which explains why an amendment is necessary, proceeds in two sections. The first demonstrates that despite Washington’s apparently strong environmental legislation, the state faces significant air, water, and soil pollution, indicating that existing laws are not doing enough. The second explains that a constitutional amendment is the necessary mechanism to address the state’s environmental challenges because an amendment will enshrine an otherwise weak and vulnerable common law, give individuals a private right of action, give the courts a constitutional hook to require private and state action, and send a strong signal to the legislature that it must prioritize the environment.

A. Despite Legislative Efforts, Washington Is Facing Pervasive and Costly Environmental Problems

Washington’s legislature has passed a variety of strong-sounding

321. At least one scholar argues that substantive due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments could be used to recognize a right to a healthy environment in the federal Constitution. See generally Janelle P. Eurick, The Constitutional Right to a Healthy Environment: Enforcing Environmental Protection Through State and Federal Constitutions, 11 INT’L LEGAL PERSP. 185 (2001). However, there is currently no explicit right to a healthy environment in the Constitution of the United States.

322. See infra Part II.A.

323. See infra Part II.B.
legislation that is meant to address pollution in the state. For example, the legislature has declared that:

Each person has a fundamental and inalienable right to a healthful environment, and each person has a responsibility to preserve and enhance that right. The beneficial stewardship of the land, air, and waters of the state is a solemn obligation of the present generation for the benefit of future generations.

Although the language and sentiment are encouraging, the reality is that all Washingtonians do not live in a healthy environment. Despite the legislature’s lofty ambition, Washington continues to face serious air, water, and soil pollution that negatively affects the health and welfare of Washingtonians.

1. **Air Pollution Poses an Ongoing Challenge to Health and the Economy**

The Washington State Legislature has attempted to address air pollution. In passing the Washington Clean Air Act the legislature declared that it is the public policy to preserve, protect, and enhance the air quality for current and future generations. Air is an essential resource that must be protected from harmful levels of pollution. . . . It is the intent of this chapter to secure and maintain levels of air quality that protect human health and safety . . .[,] to prevent injury to plant, animal life, and property, to foster the comfort and convenience of Washington’s inhabitants, to promote the economic and social development of the state, and to facilitate the enjoyment of the natural attractions of the state.

To realize this sweeping goal, the legislature explicitly stated that, “it is the intent of this chapter to prevent any areas of the state with acceptable air quality from reaching air contaminant levels that are not protective of human health and the environment.” The legislature has failed to

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324. A full review of all of the environmental laws that have a protectionist aspect is beyond the scope of this Comment. The following examples are merely exemplary of the fact that the legislature has passed legislation with the goal of eliminating a particular type of pollution, and that those goals have not been met.

325. **WASH. REV. CODE § 70.105D.010 (2014).**

326. A full review of the legislature’s actions to prevent air pollution is beyond the scope of this Comment. The example provided is meant to illustrate that the legislature has taken action, and that the action has failed to reduce air pollution to a level where human health is not negatively affected.

327. **WASH. REV. CODE §§ 70.94.011–70.94.990.**

328. **Id. § 70.94.011.**

329. **Id.** The statute also states that, “[t]he legislature recognizes that the problems and effects of air pollution cross political boundaries, are frequently regional or interjurisdictional in nature, and
achieve this goal, and air pollution continues to have negative health impacts on the residents of Washington.

Air pollution can cause lung disease, and it makes existing lung and heart disease worse. It is also associated with cancer. In 2009, the Washington State Department of Ecology estimated that fine particulate pollution contributed to 1500 nonfatal heart attacks, 1900 incidents of acute bronchitis, and thousands of cases of worsened asthma annually. Overall, the direct and indirect costs of these air pollution-related diseases are about $190 million per year.

The main sources of air pollution in Washington—wood smoke, motor vehicles, and outdoor burning—come from within the state’s own borders. Each one of these sources of pollution brings health risks to Washingtonians and the environment. For example, air pollution from motor vehicles can trigger asthma, and is linked to heart attacks and cancer. More than a third of Washingtonians “are in an age group
that is at risk for health problems from this pollution, or have at least one medical condition that is made worse by it.”

Wood smoke from fireplaces, stoves, and other wood burning devices is also particularly dangerous to human health, releasing fine particulates, many of which are toxic. These tiny particles are so small that they can go deep into the lungs, scarring the lung tissue. Studies have shown that in some cities, death rates increased “when there were higher levels of fine particles in the air. Wood smoke is most dangerous to the health of infants and children, pregnant women, the elderly, and people with lung or heart disease.” Indeed, “children in wood burning neighborhoods are more likely to have lung and breathing problems.”

Wood smoke is a particularly serious problem in Washington because almost all of it is released during winter. Winter weather conditions cause stagnant air, which traps smoke close to the ground, making many neighborhoods unhealthy.

Air pollution is not only damaging to human health, but it is also extremely harmful for the environment. Cars and other transportation-related sources of air pollution “produce nearly half of the greenhouse gas emissions” in Washington. As the Washington State Department of Ecology explains, “[g]reenhouse gases cause climate change. Effects of climate change in Washington include reduced snow pack, low summer stream flows, more winter flooding, increased coastal erosion, reduced water supplies for people and agriculture, and further loss of salmon habitat.” These environmental consequences are not only

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337. Id.
339. Id. There is no “cure” for pulmonary fibrosis (scarring of the lungs)—treatment aims to prevent more scarring, but it cannot fix existing scarring. Symptoms, Diagnosis and Treatment, AM. LUNG ASS’N, http://www.lung.org/lung-disease/pulmonary-fibrosis/symptoms-diagnosis.html (last visited Dec. 12, 2014). Symptoms of pulmonary fibrosis include: hacking, dry cough; shortness of breath; shallow and fast breathing; tiredness; unintended gradual weight loss; aching muscles and joints; and a “widening and rounding of the tips of the fingers or toes” (clubbing). Id.
341. Id.
342. Id. During winter, wood smoke is the state’s third largest source of air pollution. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Air Quality: Motor Vehicles, supra note 335.
346. Id. It should be noted that in 2008 the Legislature passed legislation reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 2020, with continuing reductions through 2050. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.235.020 (2014); Climate Change, DEPT OF ECOLOGY, ST. OF WASH., http://www.ecy.wa.gov/climatechange/ghg_reducing.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2015). In addition, both former Governor Gregoire and current Governor Inslee signed executive orders aimed at reducing carbon and greenhouse gas pollution. Id. The effectiveness of these measures remains to be seen.
damaging to species like salmon, but they have a serious and negative effect on future human health. The decrease in the snowpack and earlier snowmelt will lead to increased water shortages.\footnote{Climate Change Health Threats in Washington, NAT’L RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL, http://www.nrdc.org/health/climate/wa.asp?airpollution (last visited Dec. 12, 2014).} Because of climate change, approximately sixty-seven percent of Washingtonians “now face a higher risk of water shortages by mid-century.”\footnote{Id.} Furthermore, “[c]limate change will worsen smog and cause[] plants to produce more pollen pollution, increasing respiratory health threats.”\footnote{Id.}

In sum, Washington’s aspirational goal of providing clean air that is healthy for both people and nature has not been met. The legislature’s language, while expressing the strong environmental protection ethos of the state, is not enough to actually provide a healthy environment. A constitutional amendment is necessary to bridge the gap between rhetoric and reality.

2. Ocean Acidification and Rising Temperatures are Negatively Affecting Washington’s Natural Resources

In 1971, before the catastrophic effects of ocean acidification were recognized, the Washington Legislature passed the Shoreline Management Act,\footnote{WASH. REV. CODE § 90.58.010–90.58.920 (2014) (Chapter 90.58 is entitled Shoreline Management Act of 1971). A full review of the Legislature’s actions to prevent ocean pollution is beyond the scope of this Comment. The examples provided are meant to illustrate that the Legislature has taken action, and that the action has failed to adequately protect the state’s ocean shoreline.} pledging to protect the shorelines and their natural resources. The Act was passed after a legislative finding “that the shorelines of the state are among the most valuable and fragile of its natural resources and that there is great concern throughout the state relating to their utilization, protection, restoration, and preservation.”\footnote{Id. § 90.58.020.}

To realize this goal, when adopting shoreline development guidelines that have a statewide effect, the Department of Ecology is required to give preference to the following seven uses in the following order:

(1) Recognize and protect the statewide interest over local interest;
(2) Preserve the natural character of the shoreline;
(3) Result in long term over short term benefit;
(4) Protect the resources and ecology of the shoreline;
(5) Increase public access to publicly owned areas of the...
shorelines;
(6) Increase recreational opportunities for the public in the shoreline;
(7) Provide for any other element as defined in RCW 90.58.100 deemed appropriate or necessary. 352

The recent oyster die-offs 353 and the continuing ocean acidification 354 demonstrate that the legislature has not met its goal of protecting the ecology of the shoreline—the fourth required use of the shorelines.

The Legislature has taken one step in response to the challenges of ocean acidification. In 2013 the State Legislature passed Engrossed Senate Bill 5603. 355 Section 4 of this legislation establishes the Marine Resources Advisory Council. 356 In addition to providing a forum for discussion around ocean acidification and its attendant problems, 357 the Council provides recommendations to the governor, local agencies, and the legislature on coastal waters issues. 358 The effectiveness of this Council remains to be seen.

What is known is that up to this point, the state has failed (and is failing) to protect its citizens and natural resources from ocean acidification, with devastating consequences. One of the leading causes of ocean acidification is atmospheric carbon dioxide. 359 Changes in land use, in combination with the burning of fossil fuels, has resulted in massive quantities of carbon dioxide being released into the earth’s atmosphere. 360 The ocean has absorbed approximately one-quarter of anthropogenic carbon dioxide. This has caused ocean acidification, or the decrease in upper-oceans pH. 361

This acidification is particularly damaging for Washington given the

352. Id. (emphasis added).
354. See infra notes 359–369 and accompanying text.
357. Id. § 2(2)(e).
358. Id. § 2(2)(f).
360. Id.
361. Id.
state’s location and geography. In addition to atmospheric carbon dioxide, “acidification in Washington State coastal waters is driven by a combination of factors, particularly in the deep waters of Puget Sound and the nearshore regions that are so important to Washington’s shellfish industry.” These factors include an increase in nutrients like nitrogen, phosphorous, and silicate in Washington waters caused, in part, by fertilizer runoff and erosion. These nutrients can lead to algal blooms, which, when they die, drive down pH levels in deeper waters and are indicated by incidences of coastal hypoxia (very low oxygen levels). Nutrients in animal waste runoff from large farms can also cause algal blooms, leading to acidification. Large factory farms also emit greenhouse gases, which contribute to climate change and its attendant negative effects on water quality. In addition, burning fossil fuels releases gases like nitrogen oxides and sulfur oxides, which form acids when dissolved in seawater. Finally, industrial wastes that are deposited directly into marine waters can be acidic.

Ocean acidification is a huge problem for Washington State, and the effects can already be felt. The recent oyster die-offs along the Washington coast were a result of ocean acidification. Other species that have cultural and economic importance to Washington and have negative reactions to ocean acidification include clams and mussels. In addition, marine fish species have shown changes in behavior, survivorship, and growth in response to ocean acidification. Ocean acidification is threatening Washington’s marine species and consequently the state’s economy. Washington is the nation’s largest provider of farmed oysters, mussels, and clams. The industry supports

362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Id. at xii.
365. Id.
368. BLUE RIBBON SUMMARY, supra note 359, at xii.
369. Id.
371. BLUE RIBBON SUMMARY, supra note 359, at xii.
372. Id.
374. Id.
3200 jobs, and generates $270 million annually. Tribes also “depend upon shellfish for food, income and connection to their cultural heritage.” Washington’s seafood industry—which could be threatened by changes to marine food webs—is also a major contributor to the state economy, generating a gross of at least $1.7 billion, and providing over 42,000 jobs. Ocean acidification could threaten not only Washington’s natural marine resources, but also its economy and culture.

In addition to ocean acidification, climate change is increasing, or will increase, water temperatures in streams, lakes, and rivers. Rising temperatures will have a particularly large impact on cold-water fish, like salmon. The United States Global Change Research Program predicts that up to forty percent of Pacific Northwest salmon could be lost by the year 2050. The loss of the salmon would be particularly devastating in Washington, where salmon is a source of food, employment, and recreation, and plays a central role in culture and tradition.

3. Washington’s Land/Soil Is Polluted, Increasing the Potential for Serious Health Risks

Washington has also passed environmental legislation that sounded promising in its potential for protecting the state’s land and soil. The Model Toxics Control Act was passed as a voter initiative in November 1988, and became effective in 1989. The “main purpose . . . is to raise sufficient funds to clean up all hazardous waste sites and to prevent the creation of future hazards due to improper disposal of toxic wastes into the state’s land and waters.” Twenty-five

375. Id.
376. Id. Coastal economies receive more than twenty-seven million dollars annually from the recreational harvests of these species. Id.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Craig, supra note 42, at 793.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Id.
384. Id. § 70.105D.920.
385. Id. § 70.105D.010 (emphasis added). Generally, hazardous substance has a broad definition, including that of hazardous waste, which is “any discarded, useless, unwanted, or abandoned substances . . . which are disposed of in such quantity or concentration as to pose a substantial
years later, not only is hazardous waste still a continuing problem in Washington, but new sources of hazardous waste are adding pollution to the state’s soils.

There are approximately 677,000 acres in the state of Washington that are classified as being affected by area-wide soil contamination. These contaminated areas are affected by low- to moderate-level soil contamination, which generally have arsenic and lead levels that are higher than levels established under the Model Toxics Control Act and higher than naturally occurring amounts. The cause of this contamination is often historic, including contamination from metal smelting operations, the “use of lead-arsenate pesticides,” and leaded gasoline. However, present-day sources of soil-polluting arsenic include “wood treated with chromated copper arsenic (often called ‘pressure-treated’ wood), emissions from coal-fired power plants and incinerators, and other industrial processes.” There are numerous present-day sources of lead that pollute the soil, including “lead-based paint, lead-soldered water pipes, home remedies or health-care products that contain lead, hobbies that use lead (e.g., staining glass or sculpturing), food and beverages, combustion of coal or oil, waste incinerators, and mining and industrial processes (such as battery and ammunition manufacturing).”

Both lead and arsenic have negative health implications for children and adults. Although in general the amount of arsenic found in Washington’s soils is too low to cause serious effects after short-term exposure, long-term exposure to amounts that can be found in the environment can have serious health effects. Multiple types of cancer—

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387. Id.

388. Id.

389. Id.

390. Id.

391. “Swallowing relatively large amounts of arsenic (even just one time) can cause mild symptoms, serious illness, or death. Milder effects may include swelling of the face, nausea, vomiting, stomach pain, or diarrhea. Serious effects may include coma, internal bleeding, or nerve damage causing weakness or loss of sensation in the hands, arms, feet, or legs. Levels of arsenic in Washington’s soil and water are generally too low to cause health effects from short-term exposure.” Arsenic, WASH. ST. DEP’T OF HEALTH, http://www.doh.wa.gov/CommunityandEnvironment/Contaminants/Arsenic.aspx (last visited Jan. 4, 2015).
including lung, bladder, non-melanoma skin, liver, and kidney—as well as cardiovascular disease, damage to peripheral nerves, and diabetes mellitus, are strongly linked to long-term arsenic ingestion. Even if other factors, like genetics, may have a stronger role in the development of these diseases than arsenic, “arsenic can increase the risk of developing these illnesses and is likely to contribute to some of the cases.” In Washington, environmental exposure is most likely to result in a small increased risk in the development of some types of cancer. Children and adults can be exposed to lead through the air, food, water, and soil. Exposure can “damage the nervous system, kidneys, and reproductive system.” Lead exposure can have serious consequences for both children and adults. In children, it can result in behavioral problems, learning difficulties, and diminished growth. “In adults, lead can increase blood pressure, affect memory, and contribute to other health problems.” The toxins that pollute Washington’s soil can have serious health consequences for Washingtonians of all ages.

In sum, despite Washington’s legislative efforts and ambitious goals, the state continues to face serious pollution problems, which can have negative effects on human health and the economy. Air pollution and the attendant respiratory problems cost the state millions of dollars per year. Ocean and air pollution, and the attendant changes in pH, are warming the waters and creating an aquatic environment that is inhospitable to shellfish and salmon. Continuing exposure to lead and arsenic in the soil increases the chances of serious disease, and can cause additional mental and behavioral problems. The legislature has passed legislation to address each of these areas of pollution, and yet, despite its lofty and admirable goals, the pollution persists. Although Washington cannot solve all of its environmental challenges alone—many of them are affected by outside causes and sources—it must do its part in the fight against pollution. The pervasive and difficult nature of these problems

392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Id.
396. Id.
398. Id.
indicates that these challenges need to be given higher priority through a constitutional amendment.

B. Amending the Washington State Constitution Is Necessary to Address These Environmental Challenges

Amending the Washington State Constitution to include an expanded public trust doctrine that codifies a positive right to a healthy environment is necessary to address the state’s ongoing environmental challenges. As demonstrated above, despite their ambitious language, legislative measures have not been successful in protecting the environment. Elevating environmental protection to the constitutional level will provide the necessary political clout and technical means to ensure that the citizens of Washington are able to live in a healthy environment, or at least legally fight for one.399

1. The Current Codified Public Trust Doctrine Is Too Narrow to Fully Protect the Environment

As it is currently interpreted, Washington’s public trust doctrine does not adequately protect a wide range of natural environments and resources.400 Indeed, at least some scholars have argued that the public trust doctrine has “made little difference in citizen rights and the availability of legal remedies in the State of Washington.”401 Although the narrow, traditional public trust doctrine402 is codified in the State Constitution,403 a broad public trust doctrine that protects all elements of the environment—not just those connected to navigable waters—is not. Expanding and codifying a public trust doctrine that reaches all elements of the environment, including the land and the air, would provide greater protection for all aspects of an interconnected environment.404

399. Amending the Constitution to include a right to a healthy environment that provides a private right of action would give individual citizens a chance to address specific pollution problems. See generally Svitak ex rel. Svitak v. State, No. 69720-2-I, 2013 WL 6632124 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 16, 2013). The amendment that this Comment is proposing will be self-executing, meaning that it will not need any legislative action to become functional. Like the right to education, the proposed amendment would provide a private right of action.

400. Bodi, supra note 73, at 645.

401. Id.

402. The traditional public trust doctrine provides for state ownership and protection of just navigable waters and their beds and shorelands. WASH. CONST. art. XVII, § 1; see also supra Part I.B.1.

403. WASH. CONST. art. XVII, § 1; see also supra Part I.B.1.

404. The Washington State Supreme Court recognized that some states have extended the public trust doctrine beyond resources connected to navigable waters because modern science identified a public need beyond navigable waters. See Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 641 & n.10, 747
2. **An Expanded Common Law Public Trust Doctrine Is Not Sufficient Because Its Uses Are Limited and It Is Inherently Vulnerable to Erosion**

Even if the public trust doctrine were to be expanded under common law, such an expansion would not adequately protect the environment. As a recent Washington case, *Svitak ex rel. Svitak v. State*, demonstrates, the common law public trust doctrine cannot be the basis of a suit for injunctive or declaratory relief based on state inaction. In *Svitak*, a group of minor children and their guardians filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against the state of Washington and various government officials, alleging “that under the public trust doctrine, the atmosphere is a public trust resource, and the State has an affirmative fiduciary duty as its trustee to preserve and protect the atmosphere from global warming for the benefit of present and future generations.” The complaint did not allege a failure of any specific law or constitutional provision.

The court dismissed the action for two reasons. First, the court found that it was a political question, and thus was not appropriate for the court to decide. Second, “the issue is not justiciable as there is no allegation of violation of a specific statute or constitution.” The court found that there was no actual dispute because the plaintiffs did not identify any constitutional provision that would have been “violated by state inaction.” Environmental problems are often the result of state inaction, and injunctive and declaratory relief can be powerful tools used to protect the environment. Amending the Washington State

P.2d 1062, 1073 & n.10 (1987). Scholars have also recognized the importance of applying the public trust doctrine to all natural resources—not just those related to navigable waters—due to the interconnected nature of the environment. See, e.g., Wood, supra note 7, at 83–84.

406. Id.
407. Id. at *1.
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. Id. at *2.
Constitution to provide a broader codified public trust doctrine and an affirmative right to a healthy environment would provide the legal, constitutional basis necessary to sustain this type of otherwise nonjusticiable suit. 414

Furthermore, as a common law doctrine alone, the public trust doctrine is limited in what it can achieve.415 Generally, the common law develops slowly, in reaction to case-specific circumstances.416 Not only does the common law public trust doctrine fail to support claims for injunctive or declaratory relief,417 it is subject to the political will of the legislature,418 which can erode the doctrine at any time or refuse to act in favor of environmental protection. Furthermore, courts can either refuse to expand the doctrine419 or, if they want to, find that they cannot. The common law nature of the public trust doctrine curtails the courts’ ability “[t]o create and impose [a] new duty, [which] would necessarily involve resolution of complex social, economic, and environmental issues.”420 Indeed, courts have recognized that under the common law they are constrained from creating programs to protect the environment by the separation of powers doctrine.421 The establishment of programs


414. Because the amendment is still a hypothetical, it is unclear how its contours would develop. It is possible that the courts, through common law, would determine how the amendment may be utilized and the extent of its protections. On the other hand, it is equally likely that the legislature would play an integral role in determining the meaning of “healthy.” Or, like the right to education, the contours of the amendment may be determined by both the legislature and the courts. Cf. McCleary v. State, 173 Wash. 2d 477, 483–84, 269 P.3d 227, 231 (2012) (indicating that both the legislature and the court shape the right to education). Because this Comment is meant primarily as an introduction to the idea of an amendment giving the people the right to a healthy environment, a discussion of how that amendment, if adopted, may develop, is outside its scope.

415. See Klass, supra note 31, at 712.

416. Id. at 713. But see Wood, supra note 7, at 78 (arguing that the flexibility of the common law public trust doctrine is a “great strength[]” and that “[i]n the face of climate crisis, which presents an urgency to which the political branches have not responded, the common law’s adaptability to new situations may prove crucial”).


418. See Ralph W. Johnson, Protection of Biodiversity Under the Public Trust Doctrine, 8 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 21, 29 (1994). But see Wood, supra note 7, at 75–77 (arguing that judges could exercise a powerful public trust “veto” which would allow the court to invalidate “[l]egislative acts inconsistent with the trust,” but recognizing that “[m]any courts . . . stay their hand” and grant deference to the legislature).

419. See Klass, supra note 31, at 712.


421. Id. (“Courts have recognized that creation of [programs to protect the environment] under the common law is inappropriate because it invades the prerogatives of the legislative branch,
that have broad social and economic implications is generally the prerogative of the legislative branch. Because there is no constitutionally protected right to a healthy environment, the courts’ hands are tied where the legislature has either refused to act or has not gone far enough. Amending the Constitution to include a broad public trust doctrine that clearly states the public has a right to a healthy environment would give the courts the constitutional hook necessary to force state (or private party) action.

3. An Amendment Would Provide the Necessary Constitutional Hook for Courts and Impose Duties on the State and Its Agencies

The amendment that this Comment suggests would, in many ways, be analogous to the right to education enshrined in article IX, section 1 of the Washington State Constitution in that it would provide the courts with a constitutional hook that would allow them to step into an area of law that is traditionally within the purview of the legislature. In the context of education, the Court is monitoring the legislature’s implementation of reforms to education funding to ensure that the state is complying with its duty to provide education for the children within its borders. As the Court recognized in McCleary, while it cannot dictate “the precise means by which the State must discharge its duty,” it also “cannot stand on the sidelines and hope the State meets its constitutional mandate to amply fund education.” Like the constitutional mandate to fund education, the proposed amendment would create a state mandate to provide for a healthy environment. The proposed amendment would, like article IX, section 1, be “a mandate, not to a single branch of government, but to the entire state.” A broad mandate ensures that the courts cannot “abdicate [their] judicial role” in ensuring that the mandate is followed. A clear, codified right to a healthy environment could also give the court reason to closely scrutinize state action or inaction that may be imposing negative

thereby violating the separation of powers doctrine.”).}

422. Id.

423. If such an amendment is adopted, Washington courts could look to other states that have a similar constitutional provision, like Montana and Pennsylvania (discussed supra Parts I.E.1.a & c), for guidance on how to interpret and implement an amendment guaranteeing a right to a healthy environment. A more detailed comparison between the proposed Washington amendment and other states’ provisions is beyond the scope of this Comment.


425. Id. at 541, 269 P.3d at 259.

426. Id.

427. Id.
environmental consequences.\textsuperscript{428}

A constitutional amendment could not only be a judicial hook, but could also impose a mandate (and the authority necessary to carry it out) on state agencies\textsuperscript{429} and the legislature.\textsuperscript{430} Passing a constitutional right to a healthy environment has a huge influence on environmental legislation.\textsuperscript{431} In the vast majority of the countries examined by Professor Boyd, countries with a constitutional right to a healthy environment have strengthened national environmental laws, and “incorporat[ed] substantive and procedural environmental rights.”\textsuperscript{432} A constitutionally enshrined broad public trust doctrine that clearly creates a positive right to a healthy environment could provide the vision and support required for the state to implement controversial environmental protection measures.\textsuperscript{433} With a constitutional mandate, neither the legislature nor the courts could avoid their duty to protect the environment. Having constitutional authority for environmental protection is particularly important given the politically controversial and often divisive nature of many environmental problems.\textsuperscript{434}

CONCLUSION

Amending the Washington State Constitution to include a positive right to a healthy environment is not a radical step for Washington. It is a necessary step to ensure the state’s environmental integrity and protect its citizens’ health. Washington, along with the rest of the world, is facing and will continue to face serious environmental challenges. Although Washington cannot control nor solve all of its impending environmental problems by itself, it must do what it can because those problems will negatively affect the state’s citizens, economy, and natural resources. Amending the Constitution, and empowering individuals with a positive right to a healthy environment, is the first crucial step to ensure that the Evergreen State remains forever green.

\textsuperscript{428} Klass, supra note 31, at 719.
\textsuperscript{429} Craig, supra note 42, at 831.
\textsuperscript{430} Cf. McCleary, 173 Wash. 2d 477, 269 P.3d 227.
\textsuperscript{431} BOYD, supra note 261, at 279.
\textsuperscript{432} Id. at 279–80.
\textsuperscript{433} See id. at 28.
Appendix A

Joint Resolution

BE IT RESOLVED, BY THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, IN LEGISLATIVE SESSION ASSEMBLED:

THAT, At the next general election to be held in this state the secretary of state shall submit to the qualified voters of the state for their approval and ratification, or rejection, an amendment to Article I of the Constitution of the state of Washington by adding a new section to read as follows:

“Article I, section ___. (a) The state of Washington is the trustee of Washington’s natural environment, including the air, water, soil, and ocean shores. It is one of the principal duties of the state to protect, preserve, and restore the state’s natural environment for the current generation and for generations to come. Those residing within Washington’s borders, now and in the future, have a positive right to live in and enjoy a healthy environment.

(b) This amendment shall take full effect immediately upon the approval and ratification by the qualified voters. The legislature may take action to carry out the purposes of this section, but no such action shall be required for this section to become effective.”

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, That the statement of subject and concise description for the ballot title of this constitutional amendment shall read: “The legislature has proposed a constitutional amendment to enshrine a positive right to a healthy environment. The amendment would create self-executing right to a healthy environment and establish the protection, preservation, and restoration of Washington’s air, water, soil, and ocean shores as a principal state duty. Should this constitutional amendment be:

Approved ................................
Rejected ................................*

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, That the secretary of state shall cause notice of this constitutional amendment to be published at least four times during the four weeks next preceding the election in every legal newspaper in the state.

— END —