An Antitrust Remedy for International Price Predation: Lessons from Zenith v. Matsushita

Authors

Harry First

Abstract

The purpose of this article is to articulate a set of rules for an antitrust cause of action against international predatory pricing. The article develops these rules in the context of the antitrust and trade litigation brought in the United States and Japan against the Japanese televisions manufacturers between 1956 and 1986. The thesis of this article is that the litigation illustrates that antitrust enforcement should concentrate on exclusion from the home market rather than on low prices in the target market. The article also argues that antitrust should encompass a concern with the strategic use of market power to protect rents, to capture spillover benefits in complementary industries, or to capture the current oligopoly profits of the targets of predation. The proposed cause of action requires proof of exclusion from the blocked home market and pricing below cost in the target market. Market opening injunctions and damages for private litigants are suggested as remedies.

First Page

211

Recommended Citation

Harry First, An Antitrust Remedy for International Price Predation: Lessons from Zenith v. Matsushita, 4 Pac. Rim L & Pol'y J. 211 (1995).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj/vol4/iss1/9