Washington Law Review
Abstract
Disclosure laws can serve many different purposes. This Article is the first to distinguish two of those purposes, which I call static and dynamic disclosures. In brief, static disclosures aim to improve consumers’ choice from among the set of products that are already available on the market. By contrast, dynamic disclosures aim to improve the range of products from which consumers must choose, by sharpening sellers’ incentives to improve the quality of their products. The Article also discusses the various ways in which the effects of static and dynamic disclosures might be measured and evaluated. In doing so, it examines and mildly criticizes the position recently advanced by Professors Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl Schneider, who argue (approximately) that disclosure almost never works, and that it should not even be considered as a policy option. While I agree with much else that Professors Ben-Shahar and Schneider say, their claim that disclosures almost never work is far too broad.
First Page
333
Recommended Citation
Richard Craswell,
Essay,
Static Versus Dynamic Disclosures, and How Not to Judge Their Success or Failure,
88 Wash. L. Rev.
333
(2013).
Available at:
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol88/iss2/3