Advisedly has the "boycott"' been characterized as "a chameleon that is impossible of definition." Only the epithet "secondary boycott has perhaps occasioned more intricate judicial gymnastics. Justice Steinert, writing for the Washington Supreme Court, has recently observed with perspicacity that "the term 'secondary boycott' is of somewhat vague signification and has no precise and exclusive denotation." In the field of labor relations, as in other branches of the law, bench and bar have leaned on the comforting pillar of "lump concept" thinking which has more than once done yeoman's service for judicial reasoning and analysis. Truly has there been more than one black-robed Humpty Dumpty whose use of the phrase "secondary boycott" has meant "just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less."
Robert C. Barnard & Robert W. Graham,
Labor and the Secondary Boycott,
15 Wash. L. Rev. & St. B.J.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol15/iss3/2