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WHITHER THE TAX GAP?

James Alm & Jay A. Soled

For decades, policy makers and politicians have railed against the “tax gap,” or the difference between what taxpayers are legally obligated to pay in taxes and what they actually pay in taxes. To close the gap, Congress has instituted numerous reforms with varying degrees of success. Notwithstanding these efforts, the tax gap has largely remained intact, and, if anything, it has gradually grown over the last several decades.

However, the tax gap may well begin to diminish in size (or “wither” away), if not immediately then over time. Three developments will help narrow the tax gap’s size. First, the ubiquity of credit cards, debit cards, and smartphone payment apps has purged cash—the erstwhile driving engine of the tax gap—from its use in many economic transactions. Second, the availability of third-party sources of information, combined with the universal use of computerization to store, access, and analyze information, has significantly curtailed a taxpayer’s ability to hide income here in the United States or overseas. Third, broad economic trends such as concentration and globalization have generated a workforce dynamic in which taxpayers generally are employed by large business enterprises (where individual tax compliance is fairly high) rather than in traditional mom-and-pop businesses (where individual tax compliance is typically low).

The implications associated with a lower tax gap are vast. Even beyond the usual considerations associated with greater tax compliance (e.g., increased revenues, reduced noncompliance-induced inefficiencies, and improved horizontal and vertical equity of tax burdens), taxpayers would experience a shift in the labor market and an adjustment in the prices paid for consumer goods and services. Also, rather than conducting audits and deterring noncompliance, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) would be able to dedicate a greater share of its limited resources to other pressing agenda items, such as assisting taxpayers in their compliance endeavors.

There are, of course, other countervailing economic trends that may subvert the forces that will act to reduce the tax gap, so its future path remains highly uncertain (and hence the alternative use of “whither”). Also, for a whole host of reasons, especially reductions in IRS funding, the tax gap will not be closed anytime soon. Nevertheless, the tide against tax noncompliance may finally be turning.

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INTRODUCTION

There is much discussion in the popular media and academic presses regarding the severity of the “tax gap,” defined as the difference between what taxpayers actually pay in taxes in a timely manner and what they should pay if they fully comply with the tax laws. The tax


gap was most recently estimated by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for the average of tax years 2008 to 2010 to be $458 billion annually, with an associated “voluntary compliance rate” (VCR) (or taxes paid relative to total taxes legally due) of 81.7%. This is a stunning dollar amount. Indeed, were the IRS to completely close this gap, the agency would come close to eliminating the nation’s annual federal government budget deficit.

Over time and in absolute dollar amounts, the tax gap’s size has progressively grown. The first IRS estimates of the tax gap were for 1973 and indicated a gross individual and corporate income tax gap of $28 billion to $32 billion and a VCR of about 84%. Subsequent estimates throughout the 1970s and 1980s indicated a steady growth in the tax gap with a fairly constant VCR between 82% to 84%. By the time the IRS released updated estimates for 1992 for the individual income tax, the gross tax gap had increased to over $93 billion. Since then, the tax gap has continued to grow to where it is today (i.e., $458 billion). The general sentiment among most observers is that this trend will likely continue and perhaps even worsen.

However, the predictions of a persistent and steadily growing tax gap, both in absolute and relative magnitudes, are in all likelihood wrong. Instead, it seems far more probable that the tax gap will diminish in size.
in the future; that is, the tax gap may well “wither” away in size over the coming years. This prediction is based upon the following three significant trends. First, the use of credit cards, debit cards, and smartphone payment apps has become much more prevalent in economic commerce. This manner of conducting economic transactions creates an electronic (and traceable) trail of commerce and simultaneously subverts the driving engine behind many tax evasion activities, namely, the use of cash. Second, governments around the world, including the United States, have added new third-party compliance measures that take advantage of computer advances to monitor taxpayer economic activities so that the opportunity for taxpayers to pay less than they owe by mistake or by subterfuge has been and will continue to be dramatically reduced. Third, as business enterprises have grown in magnitude—in many instances eradicating small businesses—there is more direct and indirect tax compliance oversight. 

Taxpayers can nevertheless be cagey and particularly tenacious in their determination to defeat their tax obligations—in some cases, legitimately, and in other cases, illegitimately. Therefore, in order to make full disclosure, it is necessary to point out and analyze possible countervailing tendencies that make the future path of the tax gap highly uncertain (and hence the title choice of “W(h)ither the Tax Gap?”).

This analysis proceeds as follows. Part I provides an overview of the tax gap. Part II details each of the trends that, together, should cause the tax gap to narrow. Part III discusses the possible implications associated with a narrower tax gap. Part IV presents the counterrtrends that make the evolution of the tax gap uncertain. The final Part concludes.

I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE TAX GAP

At the outset, it is important to differentiate tax avoidance from tax evasion. Taxpayers may participate in legal “tax avoidance” activities, such as income splitting, postponement of taxes, and tax arbitrage across income that faces different tax treatment, all of which minimizes one’s tax liability. In contrast, the phrase “tax evasion” refers to illegal and intentional actions taken by taxpayers to circumvent their legally due tax
obligations by underreporting incomes, overstating deductions, exemptions, or credits, failing to file appropriate tax returns, and even engaging in barter. Most often these actions are viewed through the lens of the individual income tax, but these types of actions can clearly be taken to mitigate other forms of taxation. It is the existence of tax evasion, not tax avoidance, that creates what commentators term the “tax gap.”

The IRS defines the tax gap as the amount of tax liability legally incurred by taxpayers that is not paid in a timely manner. More precisely, the tax gap is the difference between tax revenues actually collected in any given year and the amount that should be collected if taxpayers fully and timely complied with the tax laws. In the most recent 2008–2010 estimates from the IRS, the tax gap consists of three separate components: (1) the “nonfiling gap” (i.e., taxes not paid by individuals who do not file a return at all or, alternatively, who file after the due date), (2) the “underreporting gap” (i.e., taxes not paid by taxpayers who file a return but misreport their true tax liability), and (3) the “underpayment gap” (i.e., taxes reported on filed tax returns that are not timely paid by taxpayers).

16. See supra notes 1–2.
17. See supra notes 1–2.
As a compendium of these three components, the IRS has published what it refers to as the Tax Gap Map, which graphically highlights the extent to which each of the components contributed to the overall tax gap in 2008–2010. Furthermore, the map breaks down each component by type of tax (i.e., individual income tax, corporate income tax, employment tax, estate tax, and excise tax) to illustrate the specific types of taxes that are nonfiled, underreported, or underpaid.

The map shows that, by far, the largest component of the 2008–2010 tax gap was the underreporting gap (equal to $387 billion), which comprised 84.5% of the entire tax gap. The largest contributor to the underreporting gap was underreporting of the individual income tax (equal to $264 billion). The map also indicates that the largest contributor to underreported individual income tax was unreported business income (equal to $125 billion).

While all tax gap estimates appear to be precise, the accuracy of these dollar estimates is subject to much uncertainty. Consider the particular challenges associated with estimating the underreporting gap: tax evasion is illegal, and taxpayers have strong incentives to conceal their cheating, particularly given financial and other penalties that are imposed on those who are found purposefully shortchanging their taxes. The approach that the IRS historically has used to compute the underreporting gap was based largely upon what is termed the “direct” measurement of evasion via actual audits of individual returns. For example, from 1963 to 1988, the IRS conducted detailed line-by-line audits of a stratified random sample of roughly 50,000 individual tax returns on a three-year cycle via its Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP). These audits yielded an IRS estimate of the taxpayer’s “true” income, which the agency could then compare to

19. See infra Appendix, Figure 2; Tax Gap Estimates, supra note 3.
20. Over time, these statistics have generally remained the same. See supra notes 5–6.
23. Id. (“TCMP started with tax year 1963 and examined individual returns most frequently—generally every 3 years—through tax year 1988. IRS contacted all taxpayers selected for TCMP studies.”).
“actual” reported items. The TCMP has now been replaced by the National Research Program (NRP),24 which examines roughly 46,000 randomly selected individual returns for selected years (which, to date, include 2001 and 2006), only some of which were subject to line-by-line audits.25 It is these NRP data that have been used for the more recent IRS estimates of the tax gap.26

With respect to the remaining two components of the tax gap, or the underpayment gap and the nonfiling gap, the difficulty of measurement varies, and the IRS uses different procedures. It is relatively easy to compute the underpayment gap, which is simply the difference between how much tax is reported by taxpayers and how much they actually pay on time.27 It is far more challenging to estimate the nonfiling gap, which results from comparing the overall tax-filing population with those who actually file and estimating the tax that nonfilers would owe less the tax that they may have paid via source withholding; the IRS makes nonfiling gap estimates using its own data and that supplied by the U.S. Census Bureau.28

For decades, the tax gap has plagued the nation’s finances. Its presence has a variety of harmful economic effects. The most obvious impact is that it contributes to larger federal government budget deficits, forcing either spending cuts or tax increases. The reduction in tax collections affects the taxes that compliant taxpayers face and the public services that they receive. The tax gap also has more subtle effects beyond these revenue losses. For example, when taxpayers alter their behavior to cheat on their taxes, such as in their choices of hours to work, occupations to enter, and investments to undertake, they create misallocations in resource use that affect the economy.29 Furthermore,


25. See Sarah B. Lawsky, Fairly Random: On Compensating Audited Taxpayers, 41 CONN. L. REV. 161, 167 (2008) (“Like the TCMP, the NRP selects returns randomly, but it reviews even fewer returns and does so with less intensity than the TCMP” (i.e., most of the returns are not reviewed line-by-line and each item audited does not require substantiation)).

26. Id.

27. The IRS estimates the underpayment gap using internal IRS tabulations. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 5.


29. For attempts to estimate these efficiency effects, see generally James Alm, The Welfare Cost of the Underground Economy, 24 ECON. INQUIRY 243 (1985); James Alm & Robert Buckley, Are Government Revenues from Financial Repression Worth the Costs?, 26 PUB. FIN. REV. 187 (1998); Jonathan R. Kesselman, Income Tax Evasion: An Intersectoral Analysis, 38 J. PUB. ECON. 137 (1989). For a more recent effort to estimate these efficiency effects, see James Alm, Analyzing and
the tax gap alters the distribution of income in arbitrary, unpredictable, and unfair ways since some taxpayers are better able to exploit the tax system than others.\textsuperscript{30} The tax gap may also contribute to feelings of unjust treatment and disrespect for the law,\textsuperscript{31} requiring the government to expend resources to detect noncompliance, to measure its magnitude, and to penalize its perpetrators. It even affects the accuracy of macroeconomic statistics since the presence of large amounts of tax evasion means that official measures of output likely omit much economic activity.\textsuperscript{32} More broadly, it is not possible to understand the true impact of taxation without recognizing the existence and the effects of the tax gap.

To date, the U.S. tax gap has proven largely resistant to efforts to reduce its size, and the experience of other countries around the world is

\textsuperscript{30} For a recent attempt to estimate these distributional effects, see Andrew Johns & Joel Slemrod, \textit{The Distribution of Income Tax Noncompliance}, 63 NAT’L TAX J. 397 (2010). They find that the ratio of misreported income to true income generally rises with true income (so that higher income individuals misreport income at a higher rate than lower income individuals), but also that the ratio of misreported taxes to true taxes tends to fall with true income (so that the lower income individuals misreport taxes at a higher rate than higher income individuals). \textit{Id.} at 397. Note that these estimates ignore any market adjustments of product or factor prices that may occur due to the tax gap, as discussed in detail later.

\textsuperscript{31} In the analysis of tax evasion behavior, there are many approaches that attempt to explain behavior by incorporating various related notions of unjust treatment and disrespect for the law, most of which have their origins in the psychology of taxation. For example, some theorists suggest that taxpayer “trust” in government affects compliance behavior. James Alm & Benno Torgler, \textit{Do Ethics Matter? Tax Compliance and Morality}, 101 J. BUS. ETHICS 635, 636 (2011). Others adopt a slightly different terminology and explore the interaction between enforcement effort ("power") and facilitation ("trust") on the part of the tax authority. Erich Kirchler, Erik Hoelzl & Ingrid Wahl, \textit{Enforced Versus Voluntary Tax Compliance: The "Slippery Slope" Framework}, 29 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 210, 211 (2008). Still others suggest that people may choose to comply willingly ("committed compliance") or unwillingly ("capitulative compliance"), they may take full advantage of the law in minimizing their taxes ("creative compliance"), or they may choose noncompliance; depending upon these choices, appropriate enforcement policies vary. Doreen McBarnet, \textit{When Compliance Is Not the Solution but the Problem: From Changes in Law to Changes in Attitude, in Taxing Democracy: Understanding Tax Avoidance and Evasion} 229 (Valerie Braithwaite ed., 2003); see also DOREEN MCBARNET, CRIME, COMPLIANCE AND CONTROL (2004). Finally, others argue that individuals are motivated either by “deference” or “defiance” motives and that enforcement actions should be tailored to reflect these different motivations. VALERIE BRAITHWAITE, \textit{Defiance in Taxation and Governance: Resisting and Dismissing Authority in a Democracy} 22, 26 (2009).

similar.\footnote{33} Even so, there are emerging forces that seem likely to reduce the tax gap in future years. In the next Part, these trends are discussed.

II. TRENDS THAT WILL NARROW THE TAX GAP

There are many commentators and politicians who contend that taxpayer noncompliance is so embedded in the nation’s fabric that it is virtually impossible to reverse.\footnote{34} In other words, it is said, given the economic incentives for cheating, those taxpayers who purposefully shortchange the government are not apt to undergo a metamorphosis anytime soon and start paying their legally due taxes. Furthermore, the IRS lacks the resources not only to detect noncompliance in a comprehensive fashion but also to prosecute the agency’s claims to the full extent of the law;\footnote{35} even if the IRS were inclined and able to do so, the political backlash would be massive and negative.\footnote{36} As a result, many believe that the tax gap will persist and even grow over time.\footnote{37} Those taxpayers who act unscrupulously and whose actions are met with impunity are likely to continue in their behavior, and other taxpayers who learn of these derelictions may start to behave in a similarly noncompliant way.\footnote{38}

\footnote{33. See Richard Murphy, Closing the European Tax Gap, TAX RESEARCH LLP (Feb. 10, 2012), http://www.socialistsanddemocrats.eu/sites/default/files/120229_richard_murphy_eu_tax_gap_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/5CLB-UWPC] (explaining the severity of the European tax gap and why it is so challenging to close).}


\footnote{37. See Raskolnikov, supra note 9.}

\footnote{38. See Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, The Economics of Strong Reciprocity, in MORAL SENTIMENTS & MATERIAL INTERESTS: THE FOUNDATIONS OF COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC LIFE 167 (2005) (“[I]f people believe that cheating on taxes, corruption, or abuses of the welfare state are widespread, they themselves are more likely to cheat on taxes, take bribes, or abuse welfare state institutions.”); Benno Torgler, Speaking to Theorists and Searching for Facts: Tax Morale and Tax Compliance in Experiments, 16 J. ECON. SURV. 657, 663–66 (2002) (describing how group dynamics may contribute to tax noncompliance).}
However, notwithstanding these points, there are three external forces that should cause the tax gap to narrow over time: (A) the rise of electronic commerce, (B) information availability via computerization, and (C) a shifting labor force.

A. The Rise of Electronic Currency

The use of physical currency to transact commerce has a long history, dating back at least four millennia. Its use constitutes a tremendous advancement from the economic system of barter that predated it. Notwithstanding the virtues of physical currency to facilitate business transactions, currency use suffers from a fundamental flaw from a tax compliance perspective: it is virtually impossible to trace. As such, currency has been one of the underground economy's cornerstones. Indeed, the magnitude of its use is one of the main metrics by which the size of the underground economy is often estimated.

However, over the course of the last several decades, the use of electronic currency in commerce has experienced a meteoric rise,

40. See Claire Priest, Currency Policies and Legal Development in Colonial New England, 110 YALE L.J. 1303, 1318 (2001) (“Pure barter creates essentially two impediments to economic activity that have been emphasized in the economic literature: the need for a ‘double coincidence of wants,’ and information problems associated with an economy without money prices.”).
41. See Joseph Bankman, Eight Truths About Collecting Taxes from the Cash Economy, 117 TAX NOTES 506, 506 (2007) (describing how those who participate in the cash economy (e.g., “comprised of non-franchise retail or restaurants, service providers, general contractors and similar businesses throughout the economy”) generally do not pay tax or pay very little tax); Susan Cleary Morse, Stewart Karolinsky & Joseph Bankman, Cash Businesses and Tax Evasion, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 37, 37–38 (2009) (“Underpayment of tax on business income is commonly attributed to the receipt of cash.”). Note that in an attempt to reduce illicit activities, including tax cheating, Europe has decided to scrap the 500 Euro bill. Alanna Petroff, 500 Euro Bill Is Being Killed Off, CNN: MONEY (May 4, 2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/05/04/news/500-euro-bill-banknote-ecb/ [https://perma.cc/E8AK-T2EL].
42. See, e.g., FRIEDRICH SCHNEIDER & DOMINIK H. ENSTE, THE SHADOW ECONOMY—AN INTERNATIONAL SURVEY (2002). More recently, see James Alm & Abel Embaye, Using Panel Methods to Estimate Shadow Economies Around the World, 1984–1986, 41 PUB. FIN. REV. 510 (2013). There are, in fact, various definitions of the “underground economy,” also referred to as the “shadow economy,” the “informal economy,” and the “black economy,” among other monikers. One definition is that the underground economy includes all economic activities that contribute to the officially calculated gross national (or domestic) product but that are not included in these accounts. Relatedly, the underground economy could be defined as all market-based but unreported income from the production of legal goods and services, either from monetary or barter transactions, that would normally be taxable if they were reported to the tax authorities. Perhaps the most widely accepted definition is that the shadow economy includes all market-based goods and services (legal or illegal) that escape inclusion in official accounts.
supplanting physical currency use. Electronic commerce comes in essentially three forms: credit cards, debit cards, and smartphone payment applications. These three commerce modes are of very recent vintage. In the mid-twentieth century, credit cards were introduced, followed soon thereafter by the introduction of debit cards and, just in the last decade, by smartphone payment applications.

The emergence of electronic currency as a means of payment strongly supports the proposition that the widespread use of cash to finance transactions may be coming to an end.

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44. See Eric Tilden, A Detailed History of Debit Cards, EHOW, http://www.ehow.com/about_5462528_detailed-history-debit-cards.html [https://perma.cc/4YVF-UMGT] (“The First National Bank of Seattle issued the first debit card to business executives with large savings accounts in 1978. These cards acted like a check signature or a guarantee card, where the bank promised the funds would cover the transaction without the customer needing a check to complete the transaction.”).

45. See A Cash Call, ECONOMIST (Feb. 15, 2007), http://www.economist.com/node/8697424 [https://perma.cc/63HC-CDVM] (“Mobile phones are becoming an increasingly popular way to make all sorts of payments.”). In some countries, such as Kenya, electronic commerce is essentially replacing cash. See, e.g., Tom Standage, Why Does Kenya Lead the World in Mobile Money?, ECONOMIST (Mar. 2, 2015), http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/05/economist-explains-18 [https://perma.cc/A294-4GWH] (“Launched in 2007 by Safaricom, the country’s largest mobile-network operator, it is now used by over 17 [million] Kenyans, equivalent to more than two-thirds of the adult population; around 25% of the country’s gross national product flows through it. M-PESA lets people transfer cash using their phones, and is by far the most successful scheme of its type on earth.”). For an interactive timeline of M-PESA, see Celebrating 10 Years of Changing Lives, SAFARICOM LTD., https://www.safaricom.co.ke/mpesa_timeline/timeline.html [https://perma.cc/B99M-WWFL].

46. See Catherine New, Cash Dying as Credit Card Payments Predicted to Grow in Volume, HUFFINGTON POST (June 7, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/06/07/credit-card-payments-growth_n_1575417.html [https://perma.cc/Z7BD-JTQH] (“What was once the most secure way to pay for things—hard cash—is increasingly becoming currency non grata in wallets and checkouts across the country. Airlines won’t take it for in-flight snacks and a growing number of stores and restaurants like Standard Market, a new neighborhood market in Chicago, won’t accept it. It’s plastic or bust for consumers who want to do a transaction in these card-only places. Meanwhile, plastic cards purchases comprised 66 percent of all in-person sales, with nearly half of them, or 31 percent, made with debit cards, according to [Javelin Strategy & Research, a marketing research firm]. Last year shoppers used credit cards for 29 percent of point-of-sale purchases; Javelin expects that number to rise to 33 percent by 2017. Shoppers deployed gift cards and prepaid cards for 6 percent of purchases made with plastic last year. A mere 7 percent of transactions involved use of a paper check, with such transactions projected to drop further in the next few years.”). See generally John Heggestuen, Cash Is Fading, and Checks Are Dying as Smartphones and Tablets Change the Way We Pay, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 4, 2014), http://www.
purchases, there are comprehensive reports prepared by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston detailing cash usage; in its 2012 report (the most recent year for which data are available), there are two stunning statistics. First, credit and charge card payments constituted 21.6% of all purchases, the highest level ever recorded. Second, “[t]he average stock of cash carried [by an individual] for transactions fell more than 30 percent in real terms since the mid-1980s (from $112 to $79) and the typical amount of a cash withdrawal [by an individual from banks] fell nearly 50 percent (from $261 to $132).”

The implications for the underground economy of this decline in cash use are vast. The use of electronic means of payment will almost certainly reduce the extent of the underground economy because individuals who once routinely hid their transactions via cash will now be stripped of this luxury. Every electronic payment leaves an indelible mark; these “marks” enable IRS auditors to accurately access income flows. To minimize their taxable income (e.g., the underreporting gap), taxpayers may continue to overstate their deductions and expenses (for which auditors can demand substantiation), but their income can no longer be readily hidden or camouflaged.

Academics have often called for the elimination or curtailment of the use of physical currency in order to reduce tax evasion. To date, businessinsider.com/cash-is-fading-and-checks-are-dying-as-smartphones-and-tablets-change-the-way-we-pay-2014-8 [https://perma.cc/3B3U-P2FW].

48. Id. at 5.
50. Even at the local coffee store, consumers are forgoing the use of cash. See, e.g., Jeff Sommer, CHEAP COFFEE AND THE STARBUCKS PREMIUM, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2015, at B6 (Starbucks’s chief executive reports that “mobile payments now represent 20 percent of all in-store transactions in our U.S. stores, more than double the figure from only two years ago.”).
52. See, e.g., Jeffrey H. Kahn & Gregg Polsky, THE END OF CASH, THE INCOME TAX, AND THE NEXT 100 YEARS, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 159 (2013). There are also increasing calls to eliminate high denomination currency notes on the basis that such notes are the main means of financing illegal transactions. See, e.g., Kenneth Rogoff, COSTS AND BENEFITS TO PHASING OUT PAPER CURRENCY, NBER MACROECONOMICS ANNUAL CONFERENCE (2014), http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/rogoff/files/c13431.pdf [https://perma.cc/S9HT-ZTI6]; Lawrence Summers, KILLING THIS “BIN LADEN” IS A
politicians have yet to heed these calls for reform. For the foreseeable future, cash will thus remain a pillar of the nation’s economy. Even so, its importance will almost certainly continue to diminish. Further, those who use cash, especially large denomination notes, will likely be flagged as potential tax evaders. Finally, in a world dominated by non-cash users, cash users cannot insulate themselves completely even by their use of cash because there will likely be some electronic traces of their transactions with non-cash users, traces that will help identify at least some of their transactions and possible transgressions.

Overall, though there are some differences between the underground economy and the tax gap, there are also clear overlaps. Thus, as the importance of cash diminishes, the tax gap should correspondingly narrow in size.

B. Information Availability via Computerization

Computers have opened the doors to information storage and utilization, the likes of which are historically unparalleled; they can readily save large stocks of information, and they can comb through such information at lightning speed. This has resulted in a second

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53. See, e.g., KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THE CURSE OF CASH (2016) (calling attention to the fact that aside from buoying corruption, terrorism, the drug trade, and human trafficking, the use of cash helps feed tax evasion). In an attempt to curtail tax evasion, India instituted a policy ridding the country of certain cash denominations (i.e., 500 and 1,000 rupee notes) and replacing these notes with new tender. Rishi Iyengar, 50 Days of Pain: What Happened When India Trashed Its Cash, CNN: MONEY (Jan. 4, 2017), [https://money.cnn.com/2017/01/04/news/india/india-cash-crisis-rupee/](https://perma.cc/4YKH-QVSF). See also India’s Cash Crisis Explained, BBC NEWS (Nov. 17, 2016), [http://www.bbc.com/news/world/asia-india-37983834](http://www.bbc.com/news/world/asia-india-37983834) (“The decision was taken to crack down on corruption and illegal cash holdings known as ‘black money.’ In an attempt to curb tax evasion, the government expects to bring billions of dollars of unaccounted cash into the economy because the banned bills make up more than 80% of the currency in circulation.”).

trend, namely, an unparalleled access to information. In particular, information storage, information retrieval, and information transmission have proven pivotal in ensuring compliance in vast swaths of the nation’s economy.

Over the last several decades, Congress has put technology to use, requiring third-party tax information reporting throughout the economy.55 Employers must issue Form W-2, in which wage income is reported to the IRS and all employees.56 Banks and brokerage firms must issue Forms 1099-DIV and 1099-INT to investors, reporting interest and dividend income.57 Businesses must issue Form 1099-MISC to independent contractors, reporting payments for services rendered.58 The failure to prepare and timely submit these tax information returns is subject to penalties that have become increasingly onerous.59

Consider a recent example of how Congress has capitalized upon technological advancements. For decades, upon the sale or disposition of taxpayers’ investment assets, taxpayers often failed to accurately report their assets’ tax bases in computing their gains and losses.60 Sometimes this was due to a lack of good record keeping, other times this was due to ignorance of how the law applied (e.g., the effect of a stock split on the tax basis of a capital stock investment), and yet other times it was
done intentionally to minimize a tax burden.\textsuperscript{61} In 2008, Congress decided that taxpayers’ tax basis misreporting was contributing too greatly to the tax gap.\textsuperscript{62} Because the vast majority of taxpayers held their marketable security investments with sophisticated third-party brokers who had the resources to track the tax basis that their clients had in their investment assets and who also understood how to apply intricate tax basis adjustments, Congress took action.\textsuperscript{63} Notwithstanding cries from the financial and banking industries that they faced a mountain of technical issues that could not be overcome, Congress passed legislation mandating that third-party brokers track the tax bases that their clients had in their investments and report these dollar figures on tax information returns.\textsuperscript{64} This law has been in effect for several years, earning accolades from both the press and general public regarding its administrative efficiencies.\textsuperscript{65} It is also likely that there have been significant revenue gains from the law as basis misreporting has undoubtedly declined.\textsuperscript{66}

In light of technological advancements, the expansion of third-party tax information reporting shows no signs of abating. Congress has a powerful device at hand to monitor taxpayers’ income far more accurately than when, for example, the ancient Egyptians had to use the Nile’s height to gauge the amount of taxes that farmers were responsible for paying.\textsuperscript{67} Due to its benefits, Congress has expanded\textsuperscript{68} and will no doubt continue to expand third-party tax information reporting.\textsuperscript{69}

\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{61} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{63} See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 60.
\item \textsuperscript{66} See Jonathan Horn, \textit{The Brave New World of Cost Basis Reporting}, J. ACCOUNTANCY (Aug. 31, 2013), \url{http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/issues/2013/sep/20137345.html} [\url{https://perma.cc/42FB-ZNFC}] (explaining taxpayers’ tax basis reporting obligations under the then new law and, as a result, how greater tax compliance was a likely upshot).
\item \textsuperscript{67} Aristide Theodorides, \textit{The Concept of Law in Ancient Egypt}, in \textit{THE LEGACY OF EGYPT} 291, 292 (J. R. Harris ed., 2d ed. 1971).
\item \textsuperscript{69} See, e.g., James Alm & Jay A. Soled, \textit{Tax Basis Determinations, Pass-Through Entities, and Taxpayer Noncompliance}, 40 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 693 (2014) (beyond marketable securities, Congress
As discussed in more detail below, the IRS has gained from these technological advancements and innovations in terms of (1) efficiency improvements and (2) overseas account reporting.

1. Efficiency Improvements

By capitalizing upon technological advancements, the tax administration process has made remarkable strides in efficiency. These improvements are essentially twofold in nature: ease of processing and increase in accuracy.

Consider first the ease of processing. In earlier, pre-computer times, the IRS would receive handwritten and typed tax returns; once received, the information populating these tax returns would be manually keypunched into computers, a truly labor-intensive task that was prone to transcription errors. In the technological era, this antiquated system of processing has been virtually eliminated. Now it only takes milliseconds for IRS computers to match third-party information returns with self-reported taxpayer declarations. Electronic filing enables millions of tax information returns prepared by third parties, with billions of individual entries, to be received, processed, and matched with the electronically received tax return counterparts submitted by taxpayers. In 2015 (for the 2014 filing season), close to ninety percent of individual income tax returns were filed electronically. This percentage is anticipated to grow and will further improve the ability of the IRS to more quickly gather information, more rapidly process this information, and more efficiently target its enforcement efforts.

Third-party tax information reporting expansion has had a remarkable impact on tax compliance. Empirical evidence strongly supports the virtues of third-party tax information reporting: when third-party tax information return reporting is present (particularly when coupled with withholding), tax compliance is high. The converse is also true: in the
absence of third-party tax information return reporting, tax compliance plummets.  

indicated in the table below (for 2001), the IRS estimated that the NMPs are lowest for income types that are matched with third-party information sources and highest for nonmatched income types. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TAX YEAR 2001 FEDERAL TAX GAP (2007), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/01raastg07map.pdf [https://perma.cc/53XH-VSAB]. For example, the NMP for wages and salaries (which, aside from information return matching, e.g., Form W-2, is also subject to employer withholding) is virtually zero, at 1.2%.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Income</th>
<th>Net Misreporting Percentage (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wages and Salaries</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest and Dividends</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pensions and IRA Income</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment Income</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S Corps, Partnerships, and Trusts</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital Gains</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alimony Income</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonfarm Business Income</td>
<td>57.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm Income</td>
<td>72.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Gains</td>
<td>64.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rent and Royalties</td>
<td>51.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Income</td>
<td>63.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


75. As indicated in the table below, the NMPs for income that is not subject to third-party matching (e.g., nonfarm business income, farm income, other gains, and rent and royalties) exceed fifty percent. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., TAX GAP FOR TAX YEAR 2006 (Jan. 6, 2012), https://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/overview_tax_gap_2006.pdf [https://perma.cc/UDZ2-9M3Y]. Similar results apply to the more recent tax gap estimates, although the NMPs in the 2008–2010 estimates are only for the individual income tax.
Consider next the heightened level of accuracy that is part and parcel of the electronic filing process. In the past, taxpayers had to rely on pencil and paper, abacuses, and calculators to compute their income, deductions, and credits—and ultimately their tax due. These modes of making numeric calculations had varying degrees of accuracy. In contrast, numeric calculations made by tax return preparation software are apt to be pluperfect. This perfection largely eliminates the portion of the tax gap that was previously attributable to taxpayers’ mathematical mistakes.

In the twenty-first century, the transformative nature of electronic filing is often taken for granted. However, one should not be blasé about it. Electronic filing enables millions of tax information returns prepared by third parties, with billions of individual entries, to be received, processed, and matched with their electronically received counterparts of the tax returns submitted by taxpayers. The manner and speed in which this matching is handled is unprecedented in the history of tax collection. Indeed, this constitutes one of the pivotal reasons why the tax gap is likely to be narrowed in future years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Income</th>
<th>Net Misreporting Percentage (%)</th>
<th>Percentage of Tax Gap (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subject to substantial information reporting and withholding (wages and salaries)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject to substantial information reporting (pensions and annuities, unemployment compensation, dividends, interest, Social Security benefits)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject to some information reporting (deductions, exemptions, partnerships and S corporation income, capital gains, alimony income)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>30.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject to little or no information reporting (nonfarm proprietor income, other income, rents and royalties, farm income, Form 4797 income, adjustments)</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>58.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Overseas Account Reporting

It was not long ago that many taxpayers would park their investments overseas and then “forget” to report the income earned on these investments on their U.S. income tax returns. Overseas investment venues that were especially popular included Switzerland and various Caribbean islands. For decades, this practice generated massive tax revenue losses, augmenting the tax gap’s size. In theory, taxpayers who engaged in such subterfuge risked detection and punishment, including criminal prosecution. However, the chances of detection were infinitesimally small, particularly in light of Swiss bank secrecy laws that made taxpayers’ bank accounts seemingly inaccessible to the outside world. Several developments, though, have largely removed the advantage that taxpayers once had in being able to hide their overseas income, developments related to information storage, retrieval, and transmission.

Information Storage. By way of background, vast volumes of information can now be stored on hard drives, disks, thumb drives, and in the cloud. Computer users can prevent access to this sensitive information through the use of appropriate passwords, so-called firewalls, and other prophylactic measures. These efforts to safeguard information are sometimes successful; other times, they are not.

When it comes to income, overseas banks have historically retained this information electronically. The IRS has recently been able to gain


access to this electronic information through two channels: from “rogue insiders,” who are motivated by whistle-blower reward money or revenge, and from “rogue outsiders” (aka “hackers”), whose motivations are often elusive but who are determined to get this sensitive information into the public domain. Whatever the case, the IRS is the benefactor of these rogue insiders and outsiders, obtaining unprecedented access to what was once veiled and secretive information.

Information Retrieval. In the aftermath of security information breaches at several financial institutions, retail stores, and even the IRS, the general public has quickly learned that electronic information is not impermeable to leaks and can be retrieved by official (and unofficial) agents, wherever and however it is stored and safeguarded. Due to the vulnerabilities of detection, the risk of potential blackmail, and the threat of possible criminal prosecution, the allure of parking assets overseas has been greatly diminished. The massive number of taxpayers participating in the IRS’s Voluntary Disclosure Program attests to the fact that this mode of hiding income has come to a virtual halt.

82. See David Kocieniewski, Get Out of Jail Free? No, It’s Better, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2012, at A1 (describing how Bradley Birkenfeld disclosed the identity of many U.S. taxpayers who had hid assets in Swiss bank accounts and, as a result, was subsequently awarded a whistle-blower amount of $104 million); Laura Saunders & Robin Sidel, Whistleblower Gets $104 Million, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 2012, at C1 (same). As a direct result of the information Birkenfeld provided, UBS paid the U.S. government $780 million to avoid criminal prosecution, and the bank agreed to turn over account information for over 4,500 U.S. taxpayers. Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. UBS AG, No. 09-60033-CR-COHN (S.D. Fla. 2009), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/tax/legacy/2009/02/19/UBS_Signed_Deeded_Prosecution_Agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/3QFI-SRST].


Information Transmission. Congress did not want to leave to chance whether the IRS could detect evasion or whether rogue insiders or outsiders were sufficiently motivated to take disclosure action. The legislative branch therefore recently took steps to help ensure compliance, steps that, even a decade earlier, were probably not technologically feasible.

The problem Congress sought to address was fairly simple. Unscrupulous taxpayers would park funds overseas and then, as disguised foreign investors, reinvest these funds in the United States. By engaging in this transformation process, almost akin to money laundering, U.S. taxpayers could skirt their tax obligations with virtual impunity. In addressing these tax concerns, bilateral tax treaties, tax information exchange agreements, and the Conventions in Mutual Administrative Assistance on Tax Matters with other countries had proven wholly inadequate.

The congressional solution is embodied in the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA). The salient features of FATCA are twofold. The first feature is a requirement that foreign financial

G7-23WV]; Lovejoy, supra note 81, at 436 ("The recent changes in the interpretation of Swiss bank secrecy laws, as evidenced by the Deferred Prosecution Agreement with UBS, will likely cause: (1) irreparable harm to Swiss banking industry; (2) virtual elimination of tax avoidance techniques previously available to American depositors in Swiss banks; and (3) greater tax revenues for the U.S. government."). See generally Edward A. Morse, Whistleblowers and Tax Enforcement: Using Inside Information to Close the "Tax Gap", 24 A仟RON TAX J. 1 (2009).

Aside from congressional legislative actions, the IRS has taken its own measures to use technology to detect noncompliance. See Richard Satran, IRS High-Tech Tools Track Your Digital Footprints, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Apr. 4, 2013), [https://money.usnews.com/money/personal-finance/mutual-funds/articles/2013/04/04/irs-high-tech-tools-track-your-digital-footprints]. [https://perma.cc/D7WL-4XWR] ("The Internal Revenue Service is collecting a lot more than taxes this year—it’s also acquiring a huge volume of personal information on taxpayers’ digital activities, from eBay auctions to Facebook posts and, for the first time ever, credit card and e-payment transaction records, as it expands its search for tax cheats to places it’s never gone before."); ERIC TODER, URBAN INST. & URBAN-BROOKINGS TAX POL’Y CTR., REDUCING THE TAX GAP: THE ILLUSION OF PAIN-FREE DEFICIT REDUCTION 9 (July 3, 2007), html://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/46536/411496-Reducing-the-Tax-Gap-The-Illusion-of-Pain-Free-Deficit-Reduction.PDF [https://perma.cc/CSX6-JYEJ] ("IRS has recently funded development of advanced computational and data mining techniques to detect patterns of flows between entities that suggest the possibility of abuse.").


90. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, TAX COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT ISSUES WITH RESPECT TO OFFSHORE ACCOUNTS AND ENTITIES, 111th Cong., at 18 (2009), [https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=3520].

91. Id. at 50–58.

institutions provide detailed information to the IRS regarding their account holders. This information includes: (i) whether the investor is a U.S. person (based upon due diligence procedures detailed in Treasury regulations); and (ii) reporting annually (a) the name, address, and Taxpayer Identification Number of each U.S. account holder; (b) the account number; (c) the amount balance or value held in such account; and (d) the gross receipts and gross withdrawals or payments from the account during the year. The second feature of FATCA is its extensive penalty withholding system. In broad terms, the Code now imposes a thirty percent withholding tax regime upon payments made to nonparticipating foreign financial institutions and so-called recalcitrant account holders (i.e., those investors who choose not to disclose their national identity). The scope of payments upon which withholding extends is extraordinarily broad and includes any U.S.-based payment of interest, dividends, rents, salaries, wages, premiums, annuities, compensations, remunerations, emoluments, and other fixed or determinable annual or periodical gains, profits, and income. Furthermore, the scope extends to “any gross proceeds from the sale or disposition of any property . . . which can produce interest or dividends from sources within the United States.”

The effects of FATCA are just beginning to emerge. While many foreign financial institutions and others have bemoaned FATCA’s administrative burdens and the concomitant expenses, FATCA brings

93. I.R.C. § 1471(d)(4)–(5) (2012) defines “foreign financial institution” as any foreign entity that (A) accepts deposits in the ordinary course of a banking or similar business (B) as a substantial portion of its business, holds financial assets for the account of others, or (C) is engaged (or holding itself out as being engaged) primarily in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities (as defined in section 475(c)(2) without regard to the last sentence thereof), partnership interests, commodities (as defined in section 475(e)(2)), or any interest (including a futures or forward contract or option) in such securities, partnership interests, or commodities.
94. Id. § 1471(b)(1)(A).
95. Id. § 1471(c)(1)(A)–(D).
96. Id. § 1471(a).
97. Id. § 1471(d)(6).
98. Id. § 1473(1)(A)(i).
99. Id. § 1473(1)(A)(ii).
100. See, e.g., Tracy A. Kaye, Innovations in the War Against Tax Evasion, 2014 BYU L. REV. 363, 363 (2014) (“FATCA garnered worldwide attention. The European Union expressed its concerns to the U.S. Treasury about the compliance burden on the financial industry and the conflict with EU Member States’ laws on privacy and data protection.”); see also Alison Bennett, Tax Legislation: Dozens of Stakeholders from Around Globe Raise Concerns on FATCA Regime, 29 TAX MGMT’T WKLY. REP. (BNA) 1535 (2010); Dean Marsan, FATCA: The Global Financial System
incredibly important tax compliance information to light. No longer can foreign financial institutions blind themselves to the nationality of their investors; if they do, they risk having all of their investors subject to an onerous withholding tax regime related to their U.S. investments.

Overseas tax reform measures did not stop there. In the face of the financial crises and urged on by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), G20 countries convened a summit in early 2009. During the course of this summit, participating nations, under the threat of economic sanctions, urged many tax havens to sign bilateral tax treaties that required the exchange of bank information.  

By the end of 2009, erstwhile tax havens had signed more than 300 treaties, widely seen as one of the most significant actions against tax evasion via tax havens that had ever been undertaken.  

As a practical matter, then, taxpayers are finding it increasingly difficult to hide their income from tax authorities around the world. In a nutshell, technological advancements have enabled Congress to pass laws that usher in a new era of tax transparency, eschewing past opaqueness.

C. A Shifting Labor Force

A third trend is that national economies are experiencing seismic labor force shifts. Individuals are increasingly gravitating toward work in ever-larger business enterprises. Compelling evidence for this


102. See Niels Johannesen & Gabriel Zucman, T H E E N D O F B A N K S E C R E C Y ? A N E V A L U A T I O N O F T H E G 2 0 T A X H A V E N C R A C K D O W N, 6 A M. E C O N. J.: E C O N. P O L’Y 65 (2014). These enforcement efforts have continued since then, albeit the exact effects of these treaties remain uncertain. Id.

103. See Peter Eavis, I N P A N A M A P A P E R S, F I N D I N G T H E G O O D N E W S I N W I D E S P R E A D T A X C H E A T I N G, N. Y. T I M E S (A p r . 5, 2 0 1 6), h t t p : / / w w w . n y t i m e s . c o m / 2 0 1 6 / 0 4 / 0 6 / u p s h o t / f i n d i n g - t h e - g o o d - n e w s - i n - w i d e s p r e a d - t a x - c h e a t i n g . h t m l ? r s = 0 [https://perma.cc/5737-Q7UZ] (“S]ince 2011, around 20 governments have collected some $50 billion in additional taxes as a result of the anti-evasion efforts. Even the documents reported to be from [the Panama law firm charged with abetting tax fraud] showed a decline in the number of offshore companies set up by the firm. Ten years ago, the number was around 13,200; in 2015 it was just over 4,300.”). See generally Susan C. Morse, A S K F O R H E L P, U N C L E S A M: T H E F U T U R E O F G L O B A L T A X R E P O R T I N G, 5 7 V I L L. L. R E V. 5 2 9 (2012).
The most recent report indicates that only 17.6% of the labor force now works for “very small enterprises” (defined as having fewer than twenty employees); the rest of the labor force works for small, medium, and large enterprises. Indeed, over half of the nation’s labor force now works for “large enterprises” (defined as having 500 or more employees). This trend began decades ago, and it has continued in recent years.

A simple illustration shows the economic effects of this shifting labor force. Many supermarket chains now offer one-stop shopping, including a recently opened ShopRite Supermarket in one of the author’s neighborhoods. Aside from a cornucopia of food offerings commonplace in most national supermarket chains, this ShopRite Supermarket has several “sub-stores” under its roof: a fresh vegetable stand (including a farmers’ market on Sundays); an enormous bakery; a deli that makes every variety of sandwich, wrap, and panini; a complete oyster bar; a health food juicing stand; a salad bar that stretches several aisles; a gourmet coffee department staffed with knowledgeable baristas; a pizzeria that makes every variety of pizza, stromboli, and calzone; a florist that has a broad array of floral offerings; and a sushi stand. This ShopRite Supermarket is open seven days a week from 7 a.m. until 11 p.m. and is open every day of the year, including Thanksgiving, Christmas, and New Year’s Day.

The opening of this ShopRite Supermarket has had significant consequences for many surrounding small businesses. For every dollar spent at this ShopRite Supermarket, there is correspondingly one less dollar spent at the local township’s farmers’ market, bakery, kosher deli, fish market, health food market, florist, and restaurants. Anecdotal evidence from these surrounding small business enterprises indicates that the economic stresses arising from the Shoprite Supermarket opening have put many of them at risk of closing.

105. Id. at 1.
106. Id.
107. Id.
This scenario is emblematic of a widespread global phenomenon in which mammoth-sized business enterprises, such as Wal-Mart, Costco, Home Depot, and Lowe’s, have become commonplace fixtures dotting the urban, suburban, and rural landscapes throughout the country. These enterprises often have a crushing effect on the surrounding small businesses. Study after study affirms this proposition, referred to, at least in the context of Wal-Mart, as the “Wal-Mart Effect.”

It is not our intention to evaluate the broader positive and negative economic effects of the rise of mammoth-sized business enterprises (e.g., consumers may pay less for their purchases, jobs are created in the larger business enterprises but lost in the smaller ones, and/or employees’ benefits may be meager). However, from a tax perspective, this labor market trend is clearly one that will lead to enhanced tax compliance. The reasons are threefold.

First, large businesses offer considerably fewer tax-evasion opportunities than small businesses. Because of the ease with which small business owners may collude to evade taxes, they are notoriously tax noncompliant. Indeed, the classic case of collusion is


110. See Emek Basker, The Causes and Consequences of Wal-Mart’s Growth, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 177, 178 (2007) (“Between 1963—one year after the first Wal-Mart store opened in Rogers, Arkansas—and 2002, the number of single-store retailers in the United States declined by 55 percent while the number of chain stores nearly doubled. The number of stores belonging to chains with 100 or more stores more than tripled over this period (U.S. Census Bureau, 1963, 2002.”).


113. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-1014, TAX GAP: A STRATEGY FOR REDUCING THE GAP SHOULD INCLUDE OPTIONS FOR ADDRESSING SOLE PROPRIETOR NONCOMPLIANCE 10 (2007), http://www.gao.gov/assets/270/265399.pdf [https://perma.cc/854P-Z6RR] (“An estimated 70 percent of Schedule C filers in 2001 (about 12.9 million) made an error when reporting net business income (that is, net profit or loss on line 31 of Schedule C). Most of the misreporting was underreporting. . . . An estimated 61 percent of Schedule C filers underreported their net income and 9 percent overreported.”).

the sole proprietor who needs only to look in the mirror to decide (with his reflection) whether, for tax purposes, he should report, say, the $800 he received in cash proceeds from his business that day. With two owners, the need for collusion obviously makes evasion more challenging, but not insurmountable, particularly in those cases when the co-owners are married or siblings, with common economic interests. In contrast, because evasion opportunities are virtually nonexistent for employees of large-scale business enterprises, they are generally tax compliant.\textsuperscript{115} Consider that large business enterprises often are structured in a pyramid fashion, with each layer of the pyramid overseeing the one immediately below. This oversight greatly reduces the risk of collusion because, at every pyramid level, all employees know that employees at the oversight layer immediately above (i.e., their superiors) will require a full accounting for every dollar coming in and leaving the layer below.

Second, large business enterprises are predominantly publicly owned.\textsuperscript{116} In such cases, the elected board of directors is held accountable to the shareholders.\textsuperscript{117} Because bonuses and pay raises are often tied to earnings, management generally will do everything within its power to show robust profits.\textsuperscript{118} Hiding income may contribute to profits, but evasion exposes management to condemnation (or worse) if discovered.\textsuperscript{119}

Third, and most importantly, large business enterprises have special reporting obligations that dissuade tax noncompliance. These reporting obligations are reflected by two schedules that corporate taxpayers must complete as part of Form 1120 (U.S. Corporate Tax Return): Schedule M-1 (Reconciliation of Income (Loss) per Books with Income per under-reported self-employment tax ($57 billion), individual small business noncompliance accounts for approximately $179 billion, or 40% of the total tax gap.").

\textsuperscript{115} See \textsc{Internal Revenue Serv.}, \textsc{Tax Gap for Tax Year 2006}, at 3 chart 1 (2012), http://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/overview_tax_gap_2006.pdf \[https://perma.cc/B9GC-X45Z\] (wages and salaries have a “net misreporting percentage” (defined as the ratio of net misreported income to true income) of one percent).

\textsuperscript{116} See America’s 500 Biggest Companies, \textsc{Time} (Oct. 30, 2014), http://time.com/3550055/fortune-500-2014/ \[https://perma.cc/BEN3-4E8T\] (listing the nation’s five hundred largest companies, the vast majority of which are publicly traded).

\textsuperscript{117} See Walter A. Effross, \textsc{Corporate Governance: Principles and Practice 1–26} (2d ed. 2013).

\textsuperscript{118} \textit{Id.} at 421–500.

\textsuperscript{119} \textit{Id.} at 43–136; \textit{see, e.g., In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig.}, 698 A.2d 959, 967–68 (Del. Ch. 1996) (suggesting that a board of directors’ failure to establish or adequately oversee a system designed to prevent violations of applicable legal standards may expose directors to personal liability).
Return) and Schedule UTP (Uncertain Tax Position Statement). Schedule M-1 reflects differences between income reporting under generally accepted accounting principles and income reporting under the Internal Revenue Code; the larger the difference between these two dollar amounts, the more likely that the IRS will conduct an audit. The heightened chance for an IRS audit presumably dissuades many taxpayers from taking aggressive tax positions. Schedule UTP functions in a similar manner. If, for federal income tax purposes, a “large” corporate taxpayer (defined as having $10 million of assets on its audited financial statements) has audited financial statements in which it or a related party has recorded a reserve for an “uncertain” tax position (i.e., a position that it anticipates the IRS may challenge), the taxpayer must submit a Schedule UTP. This reporting mandate assists the IRS in the detection process of aggressive tax return positions; and, like the Schedule M-1, it creates incentives for large-business-enterprise taxpayers to exercise caution.

* * *

To date, there is little empirical information that directly supports the proposition that these three trends—the rise of electronic transactions, information availability via computerization, and a shifting labor force—are closing the tax gap. Nevertheless, there are compelling reasons to strongly suggest that this should soon be the case. On the whole, then, the tax gap may be finally meeting its match, not so much from IRS enforcement efforts per se but from these technological and economic trends.

120. Those corporations that report on Schedule L of Form 1120 total assets at the end of the corporation’s (or U.S. consolidated tax group’s) taxable year equaling or exceeding $10 million must file an even more detailed schedule, known as Schedule M-3 (Net Income (Loss) Reconciliations for Corporations with Total Assets of $10 Million or More).


123. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INSTRUCTIONS FOR SCHEDULE UTP (FORM 1120) 1 (2012).

III. PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS

If the aforementioned trends do in fact work over time to reduce the tax gap, the public policy implications would be vast, with significant and far-reaching economic, political, and administrative dimensions. Consider each in the following three sections.

A. Economic Dimensions

Recall the range of economic effects associated with the tax gap’s existence, starting with a loss in tax revenues and extending to inefficiencies in resource allocation and inequities in the tax burden. A declining tax gap would clearly tend to reverse these effects. Put differently, if the existence of the tax gap affects revenue adequacy, resource allocation efficiency, and distributional equity of taxation, then a declining tax gap would have similar—but opposite—effects on these economic aspects.

Revenue Adequacy. The effects on tax collections are clear-cut. The existence of the tax gap generates substantial revenue losses; if there is a declining tax gap, then this will generate additional revenues, which will allow increases in spending, decreases in taxes, or both.

Resource Allocation Efficiency. The effects on efficiency are more complicated. The existence of sectors to which resources may move to evade taxes means that taxes create incentives for such movement. This movement generates inefficiencies, commonly referred to as the “excess burden of taxation” and defined as welfare losses in excess of tax revenues actually collected. Put differently, the excess burden of a tax is a measure of the lost output due to the distorting effects of the tax.

125. See supra Part II.
126. See supra Part II.
127. The nature of the inefficiency of taxation can be illustrated by way of a simple example. Suppose that the advertised price for a new watch is $40 and suppose further that one person is willing to pay $55 for the watch and that another person is willing to pay $45. By paying the advertised price of $40, both individuals benefit, the first by $15 and the second by $5, for a total benefit of $20, which is called the consumer surplus. Now, consider what happens if an excise tax of $10 per watch is imposed, raising the price to $50. The person who was willing to pay $55 will still purchase the watch and pay a tax of $10, enjoying only a $5 benefit. The person who was willing to pay $45 will no longer purchase the watch because its cost ($50) is now greater than the amount he was willing to pay ($45). The tax has generated revenues of $10, but the tax has also made both individuals worse off: the consumer surplus has fallen by $15, from $20 to only $5. Because the $15 decline in consumer surplus is greater than the tax revenues of $10, there is an excess burden that equals the difference, or $5. Almost all taxes generate excess burden because most taxes cause taxpayers (and employers) to change their behavior. The overall losses to everyone in society constitute an estimate of the total excess burden, or the total efficiency loss, of taxes.
In the presence of taxation, labor, capital, and other factors of production have often migrated into the untaxed, or underground, economy to evade taxation, a migration that affects the production (as well as prices) of goods and services in the untaxed and taxed sectors. This movement of resources generates economic inefficiencies as there is an increase in the production of goods and services that are untaxed and there is a decline in goods and services that are taxed appropriately.

However, a decline in the tax gap means that the possibility of evading taxes via mobility into untaxed sectors is reduced. As a result, the resource misallocation described in the prior paragraph will be reversed, and there will be corresponding efficiency gains. While identifying these resource allocation efficiency effects requires a detailed computable general equilibrium model of the economy, existing studies suggest that the efficiency gains from a reduction in the tax gap would be quite significant, potentially as large as 10% to 30% of taxes and between 3% and 7% of output.128

Closely related to these efficiency effects are their sectoral, occupational, and employment effects. As a general rule, resources migrate to those economic sectors that yield the highest returns; when those economic sectors are taxed, the migration process reverses as taxes diminish returns.129 In the presence of the tax gap, this means that workers have an incentive to choose employment in those sectors where cash use predominates and taxes go unpaid. Assuming labor is mobile, labor will respond to taxes in the taxed sector by moving between the taxed and untaxed sectors until the net-of-tax return across the various sectors is equalized.130 This movement affects the wages of labor in the different sectors, raising gross-of-tax wages in the taxed sector as labor flows away from this sector while simultaneously reducing wages in untaxed sectors as labor migrates into these sectors.131 However, if the possibility of evading taxes is reduced as the tax gap declines, then mobility effects will be reversed.

Fully identifying these impacts once again requires a detailed general equilibrium model of the economy. A study conducted in another country, Colombia, demonstrates the mobility effects associated with tax

129. See supra note 29.
130. See id.
131. There will also be an impact on the returns to other factors of production, product prices, and the overall unemployment rate. See James Alm & Edward B. Sennoga, Mobility, Competition, and the Distributional Effects of Tax Evasion, 63 NAT’L TAX J. 1055 (2010).
evasion.\textsuperscript{132} Using a general equilibrium model that divided the Colombian economy into four sectors (farming, urban/informal, urban/unskilled, and urban/skilled), the study found that high rates of labor taxation led to an overall increase in the number of unemployed workers and also increased employment in the informal sector.\textsuperscript{133} A decline in the tax gap would reverse the incentives for labor to migrate to the untaxed sector via its effects on the relative returns in the untaxed and taxed sectors.\textsuperscript{134}

\textit{Distributional Equity.} The existence of the tax gap also has major effects on the distribution of income, although these effects are generally misunderstood. The standard assumption underlying the incidence of tax evasion is that the successful evader retains the evaded income in its entirety so that the beneficiaries of evasion are its perpetrators.\textsuperscript{135} However, this assumption is likely to be incorrect or at least incomplete. Those who benefit from tax evasion are not necessarily the individuals actually engaging in evasion. Indeed, these participants may not financially benefit at all. In many situations, tax evasion can be viewed as a “tax advantage” generated by the tax laws. However, if there is any advantage at all, then replication and competition will work toward the elimination of this advantage. A general equilibrium process of adjustment should then occur through changes in the relative prices of both commodities and factors of production as resources move into and out of the relevant activities, and these changes should tend to eliminate, or at least to reduce, the initial financial advantage associated with tax evasion.\textsuperscript{136} These types of general equilibrium effects are not typically considered in the standard approach to tax evasion.

A simple case that demonstrates these effects is tax evasion by domestic help, such as housecleaners, babysitters, and yard-care workers. Tax evasion here may actually benefit the higher-income households hiring these services because the former can pay lower prices for the services of the latter. Three examples illustrate this point—one in

\textsuperscript{132} See James Alm & Hugo Lopez-Castaño, Payroll Taxes in Colombia, in FISCAL REFORM IN COLOMBIA—PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 191 (Richard M. Bird, James M. Poterba & Joel Slemrod eds., 2005).

\textsuperscript{133} Id.

\textsuperscript{134} In another case study for Tunisia, similar sectoral effects were found. See generally Alm, Analyzing and Reforming Tunisia’s Tax System, supra note 29.

\textsuperscript{135} The first and still classic analysis is by Michael G. Allingham & Agnar Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis, 1 J. PUB. ECON. 323 (1972).

which there is equal negotiating power between the parties, another in which one of the two parties holds the upper hand, and still another more general “thought experiment.”

First, suppose that a “service seeker” and a “service provider” are on equal footing in terms of negotiating power. Suppose further that a painter (the service provider) is willing to paint the home of an individual (the service seeker) for $10,000. If the painter were to report this income, assuming a forty percent tax rate, then she would net $6,000 after taxes. The painter and the homeowner could negotiate a cash price in which the painter will instead accept $8,000, which is untaxed due to the nature of the cash transaction. This arrangement leaves both the painter and the homeowner $2,000 richer. It is, of course, the government that loses $4,000 of revenue.

Second, suppose that the service seeker (e.g., a restaurant owner) has the upper hand in negotiating with the service provider (e.g., waiters) due to an excess supply of labor in the service market. Suppose that waiters who are “on the books” earn $15 per hour and pay forty percent tax on their earnings (netting $9 per hour). Suppose also that a restaurant owner can hire waiters “off the books” by paying them $9 per hour. In this situation, the waiter who receives cash does not benefit from being paid off the books. Rather, it is only the restaurant owner who benefits, pocketing the $6 difference between the “on the books” $15 per hour rate and the “off the books” $9 per hour rate.

Third, suppose that in some previous year many service providers (e.g., plumbers) would traditionally offer service seekers (e.g., homeowners) two prices to install a new kitchen sink: $100 if paid in cash and $150 if paid with a check or credit card. Suppose further that, as a purchase incentive, many retail stores (e.g., Home Depot) now offer kitchen sink installations for a flat fee of $125, and that virtually all homeowners avail themselves of this convenience. On the basis of these assumptions, here are two tentative predictions. At least some plumbers would migrate to other labor markets because they are no longer able to misreport their plumbing transactions. Further, as a result of this labor movement away from the profession of plumbing, even those homeowners who sought to pay cash to command a lower price would nevertheless have to pay higher prices for the plumbing services rendered. These two predictions suggest that closing the tax gap would have important implications in at least some economic segments with respect to the overall labor market, labor compensation, and market prices.

These three examples demonstrate how wages and prices are determined when the underground economy flourishes. More generally,
these examples suggest how wages and prices are affected when the existence of tax evasion leads to a tax gap. If cash were no longer used in the transactions, or if tax evasion were no longer a viable option, then there would be major impacts on product and factor prices, and thus on income distribution.

A complete analysis of these distributional effects requires a detailed computational general equilibrium model of an economy, and the precise distributional effects will, of course, depend on the specific circumstances. Still, existing work suggests that the ultimate distributional effects may differ significantly from the effects that assume no general equilibrium adjustments; indeed, these studies indicate that taxpayers who successfully evade their tax liabilities often have a post-evasion welfare that is only marginally higher than their post-tax welfare if they had fully complied with the tax.137 Further, those taxpayers who evade their taxes retain only about three-quarters of their initial increase in welfare, while one-fourth of their initial gains disappear as a result of mobility that reflects competition and entry into the informal sector.138 Consequently, and consistent with the erosion of the initial benefits of tax evasion via general equilibrium adjustments, the evading taxpayers only marginally benefit from successful tax evasion; furthermore, this advantage diminishes with mobility via competition/entry in the informal sector, and at least some of the benefits of tax evasion are shifted to consumers and to other factors.139

In a broad sense, general equilibrium calculations demonstrate that the gains from evasion are shifted at least in part from the evaders to the consumers of their output. These shifts occur via lower prices for goods and lower wages for services. Together, these price and wage shifts typically eliminate the incentive for workers to enter the untaxed sector. As more workers enter the untaxed sector, their production pushes down the relative price of the informal sector output and consequently the hourly returns; the movement of workers between the sectors also changes the relative productivity of workers in each sector as capital also moves between the sectors. In equilibrium, therefore, the marginal entrant to the untaxed sector has the gains from evading taxes offset by the relative price and productivity effects. If the existence of the tax gap generates these effects, then a declining tax gap will reverse them.

137. See Alm & Sennoga, supra note 131, at 1056.
138. Id. at 1076–77, 1081.
139. Id. at 1055–84; Kesselman, supra note 29, at 137–82; Philippe Thalmann, Factor Taxes and Evasion in General Equilibrium, 22 REG’L SCI. AND URB. ECON. 259–83 (1992).
B. Political Dimensions

In recent decades, a common political refrain has been the claim that there is no need to raise taxes or to cut spending.\(^{140}\) Instead, politicians have often asserted that the nation may collect additional revenues simply through enhanced tax compliance.\(^{141}\) If the tax gap is truly closing, then this would have a monumental impact on political discourse of this nature.

On a superficial level, the nature of political discourse itself would have to adjust. Politicians who have routinely signed “no new tax” pledges\(^{142}\) yet promised vast public infrastructure improvements funded with additional tax revenue would have to rethink their financing strategies. Put differently, the reliance in political debate upon what many politicians commonly believe to be, or at least describe as, “low hanging fruit” (e.g., closing the tax gap) would disappear.

On a more substantive level, politicians would have to consider the need to raise additional revenue, enact budget cuts, or let the federal budget deficit grow. The existence of a large tax gap has always served a political convenience. The standard mantra has been something like this:


\(^{141}\) See, e.g., President’s Econ. Recovery Advisory Bd., The Report on Tax Reform Options: Simplification, Compliance, and Corporate Taxation 53–64 (2010), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/Report-Tax-Reform-Options-2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/5293-6J4V] (outlining compliance recommendations that would yield more tax revenue). To achieve this objective, some have said that the IRS must offer better taxpayer service. See 2007 Tax Gap Study, supra note 1, at 4 (“Service is especially important to help taxpayers avoid unintentional errors. Given the increasing complexity of the tax code, providing taxpayers with assistance and clear and accurate information before they file their tax returns reduces unnecessary post-filing contacts, allowing the IRS to focus enforcement resources on taxpayers who intentionally evade their tax obligations.”). Others have contended that a better-funded IRS armed with stronger enforcement tools will galvanize more robust tax compliance. See TODER, supra note 88, at 1 (“For example, in the 1988 presidential campaign, Democratic candidate Michael Dukakis called for more tax enforcement as a means of reducing the budget deficit and cited his success in improving tax compliance in Massachusetts as a model of what might be accomplished at the federal level.”); Eric Katz, After Years of Cutting Funding, Republicans Seek to Privatize Part of the IRS, GOV’T EXECUTIVE (July 22, 2015), http://www.govexec.com/management/2015/07/after-years-cutting-funding-republicans-seek-privatize-part-irs/118365/ [https://perma.cc/FW7D-9QSQ] (“The real scandal around the IRS is that they have been so poorly funded that they cannot go after these folks who are deliberately avoiding tax payments,” Obama said in an appearance on The Daily Show with Jon Stewart Tuesday evening.”).

“We do not need to raise taxes to finance expenditures—we simply need to enforce the tax laws that are already on the books.” However, if the decline in the tax gap eliminated this option, then politicians would have to confront difficult political choices. Would they raise marginal tax rates? Would they cut their favorite spending program? Would they recommend more borrowing, including the associated higher debt limit? Politicians would now have to confront more realistic means of dealing with these and similar questions.

Over the past several decades, the existence of the tax gap has served the needs of politicians on both sides of the political aisle: politicians on the left or on the right could advocate more spending financed by the “costless” method of eliminating the tax gap without incurring the wrath of groups like Americans for Tax Reform, which regard higher tax rates as a broken pledge. However, as the tax gap narrows, the political dynamics will change. If politicians want to extract additional revenue without the “free lunch” of the tax gap, they will have to rethink their approach, including changes in various administrative policies of the IRS, as discussed in the next section.

C. Administrative Dimensions

For the past several decades, the IRS has endured constant scrutiny regarding its ability to monitor taxpayer compliance and to provide meaningful deterrence. This scrutiny has traditionally been measured by a simple metric: the percentage of audits that the agency was able to conduct. Based upon this metric, the IRS does not seem too adept. At least in the general public’s eyes, the agency has appeared to be faltering as audit levels have plummeted, hovering at historic lows.

143. The website for Americans for Tax Reform considers low tax rates one of the most important features of an effective government and asks politicians to pledge their commitment to tax reductions. See AMERICANS FOR TAX REFORM, http://www.atr.org/ [https://perma.cc/PXW3-DHJ9].

144. See TODER, supra note 88, at 20 (“Costs of closing the tax gap include IRS budgetary costs and compliance burdens on taxpayers and third parties. Decisions about increasing IRS enforcement and imposing additional requirements must balance expected improvements in compliance against these additional costs.”).

145. See Woolley, supra note 35 (“For some filers or their tax preparers [because the anticipated 2015 audit rate is projected to be so low], this all might seem like license to experiment with a more aggressive strategy.”).

It is hardly surprising that over the past decade the IRS has conducted fewer audits. The agency’s budget has either shrunk or stagnated, causing the number of IRS staff to dwindle. Simultaneously, the number of individual income (and other) tax returns keeps growing. In addition, the agency has been charged with a plethora of added responsibilities, including the task of implementing and overseeing the Affordable Care Act.

In theory, the nation appears poised to be beset with rampant taxpayer noncompliance as the IRS has been financially crippled and its duties greatly expanded. However, to date this has not happened. At least as evidenced by the prior tax gap studies, the percentage of noncompliant taxpayers has remained fairly constant. These findings are not surprising. Indeed, as evidenced by Part III of this analysis, the trend will likely be toward greater tax compliance as opportunities for noncompliance become fewer and farther between.

Assuming the tax gap is narrowing, the implications for the IRS are vast. Consider the fact that conducting audits is resource intensive in nature. With less need to conduct audits, the agency’s resources would be liberated to achieve other objectives. In particular, rather than utilizing a sizable portion of its budget to conduct audits, the IRS could now concentrate its efforts on other pressing endeavors, including (1) the identification of unscrupulous tax return preparers, (2) the detection of identity theft perpetrators, and (3) the enhancement of IRS services to taxpayers.


148. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 146 (showing that in eight of the last ten years, the number of individual income tax returns submitted has increased).


150. See TODER, supra note 88, at 6 (“With the caveat that estimates are very imprecise and the degrees of imprecision can change, we note that the measured tax gap has been quite stable over time in relation to ‘true’ tax liability.”).
1. Identification of Unscrupulous Tax Return Preparers

Given the complexity of the tax system, tax return preparers often play a pivotal role in the tax return submission process, assisting taxpayers in the fulfillment of this critical civic duty. Some tax return preparers are highly trained professionals (e.g., certified public accountants and lawyers); if and when they act unscrupulously, they risk suspension or loss of their professional licenses. Unfortunately, however, most tax return preparers lack any formal training and have little downside risk if they are derelict in their duties. 

By way of background, well over a century ago, Congress decided that the Department of the Treasury should be able to regulate taxpayer representatives who practice before the agency, enacting what has become known as Circular 230. Initially, this legislation enabled the Treasury Department to regulate “agents, attorneys, or other persons representing claimants before [the D]epartment.”

The enabling statute presently reads as follows:

Subject to section 500 of title 5, the Secretary of the Treasury may—

regulate the practice of representatives of persons before the Department of the Treasury; and


152. See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., MOST TAX RETURNS PREPARED BY A LIMITED SAMPLE OF UNENROLLED PREPARERS CONTAINED SIGNIFICANT ERRORS 14 (2008), https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/audireports/2008reports/200840171fr.pdf [https://perma.cc/X72S-2PWHT], (“Pursuing abusive preparers is part of the IRS’ strategy to reduce the tax gap, which researchers estimate to be $290 billion based on 2001 data.”); U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-14-467T, PAID TAX RETURN PREPARERS: IN A LIMITED STUDY, PREPARERS MADE SIGNIFICANT ERRORS (2014), http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/662366.pdf [https://perma.cc/M6QZ-VRQ4]; U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-06-563T, PAID TAX RETURN PREPARERS: IN A LIMITED STUDY, CHAIN PREPARERS MADE SERIOUS ERRORS (2006), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06563t.pdf [https://perma.cc/M2BR-5UWF]; Nina E. Olson, More Than a ‘Mere’ Preparer: Loving and Return Preparation, 139 TAX NOTES 767, 767–68 (2013) (“[S]ignificant concerns have been raised about incompetent and unscrupulous preparers and their negative impact on taxpayers and tax compliance. If a preparer makes inflated claims that the IRS later rejects, or fails to claim benefits to which the taxpayer is entitled, the taxpayer suffers. If a preparer makes inflated claims that the IRS does not detect, federal revenue collection suffers.”).

153. See Bryan T. Camp, Loving’ Return Preparer Regulation, 72 TAX PRAC. 604, n.6 (2013) (noting that in 1921 the Treasury Department promulgated regulations (aka Circular 230) that sought to regulate tax practitioners, namely, attorneys and accountants, who practiced before the agency; “[t]he three basic regulatory efforts before 1921 were: Circular 13 (Feb. 6, 1886) (concerning internal taxes), Circular 94 (Oct. 4, 1890) (same), and T.D. 32974 (Nov. 30, 1912) (concerning Customs).”)

154. 31 U.S.C. § 330(a); 23 Stat. 258 (1884) (original text).
before admitting a representative to practice, require that the representative demonstrate—
good character;
good reputation;
necessary qualifications to enable the representative to provide to persons valuable service; and
competency to advise and assist persons in presenting their cases.155

Until 2011, the Department of the Treasury sought to regulate essentially four categories of tax professionals, namely, attorneys, certified public accountants, enrolled agents, and enrolled actuaries.156 In 2011, however, the Treasury promulgated new regulations that sought to expand the category of those regulated to include all tax return preparers, mandating that they pass qualifying examinations and take continuing education classes.157 In two different cases—Loving v. Commissioner158 and Ridgely v. Lew159—judges rebuffed the IRS, invalidating these regulations. More specifically, in terms of preparing taxpayers’ returns, these two court decisions held that tax return preparers were neither “practicing” before the IRS160 nor functioning as taxpayers’ “representatives,”161 both of which are predicates under the enabling statute.

For the time being, Congress does not seem inclined to pass legislation that will expand the scope of those regulated to include tax return preparers.162 That being the case, the IRS will be on its own to

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160. Loving, 742 F.3d at 1018 (“All of this underscores that tax-return preparers do not practice before the IRS when they simply assist in the preparation of someone else’s tax return.”); Ridgely, 55 F. Supp. 3d at 95 (“[A] CPA hardly ‘practices’ before the IRS when he simply prepares and files a taxpayer’s refund claim, before being designated as the taxpayer’s representative and before the commencement of an audit or appeal.”).
161. Loving, 742 F.3d at 1016 (“The term ‘representative’ is traditionally and commonly defined as an agent with authority to bind others, a description that does not fit tax-return preparers.”); Ridgely, 55 F. Supp. 3d at 95 (“Thus, Section 330’s use of the term ‘representative’ excludes refund claim preparers.”).
162. Many bills were introduced to extend Treasury’s authority over tax return preparers, but all have been rejected in committee. See Taxpayer Protection and Preparer Fraud Prevention Act of
identify unscrupulous tax return preparers, of which there are apparently many. This identification exercise promises to be a resource-intensive task insofar as unscrupulous tax return preparers who lack a professional license do not commonly appear listed in any directory or telephone book or on any website; and they may not even register for a preparer taxpayer identification number (PTIN), making their shadowy existence and the identification process problematic and challenging. Even after the IRS identifies these unscrupulous tax return preparers, the agency’s tasks are far from over: the U.S. Justice Department must then be contacted to bring injunction actions against these actors. Unless the latter are imprisoned, they are apt to continue their practices; given this somewhat dire state of affairs, regulation of this industry by the IRS is entirely apropos and should be endorsed by Congress.

2. Detection of Identity Theft Perpetrators

Identity theft is a crime that largely did not exist until the turn of the twenty-first century. However, over the course of the last decade or so, particularly as the so-called Information Age has come into full


163. See supra note 152.


166. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, IDENTITY THEFT AND DATA SECURITY 1 (2015), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/ media-resources/identity-theft-and-data-security [https://perma.cc/B5Q6-9RXL] (“Identity theft tops the list of consumer complaints that are reported to the FTC and other enforcement agencies every year.”).
bloom, this crime has become rampant throughout the country, annually plaguing millions of people.167

Identity theft comes in a variety of different forms. To achieve their objectives, perpetrators sometimes steal people’s mail and credit card information; other times, they phish on the internet to collect vital personal information.168 These criminals frequently seek taxpayers’ tax returns, which provide them with a treasure trove of information and which facilitate their ability to perpetrate identity theft.169

In the sphere of tax refunds, identity theft is no small problem. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that the IRS prevented approximately $24.2 billion in stolen identity refund claims in 2013.170 This was the good news. The bad news was that the IRS apparently sent out a stunning $5.8 billion in fraudulent refunds.171 This problem shows no signs of abating anytime soon.172

In light of this crime epidemic, the IRS should forcefully respond. To date, the IRS has not sat idle as it has tried to strengthen its computer security systems, help victims, and pursue the criminals. This compliance effort has not come cheaply: the agency currently dedicates 3,000 employees to combat this fraud.173

Even so, more needs to be done, and a narrower tax gap would provide the IRS this opportunity. A narrower tax gap would give the IRS the ability to dedicate additional resources, as well as to reallocate

171. Id.
172. See Michael S. Schmidt, Hacking of Tax Returns More Extensive Than First Reported, IRS Says, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/18/us/politics/hacking-of-tax-returns-more-extensive-than-first-reported-irs-says.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/4VNZ-Q7F2] (“The Internal Revenue Service said Monday that hackers had gained access to the tax returns of more than 300,000 people, a far higher number than the agency had reported previously.”).
existing resources, to the identity theft problem; thus, the IRS could redouble its efforts to improve its computer security systems and their ability to screen for fraud, to help taxpayers navigate the difficult plight of having their stolen refunds recovered, and to capture those who commit these acts. Such efforts on the agency’s part would hopefully rekindle renewed confidence in the entire tax system.

3. IRS Service Enhancement

Due to resource inadequacy and resource mismanagement, the IRS has fallen short of delivering adequate service to taxpayers. For example, phone lines to taxpayers are not being properly staffed, and written response times to taxpayers’ inquiries are reprehensible.174 As a whole, taxpayers have never relished dealing with the IRS; now, their worst fears are being realized.

If the IRS did not have to devote a large portion of its limited resources to audit taxpayers’ tax returns, it could instead invest in improving taxpayer service.175 Direct improvements would include the dedication of additional employees to respond to taxpayers’ telephone and written inquiries. Moreover, additional funds could be used to better train IRS employees so that their responses would be more timely and accurate. Such improvements would vastly increase taxpayer

174. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-578T, TAX FILING: IRS NEEDS A COMPREHENSIVE CUSTOMER SERVICE STRATEGY AND NEEDS TO BETTER COMBAT IDENTITY THEFT REFUND FRAUD AND PROTECT TAXPAYER DATA (2016), http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/676675.pdf [https://perma.cc/KGR6-3P8B] (explaining why the IRS needs more funding to improve customer service); NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 149, at 1 ("With funding down about 17 percent on an inflation-adjusted basis since FY 2010, and with the IRS having had to implement large portions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) and the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) this year without any supplemental funding, sharp declines in taxpayer service were inevitable.” (citation omitted).); NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 1 2014 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 3–25 (2014), http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2014-Annual-Report/Volume-One.pdf [https://perma.cc/86JH-G44C] ("Most Serious Problem: Taxpayer Service: Taxpayer Service Has Reached Unacceptably Low Levels and Is Getting Worse, Creating Compliance Barriers and Significant Inconvenience for Millions of Taxpayers."); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-156, 2012 TAX FILING: IRS FACES CHALLENGES PROVIDING SERVICE TO TAXPAYERS AND COULD COLLECT BALANCES DUE MORE EFFECTIVELY 2 (2012), http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/650962.pdf [https://perma.cc/4548-N5GE] ("However, IRS’s level of telephone service (the percentage of callers seeking live assistance who receive it) declined to 68 percent. In addition, of the 21 million pieces of paper correspondence IRS received, about 40 percent were considered overage (meaning that IRS did not respond within 45 days of receipt), an increase compared to last year.").

satisfaction, perhaps crystallizing in the form of higher taxpayer compliance.

Better IRS service also extends to indirect improvements in how the agency functions. For example, additional resources would enable the IRS to modernize some of its antiquated technology systems, which are pivotal to limiting the number of false positives that the agency’s systems generate while simultaneously improving tax compliance. In particular, utilizing redirected funds, the IRS could accelerate the implementation of two important programs: the Reporting and Document Matching Program and the Return Review Program. The first program “is intended to be used to improve business taxpayer compliance by matching business information (e.g., 1099-K tax returns with individual tax returns to identify potential income under reporting.” 176 The second program “is expected to make use of leading-edge technology to detect, resolve, and prevent fraud.” 177

A final agenda item that the IRS might seek to pursue with these redirected funds is the agency’s ability to offer prepared tax returns. Following the lead of California’s highly acclaimed and successful ReadyReturn Program 178 (a program that prepares and distributes prepared state income tax returns on behalf of many low-income taxpayers who can then submit, modify, or reject them), the IRS could try to replicate the program at the national level. 179


177. Id.


179. See William G. Gale, Remove the Return, in TOWARD TAX REFORM: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PRESIDENT OBAMA’S TASK FORCE 40, 41 (2009), http://www.taxanalysts.com/www/freefiles.nsf/Files/TowardTaxReform.pdf/Sfile/TowardTaxReform.pdf [https://perma.cc/G9XF-TALV] (“Fifth, and most important, the task force should recommend gradually moving an increasing number of people to a ‘return-free’ tax system. This could be either a fully return-free system, which would feature exact withholding, or, more likely, a tax agency reconciliation system, in which the IRS sends households a provisional tax return for confirmation or changes. These systems are feasible; they already exist in several developed countries. And a recent California experiment with a tax agency reconciliation system was successful and popular.”); HAMILTON PROJECT, THE SIMPLE RETURN: REDUCING AMERICA’S TAX BURDEN THROUGH RETURN FREE FILING 3 (2006), http://www.hamiltonproject.org/files/downloads_and_links/The_Simple_Return__Reducing_Americas_Tax_Burden_Through_Return-Free_Filing_Brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/6GW6-2FYF] (“With the Simple Return, the IRS would use the information about income that it already receives from employers and banks to send prefilled tax returns to taxpayers who have sufficiently simple finances. The program would be voluntary. Taxpayers who prefer to fill out their own tax forms or to pay a tax preparer to do it could use the Simple Return as the basis for their own calculations, or
this nature adopted, it would greatly alleviate the administrative burden that many taxpayers endure annually when preparing their own tax returns.

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In sum, even in the face of a shrinking tax gap, the IRS would necessarily continue to monitor taxpayer compliance, retaining the agency’s important deterrent role. However, as the landscape around the IRS changes, the agency should adapt. If there are external factors that enhance tax compliance, the agency should redeploy its limited resources to areas of greater productivity. Three such areas of possible redeployment include the identification of unscrupulous tax return preparers, the detection of identity theft perpetrators, and the enhancement of IRS service to taxpayers. Although these areas of improvement are not targeted directly at enhancing taxpayer compliance, they would indirectly contribute to its amelioration.

IV. COUNTERTRENDS THAT MAY INCREASE THE TAX GAP

While the trends to curtail the tax gap are strong, if not inexorable, there are many potential obstacles on the immediate and not-too-distant time horizons that may impede the “withering” of the tax gap, making its “withering” an open question.180

Some obstacles are blatantly obvious. If Congress, for example, continues to reduce IRS funding, more taxpayers will likely join the ranks of the noncompliant.181 With virtually no downside risk, taxpayers must only confront their consciences, which may prove wholly inadequate to keep them on the tax compliance bandwagon. Other countries have poorly funded their taxing authorities, and they have

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180. In the past, hiding cash or “forgetting” about an overseas account was fairly easy to effectuate and did not take much effort or engender much costly professional advice. The twenty-first century tax noncompliance strategies that taxpayers may embark upon next will probably not share these same characteristics. Instead, these strategies are apt to be far more complex and require costly professional advice. The very existence of these frictions may dissuade even those taxpayers with a propensity to be derelict from their participation.

181. See supra notes 146–47 and accompanying text.
found that the outcomes have proven abysmal. Governments can save on an immediate public expenditure by a reduction in administrative funding but often at a tremendous subsequent revenue cost.

Other obstacles are less obvious. Advances in technology may actually increase the possibility for tax evasion. For example, Bitcoin and other forms of virtual currency may become more commonplace, and the use of such devices as “zappers” may make evasion easier. Indeed, it is impossible to predict how technology will evolve in the future, and currently unknown technologies may emerge to make tax evasion easier. Globalization and the associated factor mobility (especially capital mobility) may also mean that some forms of income are increasingly mobile and may more easily be masked.

Aside from obvious and not-so-obvious trends directly related to taxpayer compliance, there are political and cultural factors at play that may retard revenue collection. One of the foremost political factors is the presence of complicated tax laws, which can create supposed platforms of legal tax avoidance methods that sometimes morph into illegal tax evasion. Thus, there may be a decline in illegal tax evasion, but a corresponding increase in legal tax avoidance. The net impact of these trends on actual tax collections may well be offsetting. Relatedly, some current developments suggest noncompliance will remain a potential concern, such as the growth in partnerships and in self-


185. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1576 (2000) (“However, greater capital mobility and international tax competition allow investors to escape taxation easily by shifting capital to low- or no-tax jurisdictions.”); see also Arthur J. Cockfield, Big Data and Tax Haven Secrecy, 18 FLORIDA TAX REV. 483, 483 (2016) (“[P]olitical incentives persist that thwart cooperative efforts to inhibit global financial crimes.”).

186. See, e.g., Joel Slemrod, The Economics of Corporate Tax Selfishness, 57 Nat’l TAX J. 877, 884 (2004) (“To be sure, creative compliance is facilitated because the tax law is exceedingly complex and open to alternative interpretations, and this undoubtedly facilitates ethical rationalizations of positions taken.”).
employed “contractors;”\(^{187}\) in both cases, the absence of third-party information reporting leaves open the possibility that those trends that diminish tax evasion may be overwhelmed by countervailing trends.

Likewise, it is always possible that cultural concerns regarding the primacy of privacy, combined with fear of a powerful and intrusive government, will foil the IRS use of information storage, retrieval, and transmission upon which much of the success of a narrowing tax gap turns. The fact that so many people now seem so willing to share their most intimate information on social media platforms suggest that privacy concerns are not critical; however, it is always possible that, say, a massive breach of confidentiality that exposes many individuals to public shame could reverse these sentiments.

To reiterate, the trends working to diminish the tax gap are vibrant. Even so, there are variables—some known and others not—that may counterbalance these trends. The jury in the form of time will tell; vigilance and patience are in order.

CONCLUSION

Intentionally or unintentionally, some taxpayers pay less than they owe in tax and, as a result, the tax gap will thus remain a permanent fixture of the tax system. Indeed, the incentives to cheat on one’s taxes are strong and abiding. Even so, there are compelling reasons to believe that several trends exist that will likely have a powerful impact in curtailing the tax gap’s size. These forces include the growing use of electronic methods to finance economic transactions, which helps generate a traceable trail of commerce; the expanding presence of third-party compliance measures that take advantage of computer advances to monitor taxpayer economic activities; and the increasing concentration of economic activity in “large” business enterprises in which there is more direct and indirect tax compliance oversight.

While there are many potential known obstacles and other unknown factors that may impede the withering of the tax gap, these appear to be relatively weak compared to the strong economic and technological trends that suggest the tax gap will soon be narrowing. If this analysis is

correct, then this systemic change associated the gradual closure of the
tax gap has important public policy implications. These policy
implications should not be ignored or shelved. Instead, Congress and the
IRS can and should immediately act upon them.
APPENDIX

Figure 1:
Tax Gap and Voluntary Compliance Rate over Time

![Graph showing Tax Gap and Voluntary Compliance Rate over Time]

Figure 2:
Tax Gap Map, 2008-2010 Annual Average

![Tax Gap Map 2008-2010 Annual Average]

These data are drawn from various tax gap studies, primarily those listed on the IRS Tax Gap Website found at https://www.irs.gov/uac/irs-the-tax-gap [https://perma.cc/U9NB-FAXQ].